562 Phil. 281
ANG isang petisyon para sa habeas corpus
ay bibigyan daan lamang kung ito ay nagpapakita na ang nagpepetisyon ay
ipinipiit o pinipigilan ang kalayaan nang labag sa batas. Ang mahigpit
na pangangalaga at ang pag-monitor ng galaw o kinaroroonan ng mga pulis
na sumasailalim sa imbestigasyon ng kanilang pamunuan ay hindi isang
uri ng ipinagbabawal na pagpiit o pagpigil sa kanilang kalayaan.A petition for
habeas corpus
will be given due course only if it shows that petitioner is being
detained or restrained of his liberty unlawfully. A restrictive custody
and monitoring of movements or whereabouts of police officers under
investigation by their superiors is not a form of illegal detention or
restraint of liberty.
Filed on August 7, 2007, this petition for the issuance of a writ of
habeas corpus
assails the
restrictive custody and
monitored movements of petitioners
SPO2 Geronimo Manalo, PO3 Leo Morcilla, PO3 Rico M. Landicho, PO2 Romeo
Medalla, Jr., SPO2 William Relos, Jr., PInsp. Roberto D. Marinda, by
the Philippine National Police (PNP), Region 4-A, after they were
implicated in the burning of an elementary school in Taysan, Batangas
at the height of the May 2007 national and local elections.
Petitioners were formerly police operatives assigned at the Regional
Special Operations Group, PNP Region 4-A, Camp Vicente Lim, Calamba
City, Laguna. When their petition was filed, they were detailed at the
Regional Headquarters Support Group at the same Camp under a
restrictive custody status.
Respondents Oscar Calderon, Geary Barias, Nicasio Radovan, Aaron
Deocares Fidel, and Luisito De Leon were, at the time of filing of the
petition, the Chief of the PNP, the Directorate for Investigation and
Detective Management, the Regional Director and Police Sr.
Superintendents, respectively.
The Facts
The facts, as reflected in the petition and its annexes, are as follows:
On May 15, 2007, at around 3:00 a.m., five unidentified malefactors bearing high-powered firearms suddenly appeared at the
Barangay
Pinagbayanan Elementary School in the Municipality of Taysan, Province
of Batangas. Earlier, the entire school grounds were converted into a
polling area for the 2007 national and local elections. The five armed
men forcibly entered Polling Precinct 76-A, and poured gasoline over a
ballot box. Then they fired several rounds of ammunitions at the
premises, setting it ablaze.
[1]
The conflagration caused the death of a school teacher, Ritchel
(Nellie) Banaag, who was then acting as an election supervisor. A poll
watcher in the person of Leticia (Letty) Ramos also perished while nine
others were reportedly injured as a result of the fire.
[2]
In the investigation that ensued, several eye-witnesses identified some
of petitioners as the perpetrators of the school burning.
[3]
The investigation also yielded that all six petitioners, who are all
members of the PNP Regional Special Operations Group (PNP-RSOG), failed
to timely respond to the incident at the Pinagbayanan Elementary School.
[4]
Acting on the report, the PNP hierarchy issued three successive memoranda dated May 18, May 22 and June 28, 2007, to wit:
A. |
| MEMORANDUM
|
|
| FOR: | TDPRM
|
|
| FROM: | TDIDM
|
|
| SUBJECT: | Order for Restrictive Custody of PCINSP ELPIDIO RAMIREZ, et al.
|
|
| DATE: | May 18, 2007 |
|
|
| -------------------------------------------------------------
|
- Reference: Memo from TDIDM with subject: Special Report re
Alleged Arson in Pinagbayanan Elementary School, Taysan, Batangas which
was approved by the C, PNP.
- This pertains to the investigation being conducted regarding the
reported involvement of personnel from PRO 4A-RSOG in the fire incident
in Pinagbayanan Elementary School, Taysan, Batangas on May 15, 2007
resulting in the death of two (2) teachers and wounding of several
others.
- In this connection, request issue orders putting in restrictive custody the following PNP personnel:
PCINSP ELPIDIO A RAMIREZ
PINSP RUEL C DELA CRUZ
PINSP ROBERTO N MARINDA
SPO2 William Relos, Jr.
(SGD.)
