363 Phil. 216
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari
of the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals, dated September 30, 1992,
which affirmed the order, dated June 24, 1991, of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch XLII, Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro for the removal of the house of
petitioners from a parcel of agricultural land in Sto. Niño, Pinamalayan,
Oriental Mindoro. The order was issued
pursuant to a decision of the trial court ordering petitioners to vacate the
land in question and to restore its possession to herein private respondents.
The land in question, which
consists of about 10,000 square meters, is devoted to palay, coconuts, and
bananas. In 1964, private respondents
were instituted by Juanita Valdez, the owner of the land, as tenants, delivering
two-thirds of the harvest to the latter. In 1976, the parties changed their relation to leasehold under which
private respondents paid rents to Juanita Valdez equal to seven and a half
cavans of rice per harvest.
Private respondents faithfully
complied with their obligation to the landowner. However, on November 4, 1985, petitioners, who are the son-in-law
and the daughter of Juanita Valdez, took over the land and had it plowed over
the protest of private respondents.
On November 15, 1985, private
respondents, therefore, filed a complaint in the Regional Trial Court of
Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro to recover possession of the parcel of
agricultural land. On November 15,
1988, judgment was rendered in their favor as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds that plaintiffs were illegally ejected by the defendants from their leasehold landholdings and hereby renders judgment against them and orders said defendants:
A. To reinstate plaintiffs to the one (1) hectare land occupied by them prior to their ejectment as leaseholders under the Agrarian Land Reform Code;
B. To carry successfully such reinstatement, defendants are ordered to vacate the premises covered by the possession of plaintiffs as such leasehold, which temporarily given to them and other persons brought by defendants or may be found in the premises are also ordered to vacate the same;
C. To pay plaintiffs the
amount of P8,700.00 as unrealized produce of the land in question, which
they are entitled because of their unlawful ejectment; and
D. Pay plaintiffs P2,000.00
as attorney’s fees; and
E. Making the injunction permanent.
SO ORDERED.[2]
Petitioners appealed to the Court
of Appeals, but the decision of the trial court was affirmed. As no further appeal was taken, the decision
of the trial court became final and executory on May 21, 1990. Accordingly, private respondents filed with
the trial court a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution, which the
latter granted. The dispositive portion
of the writ of execution, dated January 9, 1991, ordered the sheriff as
follows:
NOW THEREFORE, you are hereby commanded to carry into effect the afore-quoted dispositive portion of the decision of this Court and reinstate plaintiffs to the one hectare of land which was tenanted by them, requiring defendants or whosoever persons may be found in the property to vacate the same and pay plaintiffs the amount ofP8,700.00 as actual damages andP2,000.00 as attorney’s fees, together with your lawful fees. The plaintiffs should be required to pay beforehand to the Clerk of Court the amount ofP2,000.00 as execution fee. If sufficient property cannot be found to satisfy this execution and the lawful fees, then you are commanded to make satisfaction of the said sums of money out of the lands and buildings of the said defendants in the manner required by the Rules of Court, and make return of your proceedings with this writ within 60 days from receipt thereof.[3]
In view of the refusal of
petitioners to remove their house from the land, private respondents moved for
the issuance of an order of demolition.[4] After due hearing, their motion was granted by the
trial court in its order, dated June 24, 1991.
Petitioners then filed a special
civil action for certiorari in the Court of Appeals assailing the order
of demolition of the trial court. In
its decision of September 30, 1992, the Court of Appeals dismissed petitioners’
action. Hence, this petition.
Petitioners argue: (1) that their house is not within the land
in question; (2) that even if it is, the decision of the trial court of
November 15, 1988 does not require the removal of improvements on the parcel of
land and, therefore, the order of demolition issued on June 24, 1991 is void;
and (3) that the filing in the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) of a complaint
for eviction against private respondents for nonpayment of leasehold rentals
constitutes a supervening event which justifies the recall of the order of
demolition.[5]
First. It is settled
that an issue which was not raised in the trial court cannot be raised for the
first time on appeal.[6] This principle applies to special civil actions for certiorari under Rule 65. In the case at
bar, petitioners’ claim that their house, which the trial court ordered
removed, is not built on the land in dispute was made for the first time in the
Court of Appeals. Petitioners’ counsel
was served a copy of the motion filed by private respondents for the issuance of an order of demolition,
yet petitioners did not raise the claim that their house was not built on the land
in question. Indeed, despite the fact
that petitioners’ counsel was given notice of the hearing on the motion
scheduled on April 17, 1991, petitioners and their counsel did not appear in
court to oppose it.[7] Hence, petitioners are estopped from raising the
issue in this Court.
