792 Phil. 336
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This refers to the NOTICE OF PERSONNEL ACTION dated August 22, 2005 approved and noted by the President.Respondent pointed out that petitioners' malice became even more evident when on the very next day, December 13, 2005, she was no longer allowed to enter the premises of petitioner SMSI. Petitioners hurriedly issued Memo 12-675[5] also on December 13, 2005, which instructed respondent thus:
Please explain and answer in writing within 24 hours upon receipt of this memo why there shall be no administrative action taken against you for the following:This is for your information and compliance.
- INSUBORDINATION. You continued to give yourself the proportionate ECOLA despite its cancellation per Notice of Personnel Action noted and approved by the President on August 22, 2005. In so doing, you manifested gross disrespect to the decision of the President and the whole HR Department.
- DISHONESTY. Despite of being aware of the fact that only the minimum wage earners and those whose basic salary are distorted as a result of addition of ECOLA, you continually give yourself the questioned proportionate ECOLA. You are the [company's] existing payroll master and you are very much aware of that rule. In fact, you are applying such rule to all other operation personnel making your case an exception to the rule.
This refers to your refusal to receive the Memo 11-673 dated December 12, 2005.This is for your information and compliance.
Because of the gravity of the offense, you are then being placed on preventive suspension effective December 14, 2005 while under investigation for Insubordination and Dishonesty.
However, you are required to come to office when you are needed by reasons of such investigation.
This refers to your Memo 12-675 dated December 13, 2005.Respondent attended the administrative hearing on December 19, 2005, accompanied by her son. During the hearing, petitioner Dabu repeatedly berated and insulted respondent.This is for your information and compliance.
- Your preventive suspension is within 30 days.
- You are required to report to office on December 19, 2005 (Monday) at 3 pm for a preliminary Administrative Hearing.
- You are instructed to bring anybody with you on your side. It could be your husband and/or your son. Should you prefer to bring a legal counsel please inform us a day before the abovementioned schedule.
We trust that you will give the matter your most favorable cooperation and attention.
After due consideration of all the circumstances, grounds have been established to justify your termination.Respondent received a copy of Memo 12-692 dated December 20, 2005 on December 21, 2005. That same day, respondent went to the office of petitioner SMSI to retrieve her personal belongings, which included an amount of less than PI 00.00 tucked in her drawer, but she was refused entry. It was only the next day, on December 22, 2005, that respondent was allowed to take her personal belongings.
1. You willfully disobey the lawful orders of your employer.
2. Willfull breach of the trust reposed in you by the management.
In view of the above and by your admission of your disobedience and dishonesty during the administrative hearing, you had violated the Company Implementing Rules and Regulations on Article V - Section 25 which states that: Act of dishonesty to the company shall be penalized with termination for the first offense.
Your services with the corporation are then being terminated effective at the close of the business hours on December 21, 2005.
This is for your information.
Petitioners contended that they discovered only in August 2005 that respondent was receiving ECOLA, even when she was not entitled to the same under Wage Order Nos. NCR-09 and NCR-10. Respondent willfully and deliberately ignored and disobeyed the Notice of Personnel Action dated August 22, 2005 cancelling the payment of her daily ECOLA of P24.67 beginning the payroll for August 16, 2005. Respondent continued to grant/give herself ECOLA in the payroll from August 16, 2005 to December 15,2005.
- Manages accounting functions and preparation of reports and statistics detailing financial results;
- Checks, verifies, and approves payroll entries;
- In charge of preparation of admin payroll;
- Checks and verifies daily check disbursements;
- Contacts delinquent account holders by telephone or in writing and requests payments to bring the account current;
- Assists the messenger/collector in personally collecting client's check payments [;]
- Oversees financial and accounting system controls and standards and ensures timely financial and statistical reports for management and/or Board of Directors' use;
- Performs routine banking transaction;
- Handles cash and cash accounts; and,
- Performs all accounting and finance functions and other related tasks as required.[10]
At bar, the issue boils down to whether or not the act of [respondent] in continuously receiving her ECOLA after she was informed that she is not entitled to receive ECOLA sometime in August 2005 constitutes dishonesty so as to warrant her termination.Ruling of the NLRC
x x x x
While it is true that ECOLA is being enjoyed by minimum wage earners, the provisions of the Wage Orders are not absolute since the Orders expressly provide certain exceptions as when it would result in wage distortion.
