372 Phil. 401
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
“The parcel of land involved in this case is located in Tindig na Mangga, Las Piñas, Metro Manila, with an area of 996,175 square meters, more or less, and covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 4216.Motions for reconsideration were filed by petitioner, movant-intervenor Firestone Ceramics, et al. and movant-intervenor Alejandro Q. Rey, however, the respondent Court denied for lack of merit all the motions in a Resolution dated October 28, 1996.[4]Alleged, among others, in the petition are that:
“5. The Municipality of Las Piñas, Rizal, now Metro Manila, was originally classified as a forest land and out of 2,556 hectares comprising it, 1,200 hectares were declared A and D lands in 1928 under LC Map No. 766, Project 13. The rest of the municipality was declassified as forest land and declared A and D lands only on January 3, 1968 under LC Map No. 2623, Project 13-A, pursuant to FAO No. 4-1141.
“6. It appears that on March 26, 1929, the spouses Lorenzo J. Gana and Maria Juliana Carlos obtained a certificate of title over 996,175 square meters of land located in Tindig na Mangga, Las Piñas, Metro Manila, under OCT No. 4216.
“7. The land ‘covered by said title was purportedly surveyed on November 17, 1925 under plan Psu-49273, approved on May 12, 1926; that in 1927, they filed an application for registration of said land; that the case was docketed as Land Registration Case No. 672, Record No. 30406; and that allegedly on the basis of the decision rendered therein (see Certification re unavailability of copy of decision, Annex B), Decree No. 351823, OCT No. 4216 was issued on March 26, 1929 to the aforesaid spouses.
“8. On the basis of investigations conducted by the then Bureau of Lands, now Lands Management Bureau, it was found that the property covered by OCT No. 4216 was, at the time of its issuance on March 26, 1929, still formed part of the forest zone and, hence, incapable of registration as private property.“8.1. Thus, it was only on January 3, 1968 when that portion of the Municipality of Las Piñas, which includes the property embraced by OCT No. 4216, was declassified from its category as forest land and declared A and D land under LC Map No. 2623, Project 13-A, pursuant to FAO No. 4-1141.
“8.2. Even assuming, however, that the same property was included in the area declared as A and D land in 1928 under LC Map No. 766, Project 13, still it could not be the subject of registration since possession thereof prior to 1928, when it was still within the forest zone, could not ripen into private ownership.”Private respondent Virginia E. Villongco, in behalf of the other private respondents filed a “MANIFESTATION WITH MOTION TO DISMISS” alleging that the issue raised in this petition which is the validity of OCT No. 4216 has already been passed upon by the Supreme Court in two cases: G.R. No. 109490 entitled “Patricinio E. Margolles, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al.” decided in their favor on February 14, 1994 and G.R. No. 112036 entitled “Golden Rod, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, et al. wherein the petition which questions the validity of OCT No. 4216 was denied.On June 28, 1996, the respondent Court rendered the assailed decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:[3]
Private respondent PELTAN DEVELOPMENT, INC., thru counsel filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that:I
THIS HONORABLE COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER OR NATURE OF THE PRESENT ACTION OF THE GOVERNMENT.II
THE VENUE OF THE PRESENT ACTION OF THE GOVERNMENT IS IMPROPERLY LAID BEFORE THIS HONORABLE COURT.III
THE PRESENT ACTION OF THE GOVERNMENT IS BARRED BY PRIOR JUDGMENT AND/OR BY STARE DECISIS.
In the private respondent’s Supplemental Motion to Dismiss an additional reason for the dismissal of the petition is that:“failure to attach to the petition a certified true copy of the decision sought to be annulled is a fatal defect for the Court has no basis on which to rule that the alleged judgment is null and void.The petitioner claims that the said judgment is fatally defective in that it ordered the registration of forest land in the name of the Gana spouses.
Indeed, such claim may be a mere conjecture as there is no copy of the questioned decision which this Court could examine in order to determine why such judgment is null and void. As pointed out by the private respondents, what if the decision stated that the land is alienable and disposable public land, or that the Director of Land and Director of Forestry did oppose the Gana spouses’ aforesaid application for registration but failed to prove that it was forest land or that the Gana spouses submitted a valid title under the Spanish regime or that they were already owners of the said parcel of land upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States of America.
