526 Phil. 191
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
WHEREFORE, decision is hereby rendered adjudging the validity of the following:On July 12, 1999, petitioners filed a Notice of Appeal which was given due course per Order dated July 15, 1999.
a) the deeds of sale dated August 11, 1947 and January 30, 1954 the former executed by Federico Gesmundo before notary public in favor of her (sic) stepmother Salome Sahagun; b) the two (2) Deeds of Partition with sale dated February 1, 1952 and January 9, 1957 executed by all the heirs of Felix Gesmundo, Sr. before a notary public;
Declaring that plaintiffs [herein petitioners] have no cause of action whatsoever against herein defendants [herein respondents] as to the properties of the deceased Felix Gesmundo, Sr. as their forbears Federico Gesmundo and Manuel Gesmundo during their lifetime had ceded, transferred and conveyed all their rights, ownership and participation in the properties of Felix Gesmundo, Sr., subjects of this suit.
Ordering defendants to deliver two-sixths (2/6) or one-third (1/3) portion of the parcel of land situated at Barangay Sta. Catalina under Tax Declaration No. 40-609 to the heirs of Federico Gesmundo namely Ronaldo Gesmundo, Reynaldo Gesmundo and the heirs of Rodolfo Gesmundo, namely, his wife Zenaida del Rosario Gesmundo and children Herminigilda, Belinda, Jayson, Arnulfo and Joan all surnamed Gesmundo and represented by Belinda Gesmundo as attorney-in-fact; and to the heirs of Manuel Gesmundo now Manuel Gesmundo, Sr. namely his wife Resurreccion Evangelista Gesmundo and children Melanie, Mario and Manuel, Jr., all surnamed Gesmundo represented by Manuel, Jr. as attorney-in-fact.
Ordering the parties named above to conduct a subdivision of said lot covered by Tax Declaration No. 40-609 in order to determine the metes and bounds of the portions respectively belonging to them.
All expenses to be incurred in the accomplishment of this division shall be borne proportionately by the parties.
For insufficiency of evidence, claims and counterclaims of damages are ordered dismissed.
Without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. [3] (Emphasis ours)
True, appellants have dispatched their motion for reconsideration as well as their appellants' brief on December 29, 2000, which is the last day allowed by law within which to file their motion for reconsideration. It must be noted however that the carrier of the motion was the Airfreight 2100, Inc., which is admittedly a private messengerial delivery service.Hence, this petition for review on certiorari on the ground that the CA erred in dismissing the appeal and denying petitioners' omnibus motion for reconsideration.
Section 4 of Rule 3 of the Revised Internal Rules of this Court provides:"Section 4. Other Modes of Filing. – Pleadings, motions and other papers sent by ordinary mail, by private messengerial services, or by any mode other than personal delivery or registered mail, shall be deemed filed only on the date and time they are actually received by the Court. The date and time of actual receipt shall be stamped and signed by the receiving clerk." (Underline Ours).The subject omnibus motion for reconsideration was received by this Court on January 3, 2001 at 10:59 a.m. This means that the said pleading was filed only on January 3, 2001, and not on December 29, 2000 which is the date of its dispatch. Stated otherwise, the omnibus motion was filed five (5) days late.
WHEREFORE, for having been filed out of time, the omnibus motion for reconsideration is DENIED and the appellants' brief thereto attached is DENIED ADMISSION. Our dismissal resolution of November 21, 2000 is thus REITERATED. Said resolution having become final and executory, the Division Clerk of Court is hereby ordered to make the corresponding entry of judgment.
SO ORDERED.[4]
Petitioners never denied the CA finding that their motion for reconsideration was filed beyond the fifteen-day reglementary period. On that point alone, the CA is correct in denying due course to said motion. The motion having been belatedly filed, the CA Decision had then attained finality. Thus, in Abalos vs. Philex Mining Corporation, we held that:The foregoing ruling finds exact application in the present case.x x x Nothing is more settled in law than that once a judgment attains finality it thereby becomes immutable and unalterable. It may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by the highest court of the land.[7] (Emphasis ours)
x x x Failure to interpose a timely appeal (or motion for reconsideration) renders the assailed decision, order or award final and executory that deprives the appellate body of any jurisdiction to alter the final judgment. x x x This rule "is applicable indiscriminately to one and all since the rule is grounded on fundamental consideration of public policy and sound practice that at the risk of occasional error, the judgment of courts and award of quasi-judicial agencies must become final at some definite date fixed by law." x x x Although, in a few instances, the Court has disregarded procedural lapses so as to give due course to appeals filed beyond the reglementary period, x x x the Court did so on the basis of strong and compelling reasons, such as serving the ends of justice and preventing a grave miscarriage thereof.In the present petition, no convincing argument was presented to show that the trial court erred in finding that petitioners' predecessors-in-interest had validly disposed of their shares in the estate of Felix Gesmundo, Sr. by executing a Deed of Sale dated August 11, 1947 and two deeds of partition dated February 1, 1952 and January 9, 1957, respectively, hence, petitioners only have inheritance rights over the conjugal share of the deceased first wife of Felix Gesmundo, Sr.. Verily, the instant case is not meritorious enough to deserve relaxation of the rules regarding timeliness of the filing of a motion for reconsideration.