870 Phil. 399
Accordingly, having suffered a work-related illness in the course of his last employment contract, the 2010 POEA-SEC imposes upon the company-designated physician the responsibility to arrive at a
definite assessment of the seafarer's fitness to work or degree of disability within a period of 120 days from repatriation.
[46] During the said period, the seafarer shall be deemed on
temporary total disability and shall receive his basic wage until he is declared fit to work or his temporary disability is acknowledged by the company to be permanent, either partially or totally, as his condition is defined under the POEA-SEC and by applicable Philippine laws. However, if the 120-day period is exceeded and no definitive declaration is made because the seafarer requires further medical attention, then the temporary total disability period may be extended up to a maximum of 240 days, subject to the right of the employer to declare within this period that a permanent partial or total disability already exists.
[47] Failure of the company-designated physician to arrive at a definite assessment of the seafarer's fitness to work or permanent disability within the prescribed periods, and if the seafarer's medical condition remains unresolved, the law steps in to consider the latter's disability as total and permanent.
[48]In the case at bar, TSPI contended that petitioner abandoned his medical treatment when he failed to return for his scheduled follow-up check-up on December 15, 2015 that effectively prevented the company-designated physician from arriving at a definite assessment, which is in breach of his obligation under the POEA-SEC. However, as correctly pointed out by the CA, there was no medical abandonment on the part of petitioner given that the company-designated physician, in the confidential medical report dated November 3, 2015, had already declared the former to have "
already reached his maximum medical improvement[,]"
[49] thus, indicating his treatment through curative means to have already ended and that the subsequent check-ups were for the improvement of his physical appearance by means of fitting a scleral shell prosthesis. The said medical report also recommended a Grade 7 disability rating based on the specialist's finding that petitioner's visual prognosis and recovery were poor due to "
permanent loss of vision in one eye despite intravenous antibiotic and steroids as well as oral medications given[,]" thus rendering him "
unfit for further sea duties."
[50]Considering that: (1) in the November 3, 2015 medical report, which was issued within the 120-day treatment period, the company-designated physician already gave petitioner a partial and permanent disability rating of Grade 7,
i.e., loss of vision or total blindness in one eye, and declared him to have already reached his maximum medical improvement, rendering him unfit for further sea duties; and (2) during petitioner's subsequent check-ups on November 24 and 25, 2015, respectively, the company-designated physician did not find any significant improvement in his condition, it is evident that there was no need for further medical treatment and he cannot be faulted for his failure to appear on his scheduled check-up session on December 15, 2015 nor can such be construed as abandonment. Besides, his attending specialist at Medical City likewise confirmed the permanent loss of vision in petitioner's left eye.
[51]Notably, while the company-designated physician assessed petitioner only a partial and permanent disability rating of Grade 7 in accordance with the POEA-SEC, the latter was nonetheless also found to be unfit for further sea duties. In
Kestrel Shipping Co., Inc. v. Munar,
[52] the Court held that the POEA-SEC merely provides the minimum acceptable terms in a seafarer's employment contract, and that in the assessment of whether a seafarer's injury is partial and permanent, the same must be so characterized not only under the Schedule of Disabilities found in Section 32 of the POEA-SEC, but also under the relevant provisions of the Labor Code and the Amended Rules on Employee Compensation, to wit:
Indeed, under Section 32 of the POEA-SEC, only those injuries or disabilities that are classified as Grade 1 may be considered as total and permanent. However, if those injuries or disabilities with a disability grading from 2 to 14, hence, partial and permanent, would incapacitate a seafarer from performing his usual sea duties for a period of more than 120 or 240 days, depending on the need for further medical treatment, then he is, under legal contemplation, totally and permanently disabled. In other words, an impediment should be characterized as partial and permanent not only under the Schedule of Disabilities found in Section 32 of the POEA-SEC but should be so under the relevant provisions of the Labor Code and the Amended Rules on Employee Compensation (AREC) implementing Title II, Book IV of the Labor Code. That while the seafarer is partially injured or disabled, he is not precluded from earning doing the same work he had before his injury or disability or that he is accustomed or trained to do. Otherwise, if his illness or injury prevents him from engaging in gainful employment for more than 120 or 240 days, as the case may be, he shall be deemed totally and permanently disabled.[53] (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
From the foregoing, since petitioner was declared by no less than his attending specialist to be unfit for further sea service due to permanent loss of vision in his left eye, the Court finds his resulting disability to be not only partial and permanent as ruled by the CA, but rather total and permanent as correctly found by the PVA. It is well to point out that in disability compensation, it is not the injury which is compensated, but rather it is the incapacity to work resulting in the impairment of one's earning capacity.
