769 Phil. 538
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
That on or about 4:50 in the rainy afternoon of July 30, 2006 at Plaridel St., Poblacion B. Camiling, Tarlac, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and with evident premeditation, that is, having conceived and deliberated to kill his own father Jose Guting y Ibarra, 67 years old, married, while inside their residential house, and armed with a bladed weapon, suddenly and unexpectedly stabbed several times the victim, employing means, manner and form in the execution thereof which tender directly and specially to insure its commission without danger to the person of said accused, the result of which attack was that said victim received multiple stab wounds on his body which directly caused his instantaneous death.When arraigned on September 19, 2006, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.[4] Thereafter, pre-trial and trial on the merits ensued.
WHEREFORE, accused Adrian Guting y Tomas is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Parricide punishable under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended and hereby sentences him to a penalty of Reclusion Perpetua.Accused-appellant appealed his conviction before the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 04596. The appellate court promulgated its Decision on May 23, 2012, decreeing thus:
Accused is likewise ordered to pay the heirs of the victim the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, another amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages, and still another amount of P30,000.00 as temperate damages.[10]
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Camiling, Tarlac, Branch 68 convicting herein accused-appellant Adrian Guting y Tomas for the crime of Parricide under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code is AFFIRMED.[11]Hence, accused-appellant comes before us via the instant appeal with the same assignment of errors he raised before the Court of Appeals, to wit:
We find no merit in accused-appellant's appeal.I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT ON THE BASIS OF HIS EXTRAJUDICIAL ADMISSION.II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT ON THE BASIS OF INSUFFICIENT CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.III
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE PROSECUTION'S FAILURE TO OVERTHROW THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE IN HIS FAVOR.[12]
SEC. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.The "investigation" in Section 12, paragraph 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution pertains to "custodial investigation." Custodial investigation commences when a person is taken into custody and is singled out as a suspect in the commission of a crime under investigation and the police officers begin to ask questions on the suspect's participation therein and which tend to elicit an admission.[14] As we expounded in People v. Marra[15]:
x x x x
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.[13]
Custodial investigation involves any questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. It is only after the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and begins to focus on a particular suspect, the suspect is taken into custody, and the police carries out a process of interrogations that lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements that the rule begins to operate. (Citation omitted.)Applying the foregoing definitions, accused-appellant was not under custodial investigation when he admitted, without assistance of counsel, to PO1 Torre and PO1 Macusi that he stabbed his father to death. Accused-appellant's verbal confession was so spontaneously and voluntarily given and was not elicited through questioning by the police authorities. It may be true that PO1 Macusi asked accused-appellant who killed his father, but PO1 Macusi only did so in response to accused-appellant's initial declaration that his father was already dead. At that point, PO1 Macusi still had no idea who actually committed the crime and did not consider accused-appellant as the suspect in his father's killing. Accused-appellant was also merely standing before PO1 Torre and PO1 Macusi in front of the Camiling Police Station and was not yet in police custody.