Before this Court in the present proceedings, was filed a motion for leave to intervene by Firestone Ceramics, Inc., Boomtown Development Corporation, Spouses Cynthia Ching and Ching Tiong Keng, Spouses Carmen Soco and Lorenzo Ong Eng Chong, Spouses Soledad Yu and Yu Sy Chia and Leticia Nocom Chan. They claim that they have a direct and material interest in the property under litigation because they own 18.8 hectares more or less thereof, covered by various titles in their names derived from the decision of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal dated July 22, 1969 in Land Registration Case No. N-6625 in which OCT No. A-S-47 was issued, and the said portion of 18.8 hectares within OCT No. 4216 must be excluded from the area to be reverted to the government, and if the position of the government is upheld, and OCT No. 4216 is nullified, their titles “become the only title to the 188,254 square meters in litigation.”
Private respondents opposed the aforesaid motion for intervention on the ground that the movants’ said titles, derived from OCT No. A-S-47, were nullified in the decision of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 109490 entitled “Patrocinio Margolles, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al.” (230 SCRA 97) which decision is final and in view of such finality, the titles of the movants can no longer be revived.
A motion for leave to admit attached complaint in intervention was also filed by intervenor Alejandro Rey adopting the government’s petition seeking the nullification of private respondents’ title based on OCT No. 4216, without prejudice to his free patent application over a portion of the land covered by the private respondents’ titles.
Private respondents also opposed the complaint for intervention of Alejandro Rey for the reason that there is a pending case filed by him against private respondents in Civil Case No. LP-8852-P before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig and having chosen such forum to ventilate his complaint he should not be allowed to participate in this case.”
“WHEREFORE, THE PETITION IS DISMISSED FOR LACK OF MERIT. THE MOTION FOR INTERVENTION OF FIRESTONE CERAMICS, INC., ET AL. AND THE COMPLAINT FOR INTERVENTION OF ALEJANDRO REY, ARE LIKEWISE DENIED. NO PRONOUCEMENT AS TO COSTS.”
“As regards the motion for intervention, as previously discussed, the decision in G.R. No. 109490 is final. This means that the movants’ titles, adverse to OCT No. 4216, have been nullified. Such titles having been nullified, the same could no longer be revived. Intervention in this proceeding will not reinstate or revive the movants’ titles derived from OCT No. A-S-47. They, therefore, no longer have any legal interest in the subject matter of this suit to justify their intervention in this case.”Intervention is not a matter of right but may be permitted by the Courts when the applicant shows facts which satisfy the requirements of the law authorizing intervention.[6] Under Section 1 Rule 19 of the Revised Rules of Court, what qualifies a person to intervene is his possession of a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or when he is situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof. As regards the legal interest as qualifying factor, this Court has ruled that such interest must be of direct and immediate character not merely contingent or expectant so that the intervenor will either gain or lose by the direct legal operation of the judgment.[7] Petitioners Firestone Ceramics, Inc., et al., failed to show such interest considering the decision in the Margolles case (G.R. No. 109490) where petitioners Firestone Ceramics Inc., et al were the plaintiffs, in which case, this Court upheld the validity of OCT No. 4216, declaring petitioners’ (Firestone Ceramics, Inc., et al) titles adverse to OCT No. 4216 as null and void. With the declaration of petitioners’ titles as void they have no more legal interest in the matter in litigation, since their titles may no longer be revived regardless of the outcome of the main petition of the petitioner Republic.
