350 Phil. 629
ROMERO, J.:
On March 11,
1993, petitioners William Dayag, Edwin Dayag, Eduardo Corton, Edgardo Corton,
Leopoldo Nagma, Aloy Flores, and Romeo Punay filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal, non-payment of wages, overtime pay, premium pay, holiday pay,
service incentive leave, 13th month
pay, and actual, moral and exemplary damages against Alfredo Young, a building
contractor doing business under the firm name Young’s Construction. They filed
the complaint with the National Capital Region Arbitration Branch of the NLRC
which docketed the same as NLRC-NCR-Case No. 00-03-01891-93. The case was subsequently assigned to Labor
Arbiter Potenciano Canizares, Jr.
Petitioners
alleged that they were hired in 1990 by Young to work as tower crane operators
at the latter’s construction site at Platinum 2000 in San Juan, Metro Manila.
In November 1991, they were transferred to Cebu City to work at the
construction of his Shoemart Cebu project. Petitioners worked in Cebu until
February 1993, except for Punay who stayed up to September 29, 1992 only and
Nagma, until October 21, 1992.
On January 30,
1993, William Dayag asked for permission to go to Manila to attend to family matters. He was allowed to do so but was not paid for
the period January 23-30, 1993, allegedly due to his accountability for the
loss of certain construction tools. Eduardo Corton had earlier left on January 16, 1993, purportedly due to
harassment by Young. In February 1993,
Edgardo Corton, Aloy Flores and Edwin Dayag also left Cebu for Manila,
allegedly for the same reason. Thereafter, petitioners banded together and filed the complaint
previously mentioned.
Instead of
attending the initial hearings set by the labor arbiter, Young filed, on July
6, 1993, a motion to transfer the case to the Regional Arbitration Branch,
Region VII of the NLRC. He claimed that
the workplace where petitioners were regularly assigned was in Cebu City and
that, in consonance with Section 1(a) of Rule IV of the New Rules of Procedure
of the NLRC,[1] the case should have been filed in
Cebu City. Young submitted in evidence
a certificate of registration of business name showing his company’s address as
“Corner Sudlon–España Streets, Pari-an, Cebu City”; its business permit issued
by the Office of the Mayor of Cebu City and a certification by the Philippine
National Police–Cebu City Police Station 2 that petitioners had been booked
therein for qualified theft upon the complaint of Young’s Construction.
Petitioners
opposed the same, arguing that all of them, except for Punay, were, by that
time, residents of Metro Manila and that they could not afford trips to Cebu
City. Besides, they claimed that
respondent had its main office at Corinthian Gardens in Quezon City. Young, in
reply, declared that the Corinthian Gardens address was not his principal place
of business, but actually his residence, which he also used as a correspondent
office for his construction firm.
Agreeing that petitioners’
workplace when the cause of action accrued was Cebu City, the labor arbiter, on
September 8, 1993, granted Young’s motion and ordered the transmittal of the
case to the regional arbitration branch of Region VII. Petitioners promptly
appealed said order to the NLRC, which, however, dismissed the same on January
31, 1995, for lack of merit.
Citing Nestlé
Philippines, Inc. vs. NLRC[2] and Cruzvale, Inc. vs. Laguesma,[3] petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the
January 31, 1995 resolution of the Commission. Acting favorably on said motion,
the Commission, on August 25, 1995, annulled and set aside its resolution of
January 31, 1995, and remanded the case to the original arbitration branch of
the National Capital Region for further proceedings. This prompted Young, in
turn, to file his own motion for reconsideration seeking the reversal of the
August 25, 1995 resolution of the Commission. Finding the two above-cited cases to be inapplicable to instant case, the
Commission made a volte-face and reconsidered its August 25, 1995
resolution. It reinstated the
resolution of January 31, 1995, directing the transfer of the case to Cebu
City. In addition, it ruled that no further motion of a similar nature would be
entertained. Hence, the recourse to
this Court by petitioners, who raise the following as errors:
1. THE LABOR ARBITER A QUO ERRED IN ISSUING THE DISPUTED ORDER DATED SEPTEMBER 8, 1993 WHEN, OBVIOUSLY, THE SAID MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE WAS FILED IN VIOLATION OF SECTIONS 4 AND 5 OF RULE 15 OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT.
2. PUBLIC RESPONDENTS ERRED IN ISSUING THE DISPUTED JUDGMENT WHEN, OBVIOUSLY, THE RESPONDENT, BY FILING ITS POSITION PAPER, HAS WAIVED ITS RIGHT TO QUESTION THE VENUE OF THE INSTANT CASE.
3. THE PUBLIC RESPONDENTS ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE WORKPLACE OF THE COMPLAINANTS IS AT CEBU CITY AND IN DECLARING THAT THE PROPER VENUE IS AT CEBU CITY.
