625 Phil. 277
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Upon the other hand, this Court is not inclined to concur with Ayala's claim of the validity of its TCT No. T-5333 and alleged OCT No. 242 absent of any admission to that effect by the plaintiffs in their complaint. A reading of the defendant's answer reveals that OCT No. 242 covers the property surveyed under SWO, but the pleadings on file fail to allege that the same was approved by the Director of the Bureau of Lands, thereby justifying this court to be skeptical of the validity of the issuance of OCT No. 242. In original land registration cases, it is mandatory that the application should be accompanied by a survey plan of the property applied for registration, duly approved by the Director of the Bureau of Lands. A survey plan without the approval of the Director of the Bureau of Lands has the character of being of dubious origin and it is not therefore worthy of being accepted as evidence. The property being claimed by the defendant ALI, allegedly registered under OCT No. 242, is shown to have been surveyed under SWO and not bearing the approval of the Director of the Bureau of Lands. Any title issued emanating from a survey plan without the approval of the Director of the Bureau of Lands is tainted with irregularity and therefore void, as ruled in Republic Cement Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 198 SCRA 734. In the said case, the Supreme Court held: "That unless a survey plan is duly approved by the Director of Lands the same is of dubious value and is not acceptable as evidence. Indubitably, therefore, the reported survey and its alleged results are not entitled to credit and should be rejected."
The submission of the plan is a statutory requirement of mandatory character and unless the plan and its technical description are duly approved by the Director of Lands, the same are not of much value (Republic vs. Vera, 120 SCRA 210). In another case, it was ruled that the Land Registration Commission has no authority to approve original survey plans (Director of Lands, et al. vs. Honorable Salvador Reyes, et al., 68 SCRA 177).
Evidently, the SWO survey of the property which defendant ALI claimed to have been originated from OCT No. 242 had not been approved by the Director of the Bureau of Lands, but was apparently prepared and approved by the then Land Registration Commissioner and under the law, the same is void.
It will also be noted that aside from the admissions made by defendant ALI in its answer, it clearly appears in its title TCT No. T-5333 that the date of survey was on July 28, 1930. Plaintiffs' property covered by TCT No. 296463 was surveyed on January 4-6, 1927. This means that plaintiffs' predecessor-in-interest had claimed ownership of the property ahead of that of defendant ALI's predecessor-in-interest. The principle of prior registration cannot be applied in this case because the land previously surveyed cannot anymore be the subject of another survey, and there is already a record of a prior survey in the Bureau of Lands. This is precisely the reason why the survey plan has to be approved by the Director of the Bureau of Lands. This must be the reason why the later survey in favor of Ayala's predecessor-in-interest did not anymore bear the approval of the Director of Lands because had it been submitted for approval, the records of the Bureau of Lands will show that an earlier survey of the same land had already been made and approved by the Director of the Bureau of Lands.
Evidently, Ayala's claim of superiority of its title over that of the plaintiffs' cannot therefore be sustained. Be that as it may, the fact that cannot be disputed on the basis of Ayala's answer is its admission that SWO survey without the approval of the Director of the Bureau of Lands was submitted in the alleged registration proceedings, rendering the decree and the title issued thereunder to be tainted with irregularity and therefore void.
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing and the prevailing jurisprudence on the matter, judgment is hereby rendered:(a) Declaring TCT No. 296463 in the name of the plaintiffs Spouses Morris G. Carpo and Socorro R. Carpo as valid and legal, and superior to that of defendant Ayala's TCT No. T-5333;
(b) Declaring TCT No. T-5333, TCT No. 125945, TCT No. T-6055, TCT No. 4366, TCT No. 4367 and TCT No. 4368 and their derivatives as null and void;
(c) Ordering the defendant Ayala Land, Inc. to pay the sum of P100,000.00 as attorney's fees; and
(d) To pay the costs.[17]
FOR THE FOREGOING DISQUISITIONS, the instant appeal is GRANTED, the assailed Summary Judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Las Piñas, Branch 255, dated December 22, 1998, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a new one is rendered as follows:
(1) TCT No. 41262, formerly TCT No. T-5333, in the name of defendant-appellant Ayala Land, Incorporated is hereby declared to be the VALID title to the subject property;
(2) TCT No. 296463 issued in the name of plaintiffs-appellees is declared to be NULL and VOID;
(3) The concerned Register of Deeds is hereby ORDERED to cancel plaintiffs-appellees' TCT No. 296463, and any and all titles issued covering the subject property, for being spurious and void, and of no force and effect.[20]
A THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE TITLE OF RESPONDENT IS VALID EVEN WITHOUT THE REQUISITE SURVEY PLAN APPROVED BY THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS.
B. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING PETITIONERS GUILTY OF LACHES AND PRESCRIPTION.
C. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE RTC "RELIED HEAVILY" ON AN ALLEGED "ADMISSION" BY RESPONDENT OF THE VALIDITY OF THE TITLE OF PETITIONERS OVER THE DISPUTED PARCEL OF LAND.
D. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THERE IS RES JUDICATA AGAINST PETITIONERS BASED ON THE CASE OF GUICO V. SAN PEDRO, ET AL., 72 PHIL 415, WITHOUT PROPER DETERMINATION OF WHETHER THE FACTS IN SAID CASE ARE DIRECTLY APPLICABLE TO THIS CASE AND WHETHER THE ELEMENTS OF RES JUDICATA ARE PRESENT.[22]
On the other hand, defendant ALI, in its responsive pleading did not deny the existence of a title in the name of the plaintiffs/private respondents. Instead, it alleged:"14. The parcel of land described in TCT No. 296463, issued in the name of the plaintiffs, completely overlaps the property covered by ALI's TCT No. T-5333. But TCT No. T-296463 traces itself to OCT No. 8575 which was issued on August 12, 1970, long after OCT No. 242 (the title from which ALI's TCT No. T-5333 was derived) was issued on May 9, 1950 (on the basis of Decree of Registration No. 2917, Record No. 43516). Hence, ALI's TCT No. T-5333 is superior to TCT No. 296463. xxx."
This is an admission that the private respondents have a title to the property in question, and that the property described in private respondents' TCT No. 296463 completely overlaps the title of petitioner ALI. This fact is further substantiated by an affidavit of Jose Rizal Mercado, a Geodetic Engineer who, after attesting to his qualifications, competence and experience, declared under oath:
"9. In connection with the subject case, Affiant was requested to find out, based on the technical descriptions in their respective titles, if the lots described in the title of plaintiffs, TCT No. 296463, overlaps the lots of ALI covered by TCT No. 41262 (formerly, TCT No. T-5333 of LPVI, and, more previously, TCT No. T (125945) 6055-A, in the name of Ayala Corporation), TCT No. 4366, TCT No. 4367 and TCT No. 4368, x x x.`9.1. To accomplish this task, Affiant resorted to the plotting of the technical descriptions found in the plaintiffs' and ALI's respective titles. The standard operating procedure, adopted by Affiant in this particular instance, in plotting properties is to study the technical description in the titles and at the same time, to get all the available survey plans described in the titles for reference.
`9.2. To evidence this plotting that Affiant conducted, Affiant prepared a Sketch Plan reflecting Plaintiffs' title vis-a-vis ALI's title. Attached hereto as Annex "G" is an original copy of the Sketch Plan prepared by the Affiant.
`9.3. The orange-shaded portion on the Sketch Plan indicates the area covered by the title of the plaintiffs and it is clearly shown in this plan that plaintiffs' claimed property entirely overlaps ALI's property delineated in TCT No. T-41262. Plaintiffs' claimed property (Lot 3, PSU-56007) is in fact identical to ALI's lot (Lot 3, PSU-80886).
`9.4. The blue, pink and green lines on the Sketch Plan indicate the boundaries of ALI's TCT Nos. 4366, 4367 and 4368, respectively, and it is clearly shown that these do not overlap with plaintiffs' claimed property.'"
