554 Phil. 323
PER CURIAM:
As an officer of the court, I am shocked beyond my senses to realize that such a wrongful and unjust decision has been rendered with you no less as the ponente. This terrible decision will go down in the annals of jurisprudence as an egregious example of how the Supreme Court, supposedly the last vanguard and bulwark of justice is itself made, wittingly or unwittingly, as a party to the wrongdoing by giving official and judicial sanction and conformity to the unjust claims of the Zuzuarreguis. We cannot fathom how such a decision could have been arrived at except through considerations other than the pure merits of the case. Every law student reading through the case can see clearly how a brother lawyer in the profession had been so short-changed by, ironically, the most sacred and highest institution in the administration and dispensation of justice.The decision referred to in the letter is the Court's decision[3] in these consolidated cases where Attys. Roxas and Santiago N. Pastor were ordered to return, among others, to Antonio de Zuzuarregui, Jr., et al. the amount of P17,073,224.84.
x x x x
This is an unjust and unfair decision, to say the least. x x x We cry out in disbelief that such an impossible decision could spring forth from the Supreme Court, the ultimate administrator and last bulwark of justice. As it stands, instead of being an administrator of justice, the Supreme Court is ironically a dispenser of injustice.
Under the circumstances, we hope you will forgive us in expressing our sentiment in this manner as we are utterly frustrated and dismayed by the elementary injustice being foisted upon us by the Supreme Court, no less. Given the facts of the case, we will never understand what moved the Honorable Justice to decide as she did and what forces and influences caused her to reason out her decision in such an unfair and unjust manner as to compromise the reputation, integrity and dignity itself of the Supreme Court, as a venerable institution of justice.
As lawyers, we are officers of the Court so that, while we are being underservedly pained by the seething injustice of the decision, we will submit to the authority of Highest Court of the Land, even as our reverence for it has been irreversibly eroded, thanks to your Honor's Judgment.
x x x x
As for Your Honor, sleep well if you still can. In the end, those we address as Honorable Justice in this earthly life will [be] judged by the Supreme Dispenser of Justice – where only the merits of Your Honor's life will be relevant and material and where technicalities can shield no one from his or her wrongdoings.
Good day to you, Madame Justice!
This is an unjust and unfair decision, to say the least. x x x We cry out in disbelief that such an impossible decision could spring forth from the Supreme Court, the ultimate administrator and last bulwark of justice. As it stands, instead of being an administrative of justice, the Supreme Court will ironically be a dispenser of injustice.Said letter was indorsed to the Clerk of Court of the First Division for its inclusion in the agenda.[14]
Under the circumstances, we cannot avoid to suspect the bias and partiality of the ponente of the case who we surmise must have been moved by considerations, other than noble.
In this regard, Mr. Chief Justice, we implore Your Honor, as steward of the Highest Court of the land, to take appropriate steps to forthwith correct this anomalous decision by first, referring the case to the Supreme Court En Banc, and then, after allowing us the opportunity to be heard orally En Banc and after judiciously considering our "Urgent and Compelling Motion for Reconsideration", thereafter reversing the decision of this Honorable Court's First Division.
Finally, in order to cleanse the Supreme Court of the blot caused by this case, we most ardently implore upon Your Honor to immediately direct the conduct of an investigation of how such an impossible decision was rendered at all and to sanction the perpetrators thereon.
As the Chief Justice, we have faith in you, Sir, to rectify a grievous wrong inflicted upon a member of the Bar and to restore the good image and reputation of the Court by causing the High Court to reverse such an inconceivable decision that is unfair, unjust and illegal, being an [impairment] of the obligation of contracts and against the principle of estoppel.
