861 Phil. 167
PER CURIAM:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, we respectfully recommend for the consideration of the Honorable Court that:1. The motion to dismiss filed by respondent Judge's counsel, Atty. Teristram B. Zoleta, be DENIED for lack of merit; and
2. Judge Godofredo B. Abul, Jr., Branch 4, Regional Trial Court, Butuan City, Agusan del Norte, be ADJUDGED GUILTY of grave misconduct constituting violations of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary and FINED in the amount of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php500,000.00), to be deducted from his retirement gratuity.RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.[14]
It has been settled that the death of a respondent does not preclude a finding of administrative liability. However, it may necessitate the dismissal of the case upon a consideration of the following factors: first, if the respondent's right to due process was not observed; second, the presence of exceptional circumstances in the case on the grounds equitable and humanitarian reasons; and third, the kind of penalty imposed.The OCA found that the allegations against Judge Abul had been confirmed and validated by Judge Abul himself and by the court records; that the affidavits of Reyes and Montilla had appeared to be credible in light of Judge Abul's inability to impute any ill-motive, malice or bad faith to the accusers; and that based on the results of the investigation Judge Abul had violated Canon 2, Canon 3 and Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary in a manner that amounted to grave misconduct.[16]
In this case, none of the foregoing factors exists. First, respondent Judge's right to due process was not violated. As borne by the records, he was duly informed of the accusations against him, having been furnished with a copy of the letter-complaint of Fr. Saniel and its attached affidavits, as well as a copy of the investigation report of Atty. Garcia. In fact, he filed his comment thereon, which the Court received on 19 April. 2017. Second, his death alone is insufficient to justify the dismissal of the case on the ground of equitable or humanitarian consideration. A case was ordered dismissed by the Court by reason of the respondent's death for equitable and humanitarian considerations as the liability was incurred by reason of respondent's poor health. In this case, there was no circumstance other than respondent Judge's death that may warrant the invocation of equitable or humanitarian ground in his favor. Third, the penalty of fine may still be imposed notwithstanding his death. In fact, in one case, the respondent who died before the investigating judge was able to finish and submit his report but was duly notified of the proceedings against him and was directed to file his answer, although he opted not to comply therewith, was still meted the penalty of forfeiture of his retirement benefits, except his accrued leave credits, after having been found guilty of grave misconduct.[15]
Going into the merits of the case, it may be true that some of the statements made by Reyes and Montilla in their respective affidavits and before Atty. Garcia were not necessarily based on their own personal knowledge since they were just mostly conveyed to them by Naomi. Nonetheless, these statements cannot simply be brushed aside as hearsay and, therefore, inadmissible in evidence against respondent Judge. It bears stressing that some of these statements were confirmed and validated by respondent Judge himself and by the records of Criminal Case No. 15630.The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of every whiff of impropriety not only in regard to his discharge of judicial duties, but also to his behavior outside his office and even as a private individual.[18] Indeed, judges should be extra prudent in associating with litigants and counsel who have matters pending before them in order to avoid even the mere perception of possible bias or partiality. They should be scrupulously careful with respect to pending or prospective litigations before them to avoid anything that may tend to awaken the suspicion that their personal, social or sundry relations could influence their objectivity, for not only must they possess proficiency in law but they must also act and behave in such manner that would assure litigants and their counsel, with great comfort, of the judges' competence, integrity and independence.[19]
First, Reyes and Montilla claimed that respondent Judge went to the Agusan del Norte Provincial Jail on 4 or 5 February 2015, and this was admitted by respondent Judge, although he denied talking with them since his supposed purpose in going there was merely to ask its Officer-In-Charge, Mr. Antenorio, whether prisoners are allowed to leave the jail premises without the court's authority in light of the complaint-affidavits of Reyes and Montilla against him that were executed before Atty. Puculan on 13 January 2015. However, the positive assertion by Reyes and Montilla that he personally talked with them inside the Provincial Warden's office is more credible than his bare denial. Notably, Montilla claimed that it was Mr. Antenorio who convinced them to talk with respondent Judge. If, indeed, he did not purposely talk with Reyes and Montilla, he could have easily obtained an affidavit or statement from Mr. Antenorio to refute such allegation, but he conveniently failed to do so.
Second, the allegation of Reyes that Naomi told her and Montilla that the drugs case against her (Naomi's) husband and his co-accused was dismissed by respondent Judge on 24 November 2014, as well as the allegation of Montilla that Naomi went to the Provincial Jail sometime in November 2014 to fetch her husband and relatives after they were acquitted by respondent Judge, are not without factual basis. As borne by the records of Criminal Case No. 15630, the Decision acquitting the accused in said case was promulgated on 24 November 2014 without the presence of all the accused, even if such presence is required under Section 6, Rule 120 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, thereby making it necessary for Naomi to fetch her husband and his co-accused from the Provincial Jail. The consistency between the statements of Reyes and Montilla and the circumstances of said case, as borne by the records, makes the allegations of Reyes and Montilla credible.