The Sketch Plan attached thereto clearly indicates the overlapping and identical boundaries between the private respondents' TCT No. 296463 and petitioner's TCT No. 125945, (formerly TCT No. T-5333).[23] In addition to the affidavit of the Geodetic Engineer, the petitioner likewise attached to its Motion for Summary Judgment copies of the following titles:
x x x x
In contrast, the private respondents never controverted the petitioner's allegation that their (private respondents') title, TCT No. 296463 traces its origin to OCT No. 8575, issued on August 12, 1970, while that of the petitioner has its origin in OCT No. 242, issued on May 9, 1950. Moreover, the private respondents attached no supporting document to its Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment.
Thus, as matters stand, the requisites for the grant of summary judgment appear to have been satisfied xxx.
x x x x
Since the existence of two titles over the same property, as well as the fact of overlapping of the technical descriptions of the two titles are admitted in the pleadings, and substantiated by the supporting documents attached by the defendant-movant (petitioner herein) to its Motion for Summary Judgment, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. If at all, the sole issue is a legal one, to wit: whose title (as to the conflicting ones) is superior and must be upheld. This issue may be decided on the basis of the affidavits and supporting documents submitted by the parties, as well as the applicable law and jurisprudence on the matter. In other words, there need not be a protracted trial thereon, since all that the trial court should do is to apply the law to the issue, taking into consideration the documents attached by the parties in their respective pleadings and/or submitted together with the motion or the opposition thereto. The same is true with the other defenses raised by the petitioner in its responsive pleading, to wit: res judicata, prescription and laches - which may likewise be resolved without going to trial.[24] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
Two (2) adjacent parcels of land located in Almanza, Las Piñas, Metro Manila, having an aggregate area of 373,868 sq. m., situated in the vicinity of the Ayala Alabang Project and BF Homes Parañaque are covered by three (3) distinct sets of Torrens titles to wit:1) TCT No. 20408 issued on May 29, 1975 in the name of Realty Sales Enterprise, Inc., which was derived from OCT No. 1609, issued on May 21, 1958, pursuant to Decree No. N-63394 in LRC Cases Nos. 657, 758 and 976, GLRO Record Nos. N-29882, N-33721 and N-43516, respectively.
2) TCT No. 303961 issued on October 13, 1970 in the name of Morris G. Carpo, which was derived from OCT No. 8629, issued on October 13, 1970 pursuant to decree No. N-131349 in LRC Case No. N-11-M (N-6217), GLRO Record No. N-32166.
3) TCTs Nos. 333982 and 333985, issued on July 27, 1971 in the name of Quezon City Development and Financing Corporation, derived from OCT No. 8931 which was issued on July 27, 1971 pursuant to LRC Case No. P-206 GLRO Record No. N-31777.
On December 29, 1977, Morris Carpo filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXIII, presided over by Judge Rizalina Bonifacio Vera (hereafter referred to as Vera Court), for "declaration of nullity of Decree No. N-63394 and TCT No. 20408." Named defendants were Realty Sales Enterprise, Inc., Macondray Farms, Inc. and the Commissioner of Land Registration. x x x.
x x x x
In the case at bar, it appears that it was Estanislao Mayuga, father of Dominador Mayuga, predecessor-in-interest of Realty, who originally filed on June 24, 1927 a registration proceeding docketed as LRC Case No. 657, GLRO Record No. N-29882 in the Court of First Instance of Rizal to confirm his title over parcels of land described as Lots 1, 2 and 3, Plan Psu-47035. (Lots 2 and 3 are the subject of the instant litigation among Carpo, Realty and QCDFC.) Case No. 657 was jointly tried with two other cases, LRC Case No. 976, GLRO Record No. 43516 filed by Eduardo Guico and LRC Case No. 758, GLRO Record No. 33721 filed by Florentino Baltazar, as the three cases involved identical parcels of land, and identical applicants/oppositors.
x x x x
Carpo bought the disputed property from the Baltazars, the original registered owners, by virtue of a deed executed before Iluminada Figueroa, Notary Public of Manila dated October 9, 1970. x x x.
x x x x
The Baltazars, predecessors-in-interest of Carpo are heirs of Florentino Baltazar, an oppositor in the original application filed by Estanislao Mayuga in 1927. As stated earlier, the CFI-Rizal confirmed the title of Estanislao to Lots 1, 2 and 3 of Plan Psu-47035 "desestimando oposicion de Florentino Baltazar . . . con respeto a dichos lotes . . ." As such successors of Florentino, they could not pretend ignorance of the land registration proceedings over the disputed parcels of land earlier initiated by Eduardo Guico, Florentino Baltazar and Estanislao Mayuga, as when as the decisions rendered therein.