Total disability refers to an employee's
inability to perform his or her usual work. It does not require total paralysis or complete helplessness.
Permanent disability, on the other hand, is a worker's
inability to perform his job for more than 120 days or 240 days, if the seafarer required further medical attention justifying the extension of the temporary total disability period, regardless of whether or not he loses the use of any part of his body.
[54]Moreover, considering that petitioner's employment contract is covered by a CBA which provides for better benefits, these terms will override the 2010 POEA-SEC provisions on disability compensation in favor of petitioner. This is so because a contract of labor is so impressed with public interest that the more beneficial conditions must be endeavored in favor of the laborer.
[55]Article 31 of the CBA on Compensation for Disability provides:
Section 1. A seafarer who suffers permanent disability as a result of work[-]related illness or from an injury as a result of an accident, regardless of fault but excluding injuries caused by a seafarer's [willful] act, whilst serving on board, including accidents and work[-]related illness occurring while travelling to or from the ship, and whose ability to work is reduced as a result thereof, shall in addition to sick pay, be entitled to compensation according to the provisions of this Agreement. In determining work[-]related illness, reference shall be made to the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) Standard Tem1s and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers On Board Ocean Going Vessels.
Section 2. The disability suffered by the seafarer shall be determined by a doctor appointed by the Company. If a doctor appointed by or on behalf of the seafarer disagrees with the assessment, a third doctor may be agreed jointly between the Company and the Seafarer and his Union, and the third doctor's decision shall be final and binding on both parties.
x x x x
Section 4. A seafarer whose disability, in accordance with 25.2 above is assessed at 50% or more shall, for the purpose of this paragraph, be regarded as permanently unfit for further sea service in any capacity and be entitled to 100% compensation. Furthermore, any seafarer assessed at less than 50% disability but certified as permanently unfit for further sea service in any capacity by the Company-nominated doctor, shall also be entitled to 100% compensation. Any disagreement as to the assessment or entitlement shall be resolved in accordance with clause 25.2 above.[56] (Emphases supplied)
Based on the above-quoted provisions of the CBA, there are three (3) instances when a seafarer may be entitled to 1 00% disability compensation, namely: (1) when the seafarer is declared to have suffered 100% disability, (2) when the seafarer is assessed with disability of at least 50%; and (3)
when the seafarer is assessed at below 50% disability, but he or she is certified as permanently unfit for sea service.
Here, since petitioner was assessed a Grade 7 disability rating by the company-designated physician, which under the CBA Degree of Disability Rate for Ratings
[57] to which he belongs is equivalent to 37.244
[58] or below the 50% disability, and further declared to be unfit for further sea duties as found by the PVA and reflected in the confidential medical report dated November 3, 2015, the CA erred in awarding partial and permanent disability only. Accordingly, petitioner is entitled to 100% disability compensation or in the total amount of US$89,100.00 as provided under the CBA.
With respect to the issue of attorney's fees, Article 2208
[59] of the New Civil Code provides that the same is granted in actions for indemnity under the workmen's compensation and employer's liability laws. It is also recoverable when the employer's act or omission has compelled the employee to incur expenses to protect his or her interest, as in this case. Case law further states that "[w]here an employee is forced to litigate and incur expenses to protect his right and interest, he is entitled to an award of attorney's fees equivalent to [ten percent] (10%) of the award."
[60] Considering that petitioner was clearly compelled to litigate to enforce what was rightfully due him under the CBA, the award of ten percent (10%) attorney's fees by the PVA was proper, and as such, must be reinstated.
[61] Finally, in line with prevailing jurisprudence, all monetary awards due petitioner shall earn legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from finality of this Decision until fully paid.
[62]WHEREFORE, the petition is
GRANTED. The Decision dated August 24, 2018 and the Resolution dated February 8, 2019 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 153637 are hereby
AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION, entitling petitioner Jolly D. Teodoro to full disability benefits in the amount of US$89,100.00 at the prevailing rate of exchange at the time of payment, as well as attorney's fees equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the total monetary award. Finally, all monetary awards shall earn legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from finality of this Decision until full payment.
SO ORDERED.
A. Reyes, Jr., Carandang,
* Inting, and
Delos Santos, JJ., concur.
