769 Phil. 837
Assailed in this petition is the June 14, 2013 Decision
[1] of the Court of
Appeals (
CA) which reversed and set aside the May 31,
2002 Decision
[2]
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Pagadian City
(
RTC), which dismissed the Complaint for Redemption
of Real Property under Commonwealth Act No. 141 filed by respondent
Minviluz C. Villanueva (
Villanueva) against
petitioners Spouses Alfonso Alcuitas, Sr. and Estela Alcuitas
(
Spouses Alcuitas).
The Factual Antecedents
Records show that Villanueva is the registered owner of a parcel of lot
containing an area of 712 square meters, more or less, and located at
Poblacion, Municipality of Buug, Province of Zamboanga del Sur,
originally covered by Original Certificate of Title
(
OCT) No. P-32, 887 and issued by virtue of the grant
of Free Patent No. IX-6-121.
Since June 1988, Spouses Alcuitas have been lessees over the subject
property operating therein a gasoline station with a term due to expire
by June 2009.
[3]
On June 22, 1993, Villanueva mortgaged her parcel of land in favor of a
certain Lucas Datoy as security for the payment of her loan obligation
of P200,000.00. Villanueva reneged on her loan obligation so the
mortgage on the subject property was foreclosed under Act No. 3135, as
amended. When the property was put up for sale in a public auction,
Spouses Alcuitas bought it for P201,000.00.
The sheriff executed a definite deed of sale in favor of Spouses
Alcuitas after Villanueva's failure to redeem the subject property
within the one-year redemption under Act No. 3135. Accordingly, title
over the subject property was consolidated in favor of Spouses Alcuitas
and OCT No. P-32, 887 was cancelled and, finally, Transfer Certificate
of Title (TCT) No. T-32, 392 was issued in the name of Spouses Alcuitas.
Villanueva informed Spouses Alcuitas of her desire and intention to
redeem the subject property at the price of P201,000.00 but the latter
refused her offer. Villanueva then proceeded to tender the amount of
P201,000.00 as redemption price to Spouses Alcuitas and consigned said
amount in the Office of the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Pagadian City.
In view of the failure of both parties to settle the matter at the
barangay level, Villanueva filed a complaint for Redemption of Real
Property under Commonwealth Act (
C.A.) No. 141
against the petitioners before the RTC.
On the other hand, Spouses Alcuitas averred that Villanueva is guilty of
fraud, misrepresentation and intentional concealment when she failed to
inform them about the mortgage of the subject property to Lucas Datoy
during the time when both parties entered into a contract of lease
covering the subject property; that they never refused to accede to
Villanueva's willingness to repurchase the subject property; that
redemption of the subject property was moot and academic because it had
been transferred in their names; that Villanueva failed to redeem the
subject property within the reglementary period; and that Villanueva
made no tender of payment.
Decision of the RTC
On May 31, 2002, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of Spouses Alcuitas dismissing Villanueva's complaint.
It explained, among others, that Villanueva's right to repurchase the
subject property under Section 119 of C.A. No. 141 is baseless for the
following reasons:
1) It is indubitable that the subject property has
been reclassified from its previous classification consistent with the
patent covering the land, i.e., as agricultural to commercial lot,
consistent with its actual use and location per zoning ordinance in
accordance with the Comprehensive Municipal Land Use and Town Plan of
the Municipality of Buug, Zamboanga del Sur, where the property is
located;
2) The rationale of the passage of the law granting unto the Patentee
the right to repurchase, i.e., to preserve the property to the Grantee
who was a recipient from the government of a public land grant which was
designed to distribute disposable agricultural lots of the State to
land destitute citizens for their cultivation, is very much wanting to
be availing with the reclassification of the subject property;
3) In the case of Santana vs. Mariñas, 94 SCRA 753,
reiterating the doctrine laid down in the case of Sinedon vs.
Peña, 36 SCRA 617, cited in the case of Bargas vs.
Court of Appeals, 91 SCRA 195, the Supreme Court ruled that
the undergoing principle of Sec. 119 of C.A. No. 141 is to give the
Homesteader as Patentee every chance to preserve for himself and his
family the land that the State has gratuitously given to him as a reward
for his labor, in cleaning and cultivating it. However, when the
property has already been reclassified and no longer used for
agricultural purposes having been reclassified as commercial lot and
utilized as such, the spirit of the law granting unto the patentee the
right of repurchase can no longer be made availing, its purpose, i.e.,
to preserve the land for cultivation is no longer there, for which
reason, repurchase in such a situation would do violence to what C.A.