It bears stressing that respondent Judge was furnished with a copy of the Investigation Report dated 10 February 2017 of Atty. Garcia, where said statements and circumstances of the subject criminal case were clearly outlined. It was also stated therein that Reyes claimed that Naomi told her that her husband and his co-accused obtained a favorable decision after paying respondent Judge the amount of Php 250,000.00. Atty. Garcia characterized the proceedings in the same criminal case as a "patent irregularity" since respondent Judge "decided it with undue haste and without due regard to the procedural rules, resulting in the questionable acquittal of all the accused" However, despite the gravity of the irregularity imputed to him and despite being required to comment thereon, respondent Judge offered not a single word to refute the findings and observations of Atty. Garcia, thereby giving the impression that respondent Judge has admitted such findings and observations.
The foregoing circumstances render the allegations of Reyes and Montilla not only admissible in evidence but also convincing, especially so that respondent Judge failed to offer any plausible imputation of ill motive, malice or bad faith on their part to make any false accusation against him. Montilla claims that she negotiated with respondent Judge over the phone regarding the amount he was asking in exchange for the dismissal of her case in the presence of Reyes and Naomi. Reyes corroborated Montilla's statement, having overheard the conversation between respondent Judge and Montilla as the phone was set on speaker mode. Montilla further claims that during the scheduled hearing of her case on 5 December 2014, respondent Judge called her to the lawyer's table, and admonished her for asking that the Php 200,000.00 she was supposed to pay him be reduced even if the affidavit she executed showed that she is guilty.[17]
Integrity is essential not only to the proper discharge of the judicial office but also to the personal demeanor of judges.
SECTION 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable observer.As regards the acquittal of the accused in Criminal Case No. 15630, the Court agrees with and adopts the following relevant findings thereon by the OCA, to wit:
SECTION 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the people's faith in the integrity of the judiciary. Justice must not merely be done but must also be seen to be done.
x x x xCANON 3
Impartiality
Impartiality is essential to the proper discharge of the judicial office. It applies not only to the decision itself but also to the process by which the decision to made.
SECTION 1. Judges shall perform their judicial duties without favor, bias or prejudice.
SECTION 2. Judges shall ensure that his or her conduct, both in and out of court, maintains and enhances the confidence of the public, the legal profession and litigants in the impartiality of the judge and of the judiciary.
SECTION 3. Judges shall, so far as is reasonable, so conduct themselves as to minimize the occasions on which it will be necessary for them to be disqualified from hearing or deciding cases.
x x x xCANON 4
Propriety
Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the activities of a judge.
SECTION 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.
x x x x
While there was no direct evidence that respondent Judge was paid Php 250,000.00 in consideration for the acquittal of all the accused in Criminal Case No. 15630, the highly questionable circumstances surrounding their acquittal on reasonable doubt give credence to the allegation of corruption against him. The decision was premature and grossly unprocedural, the same being in violation of Section 5, Rule 30 of the Rules of Court. Notably, he allowed the accused to manipulate the proceedings when he unduly acted favorably on their memorandum praying for their acquittal despite the vehement opposition thereto of the prosecution, correctly pointing out that the same could not be treated as demurrer to evidence having been filed out of time. Worse, without considering the merits of the prosecution's opposition to the memorandum despite its legal and logical soundness, he submitted the case for decision by merely stating in his order that "the defense has filed a memorandum indicating that they (sic) are submitting the case for decision based on prosecution's evidence and the prosecution has submitted its comment." With extraordinary and undue speed, he penned the decision on the same day that the case was submitted for decision, and he promulgated the decision without the presence of the accused in violation of Section 6, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.Plainly enough, Judge Abul's actuations and behavior constituted grave misconduct. It is settled that grave misconduct exists where the requisites of corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of established rule are present. As an element of grave misconduct, corruption consists in the act of an official or fiduciary person who unlawfully and wrongfully uses his station or character to procure some benefit for himself or for another person, contrary to duty and the rights of others.[20]
Procedural due process is canonically a part of this provision. Due process has no controlling and precise definition but is generally premised on the idea of fairness or "freedom from arbitrariness."[8] It is considered to be "the embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play."[9] In Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila:[10]ARTICLE III
Bill of Rights
SECTION 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
