626 Phil. 735
PERALTA, J.:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the motion for summary judgment is hereby GRANTED and it is hereby adjudged that:
1. Plaintiffs are the absolute owners and rightful possessors of Lot 9250, CAD-355, Tagaytay Cadastre, subject to the rights of occupancy of the farm workers on the one-third area thereof;
2. The Judgment dated June 7, 1994 in Land Registration Case No. TG-423 is set aside and the Decree No. N-217313, LRC Record No. N-62686 dated August 20, 1997 is null and void;
3. The Original Transfer Certificate of Title is ordered to be canceled, as well as tax declaration covering Lot 9250, Cad-355.
SO ORDERED.
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed Resolution dated November 3, 1999, of the RTC, Branch 18, Tagaytay City, in Civil Case No. TG-1784, is AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to cost.
SO ORDERED.
5.1 THE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED IN A MANNER NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE COURT WHEN IT RULED THAT RESPONDENTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT DATED AUGUST 05, 1999 DID NOT VIOLATE THE TEN (10)-DAY NOTICE RULE UNDER SECTION 3, RULE 35 OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
5.2 THE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED IN A MANNER NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE COURT WHEN IT RULED THAT A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS PROPER IN AN ACTION FOR QUIETING OF TITLE.
5.3 THE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED IN A MANNER NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE COURT WHEN IT RULED THAT THERE ARE NO GENUINE FACTUAL AND TRIABLE ISSUES IN CIVIL CASE NO. TG-1784.
5.4 THE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED IN A MANNER NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE COURT WHEN IT UPHELD THE RESOLUTION DATED NOVEMBER 03, 1999 OF THE COURT A QUO, BASED ON TESTIMONIES OF RESPONDENTS' WITNESSES TAKEN WITHOUT GRANTING HEREIN PETITIONER THE RIGHT TO CROSS-EXAMINE AND UPON DOCUMENTARY EXHIBITS PRESENTED BUT NOT ADMITTED AS EVIDENCE.
5.5 THE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED IN A MANNER NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE COURT WHEN IT UPHELD THE RESOLUTION DATED NOVEMBER 03, 1999 OF THE COURT A QUO BASED ON FALSIFIED "EVIDENCE."
5.6 THE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED IN A MANNER NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE COURT WHEN IT FAILED TO RULE THAT THE COURT A QUO PATENTLY DEPRIVED PETITIONER OF ITS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS IN RENDERING ITS SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
5.7 THE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED IN A MANNER NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE COURT WHEN IT HELD THAT THE COURT A QUO HAS JURISDICTION TO CANCEL PETITIONER'S ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF TITLE (OCT) NO. 0-660 IN AN ACTION TO QUIET TITLE.
SEC. 1. Summary judgment for claimant. - A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory relief may, at any time after the pleading in answer thereto has been served, move with supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any part thereof
SEC. 3. Motion and proceedings thereon. - The motion shall be served at least ten (10) days before the time specified for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. After the hearing, the judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleading, depositions, and admissions on file together with the affidavits, show that, except as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.[46]
Nonetheless, going by the records of the admitted and uncontroverted facts and facts established there is no more litigious or genuine issue of basic fact to be the subject of further trial on the merits.
The first defense as to the identity of the subject property, the issue has already become nil because of not only the lack of seriousness in the allegations but also because the identity of the subject parcel of land Lot 9250 was proven by the approved plan Ap-04-008367 that was already presented and offered in evidence as Exhibit "B" for the plaintiffs.
The second defense that plaintiffs' claim of the property is barred by prior judgment rule is unavailing considering that the vital documentary evidence they presented in Land Registration Case No. TG-423 before this Honorable Court the markings and descriptions of such documents are stated in the Judgment quoted as follows:(1) Tax Declaration No. 015224-A (Exhibit "Q"; x x x.
(2) Tax Declaration No. 05019-B (Exhibit "R"; x x x.
(3) Tax Declaration No. 01926-B (Exhibit "S"; x x x.
(4) Tax Declaration No. GR-007-0007 (Exhibit "T" x x x.
are the very documentary evidence adopted and relied upon by the plaintiffs in seeking the review and nullity of the Decree No. 217313 issued on August 20, 1997 under LRC Record No. N-62686 pursuant to the Judgment dated June 7, 1994 rendered by this Honorable Court penned by the acting presiding Judge Eleuterio F. Guerrero in said Land Registration Case No. TG-423.
