351 Phil. 587
REGALADO, J.:
Accused-appellant
Winston de Guzman was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Mati, Branch
5, Davao Oriental[1] with the crime of rape in an
information docketed as Criminal Case No. 2584, and which alleged:
That on or about June 9, 1994, in the Municipality of Governor Generoso, Province of Davao Oriental, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with lewd designs, by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of one JOVELYN A. GERAM, a (sic) against her will.[2]
Appellant
pleaded not guilty when arraigned on the aforequoted indictment on September 5,
1994,[3] and the case then went to trial.
The evidence for
the prosecution reveals that 14-year old complainant, Jovelyn A. Geram,[4] was alone in their residence at Barangay
Monserrat, Governor Generoso, Davao Oriental when the crime was committed in
the afternoon of June 9, 1994 by appellant who had managed to gain entry into
the house.
Complainant was
sleeping at around two o’clock that afternoon when she was awakened by the
weight of something on top of her. Upon
opening her eyes, she saw herein appellant naked and sitting on her thighs. Complainant instinctively tried to shout for
help but appellant covered her mouth and nose with his hand and warned her not
to resist or she would be killed. A
struggle between the two ensued thereafter. The strength of appellant and the strain of complainant’s efforts at
resistance took its toll on the latter, causing her to feel weak and faint.
On recovering
her senses, complainant discovered that she was already undressed and she saw
blood on her vagina. She also noticed
some white fluid on her abdomen and thighs. Complainant felt pain on her genitals and other parts of her body. Appellant was no longer around, and the
hapless complainant was left crying over the tragedy which had befallen her.
In the evening
of the same day, a neighbor, Florami Bayno, arrived in the house of the Gerams
to watch television. Complainant went
with Florami when the latter went home. They proceeded to the house of Mauricia and Hugo Bayno, close friends of
the Gerams and Florami’s parent’s-in-law. In front of the couple, complainant recounted her ordeal at the hands of
appellant.
In the morning
of June 10, 1994, complainant went to the house of another neighbor, Genesis
Delgado, and confided her misfortune to the latter. Later, she went to the house of the Baynos and waited for her
parents who were in Barangay Tambo attending to their fishing
enterprise. Complainant’s mother,
Evelyn Geram,[5] arrived shortly thereafter. Mother and daughter could only cry as the
latter related the incident to the former.
Complainant and
her mother subsequently went to the barangay captain of Monserrat who
advised them to report the matter to the police authorities of Sigaboy,
Governor Generoso. After complainant
had narrated the incident to the police, she and her mother proceeded to the
municipal hospital for the physical examination of the former.
Dr. Divina
Lopez,[6] a resident physician of the
Municipal District Hospital of Governor Generoso, issued a medical certificate
detailing the result of her examination of complainant, as follows:
FINDINGS:
1) Positive (+) BLOOD CLOTS BOTH ON LABIA MINORA
2) POSITIVE (+) RUPTURED HYMEN
3) REDNESS AROUND THE VULVAR AREA[7]
Prosecution
witness Genesis Delgado[8] declared that he saw appellant
going inside the house of complainant on June 9, 1994 at around two o’clock in
the afternoon. Apparently, appellant
entered through the kitchen door at the rear portion of the house. Two hours later, appellant went out of the
house through the same kitchen door. Delgado noticed all of these while he was watching television inside
their house located just beside the Gerams’ residence.
Later, at the
rebuttal stage, Enecita[9] dela Cruz Torion,[10] a teacher in Monserrat Elementary
School, also testified that she saw appellant, together with two companions,
sitting at the front porch of the house of the Gerams at about one o’clock in
the afternoon of June 9, 1994. Enecita
was then on her way from the school which was located in front of the house of
the Gerams.
The defense of
appellant is denial and alibi. Aside
from the intrinsic weakness of this shopworn excuse, we are not persuaded to
grant any credence thereto since the facts relied on to make out appellant’s
story obviously appear too pat as to have clearly been contrived. The only persons presented to corroborate
appellant’s story are his own parents, despite the availability of other
persons whose lack of relationship to him would not have engendered suspicion
of connivance.
Appellant,[11] who is also a resident of
Monserrat, asserted before the trial court that he was in Davao City at the
time of the commission of the felony. He allegedly went there on June 6, 1994 with his mother to attend to his
sister-in-law who was confined in the Davao Medical Center due to an incomplete
abortion.[12] After sister-in-law was discharged
from the hospital in the afternoon of June 8, they went to the house of
Christy, his sister who was residing at Sasa, Davao City. He stayed in the house and cleaned it the
whole day of June 9. At 4:30 in the
morning of June 10, he and his mother left Davao City for Monserrat, arriving
at their house between 8:30 and 9:00
A.M.