GEARY L. BARIAS
Police Director[5]
B. |
| MEMORANDUM
|
|
| To | : GD, RHSG
|
|
| From | : Regional Director
|
|
| Subject | : Monitoring of PCOs and PNCOs
|
|
| Date | : May 22, 2007 |
|
|
| -------------------------------------------------------------
|
- References:
- Verbal instruction of RD, PRO, CALABARZON, dated May 22, 2007; and
- S.O. No. 274 dated May 17, 2007, PRO, CALABARZON.
- Above references pertains to the relief of PINSP ROBERTO D.
MARINDA, SPO2 William D. Relos, SPO2 Leo V. Morcilla, SPO2 Geronimo R.
Manalo, PO3 Rico M. Landicho and PO2 Romeo E. Medalla, Jr, from their
respective unit assignment and subsequent reassignment to that office.
- In connection thereof, subject PCO and PNCOs should be properly
accounted from time to time taking into consideration the following:
- All their movements within camp should be monitored;
- When situation warrants their movement outside camp, they should be properly escorted on one-on-one basis; and
- A logbook should be maintained to record the accounting of said PCO
and PNCOs, their place of destination, name of escort, Estimated Time
of Departure (ETD) and Estimated Time of Return to Station (ETRS).
- Further inform the Regional Director and the Command Group thru
Chief, Regional Directorial Staff of any unusual incident or movement
involving subject PCOs and PNCOs.
- This Order takes effect immediately.
BY AUTHORITY OF PCSUPT RADOVAN, JR.:
(SGD.)
AARON DEOCARES FIDEL, CSEE
Police Senior Superintendent (DSC)
Chief, Regional Directorial Staff[6]
C. |
| MEMORANDUM
|
|
| FOR | : GD, RHSG 4A
|
|
| FROM | : Chief, RPHRDD
|
|
| SUBJECT | : Order for Restrictive Custody of PINSP ROBERTO NAZ MARINDA and SPO2 William Dizon Relos, Jr.
|
|
| DATE | : June 28, 2007 |
------------------------------------------------------
- References
- Memorandum from TDPRM dated May 23, 2007;
- Memorandum from Chief, RLS 4A June 19, 2007 noted by RD, PRO 4A
- This is in connection with the reported involvement of PRO 4A-RSOG
personnel to the fire incident on May 15, 2007 at Pinagbayanan
Elementary School, Taysan, Batangas
- Please be informed that pursuant to reference 1.a., orders are
being issued by this Office placing following named PNP personnel under
Restrictive Custody (in view of the investigation being conducted against them) effective this date, namely:
PINSP ROBERTO NAZ MARINDA
SPO2 William Dizon Relos, Jr.
- In this regard, inform concerned personnel and adjust your records accordingly.
- For information and be guided accordingly.
(SGD.)
IRENEO DIZON BORDAS
Police Senior Superintendent DSG
Chief, RPHRDD[7]
Petitioners contend that the May 22, 2007 Memorandum “defines and
circumscribes the scope of petitioners’ restrictive custody” status;
[8]
that “although technically speaking, petitioners as PNP officer are not
detained or imprisoned, their physical movements are, however, limited
only within Camp Vicente Lim, Calamba City, Laguna; they cannot go home
to their respective families and if they would leave Camp Vicente Lim
they need to be escorted;”
[9]
“that petitioners’ restrictive custody status is illegal” and “not
sanctioned by any existing provision of our constitution and laws;”
[10]
that “it is degrading,” “summarily and arbitrarily imposed on the basis
of mere suspicion and it actually makes PNP members enjoy lesser rights
than what are actually enjoyed by ordinary citizens.”
[11]
Petitioners further posit that what is only sanctioned is preventive
suspension under which they can enjoy liberty and go home to their
families pending administrative investigation. Hence, they urge, this
practice by the PNP organization should be put to a stop.
In support of their petition, petitioners principally rely on the case of
Moncupa v. Enrile, et al.,[12] where it was essentially held that the writ of
habeas corpus applies to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty.
The ruling holds true even if petitioners are released but continue to
be denied one or more of his constitutional freedoms, where there is
present a denial of due process, where the restraints are not merely
involuntary but appear to be unnecessary, and where a deprivation of
freedom, originally valid has, in the light of subsequent developments,
become arbitrary.
