819 Phil. 310
BERSAMIN, J.:
That on or about the 8th day of August, 1997, at about 6:00 o'clock in the afternoon, at Barangay Diaz, Municipality of Gandara, Province of Samar, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with deliberate intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot one VICENTE DELECTOR alias TINGTING with the use of a firearm (revolver), which the accused had conveniently provided himself for the purpose, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds on the different parts of his body, which caused the untimely death of said Vicente Delector.In his defense, the accused insisted during the trial that the shooting of Vicente had been by accident. His own son corroborated his insistence. According to them, Vicente had gone to their house looking for him, but he had earlier left to go to their mother's house nearby in order to avoid a confrontation with Vicente; however, Vicente followed him to their mother's house and dared him to come out, compelling Antolin to intervene and attempt to pacify Vicente. Instead, Vicente attacked Antolin, which forced the accused to go out of their mother's house. Seeing Vicente to be carrying his gun, he tried to wrest the gun from Vicente, and they then grappled with each other for control of the gun. At that point, the gun accidentally fired, and Vicente was hit.[7]
CONTRARY TO LAW.[6]
WHEREFORE, accused Armando Delector is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and is hereby meted a penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA.
Accused shall likewise indemnify the heirs of Vicente Delector the sum of Php50,000.00, actual damages of Php12,000.00, moral damages of Php30,000.00 and costs.
In line with Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the Warden of the Sub-Provincial Jail, Calbayog City, is hereby directed to immediately transmit the living body of the accused Armando Delector to the New Bilibid Prison at Muntinlupa City, Metro Manila where he may remain to be detained. The accused shall be credited for the period he was under preventive detention provided he has previously expressed his written conformity to comply with the discipline, rules and regulations by the detention center, otherwise he shall be entitled to only 4/5 thereof pursuant to Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
SO ORDERED.[9]
Nonetheless, the CA affirmed the conviction for murder subject to an increase of the moral damages to P50,000.00,[10] to wit:I
THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED GIVING FULL FAITH AND CEREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES; andII
THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF MURDER.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by us DENYING the appeal filed in this case and AFFIRMING the decision of the lower court in Criminal Case No. 3403 with the MODIFICATION that the award of moral damages is increased to P50,000.00.The CA opined that the exempting circumstance of accident was highly improbable, stating:
SO ORDERED.
Indeed, given the circumstances surrounding the death of the victim, it is highly improbable that the same was due to an accident. It is unlikely that the accused-appellant would purposely set out and grapple with the victim who, if he is to be believed, was already armed with a gun while he (accused-appellant) was totally unarmed. Such actuation is utterly inconsistent with the ordinary and normal behavior of one who is facing imminent danger to one's life, considering the primary instinct of self-preservation. But then, even granting that the accused-appellant merely acted in defense of his other brother, Antolin, his failure to help or show concern to the victim, who was also his brother, casts serious doubts to his defense of accident.Hence, this appeal, in which the accused insists that:
Furthermore, a revolver, the gun involved in this case, is not one that is prone to accidental firing because of the nature of its mechanism. Considerable pressure on the trigger must have been applied for it to have fired.[11]
On its part, the State, through the Office of the Solicitor General, submitted its appellee's brief maintaining that the evidence of guilt was sufficient, but recommending that the crime for which the accused should be held guilty of was homicide, not murder, considering that the records did not support the holding that he had deliberately and consciously adopted a method of attack that would insure the death of the victim; and that evident premeditation was not also shown to be attendant.[13]I
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING FULL FAITH AND CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES.II
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF MURDER.[12]
... had the accused really been grappling and twisting the victim's right hand which was holding a gun, the latter would not have sustained the wounds. It was improbable that the gun would fire not only once but twice and both times hitting the victim, had its trigger not been pulled. Further, the location of the gunshot wounds belies and negate(d) accused (appellant's) claim of accident.We reiterate that issues concerning the credibility of the witnesses and their account of the events are best resolved by the trial court whose calibration of testimonies, and assessment of and conclusion about their testimonies are generally given conclusive effect. This settled rule acknowledges that, indeed, the trial court had the unique opportunity to observe the demeanor and conduct of the witnesses, and is thus in the best position to discern whether they were telling or distorting the truth.[18]
Also, the Court finds incredible [the] accused (appellant's) allegation that he did not know that the victim was hit. He admitted there were two gun reports. The natural tendency of (a) man in his situation would (be to) investigate what was hit. He surely must have known his brother was hit as he even said he let go of the gun. Then he said his brother went home so he also went home. It is odd that he did not attempt to help or show concern for the victim, his brother, had his intention (been) really merely to pacify.[17]
xxx the above-named accused, with deliberate intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot one VICENTE DELECTOR alias TINGTING with the use of a firearm (revolver), which the accused had conveniently provided himself for the purpose, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds on the different parts of his body, which caused the untimely death of said Vicente Delector.did not sufficiently aver acts constituting either or both treachery and evident premeditation. The usage of the terms treachery and evident premeditation, without anything more, did not suffice considering that such terms were in the nature of conclusions of law, not factual averments.