Petitioner
contends that the labor arbiter acted with grave abuse of discretion when it
entertained Young’s motion to transfer venue since it did not specify the time
and date when it would be heard by the labor arbiter. They raise the suppletory application of the Rules of Court,
specifically Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15,[4] in relation to Section 3 of Rule I
of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, in support of their contention.
We find no merit
in petitioners’ argument. In a long line of decisions,[5] this Court has consistently ruled
that the application of technical rules of procedure in labor cases may be
relaxed to serve the demands of substantial justice. As provided by Article 221
of the Labor Code “rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity
shall not be controlling and it is the spirit and intention of this Code that
the Commission and its members and the Labor Arbiters shall use every and all
reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively
and without regard to technicalities of law or procedure, all in the interest
of due process.” Furthermore, while it
is true that any motion that does not comply with the requirements of Rule 15
should not be accepted for filing and, if filed, is not entitled to judicial
cognizance, this Court has likewise held that where a rigid application of the
rule will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice,
technicalities may be disregarded in order to resolve the case. Litigations
should, as much as possible, be decided on the merits and not on
technicalities.[6] Lastly, petitioners were able to
file an opposition to the motion to transfer venue which, undisputedly, was
considered by the labor arbiter when he issued the disputed order of September
8, 1993. There is, hence, no showing
that petitioners have been unduly prejudiced by the motion’s failure to give
notice of hearing.
Given the
foregoing, it seems improper to nullify Young’s motion on a mere
technicality. Petitioners’ averments
should be given scant consideration to give way to the more substantial matter
of equitably determining the rights and obligations of the parties. It need not be emphasized that rules of
procedure must be interpreted in a manner that will help secure and not defeat
justice.[7]
Likewise,
petitioners harp on Young’s so-called “waiver” of his right to contest the
venue of the instant case. They argue that Young is estopped from questioning
the venue herein as his motion to transfer venue was actually a position paper,
a close scrutiny of the same purportedly showing that he admitted and denied
certain allegations found in petitioners’ complaint.
Petitioners’
contention rings hollow. Even if the questioned motion was at the same time a
position paper, Section 1(c) of Rule IV provides: “(w)hen improper venue is not
objected to before or at the time of the filing of position
papers, such question shall be deemed waived” (Emphasis supplied). Consequently, there is no waiver of improper
venue if a party questions venue simultaneously with the filing of a position
paper. Moreover, nowhere in the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC is there a
requirement that a party must object solely to venue, on penalty of
waiving the same. In fact, Section 1(d) provides that:
“The venue of an action may be changed or transferred to a different Regional Arbitration Branch other than where the complaint was filed by written agreement of the parties or when the Commission or Labor Arbiter before whom the case is pending so orders, upon motion by the proper party in meritorious cases” (Emphasis supplied).
Young’s acts are
in consonance with this provision, for he seasonably made representations to
transfer the venue of the action in the proper motion.
Finally, while
it is true that objections to venue are deemed waived if the respondent,
through conduct, manifests satisfaction with the venue until after the trial,
or abides by it until the matter has proceeded to a hearing,[8] no waiver of the defense of venue
on the ground of estoppel by conduct can be attributed to Young, who
consistently and persistently contested the same even before trial.
Similarly,
petitioners’ reliance on Nestlé[9] and Cruzvale[10] is likewise misplaced. While Nestlé ruled that Rule IV of the New Rules of
Procedure of the NLRC does not constitute a complete rule on venue in cases
cognizable by labor arbiters, Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court[11] having suppletory effect, it also
held that the foregoing provision of the Rules of Court applies only where the
petitioners are labor unions or where a single act of an employer gives rise to
a cause of action common to many of its employees working in different branches
or workplaces of the former. It is not
denied that petitioners herein are not represented by a union; nor were they
assigned to different workplaces by Young. Likewise, Cruzvale is inapplicable to the case at bar, the issue
involved therein being the propriety of the DOLE Region IV Office’s taking
cognizance of a petition for certification election when the company’s place of
business was in Cubao, Quezon City, while the workplace of the petitioning
union was elsewhere. The instant case does
not involve any certification election; nor are the workplace of the employees
and place of business of the employer different.
Young cannot,
however, derive comfort from the foregoing, this petition having been overtaken
by events. In the recent case of Sulpicio Lines, Inc. vs. NLRC[12] this Court held that the question of venue
essentially pertains to the trial and relates more to the convenience of the
parties rather than upon the substance and merits of the case. It underscored the fact that the permissive
rules underlying provisions on venue are intended to assure convenience for the
plaintiff and his witnesses and to promote the ends of justice. With more reason does the principle find
applicability in cases involving labor and management because of the doctrine
well-entrenched in our jurisdiction that the State shall afford full protection
to labor. The Court held that Section
1(a), Rule IV of the NLRC Rules of Procedure on Venue was merely
permissive. In its words:
“This provision is obviously permissive, for the said section uses the word ‘may,’ allowing a different venue when the interests of substantial justice demand a different one. In any case, as stated earlier, the Constitutional protection accorded to labor is a paramount and compelling factor, provided the venue chosen is not altogether oppressive to the employer.”