Moreover, it is not disputed that the title in the name of Dominador Mayuga, from whom Realty derived its title, was issued in 1958, or twelve years before the issuance of the title in the name of the Baltazars in 1970.
In this jurisdiction, it is settled that "(t)he general rule is that in the case of two certificates of title, purporting to include the same land, the earlier in date prevails x x x. In successive registrations, where more than one certificate is issued in respect of a particular estate or interest in land, the person claiming under the prior certificate is entitled to the estate or interest; and that person is deemed to hold under the prior certificate who is the holder of, or whose claim is derived directly or indirectly from the person who was the holder of the earliest certificate issued in respect thereof x x x."[27] (Emphasis and underscoring ours; citations omitted.)
Upon the other hand, this Court is not inclined to concur with Ayala's claim of the validity of its TCT No. T-5333 and alleged OCT No. 242 absent of any admission to that effect by the plaintiffs in their complaint. A reading of the defendant's answer reveals that OCT No. 242 covers the property surveyed under SWO, but the pleadings on file fail to allege that the same was approved by the Director of the Bureau of Lands, thereby justifying this court to be skeptical of the validity of the issuance of OCT No. 242. In original land registration cases, it is mandatory that the application should be accompanied by a survey plan of the property applied for registration, duly approved by the Director of the Bureau of Lands. A survey plan without the approval of the Director of the Bureau of Lands has the character of being of dubious origin and it is not therefore worthy of being accepted as evidence. The property being claimed by the defendant ALI, allegedly registered under OCT No. 242, is shown to have been surveyed under SWO and not bearing the approval of the Director of the Bureau of Lands. Any title issued emanating from a survey plan without the approval of the Director of the Bureau of Lands is tainted with irregularity and therefore void, as ruled in Republic Cement Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 198 SCRA 734. In the said case, the Supreme Court held: "That unless a survey plan is duly approved by the Director of Lands the same is of dubious value and is not acceptable as evidence. Indubitably, therefore, the reported survey and its alleged results are not entitled to credit and should be rejected."
The submission of the plan is a statutory requirement of mandatory character and unless the plan and its technical description are duly approved by the Director of Lands, the same are not of much value (Republic vs. Vera, 120 SCRA 210). In another case, it was ruled that the Land Registration Commission has no authority to approve original survey plans (Director of Lands, et al. vs. Honorable Salvador Reyes, et al., 68 SCRA 177).
Evidently, the SWO survey of the property which defendant ALI claimed to have been originated from OCT No. 242 had not been approved by the Director of the Bureau of Lands, but was apparently prepared and approved by the then Land Registration Commissioner and under the law, the same is void.[28]
Pursuant to the foregoing, the court a quo erred when, in ruling that the validity of OCT No. 242 is dubious, it gave emphasis to defendant-appellant's failure to allege that the survey plan of OCT No. 242 was duly approved by the Director of the Bureau of Lands. It is admitted that a survey plan is one of the requirements for the issuance of decrees of registration, but upon the issuance of such decree, it can most certainly be assumed that said requirement was complied with by ALI's original predecessor-in-interest at the time the latter sought original registration of the subject property. Moreover, the land registration court must be assumed to have carefully ascertained the propriety of issuing a decree in favor of ALI's predecessor-in-interest, under the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions by public officers. The court upon which the law has conferred jurisdiction, is deemed to have all the necessary powers to exercise such jurisdiction, and to have exercised it effectively. This is as it should be, because once a decree of registration is made under the Torrens system, and the time has passed within which that decree may be questioned the title is perfect and cannot later on be questioned. There would be no end to litigation if every litigant could, by repeated actions, compel a court to review a decree previously issued by another court forty-five (45) years ago. The very purpose of the Torrens system would be destroyed if the same land may be subsequently brought under a second action for registration, as what the court a quo did when it faulted ALI's failure to allege that its predecessor-in-interest submitted a survey plan approved by the Director of the Bureau of Lands in the original land registration case.