They also cite
Villavicencio v. Lukban,
[13]
where certain women were illegally transported against their will from
Manila to Davao. There they were forced to change their domicile and
some of them returned to Manila. Yet, this Court condemned the
involuntary restraints on petitioners, fined the City Mayor of Manila
and hoped the decision would serve to bulwark the fortifications of an
orderly government of laws and to protect individual liberty from
illegal encroachment.
Petitioners thus pray that a writ of
habeas corpus
be issued, commanding the respondents to produce the bodies of
petitioners before the Court, to explain the lawful cause of their
detention and deprivation of physical liberties and, thereafter, for
this Court to adjudge their restrictive custody status as illegal and
to set them free.
Without necessarily giving due course to the petition, the Court required respondents to comment.
In lieu of a comment, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) manifested that by Memorandum Order of August 30, 2007,
[14]
respondent Radovan, Director of PNP Regional Office 4-A, has recalled,
effective immediately, the assailed restrictive custody order embodied
in the two Memoranda dated May 22 and June 28, 2007. In view of the
recall, it is prayed that the petition be dismissed on ground of
mootness.
Issues
Two critical issues are thus posed for our determination. One, by
petitioners, on whether or not they are unlawfully detained or
restrained of their liberty under their restrictive custody status.
Two, by respondents, on whether the Court should dismiss the petition
on the sole ground of mootness, the assailed orders having been
recalled, or proceed to decide the petition on the merits.
We shall resolve them in the reverse order, dealing with the procedural ahead of the substantive question.
Our Ruling
I. | This Court, By Way Of Exceptions, Decides Moot Issues |
Notwithstanding the mootness of the issues on restrictive custody and
monitoring of movements of petitioners, We opt to resolve them given
(a) the paramount public interest involved, (b) their susceptibility of
recurring yet evading review and (c) the imperative need to educate the
police community on the matter.
Sa kabila ng pagiging akademiko na
lamang ng mga isyu tungkol sa mahigpit na pangangalaga (restrictive
custody) at pagmonitor ng galaw (monitoring of movements) ng
nagpepetisyon, dedesisyunan namin ito (a) dahil sa nangingibabaw na
interes ng madla na nakapaloob dito, (b) dahil sa posibilidad na
maaaring maulit ang pangyayari at (c) dahil kailangang maturuan ang
kapulisan tungkol dito.
The release of petitioners by respondents in a petition for
habeas corpus
does not automatically abate a decision on the case. Similarly, a
recall of the custody order challenged by petitioners will not
necessarily call for a dismissal on the ground of mootness alone.
Although the general rule is mootness of the issue warrants a
dismissal, there are well-defined exceptions.
In the
habeas corpus case of
Aquino, Jr. v. Enrile,
[15]
twenty-six (26) petitioners were released from custody and one withdrew
during the pendency of the petition. The fact that the petition was
rendered moot and academic did not prevent this Court in the exercise
of its symbolic function from promulgating one of the most voluminous
decisions ever.
Even petitioners cite
Tibo v. The Provincial Commander[16] and
Toyoto, et al. v. Ramos, et al.,[17] where respondents filed a motion to dismiss the petition for
habeas corpus
on the ground that petitioners had been temporarily released and their
case had, therefore, become moot and academic. This Court, as in
Moncupa,
chose to decide the said cases. The Court sustained petitioners’ plea
that their case be considered moot and academic only “if their release
would be permanent.”
In
Acop, et al. v. Guingona, Jr.,[18]
petitioning PNP officers questioned, via petition for injunction, the
legality of the admission of SPO2 delos Reyes and SPO2 dela Cruz into
the Witness Protection Program. Petitioners contended that under
Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 6981, law enforcement officers like the said
SPO2 are disqualified from being admitted into the program, though they
may be testifying against other law enforcement officers.
In its comment, the OSG claimed that the petition lacked merit and that
the same was rendered moot and academic because the coverage of SPO2
delos Reyes and SPO2 dela Cruz under the program was already terminated
on December 3, 1997 and August 23, 1998, respectively, as evidenced by
the letter of the Director of the Program addressed to the OSG, dated
February 10, 1999. In their comment, private respondents SPO2 delos
Reyes and SPO2 dela Cruz agreed with the OSG.
