383 Phil. 479
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered by this Court as follows:As earlier mentioned, on appeal to the Court of Appeals, said judgment was affirmed and the petition for registration of private respondents over the subject parcels of land was approved.
(1) In LRC Case No. TG-362, this Court hereby denies the application for registration of the parcels of land mentioned therein by applicant Norma R. Almanzor for lack of factual and legal bases;
(2) In LRC Case No. 396, this Court hereby approves the petition for registration and thus places under the operation of Act 141, Act 946 and/or P.D. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Law, the land described in Plan Psu-67537-Amd-2 and containing an area of 308,638 square meters, as supported by its technical descriptions now forming parts of the records of these cases, in addition to other proofs adduced in the names of petitioners Damian Ermitaño De Guzman, Deogracias Ermitaño De Guzman, Zenaida Ermitaño De Guzman, Alicia Ermitaño De Guzman and Salvador De Guzman, all married, of legal age and with residence and postal addresses at Magallanes Street, Carmona, Cavite, subject to the claims of oppositors Dominga Ermitaño, Natividad Encarnacion, Melba E. Torres, Flora Manalo, Socorro de la Rosa, Jose Ermitaño and Esmeranso Ermitaño under an instrument entitled 'Waiver of Rights with Conformity" the terms and conditions of which are hereby ordered by this Court to be annotated at the back of the certificates of title to be issued to the petitioners pursuant to the judgment of this Court.
SO ORDERED."[3]
We find merit in the instant Petition.I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE DE GUZMANS HAVE NOT SUBMITTED PROOF OF THEIR FEE SIMPLE TITLE OR POSSESSION IN THE MANNER AND FOR THE LENGTH OF TIME REQUIRED BY LAW TO JUSTIFY CONFIRMATION OF AN IMPERFECT TITLE.II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE DE GUZMANS HAVE NOT OVERTHROWN THE PRESUMPTION THAT THE LANDS ARE PORTIONS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN BELONGING TO THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES.[4]
"(W)hile it is true that the land became alienable and disposable only in December, 1965, however, records indicate that as early as 1928, Pedro Ermitaño, appellees' predecessor-in-interest, was already in possession of the property, cultivating it and planting various crops thereon. It follows that appellees' possession as of the time of the filing of the petition in 1991 when tacked to Pedro Ermitaño's possession is 63 years or more than the required 30 years period of possession. The land, which is agricultural, has been converted to private property ."[7]We disagree.
"The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the private respondents had not qualified for a grant under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act because their possession of the land while it was still inalienable forest land, or before it was declared alienable and disposable land of the public domain on January 13, 1968, could not ripen into private ownership, and should be excluded from the computation of the 30-year open and continuous possession in concept of owner required under Section 48(b) of Com. Act 141. It accords with our ruling in Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, Ibarra Bishar, et al., 178 SCRA 708, that:So, too, is the Court of Appeals' reliance on the case of Director of Land Management vs. Court of Appeals[9] misplaced. There, while the period of possession of the applicant's predecessor-in-interest was tacked to his own possession to comply with the required thirty year period possession requirement, the land involved therein was not forest land but alienable public land. On the other hand, in the case before us, the property subject of private respondents' application was only declared alienable in 1965. Prior to such date, the same was forest land incapable of private appropriation. It was not registrable and possession thereof, no matter how lengthy, could not convert it into private property, (unless) and until such lands were reclassified and considered disposable and alienable.[10] alonzo'Unless and until the land classified as forest is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply (Amunategui vs. Director of Forestry, 126 SCRA 69; Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 689; Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 133 SCRA 701; Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 148 SCRA 480; Vallarta vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 151 SCRA 679).
'Thus possession of forest lands, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership (Vamo vs. Government, 41 Phil. 161 [1920]; Adorable vs. Director of Forestry, 17 Phil. 410 [1960]). A parcel of forest land is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry and beyond the power and jurisdiction of the cadastral court to register under the Torrens System (Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 89 SCRA 648; Republic vs. Vera, 120 SCRA 210 [1983]; Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 689 [1984].' " (italics ours)