“As to Alejandro Rey, his filing of an earlier suit against the private respondents bars him from intervening in this case. He has chosen his forum and cannot litigate his claims in another forum. Since he has not shown any right or interest in the subject property he cannot have a legal interest therein to warrant his intervention. Assuming that the government were to prevail in this case it does not necessarily follow that his application for free patent would be approved.”Petitioner Rey’s intervention in the present proceedings was anchored on his legal interest arising from his pending application for a free patent of a portion of the subject land. A mere collateral interest in the subject matter of the litigation cannot justify intervention.[9] Petitioner Rey admitted that he had instituted a substantially similar case against the private respondents herein (Peltan Development Corporation, et al) with the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City docketed as Civil Case No. LP-8852-P and notably, this case had reached this Court by way of a petition for review docketed as G.R. No. 117029, entitled Peltan Development, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., where Alejandro Rey was a private respondent. A decision was promulgated on March 19, 1997 where this Court categorically ruled that private respondents therein (including herein Petitioner Alejandro Rey) had no cause of action to assail the validity of O.C.T. No. 4216 in view of the ruling in Margolles (supra) upholding the validity of said title. Additionally, this Court also held in Peltan that Alejandro Rey, et al. are not the real parties-in-interest to assail the validity of the titles of herein private respondents, whose titles were derived from said O.C.T. 4216, the validity of which in turn was upheld in the Margolles case.
The principal and crucial issue to be resolved in the Republic’s petition is the applicability of this Court’s decision in the Margolles case[10] to the case now before us.
A. PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT RES JUDICATA APPLIES TO THE PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT AND CANCELLATION OF TITLES AND REVERSION; B. PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT PETITIONER FAILED TO PROVE THE GROUNDS FOR ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT.
“A perusal of the decision dated February 14, 1994 of the Supreme Court in G. R. No. 109490 entitled “Patrocinio E. Margolles, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al.” discloses that the matter regarding the alleged invalidity of OCT No. 4216 in relation to LC Map No. 2623 (Project 13-A) and FAO No. 4-1141 had been passed upon by the Supreme Court in this wise:Clearly, this Court had already made a declaration on the genuineness and validity of OCT No. 4216 and the titles derived therefrom by private respondents in the Margolles case promulgated in 1994. In fact, two (2) petitions for review filed separately which involved the legality of OCT No. 4216 were dismissed by this Court,[14] invoking the Margolles ruling. Well-settled is the rule enunciated in Church Assistance Program, Inc. vs. Sibulo,[15] that -
‘The private respondents maintain, nonetheless, that OCT No. 4216, issued in favor of the spouses Gana and Carlos, is invalid, so covering, as it supposedly did, unclassified public lands. Here, the private respondents base their claim on Forestry Administration Order (FAO) No. 4-1141-(1968), implementing LC Map No. 2623, Project No. 13-A. According to them, Las Piñas comprises 2,556 hectares, out of which 1,200 hectares have been declared alienable and disposable public lands in 1928, under LC Map No. 766, Project 13, and that `Tindig na Mangga’ has not been covered thereby until the reclassification in 1968. As such, they submit, the Court of First Instance of Rizal, sitting as Land Registration Court in 1929, did not acquire jurisdiction to adjudicate the property in question to the petitioner’s predecessors-in-interest.
“No cogent proof, however, has been given to support the above contention. To the contrary, in fact, is the letter, dated 27 April 1988, of then Solicitor General Francisco Chavez, which in part, reads:`Thirdly, it is also alleged that the title is null and void because it allegedly covers land within the forest zone. There is no clear-cut proof to that effect. The certification of Mr. Rogelio dela Rosa of the Timber Management Division, Bureau of Forest Development, dated July 31, 1979, simply states `that the tract of land situated in Barrio Tindig na Mangga, Las Piñas, Metro Manila containing an area of 197.525 square meters as shown and described on this plan Psu-04-006417 x x x was found to be within the Alienable or Disposable Block of LC Project 13-A of Las Piñas, Rizal certified as such on January 3, 1968 per BFD Map LC-2623.’ The certification refers to land with an area of only 19.7525 hectares. It does not state the relationship of said land with the land covered by OCT No. 4216 which has an area of 99.6157 hectares.“Unfortunately, for all concerned, no authentic copy of LC Map No. 766, Project 13, could be presented, albeit understandably, considering that even the records of the National Mapping and Resource Authority (NAMREA) have apparently been lost or destroyed during the second World War.x x x x x x x x x
`Fifthly, the recommendation of the Director of Lands for the cancellation of OCT No. 4216 is premised mainly on the allegation that the land is within the forest zone, having been allegedly released as A & D land only 1968. But the recommendation is based on the same certification of Mr. Dela Rosa of the Bureau of Forest Development which, as earlier observed, does not make any clear reference to the land covered by OCT No. 4216 and is, therefore, vague and inconclusive.’