On the other hand, as to the gravamen of the claims in the complaint, the plaintiffs have presented clear and convincing evidence as the well-nigh or almost incontrovertible evidence of a registerable title to the subject land in the proceedings conducted on the reception of evidence ex-parte for the plaintiffs establishing in detail the specifications of continuous, open, exclusive possession as aspects of acquisitive prescription as confirmed in the affidavit herein attached as Annex "A";
This Court, going by the records, observed keenly that plaintiffs' cause of action for quieting of title on the disputed parcel of land is based on the alleged fraud in the substitution of their landholdings of Lot 9250, Cad 355, Tagaytay Cadastre containing only an area of 244,112 square meters with Lot 9121, Cad 335, Tagaytay Cadastre, containing only an area of 19,356 square meters. While defendant Eland in its answer practically and mainly interposed the defenses of: (a) the parcel of land being claimed by the plaintiffs is not the parcel of land subject matter of Land Registration Case No. TG-423; (b) the claim of the plaintiffs is barred by prior judgment of this Court in said Land Registration Case; and (c) plaintiffs' complaint is barred by the Statute of Limitation since Original Certificate of Title No. 0-660 has become incontrovertible.
Cross-reference of the above-cited Land Registration Case No. TG-423 that was decided previously by this Court with the case at bench was imperatively made by this Court. Being minded that the Court has and can take judicial notice of the said land registration case, this Court observed that there is no genuine issue of fact to be tried on the merits. Firstly, because the supposed identity crisis of the controverted parcel of land covered by the Land Registration Case No. TG-423 with the subject parcel of land is established by Plan Ap-04-006275 (Exhibit "N") LRC Case No. 423 and by Plan A04 008367 (Exhibit "B" of the plaintiffs) and the Technical Description of Lot 9250, Cad 355 (Exhibit "B-1" of the plaintiffs). Secondly, the prior judgment rule cannot be availed of by defendant Eland since not only intrinsic fraud but extrinsic fraud were alleged in and established by the records. (Heirs of Manuel Roxas v. Court of Appeals, G. R. No. 1184436, pro. March 21, 1997). Thirdly, it is incontrovertible that the complaint in this case seeking to review the judgment and annul the decree was filed on March 5, 1998 or within one (1) year from August 20, 1997 or the date of issuance of Decree No. 217313, LRC Record No. N-62686, hence, the Original Certificate of Title No. 0-660 issued to defendant Eland has not attained incontrovertibility. (Heirs of Manuel Roxas v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118436, prom. March 21, 1997).
Notwithstanding, the issue of possession is a question of fact by the interaction of the basic pleadings, the observation of this Court is that the plaintiffs were able to prove by the well-nigh incontrovertible evidence, the aspects of possession in accordance with Section 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act 141, as amended, as hereinafter illustrated.
The contention of defendant-appellant is untenable. Summary judgment is not only limited to solving actions involving money claims. Under Rule 35 of the 1997 Rules of Court, except as to the amount of damages, when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law, summary judgment may be allowed. The term "genuine issue" has been defined as an issue of fact which calls for the presentation of evidence as distinguished from an issue which is sham, fictitious, contrived, set up in bad faith and patently unsubstantial so as not to constitute a genuine issue for trial.
Thus, under the aforecited rule, summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of fact, which call for the presentation of evidence in a full-blown trial. Thus, even if on their face the pleadings appear to raise issues, but when the affidavits, depositions and admissions show that such issues are not genuine, then summary judgment as prescribed by the rules must ensue as a matter of law.
It should be stressed that the court a quo which rendered the assailed resolution in Civil Case No. TG-1784 was the very court that decided the LRC Case No. TG-423. Such being the case, the court a quo was privy to all relevant facts and rulings pertaining to LRC Case No. TG-423 which it considered and applied to this case. Thus, where all the facts are within the judicial knowledge of the court, summary judgment may be granted as a matter of right.
2. SPECIFIC DENIALS
2.1 Answering defendant specifically denies the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 and 3 of the Complaint insofar as it alleges the personal circumstances of the plaintiff and one A. F. Development Corporation for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof.
