351 Phil. 644
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
Accused-appellant
Alberto Cario alias “Enteng” appeals from the 17 August 1995 decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court of
Cavite City, Branch 17, in Criminal Case No. 365-94, which ruled against him as
follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds the accused Alberto Cario also known as “Enteng” guilty beyond reasonable doubt of “MURDER” and he is hereby sentenced to reclusion perpetua; to indemnify the heirs of Rolando B. Sobreo in the amount ofP50,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; to pay the amount ofP28,000.00 for funeral expenses also without subsidiary imprisonment, and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
The accusatory
portion of the information[2] to which accused-appellant entered
a plea of not guilty upon arraignment, and under which he was tried and convicted,
read as follows:
That on or about June 7, 1994, in the City of Cavite, Republic of the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, then being armed with an improvised shotgun or “sumpak”, with intent to kill and with treachery, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and shoot one ROLANDO B. SOBREO, thereby inflicting upon the latter gunshot wounds affecting his internal organs such as heart, lung, liver, stomach and part of intestine, which ultimately caused his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The witnesses
presented by the prosecution were Arlene Sobreo, the victim’s wife; Roberto
Maxwell, an eyewitness; and Dr. Regalado Sosa, City Health Officer of Cavite
City.
Arlene Sobreo
testified that on 7 June 1994 at around 6:00 p.m., she was on her way
home. As she neared “Nognog” store at
Jasmin Street, Cavite City, she heard a “shot.” As she passed by the store she saw accused-appellant carrying a “sumpak,”
a homemade shotgun. When she got home,
Bernadette Mata, a neighbor, told Arlene that her husband was shot by
accused-appellant. Arlene rushed to the scene of the incident, which was a
short distance from “Nognog” store, only to find her husband wounded and lying
on the ground in front of “Medy” store. While there were people milling around at the crime scene, she was
unable to recognize them as she was thinking of her husband. As she was unable
to carry him, she asked Lito, her neighbor, to help bring her husband to the
hospital, where a doctor told her that her husband was dead. She declared that she incurred expenses for
her husband’s wake, but could not recall the precise amount as the receipts
therefor were with the victim’s parents. On cross-examination, Arlene recalled that the incident took place at
around 6:00 p.m., but it was not yet so dark that she was unable to see
accused-appellant carrying a “sumpak;” and that the place where her
husband was shot was near the sea, while “Nognog” store was on the other side
near the main road.[3]
Roberto Maxwell
testified that he was able to positively identify accused-appellant as the one
who shot the victim as Roberto had been seeing accused-appellant at the public
market. On 7 June 1994, between 5:30
and 6:00 p.m., while Roberto was on his way to visit Rolando, Roberto saw
accused-appellant shoot Rolando at a place called Aplayang Munti, at Sea Breeze
Subdivision, Cavite City. At that time,
accused-appellant and the victim stood facing each other, an arm’s length
apart. Roberto, who was then about ten
meters away from the victim, was startled by the occurrence that he stepped
back and went home. He described the
gun used by accused-appellant as a “sumpak,” which was made from a lead
pipe.[4] However, it was only on 20 June
1994 when Roberto gave his statement about the incident[5] to the police authorities.
Dr. Regalado
Sosa, City Health Officer of Cavite City, conducted the autopsy on the cadaver
of the victim. His findings were
summarized in the Autopsy Report[6] as follows:
EXTERNAL FINDINGS:
x x x
= Contusion on the left jaw with 0.3 cm. x 0.6
cm. Abrasion within.
= Contusion
on the left chin with 0.1 cm. x 0.2 cm. Abrasion within.
= Abrasion
triangular in shape 0.5 cm. x 0.5 cm. X 0.3 cm. At the left posterior shoulder.
= Gun
shot wound, 2.5 cm x 2.8 cm wound with irregular inverted borders at the center
of a 6 cm x 5 cm powder burns. The wound is located 4 cm below the level of the
nipples and 2 cm away from the anterior
median line to the left. It is directed inwards, postero-lateral wards to the
left with eight (8) exit wounds at the left posterior shoulder. The exit wounds
are 4 cm-5 cm apart and the wound measures 0.5 cm in dm with irregular everted
borders occupying 13 cms x 9 cms x 7 cms triangular space. One (1) deformed 0.5 in dm lead pallet was
protruding from one of the exit wounds. Two slugs of the same form was palpated
near the exit wounds and excised.
