351 Phil. 108
BELLOSILLO, J.:
The issue here
is not new; it is simply, whether a judgment may still be executed by mere
motion after the lapse of five (5) years from its finality.
Before the then
Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Balanga, Bataan,
respondents Leoncia Dizon, Ricardo Valera, Delfin Manlapid, Jacobe Quintos and
spouses Gaspar and Elena Quintos instituted an action for specific performance
against petitioner Aurora B. Camacho concerning certain portions of Lot No.
26108 covered by TCT No. T-29799. Their claim was anchored on the respective
deeds of sale in their favor.
On 20 December
1974 the trial court ruled for respondents. Petitioner was ordered, among other things, to segregate the definite
portions sold to respondents and to deliver to them their corresponding titles.[1] On 30 January 1981 respondent Court
of Appeals affirmed the judgment with modification. On 4 June 1982 the appellate court granted reconsideration by
deleting the modification. On 21 March
1983 this Court denied the petition for review on certiorari which denial became final and executory on
23 May 1983. On 6 June 1983 the
records were remanded to the Balanga trial court.
On respondents'
motion, the writ of execution was
issued on 26 August 1983. On 28
September 1983 petitioner moved to defer the execution on the ground that the
directive of the judgment could not be carried out in the absence of an
approved subdivision plan. Besides, the
boundaries and exact locations of the subject lots could not be
determined. On 18 January 1984 the
trial court denied the motion and ordered the Provincial Sheriff to enforce the
writ. Thereafter petitioner filed a
notice of appeal while respondents moved for its dismissal. On 22 March 1985 the trial court ruled that
its order was not appealable and directed the issuance of a new writ of
execution. Undaunted, petitioner
resorted anew to respondent court by way of a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus which was however denied. On 26 February 1986
the petition before us met the same fate.
On 26 September
1986 a new writ of execution was issued. Nonetheless the judgment remained unenforced due to the alleged failure
of petitioner to surrender her copy of the title. Upon inquiry with the Register of Deeds of Bataan, respondents discovered
that titles to the subject lots were
transferred in 1984 to petitioner's daughter Aurora Fe B. Camacho. Thus on 14 April 1987 respondents moved that
petitioner and/or her daughter surrender the copies of the present titles to
the trial court.
On 11 August
1987 the trial court granted the motion insofar as it was directed against
petitioner but not as against her daughter. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration on 4 September 1987 while respondents moved for modification
which petitioner opposed. Subsequently,
another incident concerning the authority of a new counsel for respondents to
replace their original counsel was submitted. The trial court considered the new counsel as co-counsel but the ruling
was assailed by petitioner. Consequently on 25 September 1990 it ordered respondents' counsel to
comment thereon without resolving the previous motions of the parties.
In a letter
dated 24 January 1992 respondents invited the attention of this Court to the
vacancy in the branch of the trial court where their case was pending. On 15 June 1992 they moved again for
implementation of the writ of execution. On 10 September 1992 petitioner countered by moving to dismiss the proceedings
on the contention that the trial court had no more jurisdiction because more
than five (5) years had elapsed from the date of entry of judgment.
The trial court
sustained petitioner and explained that although respondents' motion was for
implementation of the writ of execution, in effect they were seeking the
issuance of an alias writ which should have been done within the period 26
February 1986 and 25 February 1991 and therefore their motion was denied. In the order of 19 November 1992,[2] the trial court dismissed the
proceedings and in view thereof found it
unnecessary to dwell on the other pending motions.
Respondent
appellate court assessed the situation differently. According to it -
x x x x The period during which defendant's motion to defer execution (dated September 28, 1983), which was finally resolved only upon the promulgation of the Supreme Court's resolution dated February 26, 1986 (about 2 1/2 years) should be considered as having stayed or suspended the five-year period. It is noted that the Court of Appeals categorically ruled that defendant's motion to defer execution is "a purely dilatory action to stave off the execution of a long final judgment of the trial court," and rejected defendant's contention that the portions of Lot No. 261-B which she sold to the plaintiffs are unidentifiable x x x x
x x x x The five-year period should be deemed extended by the delay due to causes not of plaintiffs' making, as that due to a vacancy in the sala. We also see no reason why the period of the pendency of plaintiffs' Motion to Surrender Owner's Duplicate Copy of Title as well as the other unresolved incidents spawned by defendant's determined efforts to resist execution of a final judgment should not be considered as having tolled the five-year period when no fault can be attributed to plaintiffs for the court's failure to resolve these pending incidents. Reasons of equity which have been justifiably invoked in the computation of the five-year prescriptive period for execution on motion argue against a contrary ruling.[3]
Thus on 15
December 1994 respondent court set aside the order of the trial court and
remanded the case for further proceedings.[4]
Petitioner[5] asserts that her motion to defer
execution as well as the petitions before the appellate courts could not have
possibly suspended the five-year reglementary period inasmuch as no writ of injunction was
issued. She adds that it is immaterial
that there was a vacancy in the sala of the Presiding Judge and that there were
unresolved motions since the problem lies in the failure of respondents to
apply for an alias writ of execution within the reglementary period.