2.2 Answering defendant specifically denies the allegations contained in paragraphs 4, 5, 6 and 7 of the Complaint for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of said allegations. And if the property referred to in said paragraphs is that parcel of land which was the subject matter of Land Registration Case No. TG-423 which was previously decided by this Honorable Court with finality, said allegations are likewise specifically denied for the obvious reason that the said property had already been adjudged with finality by no less than this Honorable Court as absolutely owned by herein answering defendant as will be further discussed hereunder.
2.3 Answering defendant specifically denies the allegations contained in paragraph 8 of the Complaint insofar as it alleged that "(u)pon exercise of further circumspection, counsel for the plaintiffs once followed-up in writing the 1994 request of the plaintiffs to have the subject parcel of land be declared for taxation purposes" and insofar as it is made to appear that parcel of land being claimed by the plaintiffs is the same parcel of land subject matter of Land Registration Case No. TG-423 for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof and for the reason that the names of the herein plaintiffs were never mentioned during the entire proceedings in said land registration case and by reason of the Affirmative Allegations contained hereunder.
2.4 Answering defendant specifically denies the allegations contained in paragraphs 9, 10, 10 (a), 10 (b), 10 (c), 10 (d), 10 (e), 10 (f), 10 (g), 10 (h), and 11 for the reason that there is no showing that the parcel of land being claimed by the plaintiff is the same parcel of land which was the subject matter of Land Registration Case No. TG- 423, and in the remote possibility that the parcel of land being claimed by the plaintiffs is the same as that parcel of land subject of Land Registration Case No. TG-423, the allegations contained in said paragraphs are still specifically denied for the reason that no less than the Honorable Court had decided with finality that the parcel of land is absolutely owned by herein defendant to the exclusion of all other persons as attested to by the subsequent issuance of an Original Certificate of Title in favor of answering defendant and for reasons stated in the Affirmative Allegations.
2.5 Answering defendant specifically denies the allegations contained in paragraph 12 of the Complaint for the obvious reason that it was the plaintiffs who appear to have been sleeping on their rights considering that up to the present they still do not have any certificate of title covering the parcel of land they are claiming in the instant case, while on the part of herein defendant, no less than the Honorable Court had adjudged with finality that the parcel of land subject matter of Land Registration Case No. TG-423 is absolutely owned by herein defendant.
2.6 Answering defendant specifically denies the allegations contained in paragraph 13 of the complaint for the reason that defendant has never ladgrabbed any parcel of land belonging to others, much less from the plaintiffs, and further, answering defendant specifically denies the allegations therein that plaintiffs engaged the services of a lawyer for a fee for lack of knowledge r information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof.
2.7 Answering defendant specifically denies the allegations contained in paragraphs 14, 15, 16, 17 and 18 of the Complaint for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as the truth thereof.
2.8 Answering defendant specifically denies the allegations contained in paragraphs IV (a) to IV (c) for the reason that, as above-stated, if the parcel of land being claimed by the plaintiffs is the same as that parcel of land subject matter of Land Registration Case No. TG-423, this Honorable Court had already decided with finality that said parcel of land is absolutely owned by herein answering defendant and additionally, for those reasons stated in defendant's Motion to Dismiss.
2.9 Answering defendant specifically denies the allegations contained in paragraph IV (d) of the Complaint for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof.
x x x x
4.1 The pleading asserting the claim of the plaintiff states no cause of action as asserted in the Motion To Dismiss filed by herein answering defendant and for the reason that there is no evidence whatsoever showing or attesting to the fact that the parcel of land being claimed by the plaintiffs in the Complaint is the same parcel of land which was the subject matter of Land Registration Case No. TG-423.
4.2 The complaint was barred by the prior judgment rendered by this Honorable in Land Registration Case No. TG-423.
4.3 The complaint is barred by the Statute of Limitation in that OCT No. 0-660 had become incontrovertible by virtue of the Torrens System of Registration; and to allow plaintiffs to question the validity of answering defendant's title through the instant complaint would be a collateral of OCT No. 0-660 which is not permissible under the law.
4.4 Plaintiffs are barred by their own acts and/or omission from filing the present complaint under the principles of estoppel and laches.