There is no controlling and precise definition of due process. It furnishes though a standard to which governmental action should conform in order that deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each appropriate case, be valid. What then is the standard of due process which must exist both as a procedural and as substantive requisite to free the challenged ordinance, or any government action for that matter, from the imputation of legal infirmity; sufficient to spell its doom? It is responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice. Negatively put, arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness avoided. To satisfy the due process requirement, official action, to paraphrase Cardozo, must not outrun the bounds of reasons and result in sheer oppression. Due process is thus hostile to any official action marred by lack of reasonableness. Correctly has it been identified as freedom from arbitrariness. It is the embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play. It exacts fealty "to those strivings for justice" and judges the act of officialdom of whatever branch" in the light of reason drawn from considerations of fairness that reflect [democratic] traditions of legal and political thought." It is not a narrow or "technical conception with fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances," decisions based on such a clause requiring a "close and perceptive inquiry into fundamental principles of our society." Questions of due process are not to be treated narrowly or pedantically in slavery to form or phrases.[11]Due process encompasses both procedural and substantive due process. Procedural due process "concerns itself with government action adhering to the established process when it makes an intrusion into the private sphere."[12] In his opinion in Perez v. Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Company.,[13] now-retired Associate Justice Arturo Brion traced the history of procedural due process:
At its most basic, procedural due process is about fairness in the mode of procedure to be followed. It is not a novel concept, but one that traces its roots in the common law principle of natural justice.In Medenilla v. Civil Service Commission[15] procedural due process has been summarized as:
Natural justice connotes the requirement that administrative tribunals, when reaching a decision, must do so with procedural fairness. If they err, the superior courts will step in to quash the decision by certiorari or prevent the error by a writ of prohibition. The requirement was initially applied in a purely judicial context, but was subsequently extended to executive regulatory fact-finding, as the administrative powers of the English justices of the peace were transferred to administrative bodies that were required to adopt some of the procedures reminiscent of those used in a courtroom. Natural justice was comprised of two main sub-rules: audi alteram partem — that a person must know the case against him and be given an opportunity to answer it; and nemo judex in sua cause debe esse — the rule against bias. Still much later, the natural justice principle gave rise to the duty to be fair to cover governmental decisions which cannot be characterized as judicial or quasi-judicial in nature.
While the audi alteram partem rule provided for the right to be notified of the case against him, the right to bring evidence, and to make argument — whether in the traditional judicial or the administrative setting — common law maintained a distinction between the two settings. "An administrative tribunal had a duty to act in good faith and to listen fairly to both sides, but not to treat the question as if it were a trial. There would be no need to examine under oath, nor even to examine witnesses at all. Any other procedure could be utilized which would obtain the information required, as long as the parties had an opportunity to know and to contradict anything which might be prejudicial to their case."[14]
. . . the right of the person affected thereby to be present before the tribunal which pronounces judgment upon the question of life, liberty, and property in its most comprehensive sense; to be heard, by testimony or otherwise, and to have the right of controverting, by proof, every material fact which bears on the question of the right in the matter involved.[16]In this jurisdiction, Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations[17] states the seven (7) cardinal primary rights in "trials and investigations of an administrative character"[18] for due process to be satisfied:
(1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. In the language of Chief Justice Hughes, in Morgan v. U.S., . . ., "the liberty and property of the citizen shall be protected by the rudimentary requirements of fair play."In Gas Corporation of the Philippines v. Inciong,[20] this Court clarified that while Ang Tibay remains to be good law, the failure to strictly apply the formalities of an adversarial proceeding before an administrative tribunal does not necessarily result in a denial of due process:
(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented. In the language of this court in Edwards vs. McCoy, . . ., "the right to adduce evidence, without the corresponding duty on the part of the board to consider it, is vain. Such right is conspicuously futile if the person or persons to whom the evidence is presented can thrust it aside without notice or consideration."
(3) "While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its decision. A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached." This principle emanates from the more fundamental principle that the genius of constitutional government is contrary to the vesting of unlimited power anywhere. Law is both a grant and a limitation upon power.
(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion, but the evidence must be "substantial." "Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." . . . The statute provides that 'the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be controlling.' The obvious purpose of this and similar provisions is to free administrative boards from the compulsion of technical rules so that the mere admission of matter which would be deemed incompetent in judicial proceedings would not invalidate the administrative order. But this assurance of a desirable flexibility in administrative procedure does not go so far as to justify orders without a basis in evidence having rational probative force. Mere uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not constitute substantial evidence.
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected. Only by confining the administrative tribunal to the evidence disclosed to the parties, can the latter be protected in their right to know and meet the case against them. It should not, however, detract from their duty actively to see that the law is enforced, and for that purpose, to use the authorized legal methods of securing evidence and informing itself of facts material and relevant to the controversy....
(6) [The tribunal or officer], therefore, must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. . . .