With all due respect to this Honorable Court, and beyond my personal grievances, I submit that the ruling in the subject consolidated cases may not have met the standards or adhered to the basic characteristics of fair and just decision, such as objectivity, neutrality and conformity to the laws and the constitution. x x xAfter reviewing the records of these cases, We firmly stand by our decision which Atty. Roxas described to be unjust, unfair and impossible, and arrived at through considerations other than the pure merits of the case. Atty. Roxas's insistence that said decision did not meet the standards or adhered to the basic characteristics of fair and just decision, such as objectivity, neutrality and conformity to the laws and the Constitution, is simply without basis. The fact that the decision was not in his favor does not mean that the same was contrary to our laws and was not rendered in a fair and impartial manner.
x x x x
Aside from the fact that the aforesaid ruling appears to be seriously flawed, it also casts grave aspersions on my personal and professional integrity and honor as a lawyer, officer of the court and advocate of justice.
x x x x
These implications, Your Honors, which I find hard to accept, have caused me severe anxiety, distress and depredation and have impelled me to exercise my right to express a legitimate grievance or articulate a bona fide and fair criticism of this Honorable Court's ruling.
While certain statements, averments and/or declarations in my 13 September 2006 letter may have been strongly-worded and construed by this Honorable Court as tending to ascribe aspersions on the person of the Honorable Associate Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario, may I assure Your Honors that no such ascription was ever intended by the undersigned.
Quite notably, despite my aggrieved sentiments and exasperated state, I chose to ventilate my criticisms of the assailed ruling in a very discreet and private manner. Accordingly, instead of resorting to public criticism through media exposure, I chose to write a personal letter confined to the hallowed halls of the highest tribunal of the land and within the bounds of decency and propriety. This was done in good faith with no intention whatsoever to offend any member, much less tarnish the image of this Honorable Court.
Nonetheless, it is with humble heart and a repentant soul that I express my sincerest apologies not only to the individual members of this Honorable Court but also to the Supreme Court as a revered institution and ultimate dispenser of justice.
As earlier explained, I was merely exercising my right to express a legitimate grievance or articulate a bona fide and fair criticism of this Honorable Court's ruling. If the nature of my criticism/comment or the manner in which it was carried out was perceived to have transgressed the permissible parameters of free speech and expression, I am willing to submit myself to the sound and judicious discretion of this Honorable Court. x x x
We note with wonder and amazement the brazen effrontery of respondent in assuming that his personal knowledge of the law and his concept of justice are superior to that of both the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. His pretense cannot but tend to erode the people's faith in the integrity of the courts of justice and in the administration of justice. He repeatedly invoked his supposed quest for law and justice as justification for his contemptuous statements without realizing that, in seeking both abstract elusive terms, he is merely pursuing his own personal concept of law and justice. He seems not to comprehend that what to him may be lawful or just may not be so in the minds of others. He could not accept that what to him may appear to be right or correct may be wrong or erroneous from the viewpoint of another. x x x.It is to be noted that prior to his letter dated 13 September 2006, Atty. Roxas wrote then Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban asking for an immediate investigation of "how such an impossible decision was rendered at all and to sanction the perpetrators thereon." It is to be stressed that then Chief Justice Panganiban was a member of the Division who concurred in the ponencia written by Justice Nazario. The former and the other three members[23] of the Division did not find anything illegal, unjust or unfair about the decision; otherwise, they would have registered their dissents. There was none. The decision was arrived at after a thorough deliberation of the members of the Court.
Moreover, every citizen has the right to comment upon and criticize the actuations of public officers. This right is not diminished by the fact that the criticism is aimed at a judicial authority, or that is it articulated by a lawyer. Such right is especially recognized where the criticism concerns a concluded litigation, because then the court's actuation are thrown open to public consumption. x x xIn the case at bar, we find the statements made by Atty. Roxas to have been made mala fides and exceeded the boundaries of decency and propriety. By his unfair and unfounded accusation against Justice Nazario, and his mocking of the Court for allegedly being part of a wrongdoing and being a dispenser of injustice, he abused his liberty of speech.x x x x
Courts and judges are not sacrosanct. They should and expect critical evaluation of their performance. For like the executive and the legislative branches, the judiciary is rooted in the soil of democratic society, nourished by the periodic appraisal of the citizen whom it is expected to serve.