It appears from the records that [respondent] merely applied the procedure prescribed by Article 124 of the Labor Code and for which she received not the entire amount but the pro-rated share of the mandated amount. This of course does not constitute payroll padding as alleged by [petitioners].
[Respondent] had aptly brought this matter up with management but this issue of Wage distortion was never settled by the [petitioners]. If indeed it were true that [respondent] was an Account Supervisor or an Accounting Manager for that matter, there must be wage level that distinguishes her position as such from a mere rank and file minimum wage earner. This is to avoid a situation where a supervisor would be receiving the same wage level as that of the supervisees.
The [petitioners] have not discussed this matter of wage distortion in their pleadings but had focused their arguments mainly on the alleged non-entitlement of [respondent] to ECOLA and her refusal to receive the notice requiring her to explain.
[Petitioners] had also resuscitated infractions whose penalty had been aptly served. We find this as totally irrelevant at bar. While we note certain demeanor of [respondent] as inappropriate like her refusal to acknowledge receipt of the memorandum being served upon her, this nevertheless, is not sufficient to warrant her termination. Such demeanor is understandable as she was already placed under preventive suspension. The penalty of dismissal is too harsh given the attendant circumstances that this issue of ECOLA is an open matter.
Records also show that her alleged illegally collected ECOLA has been settled upon her termination and upon the release of her final salary on December 19, 2005. It being the case, we find that paying her separation pay in lieu of reinstatement would be the most practicable relief under the circumstances. (Citation omitted.)
In the end, the Labor Arbiter decreed:
WHEREFORE, prescinding from the foregoing considerations, the [petitioners] are hereby ordered to pay the [respondent] her separation pay at the rate of one (1) month salary for every year of service computed from date of hire up to date hereof or the total amount of ONE HUNDRED SIXTY-NINE THOUSAND (P169,000.00) Pesos.[13]
We find reversible error.In a Resolution[18] dated March 27, 2008, the NLRC denied respondent's Verified Motion for Reconsideration.
[Respondent's] justification for entitlement to proportionate share of ECOLA under Wage Order Nos. 9 and 10 is to prevent wage distortion.
We are not convinced.
Records show that there are other employees of [petitioners] who, like [respondent], received more than the minimum wage. Yet, these other employees did not receive proportionate share of ECOLA. [Respondent's] attention on this matter was called by [petitioners] in a memorandum dated December 12, 2005 xxx.
x x x x
The fact, that other personnel of [petitioners] receiving more than the minimum wage were not paid ECOLA, was admitted by [respondent] during the administrative hearing conducted by [petitioners] on December 19, 2005 xxx. Pertinent portion of the findings in said hearing reads:As correctly argued by [petitioners], if indeed there was wage distortion then [respondent], being in charge of the payroll, should have applied proportionately the ECOLA to affected employees. But she did not. Other employees of [petitioners] who were paid more than the minimum wage and/or with the same salary rate with [respondent] were not given ECOLA xxx. As it appears it was only [respondent] who received proportionate ECOLA from among the employees of [petitioners] who are receiving more than the minimum wage. Clearly, there was a breach of trust committed by [respondent] that would warrant her termination from the service. It is to be stressed that [respondent's] position as Accounting Supervisor involves trust and confidence for it deals with [petitioners'] finances. One aspect of which is the preparation of [petitioners'] payroll for their employees.
"4. That in one of the inquiry of the Accounting Manager one time asking why some of the employees have no E-COLA, that the respondent (complainant) answered quickly with "Kasi ma 'am, hindi po sila minimum, above minimum napo", which was questioned by the committee member. If only the minimum wage earners were entitled to the E-COLA, why did the respondent (complainant) gave herself a corresponding E-COLA? That the respondent (complainant) answered with "because it was given to me as a result of distortion ". That should be applied to all employees at her level in terms of rates since she is a payroll master."