(7) [The tribunal or officer] should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.[19] (Citations omitted)
The vigor with which counsel for petitioner pressed the claim that there was a denial of procedural due process is inversely proportional to the merit of this certiorari and prohibition suit as is quite evident from the Comment of the office of the Solicitor General. It is undoubted that the due process mandate must be satisfied by an administrative tribunal or agency. So it was announced by Justice Laurel in the landmark case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations. That is still good law. It follows, therefore, that if procedural due process were in fact denied, then this petition must prosper. It is equally well-settled, however, that the standard of due process that must be met in proceedings before administrative tribunals allows a certain latitude as long as the element of fairness is not ignored. So the following recent cases have uniformly held: Maglasang v. Ople, Nation Multi Service Labor Union v. Agcaoili, Jacqueline Industries v. National Labor Relations Commission, Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions v. Bureau of Labor Relations, Philippine Labor Alliance Council v. Bureau of Labor Relations, and Montemayor v. Araneta University Foundation. From the Comment of the office of the Solicitor General, it is quite clear that no imputation of arbitrariness can be justified. The opportunity to present its side of the case was given both parties to the controversy. If, for reasons best known to itself, petitioner did not avail of its right to do so, then it has only itself to blame. No constitutional infirmity could then be imputed to the proceeding before the labor arbiter.[21] (Citations omitted)Thus, due process in administrative proceedings generally does not require that the respondent must be heard. It merely requires that the respondent is given the opportunity to be heard.[22] This opportunity to be heard, however, is not lost even after a judgment is rendered. Due process in administrative proceedings requires that the respondent still be given the opportunity to question the unfavorable judgment.
In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to explain one's side. One may be heard, not solely by verbal presentation but also, and perhaps even much more creditably as it is more practicable than oral arguments, through pleadings. An actual hearing is not always an indispensable aspect of due process. As long as a party was given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he cannot be said to have been denied due process of law, for this opportunity to be heard is the very essence of due process. Moreover, this constitutional mandate is deemed satisfied if a person is granted an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.[24] (Emphasis supplied)The opportunity to be heard should be present in all aspects of the procedure until the finality of the judgment, decision, or resolution. It is not a mere formality but an intrinsic and substantial part of the constitutional right to due process. This is what inspires the Revised Penal Code provision that dismisses a case against an accused for any crime when he or she dies.[25]
Resignation requires intent. It is a voluntary cessation from public office. Sometimes, however, respondents in disciplinary proceedings opt to resign to avoid being forcibly dismissed from service. Thus, this Court has stated that resignation "should be used neither as an escape nor as an easy way out to evade administrative liability by a court personnel facing administrative sanction."[28][T]o constitute a complete and operative resignation of public office, there must be an intention to relinquish a part of the term, accompanied by the act of relinquishment . . . and a resignation implies an expression by the incumbent in some form, express or implied of the intention to surrender, renounce, or relinquish, the office, and an acceptance by competent and lawful authority.[27]
Petitioner argues that a government employee who has been separated from service, whether by voluntary resignation or by operation of law, can no longer be administratively charged. Such argument is devoid of merit.
In Office of the Court Administrator v. Juan, this Court categorically ruled that the precipitate resignation of a government employee charged with an offense punishable by dismissal from the service does not render moot the administrative case against him. Resignation is not a way out to evade administrative liability when facing administrative sanction. The resignation of a public servant does not preclude the finding of any administrative liability to which he or she shall still be answerable.Likewise, in Baquerfo v. Sanchez:[31]
A case becomes moot and academic only when there is no more actual controversy between the parties or no useful purpose can be served in passing upon the merits of the case. The instant case is not moot and academic, despite the petitioner's separation from government service. Even if the most severe of administrative sanctions — that of separation from service — may no longer be imposed on the petitioner, there are other penalties which may be imposed on her if she is later found guilty of administrative offenses charged against her, namely, the disqualification to hold any government office and the forfeiture of benefits.