Aside from
merely repeating the position of appellant, his father, Raul De Guzman,[13] tried to convince the trial court
that he saw complainant in the afternoon of June 9, 1994. According to this witness, Jovelyn went to
their store on that date to borrow a VHS cassette tape featuring “Robo
Vampire.” Appellant’s mother, Violeta
De Guzman,[14] also sought to support his story by
claiming that it was her decision to bring appellant along to Davao City so that he could help minister to
her daughter-in-law.
After
considering the evidence of both the prosecution and the defense, the lower
court gave credence to the testimony of Jovelyn and disregarded the defense of
denial cum alibi presented by appellant.
The trial court
considered the immediate revelation made by Jovelyn of the crime committed
against her, and her steadfast efforts to bring her violator to justice, as
indicative of the veracity of her charge. It rejected the defense put up by appellant in light of the positive
identification made by Jovelyn and the categorical declarations of the other
prosecution witnesses placing him within the vicinity of the locus criminis
at the time of the commission of the crime.
Accordingly,
appellant was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, to
indemnify Jovelyn in the amount of P40,000.00, and to pay the costs.[15]
Appellant now
pleads for the reversal of the judgment of the trial court, contending that
said court erred in giving credence to the testimony of Jovelyn and in finding
him guilty on the basis thereof.[16]
Appellant
adverts to the fact that complainant stated in her complaint[17] and in her testimony[18] given during the preliminary
investigation that he committed the crime of rape through the application of
odorous chemicals over her nose and mouth which caused her to sleep. This fact was not repeated by complainant in
the trial court but she merely claimed the crime was consummated by appellant
through force and intimidation. Such
inconsistency, according to appellant, destroys Jovelyn’s credibility, thus
warranting a reversal of the lower court’s judgment of conviction.
The records
disclose that at the trial, counsel for appellant tried to utilize the
testimony of complainant given in the preliminary investigation before Judge
Rodolfo A. Castro to impeach her through statements therein supposedly
different from what she gave in court.[19] Alluding to her answer to Judge
Castro’s questions numbered 28 and 29,[20] appellant’s counsel asked
complainant if she first reported the rape to one Dioneson Bayno. Complainant duly corrected that statement
and clarified that it was Mauricia and Hugo Bayno whom she first told about the
incident.[21]
However,
complainant was never confronted during the proceedings in the trial court with
her answers allegedly given in the same testimony at the preliminary
investigation regarding appellant’s resort to sleep-inducing chemicals. In fact, no sub-markings for such particular
answers as exhibits were made in the records of her testimony in the
preliminary investigation, much less offered by the counsel of appellant for
that purpose during the trial of the case.
It is
universally accepted that a witness cannot be impeached by evidence of
contradictory or prior inconsistent statements until the proper foundation or
predicate has been duly laid by the party against whom said witness was called.[22] The American rule on laying the
predicate is embodied in Rule 132 of our own Rules of Court, to wit:
SEC. 13. How witness impeached by evidence of inconsistent statements. - Before a witness can be impeached by evidence that he has made at other times statements inconsistent with his present testimony, the statements must be related to him, with the circumstances of the times and places and the persons present, and he must be asked whether he made such statements, and if so, allowed to explain them. If the statements be in writing they must be shown to the witness before any question is put to him concerning them.
Although the
whole record of the testimony of complainant at the preliminary examination was
offered in evidence by the defense and admitted by the trial court,[23] complainant cannot now be
discredited through any of her extrajudicial statements which were not brought
to her attention during the trial. Thus, it has been held that granting arguendo the alleged
contradictions, previous statements cannot serve as bases for impeaching the
credibility of a witness unless his attention was first directed to the
discrepancies and he was then given an opportunity to explain them.[24]
In People vs.
Resabal,[25] this Court explicitly ruled that
the mere presentation of the prior declarations of a witness without the same
having been read to the witness while he was testifying in court is insufficient
for the desired impeachment of his testimony. As explained therein, the apparent contradiction between the
declarations of the witness before the former justice of the peace court and
those before the then court of first instance was insufficient to discredit him
since he was not given ample opportunity, by reading to him his declarations
before the lower court, to explain the supposed discrepancy.
The rule which
requires a sufficient foundation to be first laid before introducing evidence
of inconsistent statements of a witness is founded upon common sense and is
essential to protect the character of a witness. His memory is refreshed by the necessary inquiries, which enables
him to explain the statements referred to, and to show that they were made
under a mistake, or that there was no discrepancy between them and his
testimony.[26]
It would be
unjust to complainant at this stage to be declared an incredible witness as a
result of the unauthorized procedure adopted by appellant. It is evidentiarily proscribed to discredit
a witness on the bases of purportedly prior inconsistent statements which were
not called to the attention of that witness during the trial, although the same
are supposedly contained in a document which was merely offered and admitted in
its entirety without the requisite specifications.
Through such a
somewhat underhanded recourse, a party can expediently offer in evidence at
the trial the whole document containing allegedly variant statements and
then point out much later on appeal the supposed contradictory
statements which were not specified, intentionally or otherwise, in the same
trial. That sub silentio gambit
would necessarily deprive a witness of the chance to explain the seeming
divergencies, which is the paramount consideration of the rule mandating the
laying of the proper predicate.