Indeed, in a special civil action
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, questions of fact
are not generally permitted, the inquiry being limited essentially to whether
the public respondent acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion.[8] Since the question whether petitioners’ house is
within the land in dispute was not raised in the trial court, the appellate
court’s failure to consider this matter cannot constitute grave abuse of
discretion or be a basis for any finding of reversible error on review in this
Court. It is noteworthy that apart from
the bare assertion of petitioners, no evidence has been cited by them to show
that their house is indeed not within the land in question.
Second. Nor is there
merit in the contention that, since the decision reinstating private
respondents to the possession of the land does not expressly require the
removal of improvements and structures thereon, the order of demolition issued
by the trial court varied the decision. Rule 39, §§13 and 14 of the 1964 Rules of Court provide:
SEC. 13. How execution for the delivery or restitution of property enforced. ¾ The officer must enforce an execution for the delivery or restitution of property by ousting therefrom the person against whom the judgment is rendered and placing the judgment creditor in possession of such property, and by levying as hereinafter provided upon so much of the property of the judgment debtor as will satisfy the amount of the judgment and costs included in the writ of execution.
SEC. 14. Removal of improvements on property subject of execution.¾ When the property subject of the execution contains improvements constructed or planted by the judgment debtor or his agent, the officer shall not destroy, demolish or remove said improvements except upon special order of the court, issued upon petition of the judgment creditor after due hearing and after the former has failed to remove the same within a reasonable time fixed by the court.
A judgment for the delivery or
restitution of property is essentially an order to place the prevailing party
in possession of the property. If the
defendant refuses to surrender possession of the property to the prevailing party,
the sheriff or other proper officer should oust him. There is no need for an express order to this effect to be stated
in the decision. Nor is there a need to
state categorically in the decision that in such event the sheriff or other
proper officer shall have the authority to remove the improvements on the
property if the defendant fails to do so within a reasonable period of
time. Precisely, the law requires in
cases where there are improvements on the land that a special order be issued
by the court, directing the removal of such improvements. It is apparent petitioners confuse the order
of demolition with the decision ordering the eviction of the defendant.
In the instant case, petitioners’
counsel was notified of the motion filed by private respondents for the
issuance of an order of demolition. However, as already noted, he did not file an opposition to the
motion. Neither did he and petitioners
attend the hearing on the motion despite notice to them. After the order of demolition was issued,
petitioners were given 15 days to remove their house from the land in question.[9] There was
thus compliance with Rule 39, §14 of the Rules of Court.
Third. The
petitioners contend that, although the execution of a decision is a ministerial
function of the court, nonetheless, if a supervening event occurs, rendering
execution inequitable, the execution should be stayed. Here, according to petitioners, they filed a
complaint for eviction against private respondents in the DAR. They claim that such filing constitutes a
supervening event.
Undoubtedly, a party cannot create
an event in order to excuse noncompliance with a final decision against
him. It is noteworthy that the
complaint filed by petitioners was dismissed by the DAR in an order, dated
January 13, 1992.[10] At the time petitioners filed this case with this
Court on November 16, 1992, they knew that the complaint had already been
dismissed by the DAR. They contend that
the complaint had been refiled.[11] It is clear, however, that in refiling the complaint,
petitioners’ counsel is merely trying to delay the execution of the decision of
the trial court, dated November 15, 1988.
It is settled that, generally, an
order of execution is not appealable because otherwise a case would never end.[12] If the order of execution cannot be appealed, neither
can the order of demolition issued in pursuance thereof be appealable.[13] Neither can an order of demolition be set aside
through a special civil action for certiorari except upon a
showing that the trial court gravely abused its discretion in issuing the same.[14] In the instant case, the Court of Appeals correctly
found that there is no sufficient evidence to show that the trial court gravely abused its discretion in
issuing the order of demolition.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the decision of
the Court of Appeals, dated September 30, 1992, is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
[1]
Per Justice Jainal D. Rasul and concurred in by Justices Emeterio C. Cui and
Segundino G. Chua.
[2]
Memorandum of Private Respondents, Annex B, Rollo, p. 109.
[3]
Id., Annex D, Rollo, p. 126.
[4]
Petition, Annex H, Rollo, pp. 29-30.
[5]
Petition, Rollo, p. 7.
[6]
De la Santa v. Court of Appeals, 140 SCRA 44, 51 (1985).
[7]
Petition, Annex H, Rollo, pp. 29-30.
[8]
Insular Bank of Asia and America v. Court of Appeals, 228 SCRA 420,
426-427 (1993).
[9]
Petition, Annex H, Rollo, pp. 29-30.
[10]
Comment, Annex A, Rollo, p. 50.
[11]
Reply, Rollo, p. 53.
[12]
Reburiano v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 102965, Jan. 21, 1999.
[13]
David v. Ejercito, 71 SCRA 484, 488 (1976).
[14]
Supra, note 12.