All told, we find that [petitioners] had sufficient cause to dismiss [respondent] on ground of loss of trust and confidence.[16]
The NLRC ruled thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated February 19, 2007 is hereby SET ASIDE and a new one entered DISMISSING the complaint for lack of merit.[17]
The minimum requirement of due process in termination proceedings consists of notice to the employees intended to be dismissed and the grant to them of an opportunity to present their own side on the alleged offense or misconduct, which led to the management's decision to terminate. To meet the requirements of due process, the employer must furnish the worker sought to be dismissed with two written notices before termination of employment can be legally effected, i.e., (i) a notice which apprises the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought; and (ii) a subsequent notice after due hearing which informs the employee of the employer's decision to dismiss him. These requirements were substantially complied with in the present case.As for substantive due process, while the Court of Appeals agreed with the NLRC that the requisites for a valid dismissal of respondent on the ground of loss of trust and confidence were present in this case, it determined that the penalty of dismissal was too harsh under the circumstances. According to the appellate court:
The memorandum dated December 12, 2005 of [petitioners'] HR manager sufficiently apprised [respondent] of the particular acts or omissions for which she was charged of "insubordination" and "dishonesty." In the same memorandum, she was directed to submit her explanation within twenty-four (24) hours from notice thereof. However, [respondent] refused to receive the memorandum. Thus, in a memorandum dated December 13, 2005, [respondent] was placed under preventive suspension effective December 14, 2005 while under investigation for insubordination and dishonesty. An administrative hearing was conducted on December 19, 2005. In a memorandum dated December 20, 2005, [respondent] was informed of [petitioners'] decision to dismiss her. x x x.[19] (Citations omitted.)
Article 282(c) of the Labor Code, as amended, allows an employer to terminate the services of an employee for loss of trust and confidence. There are two (2) requisites for a valid dismissal on the ground of loss of trust and confidence. The first requisite for dismissal on the ground of loss of trust and confidence is that the employee concerned must be one holding a position of trust and confidence. Settled is the rule that in order to determine whether an employee holds a position of trust and confidence, what should be considered is not the job title but the actual work that the employee performs. The second requisite is that there must be an act that would justify the loss of trust and confidence.The Court of Appeals then proceeded to award respondent with separation pay in lieu of reinstatement, but denied her backwages and damages. Citing Victory Liner, Inc. v. Race,[21] the appellate court rationalized:
The aforementioned requisites are present in this case. [Respondent] occupied the position of accounting supervisor at the time of her dismissal from employment. The duties of [respondent] as an accounting supervisor included, among others, checking and verifying of payroll entries encoded by the payroll clerk, preparation of administrative payroll, overseeing financial and accounting system controls and standards and performance of all accounting and finance functions as required by the company. As correctly pointed out by public respondent NLRC, [respondent's] "position as Accounting Supervisor involves trust and confidence for it deals with [petitioners'] finances." Public respondent NLRC considered [respondent] to have breached [petitioners'] trust because it appears it was only complainant ([respondent]) who received proportionate ECOLA from among the employees of [petitioners] who are receiving more than the minimum wage, x x x.
xxxx
There was, therefore, reasonable basis to sanction [respondent] for allowing herself to receive a proportionate ECOLA, while other similarly-situated employees did not. However, the penalty of dismissal is too harsh under the circumstances. It is undisputed that (i) [respondent] had worked for [petitioners] for more than eleven (11) years and (ii) her erroneously collected ECOLA had been deducted from her final salary when she was dismissed from employment on December 21, 2005. Hornbook is the doctrine that infractions committed by an employee should merit only the corresponding penalty demanded by the circumstances. The penalty must be commensurate with the act, conduct or omission imputed to the employee.[20] (Citations omitted.)
