470 Phil. 290
CORONA, J.:
A careful examination of the affidavit complaint plus the reply affidavit of complainant failed to state the ultimate facts constituting the cause of action.Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but this was denied by 1st Assistant City Prosecutor Gerona who ruled that there was no “manifest error or grave abuse of discretion to justify reversal, alteration or modification of the challenged resolution.”[7]
While complainant states that their audit resulted in Feria's misappropriation of the company's products, unremitted collections, unreturned advances and unsubmitted sales proceeds in the total amount of P41,733.01, the specifics of the misappropriation, (i.e., [ineligible]. . . when committed, where committed, how much per act of misappropriation or was the misappropriation a one-act deal…[ineligible]) were all conclusions a general recitals (sic) of the fact of commission/omission followed by the personal conclusion of guilt by the complainant which are not sustained by admissible evidence.[6]
While it is an undisputed fact that respondent incurred some accountabilities with Filadams during the duration of his employment, as shown by respondent's payment of the amount of P3,000.00 on September 13, 1994, mere acknowledgment by respondent of these accountabilities does not of itself establish that estafa under par. 1 (b) was committed. What is apparent from the evidence adduced is the necessity for the parties to sit down together and make an accounting of the alleged accountability. Complainant failed to present any evidence of conversion of the property to the benefit of the respondent or of some other person. Respondent's failure to return the goods or cash advances in this case is not sufficient proof of conversion. If at all, respondent's liability to the company is purely civil in nature as the acts complained of do not constitute the crime of estafa.[10]On the ground of grave abuse of discretion, Filadams filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to annul the above-quoted decision of the DOJ dismissing its appeal and affirming the resolution of the Assistant City Prosecutor of Quezon City. The Court of Appeals denied the petition on two grounds: (1) the proper remedy for the petitioner was a petition for review under Rule 45 and not a petition for certiorari inasmuch as certiorari was available only if there was no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, and (2) assuming that a petition for certiorari was proper, the DOJ decision was not marked by grave abuse of discretion.[11]
Before anything else, we need to clarify some ground rules. This case was elevated to the Court of Appeals by way of a petition on certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari on the ground that the proper remedy was petition for review under Revised Circular No. 1-91, now embodied in Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 43 applies to “appeals from judgments or final orders of the Court of Tax Appeals and from awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of or authorized by any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of quasi-judicial functions to the Court of Appeals.”[13] The question is: was the Office of the Prosecutor of Quezon City a quasi-judicial agency whose resolutions were appealable to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43? In Bautista vs. Court of Appeals,[14] we ruled:I
WHETHER OR NOT APPEAL AND NOT CERTIORARI IS THE PROPER REMEDY IN ASSAILING THE TWO RESOLUTIONS OF THE CHIEF STATE PROSECUTOR FINDING THE ABSENCE OF PROBABLE CAUSE.II
WHETHER OR NOT BOTH THE CHIEF STATE PROSECUTOR AND THE COURT OF APPEALS HAVE COMMITTED A (SIC) GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DISREGARDING THE GUIDELINES SET BY THIS HON. SUPREME COURT IN DETERMINING THE EXISTENCE OF A PROBABLE CAUSE TO WARRANT THE FILING OF AN INFORMATION IN COURT.[12]
Petitioner submits that a prosecutor conducting a preliminary investigation performs a quasi-judicial function, citing Cojuangco v. PCGG, Koh v. Court of Appeals, Andaya v. Provincial Fiscal of Surigao del Norte and Crespo v. Mogul. In these cases this Court held that the power to conduct preliminary investigation is quasi-judicial in nature. But this statement holds true only in the sense that, like quasi-judicial bodies, the prosecutor is an office in the executive department exercising powers akin to those of a court. Here is where the similarity ends.With our ruling in Bautista that the Office of the Prosecutor was not covered by the appellate process under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, what then was petitioner's remedy from the resolution of the Assistant Prosecutor dismissing his complaint? Based on the 1993 Revised Rules on Appeals from Resolutions in Preliminary Investigations or Reinvestigations — now the 2000 NPS[15] Rule on Appeals — the petitioner could appeal to the Secretary of Justice. In this case, the petitioner did appeal to the Secretary of Justice but his appeal was dismissed. His motion for reconsideration was also dismissed. Since there was no more appeal or other remedy available in the ordinary course of law, the petitioner correctly filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals on the ground of grave abuse of discretion.