The Court need not emphasize that it is not for ALI to allege in its pleadings, much less prove, that its predecessor-in-interest complied with the requirements for the original registration of the subject property. A party dealing with a registered land need not go beyond the Certificate of Title to determine the true owner thereof so as to guard or protect his or her interest. Hence, ALI was not required to go beyond what appeared in the transfer certificate of title in the name of its immediate transferor. It may rely solely, as it did, on the correctness of the certificate of title issued for the subject property and the law will in no way oblige it to go behind the certificate of title to determine the condition of the property. This is the fundamental nature of the Torrens System of land registration, to give the public the right to rely upon the face of a Torrens certificate of title and to dispense with the need of inquiring further.[30] (Underscoring ours; citations omitted.)
Section 3. Disputable presumptions. -- The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence:
x x x x
(m) That official duty has been regularly performed;
(n) That a court, or judge acting as such, whether in the Philippines or elsewhere, was acting in the lawful exercise of jurisdiction;
(o) That all the matters within an issue raised in a case were laid before the court and passed upon by it; and in like manner that all matters within an issue raised in a dispute submitted for arbitration were laid before the arbitrators and passed upon by them; x x x.
In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the Ordinary Decree Book, LRC (CLR) Rec. No. 6763, showing that Decree No. 4244 was issued on March 3, 1911, is presumed to have been regularly issued by the accountable public officers who enjoy the legal presumption of regularity in the performance of their functions. Thus, the proceedings that led to the issuance of Decree No. 4244 in favor of the Municipality of Cabuyao cannot be overturned without any countervailing proof to the contrary. In the words of Tichangco v. Enriquez:[32]To overturn this legal presumption carelessly -- more than 90 years since the termination of the case -- will not only endanger judicial stability, but also violate the underlying principle of the Torrens system. Indeed, to do so would reduce the vaunted legal indefeasibility of Torrens titles to meaningless verbiage. (Emphasis supplied.)
Section 1. Burden of proof. -- Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law.
In this jurisdiction, it is settled that "(t)he general rule is that in the case of two certificates of title, purporting to include the same land, the earlier in date prevails x x x. In successive registrations, where more than one certificate is issued in respect of a particular estate or interest in land, the person claiming under the prior certificate is entitled to the estate or interest; and that person is deemed to hold under the prior certificate who is the holder of, or whose claim is derived directly or indirectly from the person who was the holder of the earliest certificate issued in respect thereof x x x."[33] (Emphasis supplied.)
As previously emphasized, OCT No. 242 of ALI's predecessor-in-interest was issued on May 7, 1950, or forty-five (45) years before plaintiffs-appellees filed their complaint on March 10, 1995. As such, it is the Court's firmly held view that plaintiffs-appellees' claim is barred not only by prescription, but also by laches.
Aside from the fact that OCT No. 242 had become incontrovertible after the lapse of one (1) year from the time a decree of registration was issued, any action for reconveyance that plaintiffs-appellees could have availed of is also barred. Although plaintiffs-appellees' complaint was for quieting of title, it is in essence an action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust, considering that plaintiffs-appellees were alleging in said complaint that there was a serious mistake, if not fraud, in the issuance of OCT No. 242 in favor of ALI's predecessor-in-interest. It is now well-settled that an action for reconveyance, which is a legal remedy granted to a landowner whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another's name, must be filed within ten years from the issuance of the title, since such issuance operates as a constructive notice. Since ALI's title is traced to an OCT issued in 1950, the ten-year prescriptive period expired in 1960.
