559 Phil. 80
AZCUNA, J.:
Petitioners, however, proffer a different version of the facts. They narrate that Aparecio was initially performing well as an employee but as years passed by she seemed to be complacent in the performance of her job and had been comparing the salaries of promo girls in other companies. It appeared that she was no longer interested in her job. In April 1998, Aparecio and two other promo girls, Jovelina V. Soco and Veronica P. Mutya, intimated to their supervisor that they were intending to resign and were requesting for some financial assistance. BMG made it clear that, as a company policy, an employee who resigns from service is not entitled to financial assistance, but considering the length of their service and due to humanitarian consideration it would accede to the request after they secure their respective clearances. Forthwith, the three employees tendered their resignations, which were accepted. When they processed the required individual clearance, it was found out that they had incurred some shortages after inventory. Per agreement, said shortages were deducted from the amounts due them. Thus, Soco and Mutya received their last salary, a proportion of the 13th month pay, tax refund and financial assistance less the deductions, and they executed their releases and quitclaims. Except for the financial assistance, Aparecio also obtained the same yet refused to sign the release and quitclaim, protesting the amount of P9,170.12 deducted from the financial assistance. She was adamant but BMG stood by the previous agreement.x x x
b. That she was illegally dismissed or terminated [from] employment on April 30, 1998; that before said date[,] however, she was asked by respondent to resign and will be paid (sic) all her benefits due — like a one-month pay for every year of service, payment of services rendered, overtime and holiday pay, rest day, 13th month, service incentive leave and separation pay — and to [execute] a letter of resignation;
c. That in view of respondent's insistence to prepare and [execute] a letter-resignation[,] even without proper accounting of any accountability, the complainant was lured, induced and compelled to submit a letter of resignation believing on respondent's promise and assurance to pay all the benefits due her as aforesaid;
d. That after executing said resignation letter, the respondent did not make good its promise and [instead] did an accounting by themselves in the absence of herein complainant and arrived on a computation that complainant's liability per their accounting reached to the staggering amount of P8,000.00; that since they offered to pay a separation pay of only P12,000.00, minus complainant's alleged accountability of P8,000.00, they are ready to pay the balance thereof any time;
e. That herein complainant was under respondent's employ for seven (7) years, seven (7) months and twenty-eight (28) days when illegally terminated [from] her employment xxx. [6]
WHEREFORE, prescinding from the foregoing consideration, the Decision appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one ENTERED finding the dismissal of complainant illegal thus ordering the respondent to pay her backwages from April 30, 1998 up to date hereof and in lieu of reinstatement, the respondent is further ordered to pay complainant separation pay computes at the rate of one (1) month pay for every year of service from date of hiring on September 2, 1990 up to the finality of this decision.The NLRC admitted its dilemma in determining whether Aparecio offered to resign on the condition that she would be paid with termination benefits or whether the resignation was triggered by BMG which offered the monetary consideration. While saying that Aparecio "offered no other evidence except her bare allegations," it was held that the sworn statement of Magno was not sufficient to establish the position of petitioners. For the NLRC, the testimonies of Soco and Mutya would have been helpful had these been presented by either side. Notwithstanding the "scanty data" available, it concluded:
All other claims are dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.[10]
x x x We find that the elements of a valid resignation are not obtaining in this case. It must be stressed that resignation is inconsistent with the filing of the complaint. Moreover, even in the absence of physical force, duress or compulsion applied upon complainant when she executed the alleged resignation letter, factual circumstances tend to show the strong and irresistible economic pressure originating from respondent if only to push the complainant into accepting the offer. For, as ever, "[i]n the matter of employment bargaining, there is no doubt that the employer stands on higher footing than the employee. First of all, there is greater supply than demand for labor. Secondly, the need for employment by labor comes from vital, and even desperate, necessity. Consequently, the law must protect labor, at least, to the extent of raising him to equal footing in bargaining relations with capital and to shield him from abuses brought about by the necessity of survival. It is safe therefore to presume that an employee or laborer who waives in advance any benefit granted him by law does so, certainly not in his interest or through generosity, but under the forceful intimidation or urgent need, and hence, he could not have done so acted freely and voluntarily." xxx (citations omitted)[11]A motion for reconsideration of the Decision was filed by petitioners. Attached therein were the sworn statements of Soco and another promo girl, Marietta Cinco, both dated September 21, 2000, confirming Aparecio's voluntary resignation. The NLRC, however, resolved to deny the motion.[12]
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied on April 26, 2002;[15] hence, this petition.x x x
Based on the evidence submitted, the [petitioners] failed to support [their] claim that [Aparecio's] resignation was made out of her own volition. Granting arguendo that [Aparecio] executed a resignation letter, it appears that she did it in consideration of the separation pay and other benefits promised by the petitioner.
Resignation, moreover, is inconsistent with the filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal. It would have been illogical for the employee to resign and then file a complaint for illegal dismissal x x x Thus, had the private respondent been determined to resign and relinquish her position in the petitioner company, she would not have commenced an action for illegal dismissal.
It must be remembered that the petitioner is in a more advantageous position than [Aparecio] considering the ratio of the demand for workers and the number of unemployed persons, so much so that the employee is vulnerable to submit to whatever offer the employer may give. Most often than not, employees are placed in a position where there is only one choice which is to accede to the employer's proposal.[14]x x x
(a.) failure of the petitioners to sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals committed any reversible error in the challenged decision and resolution as to warrant the exercise by this Court of its discretionary appellate jurisdiction in this case; andConsidering, however, the Motion for Reconsideration[17] filed and the Comment[18] as well as the Reply[19] thereon, this Court resolved[20] on April 23, 2003 to reinstate the petition and require the parties to submit their respective memoranda.