Complainant is
undoubtedly the person best suited and mandated by the rule to explain the
supposed differences in her statements. Without such explanation before us, whether plausible or not, we are
left with no basis to evaluate and assess her credibility on the rationale that
it is only when no reasonable explanation is given by a witness in reconciling
his conflicting declarations that he should be deemed impeached.[27] As things stand before us and the
court a quo, therefore, complainant’s credibility remains unimpeached.
On the foregoing
considerations, we confirm the validity of the doctrine articulated by the
Court of Appeals in Villaruel vs. Bascon[28] that, unless the proper predicate is laid during the
trial by calling the attention of a witness to his alleged inconsistent
statements given outside of his testimony in court and asking him to explain
the contradiction, the supposed inconsistencies cannot be pointed out on appeal
for the purpose of destroying the credibility of the witness. This pronouncement was actually based upon
and in line with the holdings of this Court in Escosura[29] and People vs. Lim Quingsy.[30]
We now take up
the other document relied upon by appellant, that is, the complaint executed by
complainant. A reading of the
transcript of stenographic notes shows that said complaint was never introduced
in evidence for the consideration of the trial court nor shown to complainant
during the trial so that she could explain the alleged discrepancies in
accordance with the foregoing rule. The
complaint is not even included in the folder of exhibits as part of the
documents admitted in evidence by the trial court. It is only attached to the original record of this case together
with the other records of the preliminary investigation forwarded to the trial
court. Under the revision in the 1985
Rules of Criminal Procedure, those records of the preliminary investigation do
not form part of the record of the case in the Regional Trial Court.[31]
Again, it is
undeniable that the proper basis was not laid for the impeachment of
complainant through the statements contained in her complaint. Coupled with the basic principle that courts
shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered or whose purpose
has not been specified,[32] the complaint cannot also be taken
into account for impeaching complainant. If appellant was really prepared to attack complainant’s credibility
based on the statements in her complaint, he should necessarily have asked
complainant about them during the trial, offered the complaint as his evidence,
and specified the purpose for its submission. Appellant utterly failed in all of these mandatory evidential
requirements.
Hence, no
impeaching evidence having been properly brought before it for its
consideration during trial, the lower court was perfectly justified in
disregarding the supposed inconsistent statements of complainant in her
complaint and her testimony during the preliminary investigation. Her testimony at the trial, therefore,
stands unassailed and entitled to full credit, together with the corroboration
afforded thereto by the testimonies of the other prosecution witnesses, in
stark contrast to the effete and puerile defense offered by appellant.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the court a quo
is hereby AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that the indemnity to
be paid by accused-appellant Winston de Guzman is increased to P50,000.00
in accordance with the present case law thereon.
SO ORDERED.
[1] Presided
over by Judge Ricardo M. Berba.
[2] Original
Record, 1.
[3] Ibid.,
38.
[4] TSN,
February 8, 1995, 2-43.
[5] Ibid.,
January 27, 1995, 3-28.
[6] Ibid.,
November 3, 1994, 5-25.
[7] Exhibit
A, Folder of Exhibits, 1.
[8] TSN, November
3, 1994, 26-59.
[9] Referred
to as Aniceta in the decision of the lower court.
[10] TSN, May
2, 1995, 4-18.
[11] Ibid.,
April 26, 1995, 36-61.
[12] Exhibit
6, Folder of Exhibits, 8.
[13] TSN,
March 20, 1995, 3-22.
[14] Ibid.,
April 26, 1995, 6-34.
[15] Original
Record, 67.
[16]
Appellant’s Brief, 1; Rollo, 51.
[17] Original
Record, 6.
[18] Exhibit
3, Folder of Exhibits, 152-154.
[19] TSN,
April 26, 1995, 62.
[20] Exhibit
3-A, Folder of Exhibits, 154.
[21] TSN,
February 8, 1995, 30-32.
[22] U.S. vs.
Baluyot, 40 Phil. 385 (1919).
[23] TSN, April
26, 1995, 64.
[24] See
People vs. Escosura, 82 Phil. 41 (1948).
[25] 50 Phil.
780 (1927).
[26] Conrad vs.
Griffey, 57 US 38, 14 L Ed 835.
[27] See
People vs. Relucio, et al., L-38790, November 9, 1978, 86 SCRA
227.
[28] CA-G.R. No.
L-24588-R, February 6, 1962, 58 O.G. 41, 6699.
[29] Supra,
fn. 24.
[30] 54 Phil.
88 (1929).
[31] Section
8, Rule 112, Rules of Court.
[32] Section 34, Rule 132, id.; People vs. Peralta, G.R. No. 94570, September 28, 1994, 237 SCRA 218; Republic vs. Sandiganbayan,
et al., G.R. Nos. 112708-09, March 29, 1996, 255 SCRA 438.