Denying the OSG motion, this Court held:
Indeed, prayers a) and b) above had been rendered moot and
academic by reason of the release of SPO2 delos Reyes and SPO2 dela
Cruz from the coverage of the Program. However, we find it necessary
to resolve the merits of the principal issue raised for a proper
disposition of prayer c) and for future guidance of both bench and bar
as to the application of Sections 3(d) and 4 of R. A. No. 6981. As we
have ruled in Alunan III vs. Mirasol, and Viola vs. Alunan III, courts will decide a question otherwise moot and academic if it is capable of repetition, yet evading review. (Emphasis supplied)
This Court then sustained the RTC observation that law enforcement
officers may be admitted into the Witness Protection Program in cases
where they are witnesses in legislative investigations.
In the recent landmark cases of
David, et al. v. Arroyo, et al.,[19] involving seven petitions for
certiorari
and prohibition, the President lifted the declaration of a state of
national emergency during the pendency of the suits. In effect,
Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 and General Order No. 5 were
withdrawn. The OSG thus moved and prayed for the dismissal of the
petitions, arguing there is no more justiciable controversy as the
issue has been mooted.
This Court denied the motion and proceeded to declare the
constitutional infirmity of the Presidential issuances. On the issue
of mootness, the Court summed up the four exceptions to the rule, thus:
The moot and academic principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved; third,
when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling
principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.
All the foregoing exceptions are present here and justify this Court’s
assumption of jurisdiction over the instant petitions. Petitioners
alleged that the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 violates the
Constitution. There is no question that the issues being raised affect
the public interest, involving as they do the people’s basic rights to
freedom of expression, of assembly and of the press. Moreover, the Court has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional precepts, doctrines or rules. It has the symbolic function of educating the bench and the bar, and in the present petitions, the military and the police,
on the extent of the protection given by constitutional guarantees. And
lastly, respondents contested actions are capable of repetition.
Certainly, the petitions are subject to judicial review. (Emphasis
supplied).
Evidently, the triple reasons We advanced at the start of
Our ruling are justified under the foregoing exceptions. Every bad,
unusual incident where police officers figure in generates public
interest and people watch what will be done or not done to them. Lack
of disciplinary steps taken against them erode public confidence in the
police institution. As petitioners themselves assert, the restrictive
custody of policemen under investigation is an existing practice,
hence, the issue is bound to crop up every now and then. The matter is
capable of repetition or susceptible of recurrence. It better be
resolved now for the education and guidance of all concerned.
II. | There Is No Illegal Restraint In The Restrictive Custody and Monitored Movements Of Police Officers Under Investigation |
The high prerogative writ of
habeas corpus,
whose origin is traced to antiquity, was devised and exists as a speedy
and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint and as
the best and efficient defense of personal freedom.
[20]
Ang mataas na pinapahalagahang writ of habeas corpus,
na ang pinagmulan ay nuon pa mang matandang panahon, ay ginawa at
umiiral bilang kagyat at mabisang lunas upang paalpasin ang tao sa
labag sa batas na pagkakapigil at bilang pinakamaigi at mahusay na
sanggalang ng sariling kalayaan.
The main thrust of the special proceeding of
habeas corpus
is to inquire into the legality of one's detention. More specifically,
its vital purpose is to obtain immediate relief from illegal
confinement, to liberate those who may be imprisoned without sufficient
cause and to deliver them from unlawful custody.
[21]
Only if the Court is satisfied that a person is unlawfully restrained of his liberty will a petition for
habeas corpus be granted and the person detained released from confinement.
[22] If respondents are not detaining nor restraining the applicants or the person in whose behalf the petition for
habeas corpus is filed, the petition should perforce be dismissed.
[23]
Ang kahilingan para sa habeas corpus
ay maari lamang pagbigyan at ang taong pinipigilan ay pawawalan sa
pagkapiit kung masisiyahan ang Hukuman na labag sa batas ang pagkakait
sa kanya ng kalayaan. Kung hindi ipinipiit o pinipigilan ang mga taong
naghain ng kahilingan para sa habeas corpus o ang mga kinakatawan nila, ang petisyon ay dapat pawalang saysay.
Measured by the foregoing yardstick, the petition, on its face, fails
to convince us that petitioners are actually and unlawfully detained
and restrained of their liberty.
Sombong v. Court of Appeals, et al.
