328 Phil. 1123; 93 OG No. 36, 5584 (September 8, 1997)
FRANCISCO, J.:
"That in or about and during the period comprised between December 14, 1988 to December 24, 1988, inclusive in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused representing herself to have the capacity to contract, enlist and transport Filipino workers for employment abroad, did then and there willfully and unlawfully for a fee, recruit and promise employment/job placement abroad to the following persons to wit: ROGELIO N. LEGASPI, ULDARICO P. LEGASPI, SONNY P. BERNABE, ARNEL B. MENDOZA, BENITO L. BERNABE, ARNOLD P. VALENZUELA, ARMANDO P. PAGULAYAN, GREGORIO P. MENDOZA, JR., RONALD T. CORREA, DANILO PALAD and ROBERT P. VELASQUEZ (hereinafter known as private complainants) without first having secured the required license or authority from the POEA."[2] (underscoring supplied.)
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court hereby finds that the accused CRISTINA HERNANDEZ, (sic) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of illegal recruitment, committed in large scale, as defined in Article 38(a) & (b) of Presidential Decree No. 1412, x x x in relation to Article 13 (b) and (c) x x x, accordingly, sentences the accused to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment (RECLUSION PERPETUA) with the accessory penalties provided for by law; to pay a fine of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND (P100,000.00) PESOS without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; to return and pay to BENITO L. BERNABE the amount of TWENTY EIGHT THOUSAND AND FIVE HUNDRED (P28,500.00) PESOS; to ROBERT P. VELASQUEZ the amount of TWENTY TWO THOUSAND AND FIVE HUNDRED (P22,500.00) PESOS; to GREGORIO P. MENDOZA the amount of TWENTY TWO THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED (P22,500.00) PESOS; to ARNEL MENDOZA the amount of TWENTY TWO THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED (P22,500.00) PESOS also without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; and to pay the costs.Appellant comes to this Court for the reversal of the judgment of conviction assigning the following errors against the lower court:
SO ORDERED.
Manila, Philippines, November 29, 1991."[5]
The first assignment of error is anchored on the contention that the prosecution failed to prove one of the essential elements of the crime of illegal recruitment -- that the offender is a non-licensee or non-holder of authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of workers.[7] The aforementioned element, specifically the fact that neither appellant nor Philippine-Thai was licensed or authorized to recruit workers as shown by the records of the POEA, was the subject of a stipulation proposed by the prosecution and admitted by the defense during trial. Appellant assails as erroneous the reliance placed by the prosecution on the said stipulation of facts in dispensing with the presentation of evidence to prove the said element of the crime of illegal recruitment. Appellant argues that: (1) the stipulation of facts was not tantamount to an admission by the appellant of the fact of non-possession of the requisite authority or license from the POEA, but was merely an admission that the Chief Licensing Officer of the POEA, if presented in court, would testify to this fact, and (2) the stipulation of facts is null and void for being contrary to law and public policy. Appellant posits the foregoing arguments to bolster her contention that the stipulation of facts did not relieve the prosecution of its duty to present evidence to prove all the elements of the crime charged to the end that the guilt of the accused may be proven beyond reasonable doubt.I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED "LIABLE OF (sic) ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT COMMITTED IN A LARGE SCALE AND BY A SYNDICATED (sic)" FOR HAVING "MAINTAINED OFFICE WITHOUT LICENSE OR REGISTRATION FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, THRU ITS OFFICE, THE PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION (POEA)."II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN TAKING JUDICIAL NOTICE OF THE "FACT THAT ACCUSED CRISTINA M. HERNANDEZ HAD BEEN CHARGED x x x OF ANOTHER ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT x x x DOCKETED AS CRIMINAL CASE NO. 88-62599" AND IN CONSIDERING THE PENDENCY THEREOF AS EVIDENCE OF THE "SCHEME AND STRATEGY ADOPTED BY THE ACCUSED x x x AND PRACTICED WITH THE HELP OF HER AGENTS AND OTHER PERSONS WORKING UNDER THE SHADE OF HER PROTECTION."III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING CREDENCE OR WEIGHT TO THE DEFENSE OF THE ACCUSED.[6]
"ProsecutorShe claims that the foregoing clearly indicate that there was no judicial admission of the fact of non-possession of a license/authority but rather a mere admission that the witness, if presented, would testify to such fact. This being the case, it remained incumbent upon the prosecution to present evidence of such fact. To buttress her position, the following was cited to note the distinction:
x x x Before we call on our first witness, we propose some stipulations regarding the testimony of the Chief Licensing Branch of the POEA -- that Cristina Hernandez is not a (sic) licensed nor authorized by the Department of Labor to recruit workers abroad.
