479 Phil. 73
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
After determining that the aforementioned employees spearheaded the strike, the petitioner terminated their employment. The employees thereafter filed complaints for illegal dismissal with the National Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). The petitioner, in turn, filed a complaint against the said employees to declare the strike illegal. The complaints were docketed as NLRC NCR Case Nos. 00-10-04910-89, 00-10-04921-89, 00-11-05361-89 and 00-11-05564-89, raffled to Labor Arbiter Nieves Vivar-de Castro.[7]
- William Inocencio
- Luis Villa
- Noel Liwag
- Lourdes Martin
- Joel Floria
- Joselito Cortez
- Asuncion Dolot
- Ronilo Mayordomo
- Edwin de Guzman
- Maximiano (sic) Bathan
- Rene Noel Ciego[6]
Dissatisfied, the petitioner and the dismissed employees appealed the decision before the NLRC, docketed as NLRC NCR No. 000936-90.[23]
- Noel Mayordomo
- Lourdes Martin
- Ronilo Mayordomo
- Erwin de Guzman
- Joel Floria
- Asuncion Dolot
- Rene Noel Ciego
- Andres Namoro
- William Inocencio
- Luis Villa
- Natividad Taquic
- Nicolas Leonardo
- Joselito Cortez
- Maximiano (sic) Bathan[22]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the strike staged by respondent LMF-LMLC is hereby declared illegal and as a consequence of which its Officers and members are hereby declared, to have legally lost their employment status, namely:The Labor Arbiter ruled that based on the records, the SWAT was the certified exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of the petitioner. Furthermore, the CBA expired on January 15, 1990 and was not renewed due to the filing by three unions, including the LMF-LMLC, of their respective petitions for certification election. However, since the CBA provided that it would continue to be in effect until a new one had been entered into, the no-strike-no-lockout clause was still in effect; as such, the contract bar rule was still applicable, and, consequently, the strike was illegal.[25] The Labor Arbiter, likewise, pointed out that the strike was based on a non-strikable ground, more specifically, an intra-union and inter-union conflict.
- Nicolas Chavez
- Alfredo Jungco
- Pablito Nava
- Florentino Alejandro
- Jonathan Josef
- Emmanuel Fabiola
- Rogelio dela Cruz
- Pedro Ege
- Restituto de Leon
- Orsie Renales
- Joel Bautista
- Ferdinand Santo
- Maria Teresa Notado
- Ricardo Templo
- Florendo Sereno
- Maria Elena Presno
- Renato Hermoso
- Rodrigo Renales
- Luis Villa*
- William Inocencio*
- Lourdes Martin*
- Josefina de Leon*
- Ranilo Mayordomo*
- Maximo Bathan*
- Joselito Cortez*
- Joel Floria*
- Edwin de Guzman*
- Noel Liwag*
- Natividad Taquic*
- Asuncion Dolot*
- Andres Namoro*
- Rene Ciego*
- Gemma Barcelon
- Nicolas Leonardo*[24]
In the meantime, on December 15, 1994, the NLRC affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter in NLRC NCR No. 0000936-90.[28]I.
THE HONORABLE LABOR ARBITER JOVENCIO Ll. MAYOR, JR., COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN HE RULED THAT THE SHOE WORKERS ASSOCIATION AND TECHNOLOGY (SWAT) IS THE SOLE AND EXCLUSIVE BARGAINING AGENT OF ALL THE RANK-AND-FILE EMPLOYEES OF APPELLEE FILCON MANUFACTURING CORPORATION.II.
THE HONORABLE ARBITER JOVENCIO Ll. MAYOR, JR. COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN HE RULED THAT THE “NO-STRIKE” PROVISION OF THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT APPLIES TO THE RESPONDENT-APPELLANT LMF-LMLC.III.
THE HONORABLE LABOR ARBITER JOVENCIO Ll. MAYOR, JR. COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN HE RULED THAT THE STRIKE WAS ILLEGAL FOR BEING BASED ON AN INTER-UNION AND/OR INTRA-UNION CONFLICT.IV.
THE HONORABLE LABOR ARBITER JOVENCIO Ll. MAYOR, JR. COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN HE RULED THAT THE STRIKE WAS ILLEGAL FOR BLOCKING THE FREE INGRESS TO AND EGRESS FROM THE COMPANY PREMISES.V.
THE HONORABLE LABOR ARBITER JOVENCIO Ll. MAYOR, JR. COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN HE RULED THAT THERE WAS NO CONDONATION OR WAIVER OF THE STRIKERS’ PARTICIPATION IN THE STRIKE.VI.