[24] teaches us that for the writ of
habeas corpus
to issue, the restraint of liberty must be in the nature of an illegal
and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. More importantly,
the prime specification of an application for a writ of
habeas corpus is an actual and effective, and
not merely nominal or moral, illegal restraint of liberty.
[25]
To the mind of the Court, petitioners are not illegally and involuntarily deprived of their freedom of action.
Walang illegal na pagpipigil o pagkakait ng kalayaan sa nagpepetisyon.
Firstly, the assailed memoranda dated May 22, 2007,
[26] June 28, 2007
[27] and May 18, 2007,
[28]
decreeing the monitoring of their movements cannot, by any stretch of
the imagination, be considered as a form of curtailment of their
freedom guaranteed under our Constitution.
Ang
ipag-utos na subaybayan ang kanilang mga kilos ay hindi maituturing na
pagbabawas ng kanilang kalayaan na ginagarantiyahan sa ilalim ng ating
Konstitusyon.
Perusing the assailed memoranda, it is evident that petitioners are not
actually detained or restrained of their liberties. What was ordered
by the PNP is that their movements, inside and outside camp be
monitored in the following manner, to wit:
- All their movements within camp should be monitored;
- When situation warrants their movement outside camp, they should be properly escorted on one-on-one basis; and
- A logbook should be maintained to record the accounting of said PCO
and PNCOs, their place of destination, name of escort, Estimated Time
of Departure (ETD) and Estimated Time of Return to Station (ETRS).[29]
It is crystal-clear that petitioners are free to go in and out of Camp
Vicente Lim as they please. The only limitation imposed upon them is
that their movements within the premises of the camp shall be
monitored; that they have to be escorted whenever the circumstances
warrant that they leave the camp; and that their estimated time of
departure and arrival shall be entered in a logbook.
Even petitioners themselves admit they are not actually detained or imprisoned.
[30]
Secondly, the “restrictive custody” complained of by petitioners is, at best, nominal restraint which is beyond the ambit of
habeas corpus.
It is neither actual nor effective restraint that would call for the
grant of the remedy prayed for. It is a permissible precautionary
measure to assure the PNP authorities that the police officers
concerned are always accounted for.
Ang restrictive custody o mahigpit na pangangalaga, na inirereklamo ng mga nagpetisyon, ay bahagyang paghihigpit lamang na labas sa saklaw ng habeas corpus.
Ito’y hindi aktuwal o mabisang pagpigil para mangailangan ng remedyong
hinihiling. Ito’y isang pinapayagang hakbang ng pag-iingat upang
makatiyak ang pamunuan ng PNP na ang mga naturang pulis ay maaring
iprisinta anumang sandali.
If said custodial procedure were not taken, respondent police superiors
themselves would have been exposed to charges of conspiracy, negligence
or laxity in the enforcement of internal discipline. If petitioners
get lost or are able to go abroad or figure in another untoward
incident, respondents would have to explain why they did not observe
the needed precaution, else they would also be administratively liable.
Thirdly, petitioners’ reliance on
Moncupa[31]
is misplaced. In said case, petitioner was ordered released by
respondent but his release was saddled with restrictions. There,
petitioner was required to secure
prior approval
for: (a) any travel outside Metro Manila; and (b) a change in
residence. His freedom of speech was likewise muffled by a prohibition
on granting interviews to local or foreign media. He was likewise
ordered to report regularly to respondent.
[32]
In the case at bench, no restrictions in the nature of those imposed in
Moncupa
exist. To reiterate, petitioners are merely held to account for their
movements inside and outside the camp’s premises. They are not
required to secure prior approval before they can move out of the camp,
only that each of them be accompanied by an escort and their time of
departure and arrival noted.
Ang mga
nagpepetisyon ay pinipigil lamang upang masubaybayan ang kanilang
ikinikilos sa loob at labas ng kampo. Hindi nila kailangan ang permiso
bago makalabas ng kampo, kailangan lang na may kasamang bantay at ang
kanilang pag-alis at pagbalik ay nakatala.
