793 Phil. 723
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
[T]here is no question that the subject property is registered and declared for taxation purposes in the name of the heirs of the late Bartola Marquez, one of whom is [Jizmundo] in his capacity as one of the grandchildren of the said deceased. It is shown that since1985 up to the present, defendant Air Transportation Office has been, and is still occupying and utilizing the land as airport parking area without any formal agreement or payment of rentals to [Jizmundo] or any of his co-heirs. [Jizmundo] and his co owners appear to have tolerated [the ATO's] long occupation of the lot in question because of its promise to them that they will be paid the reasonable value of their land. Taking this fact into account, it appears that when [the ATO] occupied [Jizmundo's] subject property sometime in 1985, [Jizmundo] was already aware that the [ATO] intended to acquire not only the physical possession of the land but also the legal right to possess and ultimately to own the subject property, shown by its promise to pay the just compensation therefor. Disconsolately, said promise was not made good by the [ATO].The ATO belatedly filed its answer to the complaint, raising special and affirmative defenses such as the failure to implead the Republic of the Philippines as an indispensable party and the doctrine of estoppel by laches. Jizmundo, thereafter, filed a Motion to Render Judgment, which the MTC granted in its Order dated August 23, 2006.
[Jizmundo], for himself and in behalf of his other co-owners, now seeks to eject the [ATO] from the land, alleging that the [ATO] has become a deforciant illegally withholding from [Jizmundo] the possession thereof when it refused to vacate the premises after [Jizmundo's] last demand (Annex "C"), which it received on June 5, 2006 (Annex "D"). [Jizmundo] filed the instant case on July 4, 2006, very well within one year from the date he made the last demand to vacate.[5]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Review is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated 17 April 2007 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 4, Kalibo, Aldan in Civil Case No. 7925, affirming in toto the Decision dated 11 September 2006 of the Municipal Trial Court of Kalibo, Aklan in Civil Case No.2735 for Unlawful Detainer With Preliminary Injunction, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.The appellate court cited the ruling of the Court in Civil Aeronautics Administration v. Court of Appeals,[9] which declared that "as the CAA was created to undertake the management of airport operations which primarily involve proprietary functions, it cannot avail of the immunity from suit accorded to government agencies performing strictly governmental functions." Being the successor-in-interest of the CAA, thus inheriting its functions, the Court of Appeals ruled that the ATO was also not immune from suit. Thus, there was no reason to hold that the Republic of the Philippines was an indispensable party in the case at bar.
The respondent is ordered to restore to petitioner possession of the property.
No pronouncement as to costs.[8]
In our view, the [Court of Appeals] thereby correctly appreciated the juridical character of the ATO as an agency of the Government not performing a purely governmental or sovereign function, but was instead involved in the management and maintenance of the Loakan Airport, an activity that was not the exclusive prerogative of the State in its sovereign capacity. Hence, the ATO had no claim to the State's immunity from suit. x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)Moreover, the Court also held in the above case that the issue of whether the ATO could be sued without the State's consent had been rendered moot by. the passage of the Civil Aviation Authority Act of 2008,[12] which abolished the ATO and transferred all its powers, duties and rights to the CAAP. Under Section 23(a) of Republic Act No. 9497,[13] one of the corporate powers vested in the CAAP was the power to sue and be sued.
State immunity from suit may be waived by general or special law. The special law can take the form of the original charter of the incorporated government agency. Jurisprudence is replete with examples of incorporated government agencies which were ruled not entitled to invoke immunity from suit, owing to provisions in their charters manifesting their consent to be sued. These include the National Irrigation Administration, the former Central Bank, and the National Power Corporation. In SSS v. Court of Appeals, the Court through Justice Melencio-Herrera explained that by virtue of an express provision in its charter allowing it to sue and be sued, the Social Security System did not enjoy immunity from suit x x x. (Citations omitted.)Therefore, by virtue of the express provision of Section 23(a) of Republic Act No. 9497, the CAAP also does not enjoy immunity from suit.
Equally untenable is the petitioners' claim that the respondents' right to recover the possession of the subject property is already barred by laches. As owners of the subject property, the respondents have the right to recover the possession thereof from any person illegally occupying their property. This right is imprescriptible. Assuming arguendo that the petitioners indeed have been occupying the subject property for a considerable length of time, the respondents, as lawful owners, have the right to demand the return of their property at any time as long as the possession was unauthorized or merely tolerated, if at all.We find no reason to disturb the MTC's factual finding, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that the ATO's possession of the subject property was, and continues to be, by mere tolerance of the heirs of the registered owner.