The rationale for the rule is obvious. The worker, being the
economically-disadvantaged party—whether as complainant/petitioner or as
respondent, as the case may be, the nearest governmental machinery to settle the
dispute must be placed at his immediate disposal, and the other party is not to
be given the choice of another competent agency sitting in another place as
this will unduly burden the former.[13] In fact, even in cases where venue
has been stipulated by the parties, this Court has not hesitated to set aside
the same if it would lead to a situation so grossly inconvenient to one party
as to virtually negate his claim. Again, in Sulpicio Lines, this Court,
citing Sweet Lines vs. Teves,[14] held that:
“An agreement will not be held valid where it practically negates the action of the claimant, such as the private respondents herein. The philosophy underlying the provisions on transfer of venue of actions is the convenience of the plaintiffs as well as his witnesses and to promote the ends of justice. Considering the expense and trouble a passenger residing outside Cebu City would incur to prosecute a claim in the City of Cebu, he would probably decide not to file the action at all. The condition will thus defeat, instead of enhance, the ends of justice. Upon the other hand, petitioner had branches or offices in the respective ports of call of the vessels and could afford to litigate in any of these places. Hence, the filing of the suit in the CFI of Misamis Oriental, as was done in the instant case will not cause inconvenience to, much less prejudice petitioner.”
In the case at
hand, the ruling specifying the National Capital Region Arbitration Branch as
the venue of the present action cannot be considered oppressive to Young. His residence in Corinthian Gardens also
serves as his correspondent office. Certainly, the filing of the suit in the National Capital Region
Arbitration Branch in Manila will not cause him as much inconvenience as it
would the petitioners, who are now residents of Metro Manila, if the same was
heard in Cebu. Hearing the case in
Manila would clearly expedite proceedings and bring about the speedy resolution
of instant case.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
resolution of February 12, 1996, of public respondent NLRC, transferring the instant case to the Seventh Regional Arbitration Branch, Cebu City, is SET ASIDE. Instead, its resolution dated August 25,
1995, remanding the case to the Arbitration Branch of Origin, is hereby REINSTATED
and AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
[1] Section 1. Venue. – (a)
All cases which Labor Arbiters have authority to hear and decide may be filed
in the Regional Arbitration Branch having jurisdiction over the workplace of
the complainant/petitioner.
For purposes of venue,
workplace shall be understood as the place or locality where the employee is
regularly assigned when the cause of action arose. It shall include the place
where the employee is supposed to report back after a temporary detail,
assignment or travel. In the case of field employees, as well as ambulant or
itinerant workers, their workplace is where they are regularly assigned, or
where they are supposed to regularly receive their salaries/wages or work instructions from, and report the
results of their assignment to, their employers.
[2] 209 SCRA 834 (1992).
[3] 238 SCRA 389 (1994).
[4] Section 4. Hearing of
Motion.— Except for motions which the court may act upon without
prejudicing the rights of the adverse party, every written motion shall be set
for hearing by the applicant.
Every written motion
required to be heard and the notice of the hearing thereof shall be served in
such a manner as to ensure its receipt by the other party at least three (3)
days before the date of the hearing, unless the court for good cause sets the
hearing on shorter notice.
Section 5. Notice of
hearing.—The notice of hearing shall be addressed to all parties concerned,
and shall specify the time and date of the hearing which must not be later than
ten (10) days after the filing of the motion.
[5] Lopez, Jr. vs. NLRC, 245 SCRA 644 (1995);
Philippine-Singapore Ports Corp. vs. NLRC, 218 SCRA 77 (1993); Sadol vs.
Pilipinas Kao, Inc., 186 SCRA 491 (1990); PT&T Corporation vs. NLRC,
183 SCRA 451 (1990); Ford Philippines Salaried Employees Assocation vs.
NLRC, 156 SCRA 284 (1987).
[6] People vs. Leviste, 255 SCRA 238 (1996).
[7] El Toro Security Agency, Inc. vs. NLRC, 256
SCRA 363 (1996).
[8] 92 C.J.S., p. 774.
[9] Supra, Note 3.
[10] Supra, Note 4.
[11] Section 2. Venue of personal actions.– All
other actions may be commenced and tried where the plaintiffs or any of the
principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal
defendants resides, or in the case of a
non-resident defendant where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff.
[12] 254 SCRA 506 (1996).
[13] Supra, Note 3.
[14] 83 SCRA 361 (1978).