832 Phil. 82
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
- Exhibit "A" - unnotarized 'Deed of Absolute Sale of a Portion of a Registered Parcel of a Residential Land' between respondent Robert Carantes and petitioners, spouses Jaime and Catherine Basa covering 107 square meters;
- Exhibit "B" - unnotarized 'Deed of Absolute Sale of a Portion of a Parcel of Land' between Robert Carantes and petitioners, spouses Juan and Erlinda Ogale, covering 84 square meters;
- Exhibit "C" - 'Deed of Sale of Undivided Rights and Interests' in favor of petitioners Rogelio and Lucena Lagasca, covering 80 square meters;
- Exhibit "D" - 'Deed of Sale of Undivided Rights and Interests' in favor of petitioners Cresencio and Eleadora Apostol, covering 80 square meters; and
- Exhibit "E" - Affidavit of Robert Carantes.[5]
At the outset, the Court would like to put emphasis on the ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Acabal vs. Acabal, 454 SCRA 555 that, 'It is a basic rule in evidence that the burden of proof lies on the party who makes the allegations - el encumbit probatio, qui dicit, non qui negat; cum per rerum natruam factum negatis probatio nulla sit (the proof lies upon him who affirms, not upon him who denies; since by nature of things, he who denies a fact cannot produce any proof). If he claims a right granted by law, he must prove it by competent evidence, relying on the strength of his own evidence and not upon the weakness of that of his opponent.'
In the present case, the petitioners Cresencio Apostol, Jaime Basa, Lucena Lagasca and Erlinda Ogale was [sic] presented to substantiate the allegations in their petition. All four gave similar testimonies that respondent Robert Carantes sold to them certain portions of a parcel of land for different sums of money on different occasions. However, although they identified photocopies of the deeds covering the transactions which were provisionally marked, they failed to submit the original copies thereof for which reason, the Court denied admission of the said documents when they were formally offered. The only other piece of documentary evidence the petitioners presented to back up their claims was an Affidavit purportedly executed by respondent Robert Carantes. However, the said respondent was never presented to testify on his affidavit, thus, the contents thereof could not be appreciated in favor of the petitioners following the ruling in the case of People vs. Brioso, 37 SCRA 336, that, 'Affidavits are generally rejected in judicial proceeding as hearsay, unless the affiants themselves are placed on the witness stand to testify thereon.'
Considering that the petitioners failed to discharge their burden of proving the truth of their claims even by preponderance of evidence, the court is left with no recourse but to deny the reliefs prayed for in their petition.[6]
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED and the above-entitled case is hereby DISMISSED without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.[7]
The court finds no cogent reason to reconsider the decision.
In the case of Llemos vs. Llemos, 513 SCRA 128, the Supreme Court had the occasion to rule that, 'Under Section 3, Rule 130, Rules of Court, the original document must be produced and no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except in the following cases: x x x a) When the original has been lost or destroyed or cannot be produced in court. without bad faith on the part of the offeror: b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice; c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the general result of the whole; and d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office.'
In the present case, there is no showing that the plaintiffs' failure to produce the original documents was based on the exceptions aforementioned. Moreover, the plaintiffs never questioned the Court's resolution of their formal offer of evidence contained in an Order dated July 24, 2009 admitting only Exhibit "E". Thus, their assertion that they did not have to present the originals there being no objection from the defendants who incidentally have lost their standing in this case as early as January 22, 2008, all the more appears to be untenable.[8]
Petitioners x x x argue that ownership over the portions they occupied should be transferred to them because (i) they were able to establish that the same were sold to them by respondent x x x Robert Carantes and they had fully paid the purchase price thereof; (ii) respondent x x x Angeline Loy was in bad faith 'in not making an investigation before entering into mortgage with Robert Carantes'; and (iii) the trial court should have reconsidered its Decision dated January 22, 2010 since petitioners x x x filed a 'motion for reconsideration explaining the reason and simultaneously submitting the original pieces of evidence.'
It is a basic rule that in civil cases, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to establish his case by preponderance of evidence. x x x
x x x x
Thus, although the trial court allowed petitioners x x x to present their evidence ex-parte for failure of respondents x x x to appear in the mediation proceedings, petitioners x x x still had to prove their allegations in their petition by preponderance of evidence.
In Saguid vs. Court of Appeals, wherein respondent therein was allowed to present her evidence ex-parte, the Supreme Court stressed:'As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as determined by the pleading or the nature of the case, asserts an affirmative issue. Contentions must be proved by competent evidence and reliance must be had on the strength of the party's own evidence and not upon the weakness of the opponent's defense. This applies with more vigor where, as in the instant case, the plaintiff was allowed to present evidence ex parte. The plaintiff is not automatically entitled to the relief prayed for. The law gives the defendant some measure of protection as the plaintiff must still prove the allegations in the complaint. Favorable relief can be granted only after the court is convinced that the facts proven by the plaintiff warrant such relief: Indeed, the party alleging a fact has the burden of proving it and a mere allegation is not evidence.'