4.5 Plaintiffs does not to the Court with clean hands as they appear to be well aware of the proceedings in said Land Registration Case No. TG- 423 and inspite of such knowledge, plaintiffs never bothered to present their alleged claims in the proceedings.
4.6 Answering defendant has always acted with justice, given everyone his due, and observed honesty and good faith in his dealings.
x x x There is overwhelming evidence or proof on record that the vendors listed in Exhibit "HH," with submarkings, are the previous owners of the parcel of land mentioned in the same deed of sale and aside form the tax declarations covering the same property (Exhibits "Q" to "T," inclusive), the uncontroverted testimony of Atty. Ruben Roxas establishes beyond any shadow of doubt that applicant's (referring to herein defendant-appellant) sellers/predecessors-in-interest are the grandchildren, great grandchildren and great great grandchildren of the spouses Lucio Petate and Maria Pobleta Petate, the former owners of the same property, whose ownership is further bolstered by tax receipts showing payments of realty taxes (Exhibits "U" to "GG," inclusive, with submarkings).
x x x
On the basis of the foregoing facts and circumstances, and considering that applicant is a domestic corporation not otherwise disqualified from owning real properties in the Philippines, this Court finds that applicant has satisfied all the conditions/requirements essential to the grant of its application pursuant to the provisions of the Land Registration Law, as amended, inspite of the opposition filed by the Heirs of the late Doroteo Miranda. Hence, the grant of applicant's petition appears to be inevitable.
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves the instant petition for land registration and, thus, places under the operation of Act 141, Act 496 and/or P.D. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Law, the land described in Plan Ap-04-006275 and containing an area of Two Hundred Forty-Two Thousand Seven Hundred Ninety-Four (242,794) square meters, as supported by its technical description now forming part of the record of this case, in addition to other proofs adduced in the name of the applicant, ELAND PHILIPPINES, INC., with principal office at No. 43 E. Rodriguez Ave. (EspaƱa Extension), Quezon City, Metro Manila.
Once this decision becomes final and executory, the corresponding decree of registration shall forthwith issue.
SO ORDERED.
To begin with, it bears emphasis that an action for quieting of title is essentially a common law remedy grounded on equity. As we held in Baricuatro, Jr. vs. CA:[54]
Regarding the nature of the action filed before the trial court, quieting of title is a common law remedy for the removal of any cloud upon or doubt or uncertainty with respect to title to real property. Originating in equity jurisprudence, its purpose is to secure `x x x an adjudication that a claim of title to or an interest in property, adverse to that of the complainant, is invalid, so that the complainant and those claiming under him may be forever afterward free from any danger of hostile claim.' In an action for quieting of title, the competent court is tasked to determine the respective rights of the complainant and other claimants, `x x x not only to place things in their proper place, to make the one who has no rights to said immovable respect and not disturb the other, but also for the benefit of both, so that he who has the right would see every cloud of doubt over the property dissipated, and he could afterwards without fear introduce the improvements he may desire, to use, and even to abuse the property as he deems best xxx.
Under Article 476 of the New Civil Code, the remedy may be availed of only when, by reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding, which appears valid but is, in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, a cloud is thereby cast on the complainant's title to real property or any interest therein. The codal provision reads:Article 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, by reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or effective but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the title.
An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon title to real property or any interest therein.
In turn, Article 477 of the same Code identifies the party who may bring an action to quiet title, thus:Article 477. The plaintiff must have legal or equitable title to, or interest in the real property which is the subject-matter of the action. He need not be in possession of said property.
It can thus be seen that for an action for quieting of title to prosper, the plaintiff must first have a legal, or, at least, an equitable title on the real property subject of the action and that the alleged cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid. So it is that in Robles, et al. vs. CA,[55] we ruled:It is essential for the plaintiff or complainant to have a legal title or an equitable title to or interest in the real property which is the subject matter of the action. Also, the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding that is being alleged as a cloud on plaintiff's title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.
Verily, for an action to quiet title to prosper, two (2) indispensable requisites must concur, namely: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of the action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.