INTERNAL FINDINGS:
= Complete
fracture (Hole) of the sternum near the last three left floating ribs.
= Ruptured
heart at the lower left half of the heart 4 cm x 5 cm in size.
= Ruptured
fundus of the liver 10 cm x 8 cm x 6 cm x 8 cm.
= Presence
of thru and thru wound at the lower lobe of the left lung.
= Severely
ruptured stomach.
= Severely
ruptured duodenum and omentum.
= Presence of 0.5 cm in dm wound numbering nine
(9) at the left internal lateral abdominal wall at the same level of the exit
wounds.
= A
white palstic material was recovered inside the left thoracic cavity.
= Presence
of 0.5 liter of liquid and clotted blood inside the thoracic and abdominal
cavities.
CAUSE OF DEATH:
= Shock secondary to massive internal hemorrhage due to gunshot
wounds affecting the internal organs such as heart, lung, liver, stomach and
part of intestine.[7]
Due to the presence of powder burns on the victim, Dr. Sosa opined that
the victim’s wounds could have been caused by a gun fired about two feet away
from the victim. The gravity of the
wounds, such as a ruptured heart, precluded the victim’s survival even if he
had been given immediate medical attention. The contusions and abrasion on various areas of the face could have been
caused by contact with a hard or rough surface like sand, stone, or a rough floor,
or possibly suffered from a fight. From
the victim’s body Dr. Sosa extracted three deformed lead pellets, each the size
of a corn kernel, and a piece of hard, white plastic.[8]
The parties
stipulated that in connection with the death of Rolando Sobreo, his family
spent P28,000.00 for the funeral services rendered by the Funeraria Filipinas,
as evidenced by a receipt (Exhibit “E”) issued by the latter, and P10,000.00
for the wake.[9]
Accused-appellant,
expectedly, told a different story, claiming he was a tricycle driver plying
the route along Esteban Street, near the public market. Since childhood, he had known the victim, a
kingpin in their area who acted as a bodyguard of a certain Max Gayak. On 6 or 7 June 1994, accused-appellant and
the victim were gambling at a place called Ariston Sison.[10] The victim allegedly lost P1,000.00
in a bet, blamed accused-appellant for the loss, then immediately left. Later, at around 5:00 p.m.,
accused-appellant again met the victim, also at Ariston Sison. The victim was then with another person,
while accused-appellant was with his son. In this second encounter, the victim charged that accused-appellant
cheated the former and thus demanded a return of his money from
accused-appellant. However,
accused-appellant replied that the money was gone and that, anyway, it was not
the victim’s money. The victim then
punched different parts of accused-appellant’s body, but the latter did not
retaliate as he was with his son. Afterwards, accused-appellant brought his son home, but returned later
to buy food. He saw the victim engaged in a “drinking session.” Although accused-appellant did not talk to
the victim, the former heard the latter say “hindi na ako sisikatan ng araw”
(meaning the sun would no longer shine on accused-appellant). Accused-appellant then “flared up” and
grabbed the victim’s gun which was lying on a bench near the victim, who then
likewise went for the gun. While the
two were grappling for the weapon, the gun went off, hitting the victim who
fell to the ground. Accused-appellant
threw the gun away and fled, as he did not know where to go. He saw neither Roberto Maxwell nor the
victim’s wife at the scene of the incident while fleeing from the area. While accused-appellant knew Roberto
Maxwell, the former never saw Roberto until the latter testified in court.[11]
On
cross-examination, accused-appellant stated that he saw what he claimed was the
victim’s gun, and identified it as a shotgun, not a sumpak. Furthermore, accused-appellant was three
meters away from the victim when accused-appellant heard the victim’s remark,
and that the victim was still talking when accused-appellant grabbed the gun;
moreover, (accused-appellant got hold of the gun ahead of the victim. Accused-appellant likewise admitted that he
was taller than the victim, and that he accused-appellant) had been previously
charged with a similar offense, but denied that it was committed with the use
of a sumpak.[12]
The trial court
gave full credit to the version of the prosecution and appreciated against
accused-appellant the qualifying circumstance of treachery, because of the
suddenness with which he shot the victim who was then unarmed and had no chance
of defending himself. The trial court likewise
considered accused-appellant’s running away after shooting the victim as flight
evidencing guilt or a guilty conscience. Thus, in its decision of 17 August 1995,[13] the trial court found
accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder;
sentenced him to reclusion perpetua; and ordered him to indemnify the
heirs of Rolando B. Sobreo in the amount of P50,000.00 without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, to pay the amount of P28,000.00 for funeral
expenses also without subsidiary imprisonment, and to pay the costs.