Anent [respondent's] claim that she is entitled to backwages, separation pay and damages, worth mentioning are the basic provisions of Article 279 of the Labor Code, as amended, that an illegally dismissed employee shall be entitled to reinstatement, backwages inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement. Based on this provision, an illegally dismissed employee shall be entitled to reinstatement and full backwages. In the event that reinstatement is no longer possible, then payment of separation pay may be ordered in its stead.The dispositive portion of the judgment of the Court of Appeals reads:
Significantly, however, the Supreme Court has qualified and/or limited the application of Article 279 of the Labor Code on the award of backwages. In Victory Liner, Inc. vs. Pablo Race, the Supreme Court pointed out several cases wherein the award of backwages was limited to a certain number of years, or no award was given at all. Thus:In San Miguel Corporation v. Javate, Jr., we affirmed the consistent findings and conclusions of the Labor Arbiter, National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), and Court of Appeals that the employee was illegally dismissed since he was still fit to resume his work; but the employer's liability was mitigated by its evident good faith in terminating the employee's services based on the terms of its Health, Welfare and Retirement Plan. Hence, the employee was ordered reinstated to his former position without loss of seniority and other privileges appertaining to him prior to his dismissal, but the award of backwages was limited to only one year considering the mitigating circumstance of good faith attributed to the employer.In sum, while the Court holds that [respondent] committed breach of trust for continuously granting proportionate ECOLA to herself despite [petitioners'] previous order for its discontinuance, the same did not merit the ultimate penalty of dismissal considering that she had worked for the company for more than eleven (11) years and [petitioners] had deducted the amount from her last salary. Hence, the labor arbiter's award of separation pay (since strained relations do not warrant reinstatement) to [respondent] is correct. Notably, even the labor arbiter did not award backwages to [respondent]. The Court sees no cogent reason to rule differently, inasmuch as [respondent's] dismissal was apparently done in good faith by [petitioners] after they had lost their trust in [respondent] and the latter was afforded ample opportunity to explain her side.
In another case, Dolores v. National Labor Relations Commission, the employee was terminated for her continuous absence without permission. Although we found that the employee was indeed guilty of breach of trust and violation of company rules, we still declared the employee's dismissal illegal as it was too severe a penalty considering that she had served the employer company for 21 years, it was her first offense, and her leave to study the French language would ultimately benefit the employer who no longer had to spend for translation services. Even so, other than ordering the employee's reinstatement, we awarded the said employee backwages limited to a period of two years, given that the employer acted without malice or bad faith in terminating the employee's services.
While in the aforementioned cases of illegal dismissal, we ordered the employee's reinstatement, but awarded only limited backwages in recognition of the employer's good faith, there were also instances when we only required the employer to reinstate the dismissed employee without any award for backwages at all.
The employee in Itogon-Suyoc Mines, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, was found guilty of breach of trust for stealing high-grade stones from his employer. However, taking into account the employee's 23 years of previously unblemished service to his employer and absent any showing that his continued employment would result in the employer's oppression or self-destruction, we considered the employee's dismissal a drastic punishment. We deemed that the ends of social and compassionate justice would be served by ordering the employee reinstated but without backwages in view of the employer's obvious good faith.
Similarly, in San Miguel Corporation v. Secretary of Labor, the employee was dismissed after he was caught buying from his co-workers medicines that were given gratis to them by the employer company, and re-selling said medicines, in subversion of the employer's efforts to give medical benefits to its workers. We likewise found in this case that the employee's dismissal was too drastic a punishment in light of his voluntary confession that he committed trafficking of company-supplied medicines out of necessity, as well as his promise not to repeat the same mistake. We ordered the employee's reinstatement but without backwages, again, in consideration of the employer's good faith in dismissing him.
Reference may also be made to the case of Manila Electric Company v. National Labor Relations Commission, wherein the employee was found responsible for the irregularities in the installation of electrical connections to a residence, for which reason, his services were terminated by the employer's company. We, however, affirmed the findings of the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter that the employee should not have been dismissed considering his 20 years of service to the employer without any previous derogatory record and his being awarded in the past two commendations for honesty. We thus ruled that the employee's reinstatement is proper, without backwages, bearing in mind the employer's good faith in terminating his services.
[Respondent's] further prayer for damages has no basis under the circumstances. An employer may only be held liable for damages if the attendant facts show that it was oppressive to labor or done in a manner contrary to morals, good customs and public policy.[22] (Citations omitted.)
WHEREFORE, the petition is partly granted. The Decision dated January 31, 2008 and Resolution dated March 27, 2008 of the public respondent NLRC are modified and [petitioners] are ordered to pay separation pay to [respondent], as previously determined by the labor arbiter, without the award of backwages.[23]Petitioners' Motion for Partial Reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution[24] dated May 13, 2010.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT RESPONDENT'S COMMISSION OF BREACH OF TRUST DID NOT MERIT THE ULTIMATE PENALTY OF DISMISSAL.Petitioners seek the following reliefs from the Court:II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AWARDING SEPARATION PAY TO RESPONDENT.[25]
PRESCINDING THEREFROM, it most respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that judgment be rendered, as follows:The instant Petition is partly meritorious.Other relief just and equitable is likewise prayed for.[26]
- to MODIFY the Honorable Court of Appeals' Decision dated February 22, 2010 and Resolution dated May 13, 2010 only in so far as granting [respondent] separation pay.