* Designated Additional Member per Raffle dated February 3, 2020.
[1] Rollo, pp. 14-27.
[2] Id. at 29-41. Penned by Associate Justice Gabriel T. Robeniol with Associate Justices Ricardo R. Rosario and Ramon Paul L. Hernando (now a member of this Court), concurring.
[3] Id. at 44-45. Penned by Associate Justice Gabriel T. Robeniol with Associate Justices Ricardo R. Rosario and Carmelita Salandanan Manahan, concurring.
[4] Id. at 195-205. Signed by Chairperson MVA Jesus S. Silo and Panel Member MVA Gregorio C. Biares, Jr., with Panel Member MVA Gregorio B. Sialsa dissenting.
[5] CA
rollo, p. 96.
[6] See id. at 136-141.
[7] See
rollo, p. 63.
[8] See Medical Examination Report dated January 6, 2015; CA
rollo, pp. 97-98.
[9] See
rollo, pp. 127-129.
[10] See id. at 70.
[11] See id. at 71-72.
[12] See CA
rollo, p. 92.
[13] See letter dated July 14, 2015; id. at 99-100.
[14] See Discharge Summary/Clinical Abstract; id. at 102.
[15] See id. at 92.
[16] Id. at 94-95.
[17] See id. at 94.
[18] See id. at 95.
[19] See id. at 115-116.
[20] See Medical Certificate dated November 23, 2015; id. at 142-143.
[21] See
rollo, p. 118.
[22] See letter dated December 16, 2015; CA
rollo, pp. 369-370.
[23] See id. at 144.
[24] See Submission Agreement dated August 10, 2016;
rollo, p. 194.
[25] See id. at 98-101.
[26] See id. a t 138.
[27] Id. at 144-152.
[28] Id. at 195-205.
[29] Id. at 204.
[30] See id. at 196-204.
[31] See motion for reconsideration dated October 6, 2017; id. at 228-250.
[32] Id. at 251-252.
[33] Dated November 27, 2017. Id. at 253-281.
[34] Id. at 29-41.
[35] See id. at 40.
[36] See id. at 33-40.
[37] Dated September 20, 2018. Id. at 282-287.
[38] Id. at 44-45.
[39] Dated December 8, 2017; CA
rollo, pp. 828-829.
[40] See Notice of Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 153637 dated July 20, 2018; id. at 512.
[41] See Notice of Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 153637 dated January 11, 2018; id. at 510.
[42] Dated September 20, 2018. Id. at 822-827.
[43] Formerly Articles 191 to 193 of the Labor Code.
[44] CA
rollo, pp. 136-141.
[45] See
Heirs of Licuanan v. Singa Ship Management, Inc., G.R. Nos. 238261 & 238567, June 26, 2019.
[46] See Section 20 (A) (3) of the 2010 POEA-SEC.
[47] See
Deocariza v. Fleet Management Services, Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 229955, July 23, 2018.
[48] Ampo-on v. Reiner Pacific International Shipping, Inc., G.R. No. 240614, June 10, 2019.
[49] CA
rollo, p. 95.
[50] See id. at 94.
[51] See Medical Certificate dated November 23, 2015; id. at 142-143.
[52] 702 Phil. 717 (2013).
[53] Id. at 730-731.
[54] See
Pastor v. Bibby Shipping Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 238842, November 19, 2018.
[55] See
Centennial Transmarine, Inc. v. Sales, G.R. No. 196455, July 8, 2019.
[56] CA
rollo, pp. 140-141.
[57] See Section 3 of Article 31 of the IBF-PSU-Teekay Fleet Agreement.
[58] See
rollo, p. 64.
[59] Pertinent portions of Article 2208 of the CIVIL CODE provides:
Article 2208. In the absence of stipulation, attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs, cannot be recovered, except:
x x x x
(2) When the defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest;
x x x x
(8) In actions for indemnity under workmen's compensation and employer's liability laws[.]
[60] Deocariza v. Fleet Management Services, Philippines, Inc., supra note 47; citing
Atienza v. Orophil Shipping International Co., Inc., 815 Phil. 480, 508 (2017).
[61] Horlardor v. Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc., G.R. No. 236576, September 5, 2018.
[62] See
Pelagio v. Transmarine Carriers, Inc., G.R. No. 231773, March 11, 2019, citing
Nacar v. Gallery Frames, 716 Phil. 267 (2013).