Jurisprudence consistently holds that "prescription and laches can not apply to registered land covered by the Torrens· system" because "under the Property Registration Decree, no title to registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession."[15]
In Manila Railroad Co. v. Paredes, the first case in this jurisdiction in which there was an attempt to compel a public service corporation, endowed with the power of eminent domain, to vacate the property it had occupied without first acquiring title thereto by amicable purchase or expropriation proceedings, we said:In the instant case, it had been more or less thirty-one (31) years since the ATO occupied and possessed the subject property without first expropriating the same. Jizmundo and his co heirs Were well aware of this fact for, as the courts a quo found, it is the nonpayment of the value of the subject property that caused them to file ejectment proceedings.x x x whether the railroad company has the capacity to acquire the land in dispute by virtue of its delegated power of eminent domain, and, if so, whether the company occupied the land with the express or implied consent or acquiescence of the owner. If these questions of fact be decided in the affirmative, it is uniformly held that an action of ejectment or trespass or injunction will not lie against the railroad company, but only an action for damages, that is, recovery of the value of the land taken, and the consequential damages, if any. The primary reason for thus denying to the owner the remedies usually afforded to him against usurpers is the irremedial injury which would result to the railroad company and to the public in general. It will readily be seen that the interruption of the transportation service at any point on the right of way impedes the entire service of the company and causes loss and inconvenience to all passengers and shippers using the line. Under these circumstances, public policy, if not public necessity, demands that the owner of the land be denied the ordinarily remedies of ejectment and injunction x x x. There is also something akin to equitable estoppel in the conduct of one who stands idly by and watches the construction of the railroad without protest. x x x But the real strength of the rule lies in the fact that it is against public policy to permit a property owner, under such circumstances, to interfere with the service rendered to the public by the railroad company. x x x (I)f a landowner, knowing that a railroad company has entered upon his land and is engaged in constructing its road without having complied with a statute requiring either payment by agreement or proceedings to condemn, remains inactive and permits it to go on and expend large sums in the work, he is estopped from maintaining either trespass or ejectment for the entry, and will be regarded as having acquiesced therein, and will be restricted to a suit for damages.Further, in De Ynchausti v. Manila Electric Railroad & Light Co., we ruled:The owner of land, who stands by, without objection, and sees a public railroad constructed over it, can not, after the road is completed, or large expenditures have been made thereon upon the faith of his apparent acquiescence, reclaim the land, or enjoin its use by the railroad company. In such a case there can only remain to the owner a right of compensation.In Ansaldo v. Tantuico, Jr., a case involving the takeover by the Government of two private lots to be used for the widening of a road without the benefit of an action for expropriation or agreement with its owners, we held that the owners therein, having been silent for more than two decades, were deemed to have consented to such taking - although they knew that there had been no expropriation case commenced - and therefore had no reason to impugn the existence of the power to expropriate or the public purpose for which that power had been exercised. In said case, we directed the expropriator to forthwith institute the appropriate expropriation action over the land, so that just compensation due the owners may be determined in accordance with the Rules of Court. (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied.)
x x x x
One who permits a railroad company to occupy and use his land and construct its roads thereon without remonstrance or complaint, cannot afterwards reclaim it free from the servitude he has permitted to be imposed upon it. His acquiescence in the company's taking possession and constructing its works under circumstances which made imperative his resistance, if he ever intended to set up illegality, will be considered a waiver. But while this presumed waiver is a bar to his action to dispossess the company, he is not deprived of his action for damages for the value of the land, or for injuries done him by the construction or operation of the road.
x x x x
We conclude that x x x the complaint in this action praying for possession and for damages for the alleged unlawful detention of the land in question, should be dismissed x x x but that such dismissal x x x should be without prejudice to the right of the plaintiff to institute the appropriate proceedings to recover the value of the lands actually taken, or to compel the railroad corporation to take the necessary steps to secure the condemnation of the land and to pay the amount of the compensation and damages assessed in the condemnation proceedings.
It bears stressing that the property sought to be restored to Jizmundo is exactly where the ATO's (how CAAP) existing facilities and structures are presently located. These facilities and structures are vital to the country's civil aviation and airport operation as they are used by the public for international and domestic travel and transportation, undoubtedly a public purpose.Under the circumstances, an action for ejectment would not be proper. Verily, it is not farfetched to presume that the grant of the unlawful detainer case against the CAAP and the transfer of the possession of the subject property in favor of Jizmundo would result in the interruption of the services provided by the CAAP and would lead to the inconvenience of the passengers and personnel that makes use of the said airport.
As the country's premier agency in charge of implementing policies on civil aviation, air safety and promotion of air travel in the Philippines and abroad, [the] ATO has the right to remain in peaceful possession over the property, not only by reason of public policy, but by public necessity as well.[17]