Fourthly, Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 6975 (DILG Act of 1990), as amended by R.A. No. 8551 (PNP Reform
and Reorganization Act of 1998), clearly provides that members of the
police force are subject to the administrative disciplinary machinery
of the PNP. Section 41(b) of the said law enumerates the disciplinary
actions,
including restrictive custody
that may be imposed by duly designated supervisors and equivalent
officers of the PNP as a matter of internal discipline, to wit:
(b) Internal Discipline. – On dealing with minor
offenses involving internal discipline found to have been committed by
any regular member of their respective commands, the duly designated
supervisors and equivalent officers of the PNP shall, after due notice
and summary hearing, exercise disciplinary powers as follows:
(1) Chiefs of police or equivalent supervisors may summarily
impose the administrative punishment of admonition or reprimand;
restriction to specified limits; withholding of privileges; forfeiture
of salary or suspension; or any of the combination of the foregoing:
Provided, That, in all cases, the total period shall not exceed fifteen
(15) days;
(2) Provincial directors or equivalent supervisors may summarily
impose administrative punishment of admonition or reprimand;
restrictive custody; withholding of privileges; forfeiture of salary or
suspension, or any combination of the foregoing: Provided, That, in all
cases, the total period shall not exceed thirty (30) days;
(3) Police regional directors or equivalent supervisors shall
have the power to impose upon any member the disciplinary punishment of
dismissal from the service. He may also impose the administrative
punishment of admonition or reprimand; restrictive custody; withholding
of privileges; suspension or forfeiture of salary; demotion; or any
combination of the foregoing: Provided, That, in all cases, the total
period shall not exceed sixty (60) days;
(4) The Chief of the PNP shall have the power to impose the
disciplinary punishment of dismissal from the service; suspension or
forfeiture of salary; or any combination thereof for a period not
exceeding one hundred eighty (180) days: Provided,
further, That the chief of the PNP shall have the authority to place
police personnel under restrictive custody during the pendency of a
grave administrative case filed against him or even after the filing of
a criminal complaint, grave in nature, against such police personnel.[33] (Emphasis supplied)
It can be gleaned from the memoranda issued by the PNP hierarchy that
an investigation is being conducted on the reported involvement of
police personnel from PRO 4A-RSOG in the fire that gutted the
Pinagbayanan Elementary School, Taysan, Batangas during the wee hours
of May 15, 2007. The initial investigation report appended to the
petition discloses that all petitioners are members of the Region 4
Special Operations Group who failed to timely respond to the incident.
Some are even tagged by key eyewitnesses as the primary suspects in the
burning of the school. As a result of the blaze, two persons,
including a school teacher performing election duties, were killed.
The incident sparked a national uproar, and rightly so, considering
that it was a direct attack on the country’s already much-maligned
electoral process. Evidently, the PNP is well within its authority to
relieve petitioners from their former positions and place them under
tight watch, at least until the termination of the said investigation.
Clearly, placing police officers facing a grave administrative case
under restrictive custody is a disciplinary measure authorized under
the PNP law.
Malinaw
na ang paglalagay sa mahigpit na pangangalaga sa mga pulis na nahaharap
sa isang grabeng kasong administratibo ay isang pandisiplinang hakbang
na pinahihintulutan ng batas ng PNP. Thus, petitioners’ claim
that their restrictive custody is an illegal practice “not sanctioned
by any existing provision of our constitution and laws” is not true.
It must necessarily fail.
Lastly, petitioners contend
that by placing them under restrictive custody, they are made to suffer
lesser rights than those enjoyed by private citizens. On this score,
the Court’s pronouncement in
Canson, et al. v. Hidalgo, et al.
[34] is categorical. It was held there that
although
the PNP is civilian in character, its members are subject to the
disciplinary authority of the Chief, Philippine National Police, under
the National Police Commission. Courts cannot, by injunction, review,
overrule or otherwise interfere with valid acts of police officials.
The police organization must observe self-discipline and obey a chain
of command under civilian officials.[35]
Elsewise stated, police officers are not similarly situated with
ordinary civil service employees. The PNP has its own administrative
disciplinary mechanism different from those of other government
employees.
Sa
ibang salita, ang kapulisan ay hindi katulad ng karaniwang kawani ng
pamahalaan. Ang PNP ay may sariling mekanismo ng pagdisiplina na kaiba
sa ipinatutupad sa ibang empleyado ng gobyerno.