Section 32. Review of decree of registration; Innocent purchaser for value. The decree of registration shall not be reopened or revised by reason of absence, minority, or other disability of any person adversely affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for reversing judgments, subject, however, to the right of any person, including the government and the branches thereof, deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by such adjudication or confirmation of title obtained by actual fraud, to file in the proper Court of First Instance a petition for reopening and review of the decree of registration not later than one year from and after the date of the entry of such decree of registration, but in no case shall such petition be entertained by the court where an innocent purchaser for value has acquired the land or an interest therein, whose rights may be prejudiced. Whenever the phrase "innocent purchaser for value" or an equivalent phrase occurs in this Decree, it shall be deemed to include an innocent lessee, mortgagee, or other encumbrancer for value.
Upon the expiration of said period of one year, the decree of registration and the certificate of title issued shall become incontrovertible. Any person aggrieved by such decree of registration in any case may pursue his remedy by action for damages against the applicant or any other persons responsible for the fraud.
The right of a person deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by adjudication or confirmation of title obtained by actual fraud is recognized by law as a valid and legal basis for reopening and revising a decree of registration.[58] One of the remedies available to him is a petition for review. To avail of a petition for review, the following requisites must be satisfied:
(a) The petitioner must have an estate or interest in the land;
(b) He must show actual fraud in the procurement of the decree of registration;
(c) The petition must be filed within one year from the issuance of the decree by the Land Registration Authority; and
(d) The property has not yet passed to an innocent purchaser for value.[59]
A mere claim of ownership is not sufficient to avoid a certificate of title obtained under the Torrens system. An important feature of a certificate of title is its finality. The proceedings whereby such a title is obtained are directed against all persons, known or unknown, whether actually served with notice or not, and includes all who have an interest in the land. If they do not appear and oppose the registration of their own estate or interest in the property in the name of another, judgment is rendered against them by default, and, in the absence of fraud, such judgment is conclusive. If an interest in the land will not by itself operate to vacate a decree of registration, a fortiori, fraud is not alone sufficient to do so.[60]
As long as a final decree has not been entered by the Land Registration Authority and period of one year has not elapsed from the date of entry of such decree, the title is not finally adjudicated and the decision in the registration case continues to be under the control and sound discretion of the registration court.[62] After the lapse of said period, the decree becomes incontrovertible and no longer subject to reopening or review.
Section 32 provides that a petition for review of the decree of registration may be filed "not later than one year from and after the date of entry of such decree of registration." Giving this provision a literal interpretation, it may at first blush seem that the petition for review cannot be presented until the final decree has been entered. However, it has been ruled that the petition may be filed at any time after the rendition of the court's decision and before the expiration of one year from the entry of the final decree of registration for, as noted in Rivera v. Moran,[63] there can be no possible reason requiring the complaining party to wait until the final decree is entered before urging his claim for fraud.
The one-year period stated in Sec. 32 within which a petition to re-open and review the decree of registration refers to the decree of registration described in Section 31, which decree is prepared and issued by the Land Registration Administrator.[64]
The provision of Section 31 that every decree of registration shall bind the land, quiet title thereto, and be conclusive upon and against all persons, including the national government, and Sec. 32 that the decree shall not be reopened or revised by reason of absence, minority or other disability or by any proceeding in court, save only in cases of actual fraud and then only for one year from the entry of the decree, must be understood as referring to final and unappealable decrees of registration. A decision or, as it is sometimes called after entry, a decree of a registration court, does not become final and unappealable until fifteen days after the interested parties have been notified of its entry, and during that period may be set aside by the trial judge on motion for new trial, upon any of the grounds stated in the Rules of Court.[65] An appeal from the decision of the trial court prevents the judgment from becoming final until that decree is affirmed by the judgment of the appellate court.[66]
A petition for review under Section 32 is a remedy separate and distinct from a motion for new trial and the right to the remedy is not affected by the denial of such a motion irrespective of the grounds upon which it may have been presented. Thus, where petitioners acquired their interest in the land before any final decree had been entered, the litigation was therefore in effect still pending and, in these circumstances, they can hardly be considered innocent purchasers in good faith.[67]
Where the petition for review of a decree of registration is filed within the one-year period from entry of the decree, it is error for the court to deny the petition without hearing the evidence in support of the allegation of actual and extrinsic fraud upon which the petition is predicated. The petitioner should be afforded an opportunity to prove such allegation.[68]