THE HONORABLE LABOR ARBITER JOVENCIO Ll. MAYOR, JR. COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN HE RULED THAT THE STRIKERS LOST THEIR EMPLOYMENT STATUS.[27]
In its comment on the petition, the petitioner insisted that the decision of the Labor Arbiter was fully and substantially supported by the established facts and record based on applicable laws and jurisprudence. It reiterated that the respondent union lacked the legal personality to file a notice of strike, considering that the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of its rank-and-file employees was the SWAT. Moreover, by engaging in concerted activities without observing the cooling-off period, the respondent union thereby conducted an illegal strike. The petitioner also reiterated that the officers and members of the respondent union participated in the prohibited activities, particularly the blockage of the ingress to and egress from the factory.I.
RESPONDENT NLRC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT RULED THAT SWAT – FILCON EMPLOYEES UNION REMAINED THE SOLE AND EXCLUSIVE BARGAINING AGENT OF ALL THE RANK-AND-FILE EMPLOYEES OF THE COMPANY.II.
RESPONDENT NLRC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT RULED THAT ONLY SWAT-FILCON EMPLOYEES UNION COULD VALIDLY DECLARE A STRIKE TO THE EXCLUSION OF ALL OTHER UNIONS AT THE COMPANY.III.
RESPONDENT NLRC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT RULED THAT PETITIONER LMF-LMLC DID NOT COMPLY WITH THE PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS OF A STRIKE.IV.
RESPONDENT NLRC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT UPHELD THE FINDING OF THE LABOR ARBITER THAT ILLEGAL ACTS WERE COMMITTED DURING THE STRIKE.V.
RESPONDENT NLRC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT UPHELD THE RULING OF THE LABOR ARBITER DECLARING THAT THE MEMBERS OF PETITIONER LMF-LMLC HAD LOST THEIR EMPLOYMENT STATUS AS A RESULT OF THE ILLEGALITY OF THE STRIKE.[33]
WHEREFORE, finding merit in the Petition, this Court issues the writ of certiorari and sets aside the Decision of the respondent Commission dated December 29, 1997 and orders the dismissal of NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-0804521-90 and the reinstatement of the dismissed employees with full backwages and other benefits from the time they were dismissed up to the time of actual reinstatement.[34]While it agreed with the NLRC that the strike staged by the respondent union was illegal, the CA ruled that by reason of the compromise agreement entered into by the parties on August 30, 1990, the petitioner had, in effect, condoned the misconduct of the striking employees. The CA emphasized that, under the agreement, the petitioner agreed to accept all workers without reservation, as evidenced by the non-retaliatory clause contained therein. Citing Article 2036, in tandem with Article 2028 of the New Civil Code, the CA emphasized that a compromise agreement comprises not only those objects which are definitely stated, but also those that are, by necessary implication, included therein. It stressed that the dismissal of the complaint for illegal strike was necessarily included in the compromise agreement entered into by the parties.
For its part, the respondent union asserts that by virtue of the compromise agreement, the petitioner had condoned the misconduct of its officers and members: staging a strike and engaging in prohibited activities in the course of such strike. Citing the case of Cebu International Finance Corporation v. Court of Appeals[38] and Armed Forces of the Philippines Mutual Benefit Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[39] the respondent asserts that a compromise agreement has the effect of res judicata upon the parties. It stresses that the CA did not gravely abuse its discretion when it gave due course to its petition for certiorari.
- THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE AND REVERSIBLE ERROR IN REOPENING AND TAKING COGNIZANCE OF THE ISSUE ON THE EXISTENCE OF CONDONATION WHICH WAS NOT RAISED IN THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND HAD ALREADY BEEN RESOLVED IN THE NEGATIVE. ASSUMING THAT SAID ISSUE COULD STILL BE REOPENED, THERE IS ABSOLUTELY NO SHOWING THAT THE LABOR ARBITER AND NLRC GRAVELY ABUSED THEIR DISCRETION IN HOLDING THAT THE COMPROMISE AGREEMENT DID NOT CONSTITUTE A CONDONATION OF THE ILLEGAL ACTS COMMITTED DURING THE STRIKE OR RENDERED MOOT THE PENDING COMPLAINT FOR ILLEGAL STRIKE.
- THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE AND REVERSIBLE ERROR IN GIVING DUE COURSE TO THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI DESPITE LMF-LMLC’S FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE MANDATORY REQUIREMENTS OF SECTION 11, RULE 13 OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
- THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE AND REVERSIBLE ERROR IN ENTERTAINING THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI WHICH WAS FILED OUT OF TIME.[37]
A careful reading of the Compromise Agreement in the context of the factual milieu convinces this Court that it was, indeed, a compact between the parties to end their dispute and restore their cordial and mutually beneficial relationship. The Agreement explicitly stipulated that the strikers would stop their strike, lift their picket lines and resume work and the company would accept them back. The parties most significantly agreed to maintain and promote industrial piece, and shall not commit any act which might be construed as acts of harassment and retaliation. Accordingly, the strikers returned to work and the company accepted them back. It is difficult to see how an amicable resolution of the dispute between the petitioner and the private respondents could be effected without the dismissal of the case for illegal strike when that case was precisely the sword of Democles which hang over the latter’s heads and consequently caused the instability and discord in the work place.We do not agree with the CA. The compromise agreement executed by the parties attested by the NCMB reads:
The Labor Arbiter and respondent Commission held that the dismissal of the said cases was not mentioned in the Agreement. True, but it should be remembered that the Agreement which was handwritten was made by the parties who are non-lawyers and cannot therefore be expected to be very precise in their terminology. Important to remember is the rule in Art. 2036 of the Civil Code which states that to be deemed included in the compromise agreement are not only those expressly stated therein but also those necessarily implied therefrom. This Court has no doubt that the parties intended to terminate the illegal strike case as implied from the expressly stipulated terms mentioned above. That subsequently, the respondent company pursued said case was nothing but a change of mind which cannot denigrate much less suppress the juridical effect of said Compromise Agreement.
The respondent Commission totally ignored the text and tenor of the Compromise Agreement and eskewed the clear intention of the parties resulting in severe prejudice to the petitioner and its members. Considering the seriousness of the mistake and gravity of the resulting injury, this Court holds that, indeed, the respondent Commission gravely abused its discretion.
Under Article 2028 of the New Civil Code, a compromise is a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid litigation or put an end to one already commenced. A compromise under the said provision contemplates mutual concessions and mutual gains to avoid the expense and expenses of litigation or, when litigation has already begun, to end it because of the uncertainty of the result thereof.[43] The caption of an agreement is not determinative of the true nature thereof. An agreement although captioned a compromise agreement may not, in fact and in law, be a compromise agreement.[44]A G R E E M E N T
- The parties agree to maintain status quo prevailing immediately on the date of strike as follows:
- The parties agree to immediately resume operations based upon the work schedules to be prepared by the Company and in the said work schedule. The 17 suspended workers shall be included. In the preparation of work schedules, no discrimination shall be committed and, if possible, all returning workers or employees be admitted to work within one (1) week from reliance of the schedules which will be released on the first week of September 1990;
- The parties shall maintain and promote industrial peace, and shall not commit any acts which might be construed as acts of harassment and retaliation.
- The cases of Messrs. Renato Hermosa, Marcelino Sabado and Noel Celestial shall be submitted to voluntary arbitration and Mr. Alvin Villamor has been mutually chosen as the voluntary arbitrator.
- The parties shall endeavor to facilitate the resolution for the certification election.
- The Union shall lift its picket on August 31, 1990 and return to work in accordance therewith. However, consideration shall be given to employees who are unable to report to work immediately due to distance, illness and other similar consideration.