We find no
reversible error committed by respondent court. Pursuant to Sec. 6, Rule 39, of the Rules of Court a judgment may
be executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry or from
the date it becomes final and executory. After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of
limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action. Resolving the same issue in Gonzales v. Court of Appeals[6] the Court emphasized -
On several instances, this Court has invoked the principle of equity in computing the 5-year period to execute a judgment by motion. We have ruled that if the delays were through no fault of the prevailing party, the same should not be included in computing the 5-year period to execute a judgment by motion x x x x
Along the same
line, the Court elucidated in Republic v. Court of Appeals[7]-
To be sure, there had been many instances where this Court allowed execution by motion even after the lapse of five years, upon meritorious grounds.[8] These exceptions have one common denominator, and that is: the delay is caused or occasioned by actions of the judgment debtor and/or is incurred for his benefit or advantage.
In the case
under consideration, the judgment sought to be executed became final and
executory on 23 May 1983. The writ of
execution was issued on 25 July 1983 but on 28 September 1983 petitioner
moved to defer execution. She even elevated the matter to respondent court
and this Court until it was settled unfavorably on 26 February 1986. By then petitioner has consumed almost two
and a half (2 1/2) years or almost half of the period alloted to respondents
within which to move to execute the judgment. On 26 September 1986 a new writ of execution was issued but
unfortunately did not serve its purpose due to the alleged failure of
petitioner to surrender her copy of the title. Then it turned out according to respondents that the original title was
cancelled and two (2) new titles were issued in the name of petitioner's
daughter, Aurora Fe. Respondents
were prompted to file on 14 April 1987 a motion requiring petitioner and/or her
daughter to surrender their copies of the new titles. This motion was granted on 11 August 1987 but only against
petitioner. The latter moved for
reconsideration on 4 September 1987 while respondents moved for modification
which petitioner opposed. Another
incident regarding the representation of respondents by new counsel arose. As of 25 September 1990 when the trial court
issued its order regarding the representation the foregoing motions remained
unresolved.
Furthermore, a
vacancy in the trial court was created when the then Presiding Judge retired on
14 November 1990. Another Judge assumed
office on 22 October 1991 but retired barely two (2) months thereafter. A second vacancy thus existed until the
present Presiding Judge was appointed on 9 March 1992. On 15 June 1992 respondents filed a motion
to implement the writ of execution. Going back to the date when
respondents moved to require petitioner and/or her daughter to surrender their
copies of the new titles almost five
(5) years and two (2) months had passed. Under the peculiar circumstances of the present case where the
delays were occasioned by
petitioner's own initiatives and for her advantage as well as beyond respondents' control, we hold that the five-year period allowed
for enforcement of the judgment by motion was deemed to have been effectively
interrupted or suspended. Once again we
rely upon basic notions of equity and justice in so ruling.
The purpose of
the law in prescribing time limitations
for enforcing judgments or actions is to prevent obligors from sleeping on
their rights. Far from sleeping on their
rights, respondents persistently pursued their rights of action. It is revolting to the conscience to allow
petitioner to further avert the satisfaction of her obligation because of sheer
literal adherence to technicality. After all, the Rules of Court mandates that a liberal construction of
the Rules be adopted in order to promote their object and to assist the parties
in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action and
proceeding.[9] This rule of construction is
especially useful in the present case where adherence to the letter of the law
would result in absurdity and manifest injustice.[10]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The questioned decision of respondent Court
of Appeals dated 15 December 1994 which ordered that the case be remanded to
the Regional Trial Court for further proceedings is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
[1] Penned by
Judge Abraham P. Vera of CFI-Br. 1; Records, p. 96.
[2] Penned by
Judge Benjamin T. Vianzon; Court of Appeals Rollo, p. 7.
[3] Rollo,
pp. 68-69.
[4] Penned by
Justice Minerva P. Gonzaga-Reyes with the concurrence of Justices Eduardo G.
Montenegro and Antonio P. Solano; Rollo, p. 69.
[5] Our
resolution of 3 September 1997 noted the special appearance of Aurora Fe in
substitution of petitioner who died; Rollo, p. 315.
[6] G.R. No.
62556, 13 August 1992, 212 SCRA 595.
[7] G.R. No.
91885, 7 August 1996, 260 SCRA 344.
[8] Citing
Justice Florenz D. Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. 1, Fifth Rev. Ed.,
pp. 271-272.
[9] Section 2, Rule 1, of the Rules of Court.
[10] See
Republic v. Court of Appeals; Note 7.