Moreover, this Court views with suspicion the precipitate act of a government employee in effecting his or her separation from service, soon after an administrative case has been initiated against him or her. An employee's act of tendering his or her resignation immediately after the discovery of the anomalous transaction is indicative of his or her guilt as flight in criminal cases.[30]
Cessation from office of respondent by resignation or retirement neither warrants the dismissal of the administrative complaint filed against him while he was still in the service nor does it render said administrative case moot and academic. The jurisdiction that was this Court's at the time of the filing of the administrative complaint was not lost by the mere fact that the respondent public official had ceased in office during the pendency of his case. Respondent's resignation does not preclude the finding of any administrative liability to which he shall still be answerable.[32]Retirement, meanwhile, may be optional or compulsory. Optional retirement for government employees may be availed after 20 to 30 year's of service, regardless of age.[33] Judges and justices may also opt to retire upon reaching 60 years old as long as they have rendered 15 years of service in the judiciary.[34] Optional retirement, like resignation, is a voluntary cessation from public office. Thus, the same rationale is applied to those who avail of optional retirement during the pendency of an administrative case. In Aquino, Jr. v. Miranda:[35]
A public servant whose career is on the line would normally want the investigating body to know his or her whereabouts for purposes of notice. The timing of respondent's application for leave, for optional retirement, and her sudden unexplained disappearance, taken together, leads us to conclude that hers is not a mere case of negligence. Respondent's acts reveal a calculated design to evade or derail the investigation against her. Her silence at the least serves as a tacit waiver of her opportunity to refute the charges made against her.In Office of the Court Administrator v. Ruiz:[37]
Neither respondent's disappearance nor her retirement precludes the Court from holding her liable. Her disappearance constitutes a waiver of her right to present evidence in her behalf. The Court is not ousted of its jurisdiction over an administrative case by the mere fact that the respondent public official ceases to hold office during the pendency of respondent's case.[36]
The records show that the respondent wrote the Court a letter on May 27, 2013 (or soon after his Sandiganbayan convictions), requesting that he "be allowed to optionally retire effective November 30, 2013." He later requested, in another letter, that the effectivity date of his optional retirement be changed from November 30, 2013 to December 31, 2013.In Re: Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in the RTC, Branch 4, Dolores, Eastern Samar:[39]
The Court has not acted on the respondent's request for optional early retirement in view of his standing criminal convictions; he stands to suffer accessory penalties affecting his qualification to retire from office should his convictions stand. The OCA records also show that he is currently on "on leave of absence" status. In any case, that a judge has retired or has otherwise been separated from the service does not necessarily divest the Court of its jurisdiction to rule on complaints filed while he was still in the service.[38] (Citations omitted)
Judge Bugtas contended that the Court lacked jurisdiction over the instant case because of the approval of his optional retirement effective 31 January 2006. This is unacceptable. In Concerned Trial Lawyers of Manila v. Veneracion, the Court held that cessation from office because of retirement does not render the administrative case moot or warrant its dismissal[.][40]Respondents in an administrative case could apply for optional retirement to evade liability. Thus, optional retirement during the pendency of an administrative case, like resignation, will not render the case moot.
[T]he petition for dismissal must be granted. There is no need to inquire further into the charge imputed to respondent Judge that his actuation in this particular case failed to satisfy the due process requirement. As an administrative proceeding is predicated on the holding of an office or position in the Government and there being no doubt as to the resignation of respondent Judge having been accepted as of August 31, 1967, there is nothing to stand in the way of the dismissal prayed for.[45]In Abiera, however, this Court clarified that Quintillan was not meant to be a precedent to immediately dismiss complaints against judges who resigned or retired while the administrative cases were pending:
It was not the intent of the Court in the case of Quintillan to set down a hard and fast rule that the resignation or retirement of a respondent judge as the case may be renders (sic) moot and academic the administrative case pending against him; nor did the Court mean to divest itself of jurisdiction to impose certain penalties short of dismissal from the government service should there be a finding of guilt on the basis of the evidence. In other words, the jurisdiction that was Ours at the time of the filing of the administrative complaint was not lost by the mere fact that the respondent public official had ceased to be in office during the pendency of his case. The Court retains its jurisdiction either to pronounce the respondent official innocent of the charges or declare him guilty thereof. A contrary rule would be fraught with injustices and pregnant with dreadful and dangerous implications. For what remedy would the people have against a judge or any other public official who resorts to wrongful and illegal conduct during his last days in office? What would prevent some corrupt and unscrupulous magistrate from committing abuses and other condemnable acts knowing fully well that he would soon be beyond the pale of the law and immune to all administrative penalties? If only for reasons of public policy, this Court must assert and maintain its jurisdiction over members of the judiciary and other officials under its supervision and control for acts performed in office which are inimical to the service and prejudicial to the interests of litigants and the general public. If innocent, respondent official merits vindication of his name and integrity as he leaves the government which he served well and faithfully, if guilty, he deserves to receive the corresponding censure and a penalty proper and imposable under the situation.[46] (Emphasis supplied)This Court, thus, established that:
In short, the cessation from office of a respondent Judge either because of resignation, retirement or some other similar cause does not per se warrant the dismissal of an administrative complaint which was filed against him while still in the service. Each case is to be resolved in the context of the circumstances present thereat.[47]As this doctrine developed, this Court has interpreted "some other similar cause" to include death. Death, however, cannot be placed on the same footing as resignation or retirement. Resignation and optional retirement are voluntary modes of cessation. The respondent may avail of them as a way to escape or evade liability. This Court, therefore, should not be ousted of its jurisdiction to continue with the administrative complaint even if the resignation is accepted or the application for retirement is approved.
A contrary rule would be fraught with injustices and pregnant with dreadful and dangerous implications. For what remedy would the people have against a judge or any other public official who resorts to wrongful and illegal conduct during his last days in office? What would prevent some corrupt and unscrupulous magistrate from committing abuses and other condemnable acts knowing fully well that he would soon be beyond the pale of the law and immune to all administrative penalties? If only for reasons of public policy, this Court must assert and maintain its jurisdiction over members of the judiciary and other officials under its supervision and control for acts performed in office which are inimical to the service and prejudicial to the interests of litigants and the general public.[48] (Emphasis supplied)In formulating the doctrine, this Court was trying to guard against corrupt and unscrupulous magistrates who would commit abuses knowing fully well that after retirement, they could no longer be punished.