Section 9. Cause of accusation. - The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense must be stated in ordinary and concise language without repetition, not necessarily in the terms of the statute defining the offense, but in such form as is sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper judgment. (8)Section 9 required that the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense must be stated "in ordinary and concise language without repetition, not necessarily in the terms of the statute defining the offense." As such, the nature and character of the crime charged are determined not by the specification of the provision of the law alleged to have been violated but by the facts alleged in the indictment, that is, the actual recital of the facts as alleged in the body of the information, and not the caption or preamble of the information or complaint nor the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions of law.[19] The facts alleged in the body of the information, not the technical name given by the prosecutor appearing in the title of the information, determine the character of the crime.[20]
xxxx Notwithstanding apparent contradiction between caption and body, we believe that we ought to say and hold that the characterization of the crime by the fiscal in the caption of the information is immaterial and purposeless, and that the facts stated in the body of the pleading must determine the crime of which the defendant stands charged and for which he must be tried. The establishment of this doctrine is permitted by the Code of Criminal Procedure, and is thoroughly in accord with common sense and with the requirements of plain justice.In People v. Dimaano,[22] the Court has reiterated the foregoing guideline thuswise:
xxxx
From a legal point of view, and in a very real sense, it is of no concern to the accused what is the technical name of the crime of which he stands charged. It in no way aids him in a defense on the merits, xxx. That to which his attention should be directed, and in which he, above all things else, should be most interested, are the facts alleged. The real question is not did he commit a crime given in the law some technical and specific name, but did he perform the acts alleged in the body of the information in the manner therein set forth. If he did, it is of no consequence to him, either as a matter of procedure or of substantive right, how the law denominates the crime which those acts constitute. The designation of the crime by name in the caption of the information from the facts alleged in the body of that pleading is a conclusion of law made by the fiscal. In the designation of the crime the accused never has a real interest until the trial has ended. For his full and complete defense he need not know the name of the crime at all. It is of no consequence whatever for the protection of his substantial rights. The real and important question to him is, "Did you perform the acts alleged in the manner alleged?" If he performed the acts alleged, in the manner stated, the law determines what the name of the crime is and fixes the penalty therefor. It is the province of the court alone to say what the crime is or what it is named. xxx.
For complaint or information to be sufficient, it must state the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the place wherein the offense was committed. What is controlling is not the title of the complaint, nor the designation of the offense charged or the particular law or part thereof allegedly violated, these being mere conclusions of law made by the prosecutor, but the description of the crime charged and the particular facts therein recited. The acts or omissions complained of must be alleged in such form as is sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper judgment. No information for a crime will be sufficient if it does not accurately and clearly allege the elements of the crime charged. Every element of the offense must be stated in the information. What facts and circumstances are necessary to be included therein must be determined by reference to the definitions and essentials of the specified crimes. The requirement of alleging the elements of a crime in the information is to inform the accused of the nature of the accusation against him so as to enable him to suitably prepare his defense. The presumption is that the accused has no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense. (Bold underscoring supplied for emphasis)If the standards of sufficiency defined and set by the applicable rule of procedure were not followed, the consequences would be dire for the State, for the accused could be found and declared guilty only of the crime properly charged in the information. As declared in People v. Manalili:[23]
xxx an accused cannot be convicted of an offense, unless it is clearly charged in the complaint or information. Constitutionally, he has a right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. To convict him of an offense other than that charged in the complaint or information would be violative of this constitutional right. Indeed, the accused cannot be convicted of a crime, even if duly proven, unless it is alleged or necessarily included in the information filed against him.Article 14, paragraph 16, of the Revised Penal Code states that "[t]here is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which offended party might make." For treachery to be appreciated, therefore, two elements must concur, namely: (1) that the means of execution employed gave the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or herself, or retaliate; and (2) that the means of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted,[24] that is, the means, method or form of execution must be shown to be deliberated upon or consciously adopted by the offender.[25]
Art. 249. Homicide. — Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246, shall kill another without the attendance of any of the circumstances enumerated in the next preceding article, shall be deemed guilty of homicide and be punished by reclusion temporal.The accused is entitled to the benefits under the Indeterminate Sentence Law. Thus, the minimum of his indeterminate sentence should come from prision mayor, and the maximum from the medium period of reclusion temporal due to the absence of any modifying circumstance. Accordingly, the indeterminate sentence is nine years of prision mayor, as the minimum, to 14 years, eight months and one day of reclusion temporal, as the maximum.
| Very truly yours, |
(SGD) | |
WILFREDO V. LAPITAN | |
Division Clerk of Court |
"WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on September 22, 2006 of the Court of Appeals subject to the MODIFICATION that accused ARMANDO DELECTOR is found and pronounced guilty beyond reasonable doubt of HOMICIDE, and, ACCORDINGLY, sentences him to suffer the indeterminate sentence of NINE YEARS OF PRISION MAYOR, AS THE MINIMUM, TO 14 YEARS, EIGHT MONTHS AND ONE DAY OF RECLUSION TEMPORAL, AS THE MAXIMUM; and ORDERS him to pay to the heirs of the late Vicente Delector P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P25,000.00 as temperate damages, plus interest of 6% per annum from the finality of this decision until the full satisfaction, and the costs of suit.NOW, THEREFORE, You are hereby ordered to immediately release ARMANDO DELECTOR unless there are other lawful causes for which he should be further detained, and to return this Order with the certificate of your proceedings within ten (10) days from notice hereof.
Considering that accused ARMANDO DELECTOR appears to have been in continuous detention since November 19, 1997, his immediate release from the New Bilibid Prison at Muntinlupa City, Metro Manila is ordered unless there are other lawful causes warranting his continuing detention.
The Court DIRECTS the Director of the Bureau of Corrections to immediately implement this decision, and to render a report on his compliance within 10 days from notice.
SO ORDERED."
| Very truly yours, |
(SGD) | |
WILFREDO V. LAPITAN | |
Division Clerk of Court |