416 Phil. 205
PUNO, J.:
"x x x x x x x x x
ATTY. CASTILLO:In so far as this petition for Indirect Contempt, Your Honor, since only the testimony of the complaining witness is our evidence to prove the charge we are now resting our case, Your Honor.
ATTY. VILLAMAR:I would like to mark this motion for joint trial in Civil Case No. R-1106 filed by no other than the defendant Sps. Aladin and Fredicanda Estores, et al., who is also the plaintiff in this case, Your Honor, we would like this to be marked as Exh. `I', Your Honor.
ATTY. CASTILLO:I have not yet notified the defendant's counsel, I already made manifestation that I withdraw that pleading so I will just furnish a copy of my manifestation to the defendant's counsel, Your Honor.
ATTY. VILLAMAR:Nevertheless, this motion for joint trial is an evidence showing that as far as the plaintiff in this case is concerned they are of the belief that the judgment in Civil Case No. R-1105 is not yet final that is why they were asking . . .
COURT:They are not bound by the belief of anybody.
ATTY. VILLAMAR:It is their belief as far as they are concerned they believe that the decision is not yet final.
COURT:There are people spreading rumor that this court is not rendering judgment fairly.
ATTY. VILLAMAR:We are not aware of that, Your Honor, I will look into that matter, Your Honor.
COURT:Spreading rumor that the decision of this court is not fair. I am now denying your motion for reconsideration and raise that to the higher court if you want.
ATTY. VILLAMAR:I will look into that matter, Your Honor.
COURT:As of today your motion is denied, submitted for resolution.ORDER. After the termination of the testimony of the complaining witness, Lolita Gordovez, counsel for the plaintiff rests its case.
SO ORDERED.
San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, January 26, 1998."[2]
"Findings:
A. Gross Ignorance of the Law
To constitute gross ignorance of the law, the acts complained of must not only be contrary to existing law and jurisprudence, but were motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty and corruption. For liability to attach for ignorance of the law, the assailed order, decision or actuation of the judge in the performance of official duties must not only be found erroneous but, most importantly, it must also be established that he was moved by bad faith, dishonesty, hatred, or some other like motive.
While complainant has explained in his memorandum, synthesized earlier, why the proceedings held and the decision rendered in Civil Case No. R-1105 should make respondent culpable of gross ignorance of the law, miserably missing in his endeavor are citations of excerpts in the recorded proceedings leading to the decision and portions of the decision itself indicating that respondent was induced by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty, corruption, hatred and other like motive in the discharge of his judicial power. The failure is understandable: There really were no such episodes in the proceedings nor were there any in the decision itself. Of course, respondent could have erred in his finding of facts and conclusion of law. This circumstance is not enough. There must be persuasive proof that the error was tainted with the aforementioned qualifying circumstances.x x x x x x x x x
B. Serious Misconduct and/or Irregularity in Rendering an Obviously Unjust Decision
As a ground for disciplinary action against a judge, for serious misconduct to exist, there must be reliable evidence showing that the judicial acts complained of were corrupt or inspired by an intention to violate the law or were in persistent disregard of all well-known legal rules.
In his memorandum, as in the evidence in the administrative investigation, complainant has not imputed corruption to respondent nor has he demonstrated by convincing proof that respondent consciously meant to violate the law or persisted to disregard well-known legal rules. What should be emphasized here is the fact that complainant's motion for reconsideration has not cited any law or jurisprudence to support the plea that respondent grievously erred in his decision. Even the transcript of stenographic notes of the hearing of said motion on 26 January 1999 does not reflect complainant citing a provision of law or decision of the Supreme Court or any appellate court which would support his submission.
The transcript of stenographic notes of said hearing x x x provides a snapshot of a trial judge in the height of a hearing who feels unfairly maligned by unfounded rumors. Unfortunately, in the case of respondent, he lost his judicial composure. Instead of resorting to judicial remedies in the Rules of Court such as the contempt power, respondent instead provided a factual occasion for an irate litigant to attack not only the court ruling but the judge himself. It would be however, incorrect to posit that respondent denied the motion in the same hearing out of `ill-will or revenge.' As borne out by the transcript, his ultimate ruling on the motion was that it was submitted for resolution. He never ruled on the motion for reconsideration by denying it in open court. Also, as the transcript bears out, he never ascribed the rumors to complainant. It would seem, however, that complainant felt alluded to as the source. Thus, he now avers that the ruling denying the motion for reconsideration was a product of ill-will or revenge.
Anent the claim that respondent violated Administrative Circular No. 20-95 dated September 12, 1995 of the Supreme Court in issuing the temporary restraining order, under situation then prevailing in the court station, since the other judge was temporarily detailed to another judicial station, respondent substantially complied with said administrative circular by setting the hearing on the prayer for writ of preliminary injunction immediately and conducting the hearing accordingly.
x x x x x x x x x
Recommendation:
In the category of --
1) ignorance of the law -- On the basis of the above discussion, respondent should be exonerated;
2) serious misconduct and/or irregularity in rendering an obviously unjust decision both arising from hearing and deciding Civil Case No. R-1105 -- On the basis of the above discussion on the charge, respondent should be exonerated.
However, respondent should be given a STERN WARNING that future similar incidents of lapses in the exercise of his judicial power will be dealt with more severely."[6]
"As everyone knows, the law provides ample judicial remedies against errors or irregularities being committed by a Trial Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction. The ordinary remedies against errors or irregularities which may be regarded as normal in nature (i.e., error in appreciation or admission of evidence, or in construction or application of procedural or substantive law or legal principle) include a motion for reconsideration (or after rendition of a judgment or final order, a motion for new trial), and appeal. The extraordinary remedies against error or irregularities which may be deemed extraordinary in character (i.e., whimsical, capricious, despotic exercise of power or neglect of duty, etc.) are inter alia the special civil actions of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, or a motion for inhibition, a petition for change of venue, as the case may be.
Now, the established doctrine and policy is that disciplinary proceedings and criminal actions against judges are not complementary or suppletory of, nor a substitute for, these judicial remedies, whether ordinary or extraordinary. Resort to and exhaustion of these judicial remedies, as well as the entry of judgment in the corresponding action or proceeding, are pre-requisite for the taking of other measures against the persons of the judges concerned, whether civil, administrative, or criminal in nature. It is only after the available judicial remedies have been exhausted and the appellate tribunals have spoken with finality, that the door to an inquiry into his criminal, civil or administrative liability may be said to have opened, or closed."[11] (emphases ours)