SECTION 46. Classification of Offenses. — Administrative offenses with corresponding penalties are classified into grave, less grave or light, depending on their gravity or depravity and effects on the government service.When a civil servant commits the most deplorable of crimes against the Republic and the Filipino people, it is in the public interest to remove him or her from public service, so that this person can no longer pollute the ranks of civil service and diminish the public's confidence in its government institutions. In City Mayor of Zamboanga v. Court of Appeals,[50] this Court meted out the penalty of dismissal on a city veterinarian found guilty of grave misconduct by the Civil Service Commission, instead of reinstatement with full backwages as previously declared by the Court of Appeals. It explained:
A. The following grave offenses shall be punishable by dismissal from the service:
- Serious Dishonesty;
- Gross Neglect of Duty;
- Grave Misconduct;
- Being Notoriously Undesirable;
- Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude;
- Falsification of official document;
- Physical or mental incapacity or disability due to immoral or vicious habits;
- Receiving for personal use of a fee, gift or other valuable thing in the course of official duties or in connection therewith when such fee, gift or other valuable thing is given by any person in the hope or expectation of receiving a favor or better treatment than that accorded to other persons, or committing acts punishable under the anti-graft laws;
- Contracting loans of money or other property from persons with whom the office of the employee has business relations;
- Soliciting or accepting directly or indirectly, any gift, gratuity, favor, entertainment, loan or anything of monetary value which in the course of his/her official duties or in connection with any operation being regulated by, or any transaction which may be affected by the functions of his/her office. The propriety or impropriety of the foregoing shall be determined by its value, kinship, or relationship between giver and receiver and the motivation. A thing of monetary value is one which is evidently or manifestly excessive by its very nature;
- Nepotism; and
- Disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines and to the Filipino people.
Indeed, to reinstate private respondent to his former position with full backwages would make a mockery of the fundamental rule that a public office is a public trust and would render futile the constitutional dictates on the promotion of morale, efficiency, integrity, responsiveness, progressiveness and courtesy in the government service. Likewise, reinstatement would place private respondent in such a position where the persons whom he is supposed to lead have already lost their respect for him and where his tarnished reputation would continue to hound him.[51]Members of the judiciary are held to an even higher standard. In Astillazo v. Jamlid:[52]
The Court has said time and time again that the conduct and behavior of everyone connected with an office charged with the administration and disposition of justice — from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk — should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility as to let them be free from any suspicion that may taint the well-guarded image of the judiciary. It has always been emphasized that the conduct of judges and court personnel must not only be characterized by propriety and decorum at all times, but must also be above suspicion. Verily, the image of a court of justice is necessarily mirrored in the conduct, official or otherwise, of the men and women, from the judge to the least and lowest of its personnel, hence, it becomes the imperative sacred duty of each and everyone in the court to maintain its good name and standing as a true temple of justice. Thus, every employee of the court should be an exemplar of integrity, uprightness, and honesty.[53] (Citations omitted)A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC[54] provides that justices and judges found guilty of serious charges, or the worst possible offenses that may be committed, are sanctioned with the following penalties:
SECTION 11. Sanctions. — A. If the respondent is guilty of a serious charge, any of the following sanctions may be imposed:For the first two (2) sanctions to be satisfied, they require the respondent judge or justice to still be in public service.
1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations. Provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits;
2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months; or
3. A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.
Respondent Escalona had already resigned from the service. His resignation, however, does not render this case moot, nor does it free him from liability. In fact, the Court views respondent Escalona's resignation before the investigation as indication of his guilt, in the same way that flight by an accused in a criminal case is indicative of guilt. In short, his resignation will not be a way out of the administrative liability he incurred while in the active service. While we can no longer dismiss him, we can still impose a penalty sufficiently commensurate with the offense he committed.In its ponencia, the majority merely reiterates Gonzales as basis for continuing with the case against respondent, who had died before the judgment was rendered.[58] What Gonzales failed to explain, however, was that in Loyao, Jr. v. Caube,[59] while this Court asserted its jurisdiction despite the respondent's death, it also conceded that the penalty could no longer be served. Thus, this Court was constrained to actually dismiss the case and consider it closed and terminated:
We treat respondent Superada no differently. While his death intervened after the completion of the investigation, it has been settled that the Court is not ousted of its jurisdiction over an administrative matter by the mere fact that the respondent public official ceases to hold office during the pendency of the respondent's case; jurisdiction once acquired, continues to exist until the final resolution of the case. In Loyao, Jr. v. Caube, we held that the death of the respondent in an administrative case does not preclude a finding of administrative liability[.][57] (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
To be sure, respondent Caube's death has permanently foreclosed the prosecution of any other actions, be it criminal or civil, against him for his malfeasance in office. We are, however, not precluded from imposing the appropriate administrative sanctions against him. Respondent's misconduct is so grave as to merit his dismissal from the service, were it not for his untimely demise during the pendency of these proceedings. However, since the penalty can no longer be carried out, this case is now declared closed and terminated.[60]Indeed, if the respondent could no longer be removed from the Bench, the full effect of the penalty can no longer be carried out. Even this Court in Gonzales found that the respondent's liability must be tempered "with compassion in light of his untimely demise"[61] and limited the imposable penalty to a P10,000.00 fine.