In support of their allegation that portions of Lot No. T-30086 were sold to them by respondent x x x Robert Carantes, petitioners x x x presented during the ex-parte hearing two (2) sets of documents, to wit: (i) four (4) photocopied deeds of sale, and (ii) an original affidavit executed by respondent x x x Robert Carantes. In its Decision dated January 22, 2010, the trial court did not consider these pieces of evidence because (i) petitioners x x x did not submit the original deeds of sale, and (ii) respondent x x x Robert Carantes was not presented in court to identify his affidavit.
The trial court cannot be faulted in so ruling. Neither can it be faulted for not reconsidering its Decision dated January 22, 2010 despite the purported 'original' deeds of sale appended to petitioners' x x x motion for reconsideration. It must be considered that:
Firstly, petitioners' x x x failure to append the original deeds of sale cannot be excused on their alleged mistaken belief that submission of the same was no longer necessary when respondents x x x did not object to the presentation of photocopies during the ex-parte hearing, as the trial court itself required the submission of the original deeds of sale. Record bears that the Branch Clerk of Court provisionally marked the photocopied deeds of sole as Exhibits 'A' to 'D' subject to the submission of the original thereof. In fact, petitioners x x x counsel manifested that they reserved the right to present the original deeds of sale.
Secondly, while during the ex-parte hearing, two (2) documents, both denominated as 'Deed of Sale of Undevided [sic] Rights and Interests,' were presented to prove the sale of portions of subject lot to petitioners x x x spouses Rogelio and Lucena Lagasca and spouses Cresencio and Eleadora Apostol, what was appended to petitioners' x x x motion for reconsideration was a different document, a carbon copy of a document denominated as 'Deed of Sale or Undivided Portions of Registered Land,' between respondent x x x Robert Carantes and petitioners x x x Rogelio Lagasca and Cresencio Apostol.
Thirdly, the 'Deed of Absolute Sale of a Portion of a Registered Parcel of a Residential Land' between respondent x x x Robert Carantes and petitioners x x x spouses Jaime and Catherine Basa was a mere carbon copy.
The Court thus finds that the evidence adduced during the ex-parte hearing was unsatisfactory and inconclusive. Moreover, instead of substantiating respondent x x x Robert Carantes' 'Affidavit', the testimonies of petitioners' x x x witnesses contradicted said 'Affidavit' as regards the areas allegedly sold and the price per square meter. In the Affidavit, respondent x x x Robert Carantes stated that he sold to petitioners x x x spouses Cresencio and Eleadora Apostol and spouses Rogelio and Lucena Lagasca portions of the subject property measuring 80 square meters each for P320,000.00 per portion. But during the ex-parte hearing, petitioner x x x Cresencio Apostol testified that what was actually sold by respondent x x x Robert Carantes for P320,000.00 was 95 square meters. In petitioners' x x x motion for reconsideration, it appeared that respondent x x x Robert Carantes sold to petitioners x x x spouses Cresencio and Eleadora Apostol for P100,000.00 a total of 95 square meters. On the other hand, the testimony of petitioner x x x Lucena Lagasca did not indicate the number of square meters sold for the purchase price of P320,000.00, while the motion for reconsideration indicated that a total of 99 square meters was sold by respondent x x x Robert Carantes to petitioners x x x spouses Rogelio and Lucena Lagasca for P100,000.00.
In sum, the pieces of evidence presented by petitioners x x x do not preponderate in their favor. The Court finds no cogent reason to reverse the findings of the trial court. x x x
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision dated January 22, 2010 and Order dated June 18, 2010 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.[9] (Citations omitted; emphasis and italics in the original)
In order that an action for quieting of title may prosper, it is essential that the plaintiff must have legal or equitable title to, or interest in, the property which is the subject-matter of the action. Legal title denotes registered ownership, while equitable title means beneficial ownership. In the absence of such legal or equitable title, or interest, there is no cloud to be prevented or removed.
x x x x
An action for quieting of title is essentially a common law remedy grounded on equity. The competent court is tasked to determine the respective rights of the complainant and other claimants, not only to place things in their proper place, to make the one who has no rights to said immovable respect and not disturb the other, but also for the benefit of both, so that he who has the right would see every cloud of doubt over the property dissipated, and he could afterwards without fear introduce the improvements he may desire, to use, and even to abuse the property as he deems best. But 'for an action to quiet title to prosper, two indispensable requisites must concur, namely: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of the action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.'[11]