Court
Would you agree?
Atty. Ulep (Counsel for the Accused): Agreed, Your Honor."[10]
"Suppose a case is set for trial and one of the parties moves for a continuance because of the absence of W, an important witness. His opponent, who is anxious to go to trial; asks what are the facts to which W would testify. The other attorney tells him, adding: 'If I consent to the overruling of my motion, will you stipulate that those are the facts?' The attorney who is pressing for trial says: 'No but I will stipulate that if W were called in this case as a witness, he would so testify.' What is the difference between the two stipulations?The distinction, though cogent, is unfortunately inapplicable to the case at bar. Conveniently omitted from the appellant's reply brief is the ensuing statement made by the court after counsel for the accused, Atty. Ulep agreed to the stipulation proposed by the prosecution, to wit:
In the first stipulation proposed there is a judicial admission of the facts, and they cannot be contradicted. But the second stipulation proposed will only have the same effect as if the witness had testified to the facts. Such testimony the party is free to contradict."[11]
Atty. Ulep (counsel for the accused): Agreed, Your Honor.From the foregoing, it is evident that the prosecution and the defense counsel stipulated on two things: that "x x x from the record of the POEA, x x x accused Cristina Hernandez, Phil. etc. Ass. x x x is neither licensed nor authorized by that office to recruit workers for overseas abroad and that if the duly authorized representative from the POEA Administratin (sic) is to take the witness stand, he will confirm to this fact x x x."[13]The claim that the lower court mistakenly interpreted defense counsel's acquiescence to the prosecution's proposed stipulation as an admission of non-possession of the requisite POEA license or authority is belied by the fact that after the above enunciation by the court, no objection was interposed by defense counsel.
Court
The prosecution and the defense agreed to stipulate/admit that from the record of the POEA Licensing and Regulation Office, Dept. of Labor and Employment, accused Cristina Hernandez/Phil. etc., Ass. x x x is neither licensed nor authorized by that office to recruit workers overseas abroad and that if the duly authorized representative from the POEA Administration is to take the witness stand, he will confirm to this fact as borne by the records.[12] (Underscoring supplied .)
"Agreements between attorneys for the prosecution and for the defense in criminal cases, by which it is stipulated that certain witnesses, if present, would testify to certain facts prevent a review of the evidence by the Supreme Court and are in violation of the law."[15]The above ruling was reiterated in a subsequent case where the accused was convicted solely on the basis of an agreement between the fiscal and the counsel for the accused that certain witnesses would testify confirming the complaint in all its parts. In reversing the judgment of conviction, this Court held that:
"It is neither proper nor permissible to consider a case closed, or to render judgment therein, by virtue of an agreement entered into between the provincial fiscal and the counsel for the accused with reference to facts, some of which are favorable to the defense, and others related to the prosecution, without any evidence being adduced or testimony taken from the witnesses mentioned in the agreement; such practice is not authorized and defeats the purposes of criminal law; it is an open violation of the rules of criminal procedure x x x."[16]The rule prohibiting the stipulation of facts in criminal cases is grounded on the fundamental right of the accused to be presumed innocent until proven guilty, and the corollary duty of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. It is therefore advanced that the prosecution being duty-bound to prove all the elements of the crime, may not be relieved of this obligation by the mere expedient of stipulating with defense counsel on a matter constitutive of an essential element of the crime charged.