Under these circumstances, it cannot be successfully claimed that appellant's confession before the mayor is inadmissible. It is true that a municipal mayor has "operational supervision and control" over the local police and may arguably be- deemed a law enforcement officer for purposes of applying Section 12 (1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. However, appellant's confession to the mayor was not made in response to any interrogation by the latter. In fact, the mayor did not question appellant at all. No police authority ordered appellant to talk to the mayor. It was appellant himself who spontaneously, freely and voluntarily sought the mayor for a private meeting. The mayor did not know that appellant was going to confess his guilt to him. When appellant talked with the mayor as a confidant and not as a law enforcement officer, his uncounselled confession to him did not violate his constitutional rights. Thus, it has been held that the constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to a spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities, but given in an ordinary manner whereby appellant orally admitted having committed the crime. What the Constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts or confessions. The rights under Section 12 are guaranteed to preclude the slightest use of coercion by the state as would lead the accused to admit something false, not to prevent him from freely and voluntarily telling the truth. Hence, we hold that appellant's confession to the mayor was correctly admitted by the trial court.Moreover, accused-appellant's verbal confession that he stabbed his father to death made to PO1 Torre and PO1 Macusi, established through the testimonies of said police officers, falls under Rule 130, Section 26 of the Rules of Court, which provides that "[t]he act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him." This rule is based upon the notion that no man would make any declaration against himself, unless it is true.[18] Accused-appellant's declaration is admissible for being part of the res gestae. A declaration is deemed part of the res gestae and admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule when these three requisites concur: (1) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (2) the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (3) the statements concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances.[19] All the requisites are present in this case. Accused-appellant had just been through a startling and gruesome occurrence, that is, his father's death. Accused-appellant made the confession to PO1 Torre and PO1 Macusi only a few minutes after and while he was still under the influence of said startling occurrence, before he had the opportunity to concoct or contrive a story. In fact, accused-appellant seemed to still be in shock when he walked to the Police Station completely unmindful of the rain and the knife in his hand, and headed directly to PO1 Torre and PO1 Macusi, who were standing in front of the Police Station, to confess to stabbing his father to death. The police officers who immediately went to the house of Jose, accused-appellant's father, found Jose's lifeless body with blood still oozing from his stab wounds. As res gestae, accused-appellant's spontaneous statement is admissible in evidence against him.
SEC. 4. Circumstantial Evidence, when sufficient. - Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:The RTC, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, found that the aforequoted requisites have been satisfied in this case given the following circumstantial evidence:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all circumstances is such as to produce conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
1. On or about 4:50 o'clock in the afternoon of July 30, 2006, the victim was stabbed to death.These circumstances constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion that points to accused-appellant, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person.[21] The incriminating collage of facts against accused-appellant was created by circumstantial evidence anchored on the credible and unbiased testimony of the prosecution's witnesses. We will not disturb but shall accord the highest respect to the findings of the RTC on the issue of credibility of the witnesses and their testimonies, it having had the opportunity to observe their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial.[22]
2. Thirty minutes later, [accused-appellant] personally went to Camiling Police Station and surrendered himself and the bladed weapon he used in killing his father to the police authorities of the said police station.
3. When his mother learned about the incident, [accused-appellant] did nothing to appease his responding mother. "It has always been said that criminal case are primarily about human nature." Here is a case of a son doing nothing to explain the death of his father to his grieving mother. Such inaction is contrary to human nature.
4. When he was detained after police investigation, [accused-appellant] did not object to his continued detention.
Art. 246. Parricide. - Any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants, or descendants, or his spouse, shall be guilty of parricide and shall be punished by the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.Parricide is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the accused; and (3) the deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate other ascendant or other descendant, or the legitimate spouse of the accused. The key element in Parricide - other than the fact of killing - is the relationship of the offender to the victim.[23] All the elements are present in this case. Jose, the victim, was killed by accused-appellant, his own son. Accused-appellant's birth certificate, which was presented before the RTC, establishes that accused-appellant was the legitimate son of Jose and Flora.
The heirs are also entitled to damages for the loss of earning capacity of the deceased Francisco Gealon. The fact that the prosecution did not present documentary evidence to support its claim for damages for loss of earning capacity of the deceased does not preclude recovery of said damages. The testimony of the victim's wife, Delia Gealon, as to the earning capacity of her husband Francisco Gealon sufficiently establishes the basis for making such an award. It was established that Francisco Gealon was 48 years old at the time of his death in 1991. His average income was P200.00 a day. Hence, in accordance with the American Expectancy Table of Mortality adopted in several cases decided by this Court, the loss of his earning capacity is to be calculated as follows:
Net earning capacity (x)
=
life expectancy
x
Gross annual income
-
less living expenses (50% of gross annual income)
x
=
2(80-48)
3
x
[73,000.00 -36,500.00]
=
21.33
x
36,500.00
=
P778,545.00
(Citations omitted.)
Finally, in conformity with current policy, we impose interest on all monetary awards for damages at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.
Net earning capacity (x) = life expectancy x Gross annual income - less living expenses (50% of gross annual income) x= 2(80-67) x [73,000.00-36,500.00] 3 = 8.67 x 36,500.00 = P316,455.00