(b.) failure of the petition to show extraordinary circumstance justifying a departure from the established doctrine that findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are well-nigh conclusive on this Court and will not be reviewed or disturbed on appeal.[16]
xxx The arbiter should have seriously considered the temper of the time in relation to our deteriorating economy on the issue [of] whether or not the resignation letter was voluntary. But he did not. To the arbiter[,] resignation letter can only be set aside if it is shown that it was made through duress or compulsion. What about FRAUD? The complainant did not offer to resign. She was offered by respondents that all labor standard benefits including but not limited to payment of overtime, salary differentials and separation pay should be given if she [would] resign. This she was made to believe by the respondents. And complainant really believed them. Unfortunately, however, complainant found herself jobless and penniless. Her resignation was obtained through fraud xxx It is clear that complainant submitted her resignation letter not because she has some accountabilities but because of respondents' offer which was hard to resist xxx[23]On the other hand, her Comment before the CA stated further:
In a nutshell, Aparecio submits that fraud, undue influence, intimidation, and/or mistake were attendant upon her resignation from BMG. As her consent was allegedly vitiated, the act of resigning became involuntary; hence, petitioners are guilty of illegal dismissal.x x x
At any rate, respondents wish to point out that the finding of the NLRC that private respondent (employee) did not voluntarily resign but was illegally dismissed is well-supported by evidence. The following considerations clearly show this, to wit:
One. It is admitted by both petitioners and the respondents that the supposed resignation of private respondent was conditional in nature. It was premised on petitioners' (employers) performance of certain prestations or petitioners' compliance with certain conditions.
Two. The supposed decision of private respondent to tender a resignation is vitiated by vices of consent. The resignation letter was wrongfully obtained from private respondent on petitioners' inducement and promise to pay employment benefits and financial assistance without any deductions. However, it is now very clear that right from the start, petitioners did not intend to comply with their promise. After private respondent handed in a resignation letter, petitioners raised all obstacles to prevent private respondent from actually receiving the promised employment benefits and financial assistance. Accordingly, it can be easily said that fraud vitiated private respondent's consent.
Three. The resignation letter was also obtained from private respondent through undue pressure and influence which again vitiates the same. The respondent NLRC made this finding:
"Moreover, even in the absence of physical force, duress or compulsion applied upon complainant when she executed the alleged resignation letter, factual circumstances tend to show the strong and irresistible economic pressure originating from respondent if only to push the complainant into accepting the offer." (NLRC Decision, 23 August 2000, p. 5; underscoring ours)
Four. At the very least, it could be easily said that the decision to resign is vitiated by mistake. It is unrebutted that private respondent handed in a resignation letter on the firm belief that petitioners would pay her the promised employment benefits and financial assistance without deductions. Resignation is also a form of contract. Like any other contracts, it can be vitiated by mistake and other vices of consent x x x
Five. Finally, it could also be said that the resignation letter was ineffective because there was no meeting of the minds on the matter of resignation. As pointed out earlier, it is an admitted fact that the supposed resignation was conditional in character in the sense that it was premised on certain conditions. Accordingly, the resignation letter could only be considered as a mere offer. Since the petitioners obviously did not accept the conditions attendant to the offer to resign, there is no resignation to speak of. (emphasis supplied) [24]
x x x
Once an employee resigns and his resignation is accepted, he no longer has any right to the job. If the employee later changes his mind, he must ask for approval of the withdrawal of his resignation from his employer, as if he were re-applying for the job. It will then be up to the employer to determine whether or not his service would be continued. If the employer accepts said withdrawal, the employee retains his job. If the employer does not x x x the employee cannot claim illegal dismissal for the employer has the right to determine who his employees will be. To say that an employee who has resigned is illegally dismissed, is to encroach upon the right of employers to hire persons who will be of service to them.[34]Subsequently, in Philippine Today, Inc. v. NLRC,[35] it was further held that:
Obviously, this is a recognition of the contractual nature of employment which requires mutuality of consent between the parties. An employment contract is consensual and voluntary. Hence, if the employee "finds himself in a situation where he believes that personal reasons cannot be sacrificed in favor of the exigency of the service, then he has no other choice but to disassociate himself from his employment". If accepted by the employer, the consequent effect of resignation is severance of the contract of employment.Certainly, what transpired here was caused by an employee's error of judgment and not by the employer's application of means vitiating the consent to resign. It would be utterly unfair to attribute to petitioners the commission of illegal dismissal and to impose upon them the burden of accepting back Aparecio who unequivocally manifested her intent and willingness to sever her employment ties.
A resigned employee who desires to take his job back has to re-apply therefor, and he shall have the status of a stranger who cannot unilaterally demand an appointment. He cannot arrogate unto himself the same position which he earlier decided to leave. To allow him to do so would be to deprive the employer of his basic right to choose whom to employ. Such is tantamount to undue oppression of the employer. It has been held that an employer is free to regulate, according to his own discretion and judgment, all aspects of employment including hiring. The law, in protecting the rights of the laborer, impels neither the oppression nor self-destruction of the employer.[36]