UNION MANAGEMENT Sgd. Sgd. 083090 8/30/90 Attested by: Sgd. for NCMB[42]
The right to strike is not absolute. It comes into being and is safeguarded by law only if the acts intended to render material aid or protection to a labor union arise from a lawful ground, reason or motive. But if the motive which had impelled, prompted, moved or led members of a labor union or organization to stage a strike, even if they had acted in good faith in staging it, be unlawful, illegitimate, unjust, unreasonable or trivial, the strike may be declared illegal. (Interwood Employees Association vs. Interwood Hardwood and Veneer Company of the Philippines, 52 O.G. 3936) (underscoring supplied) For “the law, in protecting the rights of the laborer, authorizes neither oppression nor self-destruction of the employer.” (Elizalde Int’l. vs. C.A., 108 SCRA 247). Thus, “a company has the right to dismiss its erring employees if only as a measure of self-protection against acts inimical to its interest.” (Manila Trading and Supply Co. vs. Zulueta, 69 Phil. 403).The NLRC affirmed the finding of the Labor Arbiter, viz:
As borne out by the record, respondent SWAT was certified as the sole and (sic) bargaining agent of all the rank-and-file employees of complainant Filcon Manufacturing Corporation whose Collective Bargaining Agreement expired last 15 January 1990 and was not renewed due to the filing of Petition for Certification Election by three (3) unions, namely: 1) Lakas Manggagawa sa Filcon-Lakas Manggagawa Labor Center; 2) Bisig ng Manggagawa; and 3) Kampli-Katipunan, which up to present is still pending before the Bureau of Labor Relations. In its Collective Bargaining Agreement, it provides that the provisions contained therein shall be in full force and effect until a new one has been entered into and one of the provisions therein reads that there shall be no strike nor lock-out. This provision must be given due respect by all the parties concerned. Thus, it is evident, therefore, that the contract bar rule applies, thereby, rendering the strike staged by respondent LMF-LMLC illegal. This is supported by evidence that respondent LMF-LMLC blocked the free ingress and egress of company premises during the course of their strike. (Exhs. “B,” “C,” “D,” “E,” “F,” “G,” “H,” “I,” and “J”), in violation of paragraph e, Article 264 of the Labor Code, as amended, to wit:
“Art. 264. PROHIBITED ACTIVITIES. –xxx xxx xxx
(e) No person engaged in picketing shall commit any act of violence, coercion or intimidation or obstruct the free ingress or egress from the employer’s premises for the lawful purposes or obstruct public thoroughfares.” (underscoring supplied)
Well-settled is the rule that strikes may only be allowed on grounds of CBA deadlock and unfair labor practices. Neither of this exist in the case at bar, as respondent LMF-LMLC failed to adduce evidence to the contrary except the sweeping allegation of its only witness who was dismissed from employment in 1989 or almost a year before the staging of the strike. Clearly, therefore, this Office is of the opinion and so holds that the strike was declared more on the ground of inter-union and intra-union conflict which is a non-strikeable issue pursuant to paragraph (b) of Article 263 of the Labor Code, as amended, to wit:“Art. 263. Strikes, Picketing and Lock-outs. –Thus, it cannot be gainsaid that respondent LMF-LMLC before it staged the strike, had complied with all the legal requisites, namely: 1) Notice of Strike; 2) Strike Vote, thus rendering the same legal.[48]xxx xxx xxx
(b) Workers shall have the right to engage in concerted activities for purposes of collective bargaining or for their mutual benefit and protection. The right of legitimate labor organizations to strike and picket and of employers to lockout, consistent with the national interest shall continue to be recognized and protected. However, no labor union may strike and no employer may declare a lockout on grounds involving inter-union and intra-union disputes.” (underscoring supplied)
There is no justification to disturb the factual findings and conclusions of the Labor Arbiter since these are amply supported by the evidence on record.The findings of facts of the quasi-judicial tribunals, in this case the NLRC which affirmed the findings of the Labor Arbiter, when based on substantial evidence, have conclusive effect on this Court absent proof that the said findings are capricious or arbitrary.[50]
Thus, only nine (9) days after the respondent union filed its notice of strike, and two (2) days after the strike vote, the said respondent union engaged in concerted activities such as picketing and other acts which are clear indications of a strike. Quite evidently, the respondent failed to observe the cooling-off period as provided in Article 263, paragraphs (e) and (f) of the Labor Code, which ordains that a strike may only be conducted after fifteen (15) days from date of filing of the notice of strike, if the issue stated therein is one involving unfair labor practice, and after seven (7) days from strike voting. Even granting that one of the strikeable issues raised in the notice of strike was union busting allegedly committed through the dismissal of three (3) union officers and member, nonetheless, there is no proof that the very existence of the union was threatened due to the alleged acts of dismissals such that it was not justified of the respondent union to stage the questioned strike immediately even before the mandatory cooling-off period expired.
What appears insurmountable as a clear proof of the illegality of the strike is that while it has yet to prove its majority status through a certification election, and worse during the pendency of a petition to that effect, the respondent union already assumed the role of a sole and exclusive bargaining agent. True enough, not one of the petitioners including the respondent union are in the certification election as they failed to garner the required majority of the total votes cast.
As correctly found by the Labor Arbiter, the incumbent union, FEU-SWAT, remained to be the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the company’s rank-and-file employees. This finds support in Article 253 of the Labor Code which, in part, states:“ART. 253. Duty to bargain collectively when there exists a collective bargaining agreement. – xxx. It shall be the duty of both parties (FILCON & SWAT) to keep the status quo and to continue in full force and effect the terms and conditions of the existing agreement during the 60-day period and/or until a new agreement is reached by the parties.”Thus, the respondent falsely assumed its rule when it filed a notice of strike during the 60-day freedom period, and while a petition for certification election was pending. As a matter of fact, a strike during the pendency of such petition is patently illegal.[49]