- to AFFIRM en toto the National Labor Relations Commission Decision dated January 31, 2008 and the Resolution dated May 27, 2008 of DISMISSING the complaint for utter lack of merit.
- to Order respondent to pay [petitioners] the total amount of the ECOLA from 2001 up to July 2005, which she illegally credited to herself.
- to Order respondent to pay [petitioners] the total amount of Php. 64,173.83 plus interest, which is her outstanding cash advances.
- to Order respondent to pay [petitioners] moral damages in the amount of Php 100,000.00 and exemplary damages in the amount of Php50,000.00
Law and jurisprudence have long recognized the right of employers to dismiss employees by reason of loss of trust and confidence. More so, in the case of supervisors or personnel occupying positions of responsibility, loss of trust justifies termination. Loss of confidence as a just cause for termination of employment is premised from the fact that an employee concerned holds a position of trust and confidence. This situation holds where a person is entrusted with confidence on delicate matters, such as the custody, handling, or care and protection of the employer's property. But, in order to constitute a just cause for dismissal, the act complained of must be "work-related" such as would show the employee concerned to be unfit to continue working for the employer.Respondent, as Accounting Supervisor, was occupying a managerial position. The Court is not persuaded by respondent's assertion that even as Accounting Supervisor, she was still just a mere rank and file employee performing the same clerical functions she had since her hiring in 1994. In her own memorandum dated February 12, 2001 to petitioner Tambunting, respondent accepted the responsibilities of an Accounting Manager. Respondent underwent training for three months, received additional compensation, and was assigned an accounting assistant to help her out with her responsibilities. As Accounting Supervisor, respondent was entrusted with the custody and management of one of the most delicate matters of any business, that is, the financial resources of petitioner SMSI. Respondent also exercised discretion in the preparation of the payroll of the employees of petitioner SMSI, evident from the fact that it was by her own judgment call that she granted and paid herself pro-rated ECOLA since November 2002.
The degree of proof required in labor cases is not as stringent as in other types of cases. It must be noted, however, that recent decisions of this Court have distinguished the treatment of managerial employees from that of rank and file personnel, insofar as the application of the doctrine of loss of trust and confidence is concerned. Thus, with respect to rank and file personnel, loss of trust and confidence as ground for valid dismissal requires proof of involvement in the alleged events in question, and that mere uncorroborated assertions and accusations by the employer will not be sufficient. But as regards a managerial employee, the mere existence of a basis for believing that such employee has breached the trust of his employer would suffice for his dismissal. Hence, in the case of managerial employees, proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required, it being sufficient that there is some basis for such loss of confidence, such as when the employer has reasonable ground to believe that the employee concerned is responsible for the purported misconduct, and the nature of his participation therein renders him unworthy of the trust and confidence demanded by his position.
In the present case, the petitioner is not an ordinary rank and file employee. The petitioner's work is of such nature as to require a substantial amount of trust and confidence on the part of the employer. Being the Chief Purser, he occupied a highly sensitive and critical position and may thus be dismissed on the ground of loss of trust and confidence. One of the many duties of the petitioner included the preparation and filling up passage tickets, and indicating the amounts therein before being given to the passengers. More importantly, he handled the personnel funds of the MV Surigao Princess. Clearly, the petitioner's position involves a high degree of responsibility requiring trust and confidence. The position carried with it the duty to observe proper company procedures in the fulfillment of his job, as it relates closely to the financial interests of the company. (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted.)