"It is not supposed to be within the knowledge or competence of counsel to predict what a proposed witness shall say under the sanction of his oath and the test of cross-examination. A conviction for crime should not rest upon mere conjecture. Nor is it possible for a trial court to weigh with exact nicety the contradictory declaration of witnesses not produced so as to be subjected to its observation and its judgment as to their credibility."[18]However, in the light of recent changes in our rules on criminal procedure, particularly the pre-trial provisions found in Rule 118, the prohibition against a stipulation of facts in criminal cases no longer holds true. Rule 118 provides the following:
"Section 1. Pre-trial; when proper -- To expedite trial, where the accused and counsel agree, the court shall conduct a pre-trial conference on the matters enunciated in Section 2 hereof, without impairing the rights of the accused.By virtue of the foregoing rule, a stipulation of facts in criminal cases is now expressly sanctioned by law. In further pursuit of the objective of expediting trial by dispensing with the presentation of evidence on matters that the accused is willing to admit, a stipulation of facts should be allowed not only during pre-trial but also and with more reason, during trial proper itself. Parenthetically, although not expressly sanctioned under the old rules of court, a stipulation of facts by the parties in criminal cases has long been allowed and recognized as declarations constituting judicial admissions, hence, binding upon the parties. In the case of People vs. Mapa[19] where the accused was charged with illegal possession of firearms, the prosecution and the defense stipulated on the fact that the accused was found in possession of a gun without the requisite permit or license. More at point is the case of People vs. Bocar[20] wherein the fiscal proposed the admission by the accused of the affidavits and other exhibits already presented by the prosecution to dispense with oral testimonies on the matter. Holding that the admissions made by the parties were binding, this Court stated that:
Sec. 2 Pre-trial conference; subjects x x x The pre-trial conference shall consider the following:
(a) Plea bargaining;
(b) Stipulation of facts;
x x x x x x x x x"(underscoring supplied)
"x x x [T]here is nothing unlawful or irregular about the above procedure. The declarations constitute judicial admissions, which are binding on the parties, by virtue of which the prosecution dispensed with the introduction of additional evidence and the defense waived the right to contest or dispute the veracity of the statements contained in the exhibits."[21] (underscoring supplied .)American jurisprudence has established the acceptability of the practice of stipulating during the trial of criminal cases, and categorically stated in People vs. Hare[22] that:
"That record discloses that the defense counsel stipulated to what certain witnesses would testify if they were present in court. x x xThe corollary issue left for the determination of this Court is whether or not Section 4 of Rule 118 -- requiring an agreement or admission made or entered during the pre-trial conference to be reduced in writing and signed by the accused and his counsel before the same may be used in evidence against the accused -- equally applies to a stipulation of facts made during trial. We resolved this issue in the negative.
x x x The defendant contends that it was error for his counsel to make these stipulations. This court has held that an accused may by stipulation waive the necessity of proof of all or any part of the case which the people have alleged against him and that having done so, he cannot complain in this Court of evidence which he has stipulated into the record.[23]
"An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made."We now go to appellant's second and third assignment of errors. In her second assignment of error, appellant makes much ado of the "judicial notice" taken by the lower court of the fact that appellant had been charged with another illegal recruitment case,[34] and in considering the pendency thereof as evidence of the scheme and strategy adopted by the accused. Appellant cites a violation of Section 3 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court which provides that before the court may take judicial notice of any matter, the parties shall be heard thereon if such matter is decisive of a material issue in the case. It is claimed that the lower court never announced its intention to take judicial notice of the pendency of the other illegal recruitment case nor did it allow the accused to be heard thereon.
"x x x in the absence of objection and as a matter of convenience to all parties, a court may properly treat all or any part of the original record of the case filed in its archives as read into the records of a case pending before it, when with the knowledge of the opposing party, reference is made to it, by name and number or in some other manner by which it is sufficiently designated, x x x"[36] (underscoring supplied .)The judicial notice taken by the lower court of the pendency of another illegal recruitment case against the appellant falls squarely under the above exception in view of the fact that it was the appellant herself who introduced evidence on the matter when she testified in open court as follows:
Even assuming, however, that the lower court improperly took judicial notice of the pendency of another illegal recruitment case against the appellant, the error would not be fatal to the prosecution's cause. The judgment of conviction was not based on the existence of another illegal recruitment case filed against appellant by a different group of complainants, but on the overwhelming evidence against her in the instant case.
"Q: You mean to say . . . by the way, where (sic) were you at the NBI when Mrs. Cinco inquired from you about placement abroad? A: I was just invited by the personnel of the NBI and I was not allowed to go home. Q: Why were you invited by the NBI? A: They told me that there was a complaint against me. Q: Complaint about what? A: The same case. Q: You mean illegal recruitment also? A: Yes, sir. xxx xxx xxx Q: You made mention than an illegal recruitment case which was supposed to be the cause of your detention at the NBI. . . . I am not referring to this case, Mrs. Hernandez -- what happened to that case, what is the status of that case? A: It is also in this sala. COURT: It is already submitted for decision.[37]