379 Phil. 303
PARDO, J.:
"Complainants were members of the Kapisanan ng Manggagawa sa Dunkin Donut-CFW (KMDD-CFW, for short) whose collective bargaining agreement with the corporation expired on November 16, 1989. During the freedom period, or on October 17, 1989, respondents through its Human Resources and Industrial Relations Manager informed the President of the Union that the initial CBA negotiation was on October 26, 1989 and, at the same time, requested for the confirmation of the people who shall be the regular members of the union panel in order to avoid any misunderstanding. At which date however, despite the absence of Leopoldo Prieto, Jr., the management representative, and the President of the Union, both panels were able to agree on the rules regarding the negotiation, including the time, date and number of days the panels had to meet. On November 7, 1989 (sic) CBA negotiations, the management panel arrived late, or at 1:35 P.M. which was thirty five minutes late, thus prompting the union panel to walkout. Despite the management request to go back and proceed with the agenda, the union simply ignored the same. A day after, or on November 8, 1989, the management addressed a letter of apology to the union and requested that the CBA negotiation be resumed on November 9, 15 and 17, 1989 which was discredited in the following wise:‘November 9, 1989
‘The Management CBA Negotiating Panel Golden Donuts, Inc.‘Attention: Ms. Gertrudes P. Bangalan HRIR Manager
‘We are in receipt of your letter expressing your sincere apology for the incident that happened last Nov. 7, 1989 at AIT.
‘Truly, it is our interest to come up with a peaceful negotiation, as we had displayed during our previous meetings. From punctuality even up to the manner of discussion we had shown our concern and sincere interest that we could finish our CBA as soon as possible smoothly and peacefully.
‘However, as we go on with the process, we observed that you are taking our CBA negotiation for granted, not considering it as one of your priorities.
‘However further, we would like to inform you that our final decision is to declare the negotiation DEADLOCK (sic).
‘Thus, we regret to inform you that we could not attent (sic) to your scheduled meeting this afternoon.‘Sincerely yours,
‘Florante M. Vicedo
'KMDD President’
"Came November 15 and 17, but the union panel did not show up despite the management letters advising the former about the CBA meetings. Again, on November 20, 1989 management sent a letter informing the union regarding the resumption of the negotiation, but the same turned out fruitless. Finally, despite management’s open letter of admonition under date of November 23, 1989, the union struck on December 18, 1989.
"On the ground that the strike was illegal because (a) it was started without the union having first exercised the ritht (sic) to collective bargaining in violation of Article 264 (a) of the Labor Code; (b) the strikers barricaded the company premises, barring ingress to and egress from the premises, which resulted to the trapping of officers and employees; (c) the strikers, on December 19, 1989, overturned the company’s Isuzu Kc-20 Van with Plate No. 506 and, thereafter, smashed its windshield, headlights and sidemirrors; (d) the strikers brandished broken bottles of Coca-Cola and effectively prevented Ernesto de Castillo, the traffic dispatcher, and his driver, Narciso Urjal, from making any move to pacify the mob; and (e) the strike was affected without any strike vote for the purpose and without the approval of the majority of the membership, and for not having reported the same to the Ministry (now Department) of Labor and Employment; a Complaint with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction was filed by Golden Donuts, Inc. on January 9, 1990, seeking the following relief (sic): a) to declare the strike illegal and to dismiss all officers of the union and members who participated in the commission of illegal acts; b) to pay petitioner actual damages as may be proven, the sum of Five Hundred Thousand (P500,000.00) Pesos and Three Hundred Thousand (P300,000.00) Pesos, respectively, as moral and exemplary damages, plus attorney’s fees. After KMU’s Atty. Pontenciano Flores was retained as counsel by the union and strikers, and sensing the gravity of the penalties attendant to the strike resorted to, including the financial award that may be due the Golden Donuts, Inc. and civil liabilities that may be awarded thereafter, said counsel pleaded for a comprome (sic). Hence, on July 16, 1990, a compromise agreement was entered into by the KMDD-CFW and Golden Donuts, Inc. whereby:
‘4.4. The parties agree to withdraw/dismiss with prejudice any and all cases, whether criminal, civil or labor filed against each other and agree to execute affidavit of desistance and/or Motion to Dismiss to ensure the dismissal of these cases.
