517 Phil. 440
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Section 15. An amount equivalent to not less than two percent of the national budget shall be automatically appropriated and regularly released for the judiciary. (Underscoring supplied)What the original draft thus provided for was automatic appropriation, which is not the same as automatic release of appropriations. The power to appropriate belongs to Congress, while the responsibility of releasing appropriations belongs to the DBM. Commissioner Ople objected to automatic appropriation, it bears emphasis, not to automatic release of appropriations.
The Commissioner will recall that when the provision giving fiscal autonomy to the judiciary was presented to the body, we were the ones who denied to it the percentage of the budget because, precisely, we wanted the judiciary to go through the process of budget-making to justify its budget and to go through the legislature for that justification. But we also said that after having gone through this process, it should have fiscal autonomy so that there will be an automatic and regular release of such funds. The whole purpose of that provision is to protect the independence of the judiciary while at the same time not giving the judiciary what we call a position of privilege by an automatic percentage.[3] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)The DBM further claims that the constitutional mandate to automatically and regularly release funds does not preclude the implementation of a cash payment schedule for all agencies, including those belonging to the constitutional fiscal autonomous group (CFAG). It explains the meaning of "cash payment schedule" in the context of the budgetary process, from the enactment of the general appropriations law to the release of appropriations, thus.
After the General Appropriations Act (GAA) is signed into law, this Department, in coordination with the agency concerned, prepares the financial plan for the year in accordance with its appropriations under the GAA. The result of this exercise is embodied in the Agency Budget Matrix or ABM which reflects the individual obligation authority ceilings of the agency, called the allotment. An allotment allows the agency to enter into a contract or otherwise obligate funds although cash has not yet been received by said agency. Simply put, allotments serve as a guarantee that the national government will look for cash to support the agency's obligations. Therefore, the closer the allotment is to the amount of its appropriation, the better.The DBM goes on to emphasize that it has no discretion on how much cash enters petitioner's coffers, as cash payment schedules are "dictated by the amount of revenue collection, borrowings, deficit ceilings and total disbursement program of the national government"[5]; and if the cash payment schedule prescribes that the total cash to be released for a given month is 85% of allotment, then a Notice of Cash Allocation amounting to 85% of each agency's allotment is released for all agencies. It thus contends that this equality in treatment does not violate the fiscal autonomy of the agencies belonging to the CFAG, for "since approved allotments of agencies belonging to the CFAG are higher than ordinary agencies, they automatically get higher cash allocations."[6]
The approved allotment of an ordinary agency does not cover its full appropriations, while those for entities vested with fiscal autonomy always cover the full amount of its appropriations. For instance, allotments for Personal Service of an ordinary agency only cover those for filled positions. In contrast, the Personal Service allotments of agencies enjoying fiscal autonomy are comprehensively released, including those for positions that are admittedly vacant. At the end of the year, whatever is unspent for Personal Services, particularly for unfilled positions, translates to savings, which may be used to augment other items of appropriations.
As emphasized, the ABM of an ordinary agency is disaggregated into those Needing Clearance and Not Needing Clearance. Pursuant to Budget Execution Guidelines no. 2000-12 dated August 29, 2000 x x x, the full allotment of entities belonging to the CFAG is placed under the Not Needing Clearance column.
Finally, items under the Not Needing Column of an ordinary agency is further disaggregated to "this release" which represents the initial allotment authorized under the ABM, and "for later release" which represents the amount to be released after the conduct of the agency performance review. In contrast, the total appropriation and allotment of entities belonging to the CFAG are all placed under "this release" since no agency performance review is conducted by the DBM on these entities.
x x x x
Thus, in order to ensure that the budgets of agencies vested with fiscal autonomy are released in full, the DBM in a ministerial capacity, ensures that the allotments of agencies belonging to the CFAG (i) cover the full amount of their annual appropriations, and (ii) are not subject to any condition. In other words, budgets of fiscal autonomous agencies occupy the highest category in terms of allotment.
x x x x
After the ABMs are issued, the Notices of Cash Allocations (NCAs) are issued every month to support approved allotments with cash.