In
Fianza v. The People’s Law Enforcement Board, et al., [36] we ruled:
x x x although respondent policemen continue to be
citizens, as public respondents contend, they are not the “private
citizens” referred to in the laws cited above. Clearly, the term
“private citizens” does not ordinarily include men in uniform, such as
the respondent PNP men. This is particularly evident in the PNP law
which uses the term “members of the PNP” as well as “private citizens”
to refer to different groups of persons and not interchangeably. The
“plain meaning rule” or verba legis
in statutory construction is applicable in this situation. When the
words of a statute are clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be
given its interpretation. The term “private citizen” in the PNP Law and
PLEB Rules is used in its common signification and was not meant to
refer to the members of the PNP, such as respondent policemen.
In sum, petitioners are unable to discharge their burden of showing
that they are entitled to the issuance of the writ prayed for. The
petition fails to show on its face that they are unlawfully deprived of
their liberties guaranteed and enshrined in the Constitution. No
unlawful restraint is foisted on them by the PNP authorities under the
questioned memoranda.
The ultimate purpose of the writ of
habeas corpus
is to relieve a person from
unlawful restraint. The writ cannot and
will not issue absent a showing that petitioners are deprived of their
liberty. Neither can it relieve petitioners, who are police officers,
from the valid exercise of prescribed discipline over them by the PNP
leadership.
Ang pangunahing layunin ng writ o utos ng habeas corpus
ay ang pagsaklolo sa isang tao mula sa pagkapiit o pagkapigil nang
lisya sa batas. Ang writ ay hindi makakamit kung walang pagkakait ng
kalayaan. Hindi rin ito mapanghahawakan ng mga nagpepetisyong kapulisan
upang makaiwas sa takdang paraan ng pagdisiplina sa kanila ng mga
pinuno ng PNP.
WHEREFORE, the petition is
DENIED DUE COURSE and
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago, (Chairperson), Austria-Martinez, Chico-Nazario, and
Nachura, JJ., concur.
[1] Rollo, pp. 47-49.
[2] Id.
[3] Id. at 15-16, 63-64.
[4] Id. at 47-49.
[5] Id. at 16.
[6] Id. at 14.
[7] Id. at 15.
[8] Id. at 4.
[9] Id.
[10] Id. at 5.
[11] Id. at 5-6.
[12] G.R. No. L-63345, January 30, 1986, 141 SCRA 233.
[13] 39 Phil. 778 (1919).
[14] Annex “1.”
[15] G.R. No. L-35546, September 17, 1974, 59 SCRA 183.
[16] G.R. No. L-44825, October 20, 1978, 85 SCRA 561.
[17] G.R. No. L-69270, October 15, 1985, 139 SCRA 316.
[18] G.R. No. 134855, July 2, 2002, 383 SCRA 577.
[19] G.R. Nos. 171396, 171409, 171485, 171483, 171400, 171489 & 171424, May 3, 2006, 489 SCRA 160.
[20] Feria v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 122954, February 15, 2000, 325 SCRA 525, 533;
Sombong v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 111876, January 31, 1996, 252 SCRA 663, 673;
Castriciones v. Chief of Staff Armed Forces of the Philippines, G.R. No. 65731, September 28, 1989;
Mizuaki Takenouchi v. Cristi, et al., G.R. No. 82232, July 25, 1988.
[21] Velasco, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 118644, July 7, 1995, 245 SCRA 677, 679;
Quintos v. Director of Prisons, 55 Phil. 304.
[22] Gonzales v. Viola, 61 Phil. 824.
[23] In the matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Ferdinand E. Marcos, etc. v. Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig, G.R. No. 88079, May 18, 1989;
In Re: Daniel Ngaya-an, et al. v. Conrado Balweg, G.R. No. 80591, August 6, 1991.
[24] G.R. No. 111876, January 31, 1996, 252 SCRA 663.
[25] Moncupa v. Enrile, et al., see note 12, citing
Villavicencio v. Lukban, 539 Phil. 778, 790.
[26] Annex “A.”
[27] Annex “B.”
[28] Annex “C.”
[29] Rollo, p. 14.
[30] Id. at 4.
[31] See note 12.
[32] Id.
[33] Id.
[34] G.R. No. 121889, August 4, 2000, 337 SCRA 293.
[35] Id. at 296.
[36] G.R. Nos. 109638-39, March 31, 1995, 243 SCRA 165, 178.