"Wage Distortion" refers to a situation where an increase in the prescribed wage rates results in the elimination or severe contraction of intentional quantitative differences in wage or salary rates between and * among employee groups in an establishment as to effectively obliterate the distinctions embodied in such wage structure based on skills, length of service, or other logical bases of differentiation.Section 14 of Wage Order No. NCR-09 covered situations wherein wage distortions result from the application of the ECOLA:
Section 14. Where the application of the emergency cost of living allowance prescribed in this Order results in distortions in the wage structure within the establishment, the wage distortion may be resolved using the following formula:Section 13 of Wage Order No. NCR-10 no longer reproduced the formula for resolving wage distortions, but required instead the application of the procedure for resolving wage distortions under Article 124 of the Labor Code,[29] as amended:
Minimum Wage Under WQ-NCR-08 x Amount of ECOLA = Amount of ECOLA Present Salary in WO-NCR-09 due to distortion
Section 13. Where the application of the emergency cost of living allowance prescribed in this Order results in distortions in the wage structure within the establishment, the distortion as corrected shall be paid as ECOLA in accordance with the procedure provided for under Article 124 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended.The NLRC and the Court of Appeals were correct in not giving much , credence to respondent's claim of wage distortion, based on their observation that respondent was the only employee of petitioner SMSI earning more than minimum wage who was receiving ECOLA.
We find no justification for the award of separation pay to Capor. This award is a deviation from established law and jurisprudence.Hence, respondent's length of service of 11 years at petitioner SMSI did not mitigate, but even aggravated her offense, demonstrating, in addition to her insubordination and dishonesty, her lack of loyalty. It is likewise worthy to note that respondent, through her years of employment, was charged with the commission of several other transgressions, to wit: failing to regularly deduct from her salary the payment for her cash advances which already amounted to P64,173.83; leaving unused bank checks unattended on her desk even though she was provided a safe/vault in which she was supposed to keep all pertinent bank documents; leaving the safe/vault unlocked; failing to submit reports on time; instructing other people to punch in her time card several times; failing to hand over the office keys to the guard on duty as company rules prescribed; and having shortages in the payroll. These administrative charges of previous acts of dishonesty or negligence form part of respondent's employment record and which the petitioners could also very well consider in finally deciding to impose upon respondent the ultimate penalty of dismissal for her latest infraction.
The law is clear. Separation pay is only warranted when the cause for termination is not attributable to the employee's fault, such as those provided in Articles 283 and 284 of the Labor Code, as well as in cases of illegal dismissal in which reinstatement is no longer feasible. It is not allowed when an employee is dismissed for just cause, such as serious misconduct.
Jurisprudence has classified theft of company property as a serious misconduct and denied the award of separation pay to the erring employee. We see no reason why the same should not be similarly applied in the case of Capor. She attempted to steal the property of her long-time employer. For committing such misconduct, she is definitely not entitled to an award of separation pay.
It is true that there have been instances when the Court awarded financial assistance to employees who were terminated for just causes, on grounds of equity and social justice. The same, however, has been curbed and rationalized in Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company v. National Labor Relations Commission. In that case, we recognized the harsh realities faced by employees that forced them, despite their good intentions, to violate company policies, for which the employer can rightfully terminate their employment. For these instances, the award of financial assistance was allowed. But, in clear and unmistakable language, we also held that the award of financial assistance shall not be given to validly terminated employees, whose offenses are iniquitous or reflective of some depravity in their moral character. When the employee commits an act of dishonesty, depravity, or iniquity, the grant of financial assistance is misplaced compassion. It is tantamount not only to condoning a patently illegal or dishonest act, but an endorsement thereof. It will be an insult to all the laborers who, despite their economic difficulties, strive to maintain good values and moral conduct.