A closer scrutiny will show that preliminary investigation is very different from other quasi-judicial proceedings. A quasi-judicial body has been defined as "an organ of government other than a court and other than a legislature which affects the rights of private parties through either adjudication or rule-making."
In Luzon Development Bank v. Luzon Development Bank Employees, we held that a voluntary arbitrator, whether acting solely or in a panel, enjoys in law the status of a quasi-judicial agency, hence his decisions and awards are appealable to the Court of Appeals. This is so because the awards of voluntary arbitrators become final and executory upon the lapse of the period to appeal; and since their awards determine the rights of parties, their decisions have the same effect as judgments of a court. Therefore, the proper remedy from an award of a voluntary arbitrator is a petition for review to the Court of Appeals, following Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95, which provided for a uniform procedure for appellate review of all adjudications of quasi-judicial entities, which is now embodied in Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
On the other hand, the prosecutor in a preliminary investigation does not determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. He does not exercise adjudication nor rule-making functions. Preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, and is often the only means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime and to enable the fiscal to prepare his complaint or information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof. While the fiscal makes that determination, he cannot be said to be acting as a quasi-court, for it is the courts, ultimately, that pass judgment on the accused, not the fiscal.
Hence, the Office of the Prosecutor is not a quasi-judicial body; necessarily, its decisions approving the filing of a criminal complaint are not appealable to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43. Since the ORSP (Office of the Regional State Prosecutor) has the power to resolve appeals with finality only where the penalty prescribed for the offense does not exceed prision correccional, regardless of the imposable fine, the only remedy of petitioner, in the absence of grave abuse of discretion, is to present her defense in the trial of the case.
His ruling that "in the crime of estafa under Art. 315 par. 1 (b), it is an essential element that there be proof of misappropriation or conversion", is not inconsistent with the ruling of the Supreme Court in Ilagan vs. Court of Appeals, 239 SCRA 575, on which petitioner relies that the operative act in the perpetration of estafa under the said article and paragraph is the failure of the agent to turn over or deliver to his principal the amounts he collected despite the duty to do so.[16]To determine whether there was probable cause warranting the filing of the information for estafa through misappropriation or with abuse of confidence[17], the presence of the following elements assumes critical importance:
The first, third and fourth elements were duly established by the complaint-affidavits and were not disputed by the parties. What was disputed was whether the element of misappropriation, the most important element of the crime charged, was shown by the affidavits to engender a well-founded belief that a crime was committed and the respondent was probably guilty thereof.[19] Invoking Ilagan vs. Court of Appeals,[20] petitioner contends that it is the mere failure to turn over or to deliver to the principal the amounts collected, despite the duty to do so, that constitutes the operative fact in the crime of estafa through unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence. In short, the mere failure of respondent Feria to turn over the stock shortages, money collections, cash advances and unused cash rebates, despite demand and the duty to do so, constituted prima facie evidence of misappropriation.
- that money, goods, or other personal property is received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return, the same;
- that there is a misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender or denial on his part of such receipt;
- that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and,
- that there is a demand made by the offended party on the offender.[18]
From the records, it is clear to us that a prima facie case for estafa exists. The dismissal of petitioner’s complaint-affidavit and the DOJ's affirmance thereof on appeal was a patent error constituting grave abuse of discretion within the ambit of exception no. 4 above.
- when necessary to afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused;
- when necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions;
- when there is a prejudicial question which is sub judice;
- when the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority;
- where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation;
- when double jeopardy is clearly apparent;
- where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense;
- where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution;
- where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance;
- when there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash on that ground has been denied.[28] (emphasis ours)