325 Phil. 484
VITUG, J.:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant (a) confirming the right of the plaintiff to the ownership and possession of the personal properties heretofore described; (b) ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff:It would appear that an execution of the decision was not pursued. Instead, on 23 June 1981, IFC’s counsel, Attorney Jose Redoblado, sent a letter to petitioner about his still unsettled accounts under the two contracts. Since the demand had not been heeded, IFC, this time, charged petitioner with estafa. The information was filed on 15 March 1983 and raffled to Branch 58 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, it read:
"(1) On the first cause of action: The sum of P160,110.18, plus interest at 12% from February 20, 1977 until fully paid, and a further amount equivalent to 20% of the amounts due, as attorney’s fees;
"(2) On the second cause of action: The sum of P249,975.44, plus interest thereon at 12% from March 5, 1977 until fully paid, and the further sum equivalent to 20% of the amount due as attorney’s fees; and
"(c) To pay the costs.
"SO ORDERED."[9]
"That in or about and during the period from April 30, 1976 and September 7, 1976, in the Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, in accordance to a Lease Agreement received from IFC-LEASING AND ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION One (1) Unit Isuzu Dump Truck and One (1) Unit Kimco Hough JH65CN Payloader all valued at P110,000.00, with the obligation to pay rentals as agreed upon and to return the said equipments upon termination of the lease period, but accused far from complying with his obligation, with intent of gain, grave abuse of confidence and to defraud the herein complainant, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply and convert to his own personal use and benefit the said equipments, and despite demands failed and refused and still fails and refuses to return the said equipments, to the damage and prejudice of said IFC-LEASING AND ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION, represented by one ARMANDO M. MARCELO, in the aforementioned amount of P110,000.00.When arraigned on 25 July 1983, petitioner pleaded "not guilty" to the charge.
"Contrary to law."[10]
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt and hereby sentences him to an indeterminate penalty of 8 years and 1 day of prison mayor as minimum to 10 years and 1 day of prison mayor as maximum and to indemnify the offended party the amount of P55,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals contending, among other things, that the fourth element of the crime of estafa, namely, the misappropriation or conversion by the accused of the thing received to the prejudice of another, was not present in this case. He averred that his failure to return the dump truck was due to circumstances beyond his control, and that it was not he but other persons, particularly Gorospe and Espino and their men, who unlawfully detained the vehicle.[20]
"SO ORDERED."[19]
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered affirming the appealed decision, with the modification that the proper penalty which the appellant should suffer is the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor as maximum. Costs against appellant.The appellate court ratiocinated that-
"SO ORDERED."[22]
"Under Article 315, subdivision 4, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of estafa with abuse of confidence are:On a motion for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals,[24] finding no sufficient reason to modify its decision, refused to reconsider.[25]"1) that money, goods, or other personal property be received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return, the same;"The appropriation or conversion of money or property received, to the prejudice of the owner thereof, is the essence of estafa through misappropriation. The words ‘convert’ and ‘misappropriate’ connote an act of using or disposing of another’s property as if it were one’s own, or of devoting it to a purpose or use different from that agreed upon. (Saddul, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, 192 SCRA 277).
"2) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender, or denial on his part of such receipt;
"3) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another;
"4) that there is a demand made by the offended party on the offender.
"xxx xxx xxx.
"All the foregoing elements are present in this case. The dump truck, a personal property was received by the accused who was under obligation to pay rentals as agreed upon and to return the said equipment upon the termination of the lease period. Accused did not return the equipment to the offended party as accused subleased it to a certain Mr. Gorospe, although accused has no authority to sub-lease the equipment to a third person. Granting therefore that Manuel Manahan, Jr. has no intention of defrauding the owner of the truck, accused certainly committed abuse of confidence when he sub-leased the equipment without the knowledge and consent of the owner. In sub-leasing the truck to Mr. Gorospe, accused assumed the right to dispose of it as if it is his (Viada, 446) thereby committing conversion.’ (p. 3, Appealed Decision)
"Appellant’s contention that one element of estafa, that is, misappropriation or conversion, is not present in the case at bar, is untenable. It must be recalled that under the lease agreement entered into by and between complainant and appellant, any breach of the lease by the latter as lessee would entitle the lessor, upon demand, to the return and possession of the vehicle in question (Exh. ‘A’, p. 175, Records). Admittedly, appellant failed to pay the stipulated monthly rentals. Despite IFC’s demand for the return of the vehicle and the decision rendered in its (IFC’s)favor in Civil Case No. 26078, appellant, had failed to give the equipment back its rightful owner. From that time on, appellant Manahan could already be considered to have committed the crime of estafa. His allegation that he could not return the chattel because it had been taken by certain persons, namely, Mr. Gorospe and Capt. Espino, fails to persuade. He received IFC’s demand letter on July 6, 1981 (p. 157, Records). The judgment in Civil Case No. 26078 confirming said corporation’s right to ownership and possession of the subject leased equipment was rendered on April 3, 1978 (p. 191, ibid.). The alleged taking of the vehicle was in June, 1983 (TSN, p. 5, March 16, 1988). Had appellant returned the truck to IFC upon the latter’s demand, such taking of the dump truck by Gorospe, if it were true, would not have occurred. Clearly, accused’s unexplained failure to return the truck to IFC during all the long time that he undisputably could have done so constituted abuse of confidence and virtual conversion.