“In Sta. Monica Industrial and Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals (a case to annul a 1912 decision of the land registration court), the Republic sought to prove that, at the time an original certificate of title was issued, the land covered thereby was still within the forest zone. It offered as evidence a land classification map prepared by the Director of Forestry in 1961. The Court ruled:`x x x. When the proceedings were originally filed by the Republic before the Court of Appeals, the petitioner contended that when the decree in favor of De Perio was issued by Judge Ostrand in 1912 the parcels of land were still part of the inalienable public forests. However, petitioner’s case rested solely on land classification maps drawn several years after the issuance of the decree in 1912. These maps failed to conclusively establish the actual classification of the land in 1912 and the years prior to that. Before this Court, petitioner reiterates said contention and refers, for the first time, to a 1908 proclamation reserving the land in Zambales as a naval reservation and alleging that the subject parcels of land are parts thereof. These x x x are insufficient to overcome the legal presumption in favor of the decree’s regularity x x x.’“Furthermore, FAO No. 4-1141, signed by then Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources Arturo R. Tanco, Jr., on 03 January 1968, provides:`1. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 1827 of the Revised Administrative Code, I hereby declare as alienable or disposable and place the same under the control of the Bureau of Lands for administration and disposition in accordance with the Public Land Act, subject to private rights, if any there be and to the conditions herein specified, the portions of the public domain situated in the Municipalities of x x x Las Piñas, x x x Province of Rizal x x x which are designated and described as alienable on Bureau of Forestry Map LC-2623, approved on January 3, 1968.’“The issuance of OCT No. 4216 in 1929, conferring a private right, is then amply protected by FAO No. 4-1141; otherwise certificates of title issued prior to 1968 could possibly be all nullified.”
“When right or fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, so long as it remains unreversed, it should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them in law or estate”.The Margolles case had long become final, thus the validity of OCT No. 4216 should no longer be disturbed and should be applied in the instant case based on the principle of res judicata or, otherwise, the rule on conclusiveness of judgment. The less familiar concept or less terminological usage of res judicata as a rule on conclusiveness of judgment refers to the situation where the judgment in the prior action operates as an estoppel only as to the matters actually determined therein or which were necessarily included therein.[16]
“x x x where the one who is offering a judgment as an estoppel and the party against whom it is being offered were both parties to the action, in which such judgment was rendered, it is no objection that the action included some additional parties who are joined in the second case. Conversely, the operation of the final judgment or order in a previous case is not altered by the fact that somebody who was not a party in that first action has been impleaded in the second case.”Significantly, this Court in upholding the validity of OCT No. 4216 in the Margolles case took into account the letters of former Solicitors-General Estelito Mendoza and Francisco Chavez stating that the information and documents submitted to the Office of the Solicitor General by the Bureau of Lands and the Land Registration Commission were not sufficient to support an action for cancellation of OCT No. 4216 and the derivative titles thereof.[20] Petitioner does not allege that it has new evidence or documents which would support their present case for annulment that was not considered in the earlier case. Petitioner’s case rests basically on the same declaration in FAO No. 4-1141 declassifying the property embraced by OCT 4216 in 1968. Thus, the fact that petitioner was not a party in the Margolles case would not bar the operation of the principle of res judicata.
“We need not emphasize the fact that the Supreme Court by tradition and in our system of judicial administration, has the last word on what the law is. It is the final arbiter of any justiciable controversy. There is only one Supreme Court from whose decisions all other courts should take their bearings. Consequently, we cannot and should not review a case already passed upon by the Highest Tribunal. It is only proper to allow the case to take its rest.”[25]WHEREFORE, the instant petitions filed by the Republic through the Office of the Solicitor General in G.R. No. 127245, and of Firestone Ceramics, Inc. et al, and Alejandro B. Rey in G.R. No. 127022 are DENIED for lack of merit.