Ideally, the NCA should cover in full the monthly allotment of the agency. The reality, however, is that every national budget is based on revenue projections, and that there is an ever present risk that these revenue targets are not met in full during the course of the budget year. Last FYs 2001 and 2002, for instance, revenue shortfall was at 7.16% and 9.16%, respectively, as shown below under Table 2.
x x x x
Further, not all revenue collections are received at the start of the budget year. The cash flow of the national government, like most other public institutions, has its highs and lows depending on the tax calendar. Thus, not all of the projected revenues are available for spending at the start of the budget year.
It thus becomes imperative for the Executive Department, through the DBM, to manage the release of funds through implementation of cash payment schedules. For instance, if collections for a given month meet the monthly revenue target, then the NCA for that month shall cover 100% of the allotment. If, however, collections do not meet the monthly revenue target, then the NCA to be released may not cover 100% of the allotment. Add a few more variables, such as amount of deficit and total disbursement of agencies, then one gets a cash payment schedule that varies on a monthly basis.[4] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Unfortunately, the sponsorship speech of Cong. Rolando G. Andaya, Jr. Chairman of the House Committee on Appropriations in justifying the introduction of Sections 63 and 64 (sic) in the FY 2002 GAA, belies such contention. x x x In his speech, he states that the incorporation of Section 62 is due to concerns raised by Congressmen on the general impoundment powers of the President, without distinguishing as to the two types of public institutions. More revealing is his explanation in introducing Section 63, which defines unmanageable national government deficit. He states that in order to discourage the Executive Department from reducing the Internal Revenue Allotment of local government units, there is need to define the legal parameters of "unmanageable deficit". Reference to local government units, which likewise enjoy fiscal autonomy according to the pronouncements of this Honorable Court [Pimentel, Jr. v. Aguirre, 336 SCRA 201 at 218 (2000)], reveal the true intent of Congress to cover both agencies vested with fiscal autonomy and those without. x x x"[8] (Underscoring supplied)The Court, however, has examined the speech of Congressman Andaya and finds nothing therein that detracts from its ruling. It bears emphasis that this Court explicitly observed that Sections 62 and 63 refer to government agencies in general, while Section 64 applies specifically to agencies with fiscal autonomy. It is in these three provisions read together, and not in reading each one in isolation, that the distinction intended by the legislature becomes evident.
After approval by Congress, the appropriations for the Judiciary shall be automatically and regularly released subject to availability of funds. (Underscoring supplied)means that fund releases may still be subject to a cash release program.
"4) the Court will look to releases by the DBM of funds against the approved budget of the Judiciary, in the full amount sought and promptly upon notice; it is willing to consider and pass upon suggestions by the DBM for scheduling of releases; x x x"(Underscoring supplied)In the same letter, the Chief Presidential Legal Counsel, after considering the Court's position, opined that one of the principles by which the constitutional mandate on judicial fiscal autonomy can be achieved is that "[a]fter approval by Congress, the appropriations for the judiciary shall be automatically and regularly released subject to availability of funds" – which opinion, the DBM alleges, is the position adopted by this Court.
This is not to say that agencies vested with fiscal autonomy have no reporting responsibility at all to the DBM. This is precisely the reason why guideline No. 5 under the Resolution of 3 June [1993] states that the Supreme Court, or constitutional commissions clothed with fiscal autonomy for that matter, may submit reports relative to its appropriation "for records purposes only." The word "may" is permissive [Dizon v. Encarnacion, 119 Phil. 20, 22 (1963)], as it is an auxiliary verb manifesting "opportunity or possibility" and, under ordinary circumstances, "implies the possible existence of something." [Supangan, Jr. v. Santos, G.R. No. 84663, 24 August 1990] x x x Interdependence will work only if it is undertaken within the parameters of the Constitution."WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration of respondent Department of Budget and Management is DENIED.