Accused-appellant
filed his notice of appeal[14] on 25 September 1995 and we
accepted the appeal in the resolution[15] of 27 November 1996.
In his
Appellant’s Brief filed on 26 June 1997,[16] accused-appellant contends that the
trial court gravely erred in: (a) giving full weight and credence to the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and in disregarding the theory of the
defense; and (b) finding accused-appellant guilty of murder despite the
insufficiency of the prosecution’s evidence. He argues that the trial court apparently relied on the weakness of the
defense and disregarded his claim that the victim was “a toughie and kingpin in
the community [who] confronted him regarding the loss of money in gambling,
boxed him on the different parts of his body and uttered to him, HINDI KA NA
SISIKATAN NG ARAW.” Accused-appellant explains that the victim’s remark was threatening for
it meant “you will die,” and that there was an immediate and actual peril to
accused-appellant as the victim was trying to reach for his shotgun. Thus accused-appellant reached for the gun
“(u)pon instinct of self-preservation and to save himself from an impending
death or injuries,” but in the course of the struggle for the weapon, it accidentally
went off and killed the victim. While accused-appellant admits his defense is
weak, it is, nevertheless, believable and in accord with common knowledge and
experience. In any event, the weakness of the defense should not be a basis for
conviction.
Accused-appellant
next cites a number of circumstances to assail the credibility of the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. As to Roberto Maxwell, despite his friendship with the victim, Roberto
did not offer to help bring the victim to the hospital; Roberto gave his
statement to the police on 20 June 1994, only about two weeks after the
occurrence of the incident; he had conveniently chosen that fateful day to
visit his friend whom he had not seen for a year; and he failed to appear in
court twice, and it was only after a warrant for his arrest was issued that he
finally came to court to testify.
Accused-appellant
likewise suggests that Arlene Sobreo’s testimony was contrived since she
“immediately mention[ed] the name of Roberto Maxwell when she had not even talk
[sic] to him and not seen him for one year.” Moreover, Arlene narrated that a neighbor, Bernadette Mata, told Arlene
that her husband was shot, and that a neighbor named Lito helped bring the
victim to the hospital, yet neither Bernadette nor Lito was presented as a
witness for the prosecution.
Finally,
accused-appellant maintains that granting arguendo that Roberto
Maxwell’s testimony was credible, it could not support a conviction for murder
since the elements of treachery were not proven,[17] i.e., the evidence did not
show that accused-appellant employed means to deprive the victim of the
opportunity to defend himself. In fact,
according to Roberto, the protagonists were standing face-to-face, hence the
victim had been “on guard” and would have been able to defend himself. Neither did the evidence indicate that
accused-appellant deliberately and consciously adopted the means of execution
of the offense, nor that there was a sudden attack against the victim. Thus accused-appellant concludes that
treachery was not proved and points to the rule that treachery cannot be
presumed but must be proved by clear and convincing evidence, as conclusively
as the killing itself.[18]
In the
Appellee’s Brief, the Solicitor General agreed with the trial court’s
assessment of the evidence. First, Roberto
Maxwell’s testimony was straightforward and consistent and he positively and
unhesitantly identified accused-appellant. Second, that Roberto chose that fateful day to visit the victim but
failed to help the victim and instead went home, were of no moment. Different people react differently to a
given situation, and there is no standard response when one is confronted with
a strange and startling experience; persons do not necessarily react uniformly
to a given situation and there is no standard rule by which witnesses to a
crime may react.[19] Besides, Maxwell was not shown to
have any motive to testify falsely against accused-appellant. Third, Maxwell’s testimony as to the
distance between accused-appellant and the victim was corroborated by Dr. Sosa’s
conclusion that the victim was close to his assailant when the former was
shot. Likewise militating against
accused-appellant was his denial that a sumpak was used, when a plastic
material and “corn-sized pellets,” not bullet slugs, were recovered from the
victim’s body.