By laches is meant the negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. It does not involve mere lapse or passage of time, but is principally an impediment to the assertion or enforcement of a right, which has become under the circumstances inequitable or unfair to permit. In the instant case, plaintiffs-appellees, as well as their predecessor-in-interest, have not shown that they have taken judicial steps to nullify OCT No. 242, from which ALI's title was derived, for forty-five (45) years. To allow them to do so now, and if successful, would be clearly unjust and inequitable to those who relied on the validity of said OCT, the innocent purchasers for value, who are protected by the precise provisions of P.D. 1529, thus:"SECTION 32. Review of decree of registration; Innocent purchaser for value - The decree of registration shall not be reopened or revised xxx subject, however, to the right of any person xxx to file in the proper Court of First Instance a petition for reopening and review of the decree of registration not later than one year from and after the date of entry of such decree of registration, but in no case shall such petition be entertained by the court where an innocent purchaser for value has acquired the land or an interest therein, whose rights may be prejudiced. Whenever the phrase innocent purchaser for value or an equivalent phrase occurs in this Decree, it shall be deemed to include and innocent lessee, mortgagee or other encumbrances for value."[35]
In its assailed decision, the court a quo relied heavily on the alleged admission by ALI in it[s] Answer of the existence and validity of plaintiffs-appellees' title. We have read the pertinent pleading and We find ALI's statement to be of no moment.
Nowhere in ALI's statement was there an admission of the validity of plaintiffs-appellees' title. x x x.
The Court cannot comprehend where and how the court a quo could have gotten the impression that ALI was admitting not only the existence, but also the validity of plaintiffs-appellees' certificate of title. x x x.[36]
The existence of plaintiffs' TCT No. 296463 has been admitted by defendant Ayala in its answer to have been originated from OCT No. 8575 which was issued on August 12, 1970. It is very significant that defendant ALI admitted it in its answer that OCT No. 8575 and plaintiffs' TCT No. 296463 both originated from Decree No. 131141 issued on October 15, 1969 in the name of Apolonio Sabater as Annex "G" to defendant ALI's answer. This admission made by the defendant in its answer is conclusive upon it. It cannot therefore take position contrary to or inconsistent with its answer, and the facts are to be taken as true (Westminister High School vs. Sto. Domingo, et al., G.R. No. 12666 R-July 5, 1955; McDaniel vs. Apacible, 44 Phil. 248-255).
Upon the other hand, this Court is not inclined to concur with Ayala's claim of the validity of its TCT No. T-5333 and alleged OCT No. 242 absent of any admission to that effect by the plaintiffs in their complaint. x x x.[37]
In Guico vs. San Pedro, the Supreme Court resolved the conflicting claims over a tract of land situated in barrio Tindig na Manga, Parañaque, Rizal, which was subdivided into eleven (11) lots. The subject land was sought to be registered by a certain Eduardo C. Guico on the basis of an accompanying plan Psu-80886, which interestingly is also the basis of ALI's TCT No. T-5333, now TCT No. 41262. Guico's application was opposed by, among others, Florentino Baltazar, on the basis of plan Psu 56007, under which plaintiffs-appellees' title was derived.
It appears that Lots 2 and 3 were adjudicated to Guico on the basis of Psu-80886 (Lot 3 is the subject matter of the instant case), Lot 10 in favor of Baltazar on the basis of Psu 56007, under which plaintiffs-appellees' title was based, and the rest to the heirs of Narciso Mayuga. While Baltazar claimed Lot 3 on the basis of his Psu-56007, his claim was rejected and the Lot was adjudicated to Guico on the basis of his Psu-80886.
It is clear, therefore, that whatever claim plaintiffs-appellees have on the subject property on the basis of Lot 3 Psu-56007, through their predecessor-in-interest, Florentino Baltazar, the same had been clearly and finally denied by the Supreme Court in Guico vs. San Pedro.
For res judicata to apply, four requisites must be met: (1) the former judgment or order must be final; (2) it must be a judgment or an order on the merits; (3) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; and (4) there must be, between the first and the second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter and of cause of action. Plaintiffs-appellees only have objections with respect to the fourth requisite, offering the lame excuse that it is not bound by such decision, there being no identity of parties in Guico vs. San Pedro and the instant case.[39]