"Appellant’s contention that he did not sublease the truck to another cannot relieve him of any liability in the present case either. For, during the time that said vehicle remained in the possession of the appellant, the complainant had been deprived of its right to use the same. In other words, there had been a disturbance of the property rights of the offended party. To repeat, the words ‘convert’ and ‘misappropriate’ connote an act of using or disposing of another’s property as if it were one’s own."[23]
"2. UTILITY: The Lessee agrees that the equipment under lease shall be installed and/or utilized at its premises in Manila or such other places as may be designated in the Schedule, and shall not, under any circumstances be removed therefrom without the consent of the Lessor first obtained in writing. The Lessee further agrees not to part with the possession of, sub-lease, pledge, or otherwise encumber or dispose of the leased equipment; x x x. If Lessee uses or allows the leased property to be used for illegal purposes or for purpose not permitted under this lease, Lessee agrees to reimburse Lessor for all damages sustained by Lessor as a result of such misuse including, without limitations, payment of any fine or fines which may be imposed on Lessor. In addition to, and notwithstanding its right to such reimbursement, Lessor may in such event at its option cancel this lease by notifying Lessee to (sic) such cancellation in writing."[26] (Italics supplied.)Thus, when IFC filed Civil Case No. 26078, it correctly pursued its remedy, and the court, after upholding IFC, aptly awarded damages to the latter. IFC, however, neither opted to cancel its lease contract with petitioner nor to see to the execution of the decision in Civil Case No. 26078, the net effect of which failure was to permit the contract to remain in force in accordance with Article 1659 of the Civil Code.[27] The decision, it should be noted, was promulgated on 03 April 1978 within the period of the lease contract, i.e., for thirty-six months from May 1976 or until April 1979. IFC’s acquiescence thereafter to petitioner’s continued possession was, in effect, a continuation of the contract under the concept of an implied new lease on a month to month basis under Article 1670, of the Civil Code.[28] The contract subsisted until IFC demanded the return of the equipment on 23 June 1981. From that moment, petitioner could well be made to answer for the corresponding civil liabilities of a possessor in bad faith,[29] such as for the loss or deterioration of the thing leased regardless of the cause of such loss or deterioration, i.e., whether on account of his fault or not.
"x x x misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods, or any other personal property received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same, even though such obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having received such money, goods, or other property."[30]The elements of this crime are: (a) that personal property is received in trust, on commission, for administration or under any other circumstance involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same, even though the obligation is guaranteed by a bond; (b) that there is conversion or diversion of such property by the person who has so received it or a denial on his part that he received it; (c) that such conversion, diversion or denial is to the injury of another; and (d) that there be demand for the return of the property.[31]
"x x x such proof ‘to the satisfaction of the court, keeping in mind the presumption of innocence, as precludes every reasonable hypothesis except that which it is given to support. It is not sufficient for the proof to establish a probability, even though strong, that the fact charged is more likely to be true than the contrary. It must establish the truth of the fact to a reasonable and moral certainty - a certainty that convinces and satisfies the reason and the conscience of those who are to act upon it.’"[37]An acquitted person, nevertheless, cannot always escape from civil liability in the attendance of facts from which such liability might arise.[38] Corollarily, an acquittal based on reasonable doubt that the accused committed the crime charged does not necessarily exempt him from civil liability where a mere preponderance of evidence is required.[39]Petitioner must, therefore, be held responsible for the value (P55,000.00) of the lost dump truck.