The Solicitor,
however, disagrees with the trial court’s finding of murder, for it was not
conclusively proved that the attack was sudden; and even if it were, frontally
or from behind, it was not shown that such mode of attack was coolly and
deliberately adopted by accused-appellant with the purpose of depriving the
victim of a chance either to fight or to retreat. Accused-appellant then could
only be convicted of the lesser offense of homicide, without any mitigating or
aggravating circumstance.
Accused-appellant
explains in his Reply Brief[20] that there is no issue as to his
identification since he admits to accidentally killing the victim. Neither is there an issue as to the distance
between him and the victim as he concedes they were grappling for the weapon
when it went off, thus Dr. Sosa’s theory as to the distance between the victim
and his assailant should not be deemed corroborative of Maxwell’s
testimony. Accused-appellant argues
that the pellets and piece of plastic recovered from the victim should not be
deemed to militate against his credibility, despite his claim that the victim’s
gun was a shotgun, not a sumpak. Regardless of whether the weapon was a shotgun or a sumpak,
accused-appellant emphasizes that a gun was the cause of the victim’s accidental death. Accused-appellant instead insists that attention should be
focused on the credibility of the prosecution witnesses.
The first
assigned error is without merit.
In his defense,
while accused-appellant expressly admits having killed Rolando Sobreo, he
interposes a combination of accident and what appears to be self-defense; the
second is a justifying circumstance under paragraph 1 of Article 11, while the
first is an exempting circumstance under paragraph 4 of Article 12, both of the
Revised Penal Code. Where an accused
admits killing the victim but invokes self-defense, it is incumbent upon him to
prove by clear and convincing evidence that he acted in self-defense; and as
the burden of the evidence is thus shifted to him, he must rely on the strength
of his own evidence and not on the weakness of that of the prosecution[21] for, even if the latter were weak,
it could not be disbelieved after the accused’s open admission of
responsibility for the killing. Thus,
to successfully invoke self-defense, the accused’s evidence must prove the
existence of the essential requisites thereof, namely: (1) unlawful aggression
on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to
prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the
person defending himself.[22]
Unlawful
aggression presupposes an actual, sudden and unexpected attack, or an imminent
danger thereof, and not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude.[23] Unlawful aggression is a condition sine
qua non for the justifying circumstance of self-defense. In other words, there can be no
self-defense, complete or incomplete, unless the victim has committed unlawful
aggression against the person defending himself. Simply put, unlawful aggression is indispensable, it being the
main ingredient of self-defense.[24]
Accused-appellant
suggests that the victim provided unlawful aggression when the latter remarked
“Hindi ka na sisikatan ng araw” then reached for his gun. While the remark may be construed as a
threat or intimidation, it could not, under the foregoing criteria, qualify as
unlawful aggression. As to the victim’s
reaching for the shotgun, accused-appellant candidly admitted that he got hold
of the gun ahead of the victim and while the latter was talking. In fact, we do not even believe that the
firearm belonged to the victim.