‘5. Upon execution of this Agreement, the parties undertake not to file any other charges/complaints against each other as this act constitutes a general waiver or release/quitclaim by them (sic).’
apart from the separation pay said strikers, 262 in all, should receive from the corporation, the variable amounts of which are stated in the list of workers attached to the agreement. Out of the said 262 striking force, only the five (5) aforenamed complainants disagree (sic) and did not receive the amount due, arguing that the compromise agreement was entered into by their counsel and the President of the Union without their individual consent and/or authority and that the same was not approved nor ratified by the majority of the union membership. Hence, these complaints which were filed on the dates mentioned earlier."[4]On January 29, 1993, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision upholding the dismissal of private respondents and ruling that they were bound by the compromise agreement entered into by the union with petitioners. The dispositive portion of the decision states:
"WHEREFORE, in conformity with the opinion above expressed, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the Golden Donuts, Inc.:In due time, private respondents interposed an appeal to the NLRC, claiming that the union had no authority to waive or compromise their individual rights and that they were not bound by the compromise agreement entered into by the union with petitioners.
"1. To pay complainants Rosita D. Tamargo, Lucita N. Tegio, Alma Magtarayo and Lenisa Hontiveros each the sum of Four Thousand Five Hundred (P4,500.00) Pesos as separation pay;
"2. To pay complainant Agapito Macandog the following amounts:"3. To pay complainants’ counsel ten percent (10%) of the total amount due them as attorney’s fees.
- Four Thousand Five Hundred (P4,500.00) Pesos as separation pay;
- One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos as unpaid salary;
- One Thousand Three Hundred Twenty-Nine and Twenty Five (P1,329.25) Centavos as balance of his thirteenth month pay.
SO ORDERED."[5]
"WHEREFORE, the decision of the Labor Arbiter is hereby accordingly modified and a new one entered ordering respondent to reinstate complainants to their former positions without loss of seniority rights and back-wages limited to three years from the time of their dismissal up to the time of reinstatement.On January 31, 1994, the NLRC denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration of the resolution, for lack of an assignment of "palpable" or "patent" errors.[7]
"Furthermore, respondent is hereby ordered as follows:
"1. To pay complainants Rosita D. Tamargo, Lucita N. Tegio, Alma Magtarayo and Leonisa Hontiveros each the sum of Four Thousand Five Hundred (P4,500.00) Pesos as separation pay;
"2. To pay complainant Agapito Macandog the following amounts:"3. To pay complainant’s counsel ten percent (10%) of the total amount due them as attorney’s fees."[6]"a. Four Thousand Five Hundred (P4,500.00) Pesos as separation pay;
"b. On Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos as unpaid salary;
"c. One Thousand Three Hundred Twenty-Nine and Twenty-Five (P1,329.25) Centavos as balance of his thirteenth month pay.
"Money claims due to laborers cannot be the object of settlement or compromise effected by a union or counsel without the specific individual consent of each laborer concerned. The beneficiaries are the individual complainants themselves. The union to which they belong can only assist them but cannot decide for them."[12]The case of La Campana was re-affirmed in the General Rubber case as follows:
"In the instant case, there is no dispute that private respondent has not ratified the Return-to-Work Agreement. It follows, and we so hold, that private respondents cannot be held bound by the Return-to-Work Agreement. The waiver of money claims, which in this case were accrued money claims, by workers and employees must be regarded as a personal right, that is, a right that must be personally exercised. For a waiver thereof to be legally effective, the individual consent or ratification of the workers or employees involved must be shown. Neither the officers nor the majority or the union had any authority to waive the accrued rights pertaining to the dissenting minority members, even under a collective bargaining agreement which provided for a ‘union shop’. The same considerations of public policy which impelled the Court to reach the conclusion it did in La Campana, are equally compelling in the present case. The members of the union need the protective shield of this doctrine not only vis-à-vis their employer but also, at times, vis-à-vis the management of their own union, and at other times even against their own imprudence or impecuniousness."[13]We have consistently ruled that "a compromise is governed by the basic principle that the obligations arising therefrom have the force of law between the parties."[14]