In fact, in the recent case of Toyota Motors Philippines, Corp. Workers Association (TMPCWA) v. National Labor Relations Commission, we ruled that separation pay shall not be granted to all employees who are dismissed on any of the four grounds provided in Article 282 of the Labor Code. Such ruling was reiterated and further explained in Central Philippines Bandag Retreaders, Inc. v. Diasnes:To reiterate our ruling in Toyota, labor adjudicatory officials and the CA must demur the award of separation pay based on social justice when an employee's dismissal is based on serious misconduct or willful disobedience; gross and habitual neglect of duty; fraud or willful breach of trust; or commission of a crime against the person of the employer or his immediate family - grounds under Art. 282 of the Labor Code that sanction dismissals of employees. They must be most judicious and circumspect in awarding separation pay or financial assistance as the constitutional policy to provide full protection to labor is not meant to be an instrument to oppress the employers. The commitment of the Court to the cause of labor should not embarrass us from sustaining the employers when they are right, as here. In fine, we should be more cautious in awarding financial assistance to the undeserving and those who are unworthy of the liberality of the law.We are not persuaded by Capor's argument that despite the finding of theft, she should still be granted separation pay in light of her long years of service with petitioners. We held in Central Pangasinan Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission that:Although long years of service might generally be considered for the award of separation benefits or some form of financial assistance to mitigate the effects of termination, this case is not the appropriate instance for generosity x x x. The fact that private respondent served petitioner for more than twenty years with no negative record prior to his dismissal, in our view of this case, does not call for such award of benefits, since his violation reflects a regrettable lack of loyalty and worse, betrayal of the company. If an employee's length of service is to be regarded as justification for moderating the penalty of dismissal, such gesture will actually become a prize for disloyalty, distorting the meaning of social justice and undermining the efforts of labor to clean its ranks of undesirables.Indeed, length of service and a previously clean employment record cannot simply erase the gravity of the betrayal exhibited by a malfeasant employee. Length of service is not a bargaining chip that can simply be stacked against the employer. After all, an employer-employee relationship is symbiotic where both parties benefit from mutual loyalty and dedicated service. If an employer had treated his employee well, has accorded him fairness and adequate compensation as determined by law, it is only fair to expect a long-time employee to return such fairness with at least some respect and honesty. Thus, it may be said that betrayal by a long-time employee is more insulting and odious for a fair employer. As stated in another case:xxx The fact that [the employer] did not suffer pecuniary damage will not obliterate respondent's betrayal of trust and confidence reposed by petitioner. Neither would his length of service justify his dishonesty or mitigate his liability. His length of service even aggravates his offense. He should have been more loyal to petitioner company from which he derived his family bread and butter for seventeen years.While we sympathize with Capor's plight, being of retirement age and having served petitioners for 39 years, we cannot award any financial assistance in her favor because it is not only against the law but also a retrogressive public policy. We have already explained the folly of granting financial assistance in the guise of compassion in the following pronouncements:xxx Certainly, a dishonest employee cannot be rewarded with separation pay or any financial benefit after his culpability is established in two decisions by competent labor tribunals, which decisions appear to be well- supported by evidence. To hold otherwise, even in the name of compassion, would be to send a wrong signal not only that "crime pays" but also that one can enrich himself at the expense of another in the name of social justice. And courts as well as quasi-judicial entities will be overrun by "* petitioners mouthing dubious pleas for misplaced social justice. Indeed, before there can be an occasion for compassion and mercy, there must first be justice for all. Otherwise, employees will be encouraged to steal and misappropriate in the expectation that eventually, in the name of social justice and compassion, they will not be penalized but instead financially rewarded. Verily, a contrary holding will merely encourage lawlessness, dishonesty, and duplicity. These are not the values that society cherishes; these are the habits that it abhors. (Emphases supplied, citations omitted.)
X X X X[30] Noblejas v. Italian Maritime Academy Phils., Inc., G.R. No. 207888, June 9, 2014, 725 SCRA 570, 579.
Where the application of any prescribed wage increase by virtue of a law or Wage Order issued by any Regional Board results in distortions of the wage structure within an establishment, the employer and the union shall negotiate to correct the distortions. Any dispute arising from the wage distortions shall be resolved through the grievance procedure under their collective bargaining agreement and, if it remains unresolved, through voluntary arbitration. Unless otherwise agreed by the parties in writing, such dispute shall be decided by the voluntary arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators within ten (10) calendar days from the time said dispute was referred to voluntary arbitration.
In cases where there are no collective agreements or recognized labor unions, the employer and workers shall endeavor to correct such distortions. Any dispute arising therefrom shall be settled through the National Conciliation and Mediation Board and, if it remains unresolved after ten (10) calendar days of conciliation, shall be referred to the appropriate branch of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). It shall be mandatory for the NLRC to conduct continuous hearings and decide the dispute within twenty (20) calendar days from the time said dispute is submitted for compulsory arbitration.
The pendency of a dispute arising from a wage distortion shall not in any way delay the applicability of any increase in prescribed wage rates pursuant to the provisions of law or Wage Order.
As used herein, a wage distortion shall mean a situation where an increase in prescribed wage rates results in the elimination or severe contraction of intentional quantitative differences in wage or salary rates between and among employee groups in an establishment as to effectively obliterate the distinctions embodied in such wage structure based on skills, length of service, or other logical bases of differentiation.