423 Phil. 443
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
The judgment in this case having already been partially served by accused-convicts Salvador and Jessie, both surnamed Lilia, and has thus become final, their notice of appeal subject judgment and their motion to be admitted to bail and released from legal custody are denied for having been filed out of time.On May 6, 1997, counsel for accused filed a Motion for Reconsideration[5] which respondent Judge denied in an Order dated May 7, 1997[6] reasoning as follows:
It appearing that the accused upon promulgation of the judgment of conviction rendered against them, although they were duly bonded even up to now has not been cancelled or withdrawn, did not manifest that they would like to enjoy their temporary liberty on the strength thereof if they intended to appeal the judgment. There being no manifestation whatsoever, the court thus openly announced that they be held to serve their sentence.Respondent Judge filed a Comment dated September 4, 1997,[7] denying the allegations in the complaint. In the comment, respondent Judge argued that:
After the promulgation of the judgment on April 24, 1997 the accused already began to serve their sentence and this fact rendered the judgment against them final, notwithstanding the fact that the period within which to appeal may not have yet elapsed as provided in Section 7, Rule 120 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure of 1985, as amended.
. . . despite respondent's length of service in the judiciary, he still misconstrued the basic provisions of the Rules of Court on when a judgment has become final and executory and when an appeal is perfected.During the pendency of the proceedings, respondent Judge compulsorily retired on April 21, 2001.[9] However, the retirement of a judge or any judicial officer from the service does not preclude the finding of any administrative liability to which he shall still be answerable. As pointed out by the Court in Gallo v. Cordero:[10]
The respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion or had exhibited gross ignorance of the law when he disapproved the Notice of Appeal seasonably filed by accused based merely on [the] failure of the accused to manifest in open court after a judgment of conviction was promulgated, that they (accused) are going to appeal said judgment.
The accused (Criminal Case No. 45124) were on bail in all stages of the proceeding, from arraignment up to the promulgation of the judgment. During the promulgation of the judgment the bonds men did not appear in court and the accused were represented only by PAO lawyer who did not participate in the trial of the case. After the promulgation of the judgment of conviction, the respondent immediately issued an order that the "accused be furnished a copy of the judgment and that they be remitted to jail to commence serving their sentence" simply because the accused and/or the PAO lawyer failed to manifest in open court that the accused be freed on the strength of the existing bail bond and they intend to appeal the judgment.
The law does not require accused and/or counsel to manifest an intention to appeal a judgment of conviction immediately after its promulgation. Precisely, the law gives the accused fifteen (15) days from the date of promulgation of judgment of conviction to avail [of] other remedies, either by filing a Motion for Reconsideration or New Trial which stops the running of the period for perfecting an appeal or file a Notice of Appeal.[8]
Respondent denied the Notice of Appeal although the fifteen (15) day period had not yet expired because the accused have already started to serve sentence, according to him. Respondent, however, lost sight of the fact that the accused was in jail when the Notice of Appeal was filed because he erroneously ordered their commitment. When the judgment was promulgated the bail bonds posted by the accused were still valid and subsisting, and even up to now, have not been cancelled, according to respondent. Mere failure of the accused and/or counsel to manifest in open court [an] intention to appeal the judgment is not a waiver of said right. The order of commitment issued by the respondent was without legal basis and the accused cannot be considered to have partially served sentence when the Notice of Appeal was filed.
This jurisdiction that was ours at the time of the filing of the administrative complaint was not lost by the mere fact that the respondent public official had ceased in office during the pendency of his case. The Court retains its jurisdiction either to pronounce the respondent public official innocent of the charges or declare him guilty thereof. A contrary rule would be fraught with injustice and pregnant with dreadful and dangerous implications . . . If innocent, respondent public official merits vindication of his name and integrity as he leaves the government which he has served well and faithfully; if guilty, he deserves to receive the corresponding censure and a penalty proper and imposable under the situation.The Court finds the recommendation of the OCA well taken.
A "final" judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more for the court to do in respect thereto - such as an adjudication on the merits which, on the basis of the evidence presented at the trial, declares categorically what the rights and obligations of the parties are and which party is in the right, or a judgment or order that dismisses an action on the ground of res judicata or prescription, for instance.[12] It is to be distinguished from an order that is "interlocutory", or one that does not finally dispose of the case, such as an order denying a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, or granting a motion for extension of time to file a pleading. As such, only final judgments or orders (as opposed to interlocutory orders) are appealable. Now, a "final" judgment or order in the sense just described becomes "final and executory" upon expiration of the period to appeal therefrom where no appeal has been duly perfected or, an appeal therefrom having been taken, the judgment of the appellate court in turn has becomes final. It is called a "final and executory" judgment because execution at such point issues as a matter of right. (Emphasis supplied)It cannot be pretended, given the foregoing yardsticks, that the judgment rendered by respondent Judge in Criminal Case No. 45124 had become "final and executory" to either justify his order of commitment for the accused to commence serving their sentence or, much less, to deny the Notice of Appeal on the ground that accused have already partially served their sentence because the same was clearly filed within the 15-day reglementary period to appeal. While indeed a judgment of conviction in a criminal case may become final even before the expiration of the period to appeal, this will apply only if the accused demonstrates his conformity in a clear and express manner to the sentence by renouncing or waiving in writing his right to appeal therefrom.[13] Accused's filing of a notice of appeal precisely underscored their dissatisfaction and non-conformity to respondent Judge's decision.