323 Phil. 189; 93 OG No. 2, 187 (January 13, 1997)
MENDOZA, J.:
Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. - Any private individual who shall kidnap or detain another, or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death:The essence of the offense is the actual deprivation of the victim’s liberty[9] coupled with intent of the accused to effect it.[10] In the case at bar, as the person supposedly detained was an infant, eight months old, the question is whether there is evidence to show that, in taking the child with her to the Escolta, accused-appellant’s intention was to take his custody from his mother. We find none in the record of this case, which shows, on the contrary, that accused-appellant had been permitted by the mother to carry the child. Indeed, the complainant and accused-appellant were neighbors and close friends in Intramuros. They had known each other for four years. Their houses were in front of each other.[11] Although complainant claimed she had allowed accused-appellant to have her child, provided "it [was] just in [their] vicinity,"[12] the fact is that on previous occasions, accused-appellant had been allowed to take the child not just in the immediate vicinity of complainant’s house but as far as Plaza Mexico in Intramuros, near the Commission on Immigration and Deportation building. Accused-appellant testified that she had grown fond of the baby and it is not farfetched to suppose that complainant, like so many Filipino mothers -especially those living in close proximity to each other - shared her baby with her neighbors, including accused-appellant.
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4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the accused is any of the parents, female or a public officer.
It would thus appear that accused-appellant was arrested at 11:00 A.M. (not 2:00 P.M. as complainant alleged), as she was ascending the Jones Bridge on her way home to Intramuros. As the Solicitor General points out, the "2:00 in the afternoon" which complainant mentioned was the time the accused-appellant met the complainant in the house of Erlinda Silvestre.[14] It was not the time accused-appellant was found on the Escolta with the child.
Q: What did you do together with the child at Escolta, Madam witness? A: I just went to see the theater if it is open sir. Q: Was the theater open at that time? A: Not yet sir. Q: And upon seeing the theater not yet open, what did you do? A: I decided to go home, sir. Q: And after you decided to go home, what happened next, madam witness? A: I met the mother-in-law of Jocelyn Gador, sir. .... Q: Now, after you have met the mother-in-law of Jocelyn Gador and companion, what happened next? A: I was just surprise when I was slapped by the woman, sir. Q: When you said "by the woman" to whom are you referring to? A: The mother-in-law of Jocelyn Gador, sir. Erlinda Silvestre sir. Q: Now, what happened next when you were slapped by Erlinda Silvestre? A: I was dragged going towards their place, sir. .... Q: And because you said you went to see a movie to the Escolta, why it take you that long to return to Jocelyn Gador? A: We met with her mother-in-law at 11:00 sir. Court: Where? A: Ascending at the bridge of Jones Bridge your Honor. Court: What bridge is this? A: Jones Bridge sir.
The Court finds the version of the defense difficult to believe. During her direct examination the accused said, "I just went (to Escolta at 9:00 o’clock in the morning) to see the theater if it is open." (TSN, Jan. 7, 1 994, p. 4.) On cross-examination she further said her purpose in going to Escolta was to watch a movie. (Ibid., p. 10) And yet she admitted that she knows that the theater opens at 10:30 o’clock in the morning. (Ibid.) The Court, thus, finds preposterous the claim of the accused that she went to Escolta early in the morning on July 1, 1993 to verify if the theater was already opened when she very well knows that the opening time of the movie house was at 10:30 o’clock.If anything, the "flaws" noted by the trial court in the testimony of accused-appellant refer to insignificant matters which, if viewed properly, indicate more lack of facility to express herself than prevarication. Accused-appellant said in her direct examination that she went to the Escolta to see if the Capitol Theater was already open. On cross examination, she said she went there to see a movie. When asked why the answer was different from her earlier answer in the direct examination, accused-appellant explained that she was going to "watch a movie if it (Capitol Theater) was already open."[16] There is no ambiguity in these statements.
When it was pointed out to the accused that a child 8 or 9 months old is not allowed admittance in any theater, she lamely said, "I will not bring the child along in the theater, what I really wanted to is to look if the theater is opened and I will see movie alone." (Ibid., p. 10.) She also affirmed that after verifying what movie was then showing in Capitol Theater, she would return the child to its mother, and then go back to Escolta at 10:30 o’clock on time for the opening of the movie house. (Ibid., p. 12.) But she likewise admitted that she was accosted by Erlinda Silvestre, mother-in-law of Jocelyn, at around 11:00 o’clock the same morning, while she was ascending Jones Bridge from Escolta, with the child still in her custody. (Ibid., pp. 11-12) Knowing that Capitol Theater would open and start its show at 10:30 o’clock that morning, the accused has not satisfactorily explained why she tarried and did not immediately return the child to its mother, after she had supposedly ascertained the opening hour of Capitol Theater.
The accused earlier declared that on July 1, 1993, at around 9:00 o’clock in the morning, when she saw Jocelyn carrying her son in her arms, "I (accused) got fond of the child and I asked Jocelyn that I will bring him along in Escoltá." (Ibid., p. 3.) Jocelyn allowed her and gave the child to her with the admonition "not to take for a long time in going there." (Ibid., pp. 3-4.) But then again, the accused failed to give a satisfactory explanation why Jocelyn gave an adverse statement to the police investigator at 3:30 o’clock in the afternoon on the same date the child was recovered from the custody of said accused charging her of kidnapping and detaining the said child (Exhibit A), other than saying:
Q: Now, do you know of any reason why you would be charge in this Court of that crime? A: There is, because her mother-in-law was really mad at me, sir. Q: Why? A: Because on that morning, she asked me if I was with another daughter-in-law on the 30th? Q: What that she told you in that morning? A: She asked me if I was with her daughter-in-law and I told her I was not, sir. Q: So what was her reaction when you told her that you were not? A: She told me not to commit any civil mistakes because she will not waste time or hesitate in having me incarcerated, sir. Court: 30th of what month? A: 30th of June, sir Q: What year? A: 30th of June 1993. .... A: The mother-in-law urged the mother of the child to having me incarcerated, sir. Q: You mean to say the mother-in-law order her daughter-in-law to file this case? A: Yes sir.
If Erlinda Silvestre was really mad at the accused on such a flimsy incident and instigated her daughter-in-law to initiate the present criminal action to put her in jail, she (Erlinda) would certainly take an active role in the prosecution of this case. Without doubt she would have offered too her statement to the police investigator, as well as to this Court, if only to press harder the charge against the accused. However, Erlinda Silvestre took no part in the prosecution of this case in the police station, in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila, and in this Court.
These flaws in the testimony of the accused fatally affect her personal credibility as well as the credibility of her version. Evidence, to be worthy of belief, must not only proceed from a credible source, but must, in addition, be credible in itself. By this is meant that it should be so natural, reasonable and probable in view of the transaction which it describes or to which it relates, such that the mind may easily believe it. We have no test of the truth of human testimony, except its conformity with our common experience, knowledge and observation. It is well-settled that where the testimony of a witness, especially one who is interested in the final outcome of the case, is clouded with uncertainty and improbability, or is contrary to the natural course of things, or otherwise appears unreliable and unworthy of belief, the court may disregard it. This Court finds the testimony of the accused in her behalf unreliable and unworthy of credit.