The Court agrees that the challenged orders of the Civil Service Commission should be upheld, and not merely upon compassionate grounds, but simply because there is no fair and feasible alternative in the circumstances. To be sure, if the deceased employees were still alive, it would at least be arguable, positing the primacy of this Court's final dispositions, that the issue of payment of their back salaries should properly await the outcome of the disciplinary proceedings referred to in the Second Division's Resolution of July 4, 1988.Even the doctrine in Gonzales was not without exceptions. There, this Court held that when the respondent dies while the disciplinary case was pending, the presence of any of the following circumstances is enough to warrant the dismissal of the case against him or her: "first, the observance of respondent's right to due process; second, the presence of exceptional circumstances in the case on the grounds of equitable and humanitarian reasons; and third, it may also depend on the kind of penalty imposed."[64]
Death, however, has already sealed that outcome, foreclosing the initiation of disciplinary administrative proceedings, or the continuation of any then pending, against the deceased employees. Whatever may be said of the binding force of the Resolution of July 4, 1988 so far as, to all intents and purposes, it makes exoneration in the administrative proceedings a condition precedent to payment of back salaries, it cannot exact an impossible performance or decree a useless exercise. Even in the case of crimes, the death of the offender extinguishes criminal liability, not only as to the personal, but also as to the pecuniary, penalties if it occurs before final judgment. In this context, the subsequent disciplinary proceedings, even if not assailable on grounds of due process, would be an inutile, empty procedure in so far as the deceased employees are concerned; they could not possibly be bound by any substantiation in said proceedings of the original charges: irregularities in the canvass of supplies and materials. The questioned orders of the Civil Service Commission merely recognized the impossibility of complying with the Resolution of July 4, 1988 and the legal futility of attempting a post-mortem investigation of the character contemplated.[63] (Emphasis supplied)
[W]e . . . cannot just gloss over the fact that he was remiss in attending to the needs of his children of his first marriage — children whose filiation he did not deny. He neglected them and refused to support them until they came up with this administrative charge. For such conduct, this Court would have imposed a penalty. But in view of his death prior to the promulgation of this Decision, dismissal of the case is now in order.[69]In Re: Judicial Audit Conducted in the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Tambulig and the 11th Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Mahayag-Dumingag-Josefina, both in Zamboanga del Sur,[70] Judge Ricardo Salvanera was able to submit his explanation but died before this Court could rule on his case. Thus, despite finding him guilty of gross inefficiency and gross ignorance of the law, this Court was constrained to dismiss the case and release his retirement benefits to his heirs.
SEC. 11. Sanctions. -A. If the respondent is guilty of a serious charge, any of the following sanctions may be imposed:The second sanction can no longer be imposed since Judge Abul already passed away (although he was preventively suspended), while the third sanction appears to be too mild a penalty and not commensurate with the offense. Presumably recommending the first sanction and considering the gravity of his offense and his intervening death, the OCA recommended that Judge Abul be fined in the amount of PhP 500,000.00 to be deducted from his retirement gratuity. However, the ponente went further and ordered the forfeiture of all of Judge Abul's benefits, excluding accrued leaves, even after his death.
1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations. Provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits;
2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months; or
3. A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.[5]
Article 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. –Criminal liability is totally extinguished:Based on the aforementioned provision, the death of the accused extinguishes the criminal liability. Meanwhile, the pecuniary penalties will only be extinguished if the accused dies before final judgment is rendered. If this is the standard for criminal cases wherein the quantum of proof is proof beyond reasonable doubt, then a lower standard for administrative proceedings such as the case at bar should be followed, even if the quantum of proof therein is substantial evidence.[6]
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment[.]