It may be
pointed out that at 5:00 p.m. of that fateful day of 7 June 1994, when
accused-appellant and the victim met again, an altercation between them ensued,
with the victim getting the better of accused-appellant in front of the
latter’s son. Accused-appellant then
brought his son home, but later returned to where the victim was, allegedly to buy
food. To our mind, however, this was a
flimsy excuse to justify his return. What the evidence and the common experience of man strongly suggest is
that accused-appellant returned, this time armed, to avenge the humiliation he
suffered at the victim’s hands. Indeed,
if accused-appellant did not own the firearm as he claimed, he could have
surrendered it to the authorities, yet he failed to do so. Further, while he testified that he threw
the gun away, he inexplicably could not point even to the general vicinity of
where he threw it, which he could have done either after his arrest or on the
witness stand. It goes without saying
that recovery of the firearm would go far in bolstering his allegation that the
firearm was not a sumpak. But
what is most telling for accused-appellant is that if there was sufficient
provocation here, it came from him. Plainly, when accused-appellant left to bring his son home, any form of
provocation or aggression from the victim had already ended. Thus, by the time accused-appellant
returned, he was the aggressor.
Accused-appellant’s
invocation of accident deserves scant consideration. Under paragraph 4 of Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code, a
person who, while performing a lawful act with due care, causes an injury by
accident without fault or intention of causing it, is exempt from criminal
liability. Having ruled, however, that
self-defense was not present, then it cannot be said that accused-appellant was
performing a lawful act.
The attempt to
discredit Roberto Maxwell’s testimony must likewise fail. The oft-repeated rule is that the
credibility of witnesses is a question left to the appraisal of the trial
court, and its findings on the matter are generally accorded great weight and
respect on appeal.[25] Maxwell was frank throughout his
direct examination and consistent during cross-examination. That Maxwell did not immediately relate his
story to the police, or that he twice failed to be present in court to testify,
does not render his testimony incredible. The natural reluctance of most people to get involved in a criminal case
is now of judicial notice,[26] yet this same reticence does not
devalue the credibility of those people as witnesses.
Maxwell’s
failure to give aid to his fallen friend and compadre likewise cannot
impair his credibility. As the Solicitor
General has pointed out, different people react differently to the same
situation, and there is no standard reaction to a startling experience.[27]
As regards the
alleged “coincidence” of Maxwell’s having chosen that fateful day to visit the
victim, neither may this affect Maxwell’s credibility. After all, the prosecution did not even
impute, much less, prove, any ill-motive Maxwell might have had for him to
testify falsely against accused-appellant. In fact, accused-appellant stressed that Maxwell was a friend of the
victim. And it has been observed that a
person who was close to the victim would not callously violate his conscience
to avenge the death of a dear one by blaming it on someone he believed innocent
thereof.[28]
We agree,
however, with accused-appellant and the Solicitor General that treachery was
not duly proved. To qualify a killing
to murder it must be shown that the same was committed with either treachery or
evident premeditation, or cruelty; or in consideration of a price, reward or
promise; or through means involving great waste or ruin, or on the occasion of
a calamity.[29] The trial court ruled that
treachery attended the killing of Rolando Sobreo. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes
against persons employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof,
which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to
himself arising from defense which the offended party might make.[30] Treachery cannot be presumed, it
must be proved by clear and convincing evidence or as conclusively as the
killing itself. Thus, where no
particulars are shown as to the manner by which the aggression was commenced or
how the act which resulted in the death of the victim began and developed,
treachery can in no way be established from mere suppositions, drawn solely
from circumstances prior to the killing.[31] Thus here, on the basis of the
testimony of eyewitness Roberto Maxwell, treachery was not proven. Accused-appellant and the victim were
standing face-to-face, and taking into account the previous incident as
testified to by accused-appellant, which, logically, made the victim expect
some form of retaliation from accused-appellant, it cannot be said that the
victim was unprepared to put up a defense or that accused-appellant employed
means or methods of attack which tended directly and specially to ensure its
execution without risk to himself arising from the defense which the victim
might make.
The crime thus
committed is only homicide, not murder as held by the trial court.
The trial court
was likewise in error when it considered accused-appellant’s running away from
the scene of the crime immediately after the killing as flight
indicative of a guilty conscience. There is here a misconception of the concept of flight as evidence of
guilt. It must be stressed that not all
flight indicates guilt. Only
where such is done to escape from the authorities or to evade prosecution,[32] and not merely to run away from the
scene of the crime, will flight be deemed a badge of guilt. In the instant case, while accused-appellant
did run away from the scene of the crime, he did not flee to some other place
to escape from the authorities or to avoid prosecution; in fact, the unrebutted
evidence is that he simply went home. Thus, on direct examination, he declared:
ATTY. AGBUNAG:
Q After the shooting took place, may I again ask you where did you go after that (sic)?