Well-recognized therefore is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a citizen, to criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges. x x x
x x x x
Hence, as a citizen and as officer of the court, a lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right, but also to consider it his duty to avail of such right. No law may abridge this right. Nor is he professionally answerable for a scrutiny into the official conduct of the judges, which would not expose him to legal animadversion as a citizen.
x x x x
But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide and shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the one hand, and abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action.
To allow litigants to go beyond the Court's resolution and claim that the members acted "with deliberate bad faith" and rendered an "unjust resolution" in disregard or violation of the duty of their high office to act upon their own independent consideration and judgment of the matter at hand would be to destroy the authenticity, integrity and conclusiveness of such collegiate acts and resolutions and to disregard utterly the presumption of regular performance of official duty. To allow such collateral attack would destroy the separation of powers and undermine the role of the Supreme Court as the final arbiter of all justiciable disputes.Atty. Roxas likewise cannot hide under the mantle of the right to privacy. It must be disclosed that prior to his letter addressed to Justice Nazario, Atty. Roxas first wrote then Chief Justice Panganiban asking for an investigation as to how the assailed decision was rendered and to sanction the perpetrators. The accusations contained therein are similar to those in his letter to Justice Nazario. The fact that his letters were merely addressed to the Justices of this Court and were not disseminated to the media is of no moment. Letters addressed to individual Justices, in connection with the performance of their judicial functions, become part of the judicial record and are a matter of concern for the entire court.[30] As can be gathered from the records, the letter to then Chief Justice Panganiban was merely noted and no show-cause order was issued in the hope that Atty. Roxas would stop his assault on the Court. However, since Atty. Roxas persisted in attacking the Court via his second letter, it behooved the Court to order him to explain why he should not be held in contempt of court and subjected to disciplinary action.
x x x x
In resume, we find that respondent Ilustre has transcended the permissible bounds of fair comment and criticism to the detriment of the orderly administration of justice in her letters addressed to the individual Justices quoted in the show-cause Resolution of this court en banc, particularly the under lined portions thereof; in the language of the charges she filed before the Tanodbayan quoted and underscored in the same Resolution; in her statements, conduct, acts and charges against the Supreme Court and/or the official actions of the justices concerned and her ascription of improper motives to them; and in her unjustified outburst that she can no longer expect justice from this Court. The fact that said letters are not technically considered pleadings, nor the fact that they were submitted after the main petition had been finally resolved does not detract from the gravity of the contempt committed. The constitutional right of freedom of speech or right to privacy cannot be used as a shield for contemptuous acts against the Court.
Section 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. – After a charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within such period as may be fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt:Section 7, Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, provides the penalty for indirect contempt as follows:
x x x x
d. Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice; x x x.
x x x x
Sec. 7. Punishment for indirect contempt. – If the respondent is adjudged guilty of indirect contempt committed against a Regional Trial Court or a court of equivalent or higher rank, he may be punished by a fine not exceeding thirty thousand pesos or imprisonment not exceeding six (6) months or both. x x x.The disrespect caused to the Court by Atty. Roxas merits a fine of P30,000.00 with a warning that a repetition of a similar act will warrant a more severe penalty.
CANON 11 -- A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE RESPECT DUE TO THE COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL OFFICERS AND SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR CONDUCT BY OTHERSIt is the duty of a lawyer as an officer of the court to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts and to promote confidence in the fair administration of justice and in the Supreme Court as the last bulwark of justice and democracy.[31] Respect for the courts guarantees the stability of the judicial institution. Without such guarantee, the institution would be resting on a very shaky foundation.[32] When confronted with actions and statements, from lawyers and non-lawyers alike, that tend to promote distrust and undermine public confidence in the judiciary, this Court will not hesitate to wield its inherent power to cite any person in contempt. In so doing, it preserves its honor and dignity and safeguards the morals and ethics of the legal profession.[33]
x x x x
Rule 11.03. – A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive and menacing language or behavior before the Courts.
Rule 11.04. – A lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge motives not supported by the record or have no materiality to the case.