SEC. 2. In case a Justice of the Supreme Court or Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan or of the Court of Tax Appeals, or a Judge of the regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court in cities, municipal trial court, municipal circuit trial court, shari'a district court, shari'a circuit court, or any other court hereafter established, dies while in actual service, regardless of his/her age and length of service as required in Section 1 hereof, his/her heirs shall receive a lump sum of five (5) years' gratuity computed on the basis of the highest monthly salary plus the highest monthly aggregate of transportation, representation and other allowances such as personal economic relief allowance (PERA) and additional compensation allowance received by him/her as such Justice or Judge: Provided, however, That where the deceased Justice or Judge has rendered at least fifteen (15) years either in the Judiciary or in any other branch of Government, or both, his/her heirs shall instead be entitled to a lump sum often (10) years gratuity computed on the same basis as indicated in this provision: Provided, further, That the lump sum often (10) years gratuity shall be received by the heirs of the Justice or the Judge who was killed because of his/her work as such: Provided, That the Justice or Judge has served in Government for at least five (5) years regardless of age at the time of death. When a Justice or Judge is killed intentionally while in service, the presumption is that the death is work-related.In line with this, according to A.M. No. 17-08-01-SC, in case of permanent disability due to death while in actual service, a judge is entitled to the following benefits:
SEC. 3. Upon retirement, a Justice of the Supreme Court or of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan or of the Court of Tax Appeals, or a Judge of the regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court in cities, municipal trial court, municipal circuit trial court, shari'a district court, shari'a circuit court, or any other court hereafter established shall be automatically entitled to a lump sum of five (5) years' gratuity computed on the basis of the highest monthly salary plus the highest monthly aggregate of transportation, representation and other allowances such as personal economic relief allowance (PERA) and additional compensation allowance he/she was receiving on the date of his/her retirement and thereafter upon survival after the expiration of five (5) years, to further annuity payable monthly during the residue of his/her natural life pursuant to Section 1 hereof: Provided, however, That if the reason for the retirement be any permanent disability contracted during his/her incumbency in office and prior to the date of retirement, he/she shall receive a gratuity equivalent to ten (10) years' salary and the allowances aforementioned: Provided, further, That should the retirement under Section 1(a) hereof be with the attendance of any partial permanent disability contracted during his/her incumbency and prior to the date of retirement, he/she, shall receive an additional gratuity equivalent to two (2) years lump sum that he/she is entitled to under this Act: Provided, furthermore, That if he/she survives after ten (10) years or seven (7) years, as the case may be, he/she shall continue to receive a monthly annuity as computed under this Act during the residue of his/her natural life pursuant to Section 1 hereof: Provided, finally, That those who have retired with the attendance of any partial permanent disability five (5) years prior to the effectivity of this Act shall be entitled to the same benefits provided herein.
Upon the death of a Justice or Judge of any court in the Judiciary, if such Justice or Judge has retired, or was eligible to retire optionally at the time of death, the surviving legitimate spouse shall be entitled to receive all the retirement benefits that the deceased Justice or Judge would have received had the Justice or Judge not died. The surviving spouse shall continue to receive such retirement benefits until the surviving spouse's death or remarriage.
SEC. 3-A. All pension benefits of retired members of the Judiciary shall be automatically increased whenever there is an increase in the salary of the same position from which he/she retired.
B.1 Where government service is at least 15 years, regardless of age -
(1) Lump sum gratuity of 10 years, to be received by the heirs (Section 2)
(2) Full survivorship pension benefits (Section 1), to be received by the surviving legitimate spouse upon survival of the gratuity period of 10 years (Section 3, first paragraph);
(3) Automatic increase of pension benefits (Section 3-A).
Provided, The same benefits shall apply in respect to a justice or judge who, with at least 5 years of government service, was killed due to his/her work as such.
B.2 Where government service is less than 15 years, regardless of age -
(1) Lump sum gratuity of 5 years, to be received by the heirs (Section 2)In light of these, it is my view that Judge Abul's spouse and son (or heirs) should be given the death benefits granted under Section 2 of R.A. No. 9946. If Judge Abul served for at least 15 years, his heirs should receive a lump sum equivalent to ten (10) years. Alternatively, if he served for less than 15 years, the lump sum should be equivalent to five (5) years. Subsequently, after the gratuity period often (10) years has passed, his heirs are entitled to survivorship benefits, specifically, full monthly pension (if Judge Abul rendered at least 15 years of service) or pro-rated monthly pension (if he served for less than 15 years).
(2) Pro-rated pension benefits (Section 1), to be received by the surviving legitimate spouse upon survival of the gratuity period of 10 years (Section 3, first paragraph);
(3) Automatic increase of pension benefits (Section 3-A).[27]
E. Survivorship Pension Benefits
The legitimate surviving spouse of a Justice or Judge who (1) has retired or was eligible to retire optionally at the time of death, and (2) was receiving or would have been entitled to receive a monthly pension, shall be entitled to receive the said benefits that the deceased Justice or Judge would have received had the Justice or Judge not died, Provided, That the justice or judge who, regardless of age, died or was killed while in actual service shall be considered as retired due to permanent disability. Provided, further, That the survivorship benefit shall be pro-rated if the deceased justice or judge had rendered government service for less than 15 years. The surviving spouse shall continue to receive such retirement benefits until the surviving spouse's death or remarriage.[28]