PROSECUTOR:
Q Already answered, He run (sic) away.
ATTY. AGBUNAG:
Q Did you not meet anybody on your way home after the incident?
A I did not. I went home straight.[33]
Notably, the prosecution did not even offer evidence that the police
authorities encountered difficulty in enforcing the warrant of arrest of
accused-appellant.
Finally, there is
no evidence that any aggravating or mitigating circumstance attended the
killing of the victim. Accordingly, the
penalty for the offense, which is reclusion temporal under Article 249
of the Revised Penal Code, may be imposed in its medium period upon accused-appellant
pursuant to Article 64 of the said Code. However, accused-appellant is entitled to the benefits provided for by
the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is GRANTED, in
part, and the challenged decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite City,
Branch 17, is hereby MODIFIED. As
modified, accused-appellant ALBERTO CARIO @ Enteng is hereby declared
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of homicide as defined
and penalized in Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code; and considering the
absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance, and applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate
penalty ranging from EIGHT (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor medium
as minimum to FOURTEEN (14) years, and eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal medium as maximum, with all the accessory penalties provided by
law. The rest of the challenged
decision is affirmed.
No pronouncement
as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
[1] Original Record (OR), 52-57; Rollo,
13-23. Per Judge Rolando D. Diaz.
[2] Rollo, 3; OR, 1.
[3] TSN, 7 March 1995, 3-12.
[4] TSN, 22 March 1995, 3-6.
[5] Id., 6; Exhibit “B,” OR, 35.
[6] Exhibit “C,” OR, 36.
[7] OR, 36.
[8] TSN, 27 March 1995, 4-7.
[9] Id., 8
[10] Accused-appellant also referred to
the place as Ariston Street, TSN, 24 April 1995, 8.
[11] TSN, 24 April 1995, 3-16.
[12] Id., 16-18; 25-29.
[13] Supra note 1.
[14] Rollo, 24.
[15] Id., 26-A.
[16] Contributing to the delay in the
filing of the Appellant’s Brief was the transmittal of incomplete records by
the Clerk of Court of the trial court, for which reason she was made to explain
and later admonished.
[17] Citing People v. Cuyo, 196 SCRA 447 [1991]; People v. Daquipil, G.R. Nos. 86305-06, 20
January 1995.
[18] Citing People v. Tiozon, 198 SCRA 368 [1991].
[19] Citing People v. Paguntalan, 242 SCRA 753 [1995];
People v.
Cabrera, 241 SCRA 28 [1995]; People v. Gomez, 251 SCRA 455 [1995].
[20] Rollo, 115-118.
[21] People v. de la Cruz, 207
SCRA 632, 646 [1992]; People v. Ybeas, 213 SCRA 793, 801 [1993]; People v. Boniao, 217 SCRA
653, 665-666 [1993]; People v. Gomez, 235 SCRA 444, 451[1994].
[22] People v. Ybeas, supra
note 21; People v. Boniao, supra note 21; People v. Gomez,
supra note 21; People v. Galas, 262 SCRA 381, 403 [1996];
People v. Tobias, 267 SCRA 229, 255 [1997].
[23] People v. Boniao, supra
note 21.
[24] People v. Boniao, supra
note 21.
[25] People v. Quijada, 259 SCRA
191, 212-213 [1996]; People v. Soria, 262 SCRA 739, 751 [1996].
[26] People v. Cortes, 226 SCRA
91, 99 [1993]. See also People v. Viente, 225 SCRA 361, 370
[1993].
[27] See People v. Garcia,
258 SCRA 411, 418-419 [1996].
[28] See People v. Boniao,
217 SCRA 653, 670-671 [1993].
[29] Art. 248, Revised Penal
Code.
[30] Article 14(16), Revised Penal Code.
[31] People v. Narit, 197 SCRA
334, 351 [1991].
[32] People v. Garcia, 215 SCRA
349, 362 [1992].
[33] TSN, 24 April 1995, 28.