141 stands for and the same will no longer be consistent with the spirit
and purpose of the law, the purchaser is not the kind of farmer for
whom the Homestead and Free Patent were intended by law.[4]
The dispositive portion of the May 31, 2002 RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing disquisitions, the
instant complaint is hereby DISMISSED for wanting of a cause of action.
As a consequence, the defendants being compelled to incur litigation
expenses to protect their rights and interests brought about by the
filing of an unfounded complaint, it is but proper to order the
plaintiff to pay unto the defendants the sum of One Hundred Thousand
(P100,000.00) Pesos as actual, compensatory and nominal damages and to
pay the costs of litigation.
SO ORDERED.[5]
Decision of the CA
On appeal, the CA
reversed and
set
aside the decision of the RTC. The CA ruled that Villanueva
had the clear statutory right to repurchase the subject property under
Section 119 of C.A. No. 141. The CA stated that Villanueva exercised her
right to repurchase or re-acquire the subject property when she filed
the subject complaint before the RTC. The filing was equivalent to an
offer to repurchase the same and to which offer, Spouses Alcuitas
admitted, they never acceded.
The CA opined that the mere reclassification of the subject land from
residential to commercial could not
ipso facto
deprive Villanueva of her right to repurchase. The CA stated that C.A.
No. 141 did not provide that the right of repurchase ceases once the
subject property's nature and classification changes. Section 119 of C.A.
No. 141 did not make any qualification as to how the property shall be
utilized. It further wrote that what the law sought to enforce was that
the repurchase must be for the purpose of preserving the land for the
use of the patentee and his family. It adhered to the policy of
preservation to the patentee and his family given by the law must be
liberally construed in order to carry out its purpose.
The CA explained that Villanueva's primary purpose for repurchasing the
subject property was for residential purposes and not for any other
purposes. The fact that the subject property had been utilized as a
gasoline station within a commercial zone was of no moment because the
commercial classification of the subject property could not serve as a
justification to defeat Villanueva's right to repurchase under C.A. No.
141. Villanueva's right to repurchase could not be arbitrarily denied
under the guise of land reclassification because to allow such situation
would put a premium on vendees acquiring patented lands because they
would convert the subject property into a commercial one to retain
ownership over it. This situation is repugnant to the purpose of C.A. No.
141.
Unsatisfied with the CA's decision, Spouses Alcuitas come to this Court
via a Petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court anchoring their petition on the following
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT VILLANUEVA WAS ABLE
TO ESTABLISH HER RIGHT TO REPURCHASE THE SUBJECT PROPERTY UNDER
COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 141.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE MERE RECLASSIFICATION OF
LAND CANNOT DEPRIVE VILLANUEVA OF HER RIGHT TO
REPURCHASE.
Spouses Alcuitas' position
Spouses Alcuitas argued that the CA's unfavorable ruling resulted in the
economic prejudice and grave injustice to them because Villanueva would
unjustly enrich herself at their expense considering that they had
already developed the entire subject property into a Class A gasoline
station and car service center, spending so much for the improvements
introduced. They likewise pointed out that the amount offered by
Villanueva to repurchase the subject property was unconscionable.
Finally, they averred that Villanueva could no longer rely on the
principle in Section 119 of C.A. 141 considering that the subject
property had already been reclassified into a commercial lot.
Villanueva's position
Villanueva argued that Spouses Alcuitas failed to perfect the subject
petition on time due to the following procedural grounds, to wit: 1)
failure of their counsel to comply with the mandatory MCLE requirement
specifically MCLE No. IV; and 2) failure to comply with the mandatory
requirement of a valid verification and certification.
The Court's Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
Simply, the crucial issues that need to be resolved in this case are: 1)
whether Villanueva has the right to repurchase the subject property
from Spouses Alcuitas; and 2) whether Villanueva's right to repurchase
the subject property ceased upon the reclassification of the same into a
commercial zone.
To recap, Spouses Alcuitas have posed two (2) main objections on
Villanueva's decision to repurchase the subject property.
First, the amount offered for the repurchase of the
subject property was so unconscionable considering that they incurred
necessary and useful expenses and introduced improvements therein. If
the repurchase of the subject property would push through with such an
unconscionable offer, it would result to their economic prejudice.
Second, Villanueva had lost her right to repurchase
under Section 119 of C.A. No. 141 because of the reclassification of the
subject property from a residential zone to a commercial zone.
Spouses Alcuitas' arguments fail to persuade.
Villanueva has the statutory right to