350 Phil. 882
ROMERO, J.:
A complaint for
disbarment was filed with this Court on October 25, 1983, by Glorito V. Maturan
against his counsel, Atty. Conrado S. Gonzales, charging him with immoral,
unethical, and anomalous acts. The
respondent filed his comment thereto on February 6, 1984. On November 11, 1997, or after thirteen (13)
years, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
submitted their report and recommendation on the instant case.
The facts, as
culled from the records, are as follows:
Spouses Antonio
and Gloria Casquejo instituted their son-in-law, Glorito V. Maturan (herein
petitioner), as their attorney-in-fact, through a Special Power of Attorney
(SPA) dated November 6, 1981. Said SPA
authorized Maturan to file ejectment cases against squatters occupying Lot
1350-A, Psd-50375, located in General Santos City, as well as criminal cases
against the latter for violation of P.D. 772, again in connection with said
lot. Respondent, Atty. Conrado Gonzales, prepared and notarized said Special
Power of Attorney.
Subsequently,
Glorito Maturan engaged the services of respondent in ejecting several
squatters occupying Lot 1350-A, Psd-50735. While said lot was registered in the name of Celestino Yokingco, Antonio
Casquejo had, however, instituted a case for reconveyance of property and
declaration of nullity against the former, docketed as Civil Case No. 2067.
As a consequence
of his engagement by petitioner, respondent Gonzales filed Civil Case No.
1783-11 for Forcible Entry and Damages against several individuals. On February
18, 1983, a judgment was rendered in favor of petitioner. Petitioner, through respondent, filed a
motion for issuance of a writ of execution on March 10, 1983.
In the interim,
the parties to Civil Case No. 2067 entered into a compromise agreement, which
was judicially approved in a judgment dated March 28, 1983.
On June 22,
1983, while the motion for issuance of a writ of execution was pending, and
without withdrawing as counsel for petitioner, respondent filed, on behalf of
Celestino Yokingco, et al., Civil Case No. 2746, an action to annul the
judgment rendered in Civil Case No. 2067. The action was predicated on the lack of authority on the part of
petitioner to represent Antonio and Gloria Casquejo, as no such authorization
was shown to be on record in Civil Case No. 2067. On August 24, 1983, respondent, on behalf of Celestino Yokingco,
et al., also filed Special Civil Case No. 161 for injunction with a prayer for
preliminary injunction, with damages, against petitioner.
Aggrieved by
respondent’s acceptance of professional employment from their adversary in
Civil Case No. 2067, and alleging that privileged matters relating to the land
in question had been transmitted by petitioner to respondent in Civil Case
1783-11, petitioner filed an administrative complaint against the former for
immoral, unethical, and anomalous acts and asked for his disbarment.
Respondent, in a
comment dated January 25, 1984, denied having committed any malicious,
unethical, unbecoming, immoral, or anomalous act against his client. Respondent
declared that he was of the belief that filing a motion for issuance of a writ
of execution was the last and final act in the lawyer-client relationship
between himself and petitioner, and that his formal withdrawal as counsel for
the Casquejos was unnecessary in order to sever the lawyer-client relationship
between them. Furthermore, he alleged that his acceptance of employment from
Yokingco was for him, an opportunity to honestly earn a little more for his
children’s sustenance.
The
investigating commissioner of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, in his
report dated August 21, 1997, found respondent guilty of representing
conflicting interests and recommended that he be suspended for three (3)
years. The Board of Governors of the
IBP adopted and approved the report and recommendation of the investigating
commissioner but recommended that the suspension be reduced from three (3)
years to one (1) year.
This Court
adopts the findings of the investigating commissioner finding respondent guilty
of representing conflicting interests. It is improper for a lawyer to appear as counsel for one party against
the adverse party who is his client in a related suit, as a lawyer is
prohibited from representing conflicting interests or discharging inconsistent
duties. He may not, without being
guilty of professional misconduct, act as counsel for a person whose interest conflicts with that of his
present or former client.[1] That the representation of
conflicting interest is in good faith and with honest intention on the part of
the lawyer does not make the prohibition inoperative.
The reason for
the prohibition is found in the relation of attorney and client, which is one
of trust and confidence of the highest degree. A lawyer becomes familiar with
all the facts connected with his client’s case. He learns from his client the weak points of the action as well
as the strong ones. Such knowledge must
be considered sacred and guarded with care. No opportunity must be given him to take advantage of the client’s
secrets. A lawyer must have the fullest
confidence of his client. For if the
confidence is abused, the profession will suffer by the loss thereof.[2]
This Court finds
respondent’s actuations violative of Canon 6 of the Canons of Professional
Ethics which provide in part:
“It is
unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by express consent of
all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. Within the meaning of this canon, a lawyer
represents conflicting interests when, in behalf of one client, it is his duty
to contend for that which duty to another client requires him to oppose.”
Moreover, respondent’s justification for his actions
reveal a patent ignorance of the fiduciary obligations which a lawyer owes to
his client. A lawyer-client relationship is not terminated by the filing of a
motion for a writ of execution. His
acceptance of a case implies that he will prosecute the case to its
conclusion. He may not be permitted to
unilaterally terminate the same to the prejudice of his client.
As to the
recommendation that the term of suspension be reduced from three years to one
year, we find the same to be unwarranted. In similar cases decided by the Supreme Court, the penalty of two or
three years suspension has been imposed where respondent was found guilty of
representing conflicting interests. In Vda.
De Alisbo vs. Jalandoon, Sr.,[3] the respondent, who appeared for complainant
in a case for revival of judgment, even though he had been the counsel of the
adverse party in the case sought to be revived, was suspended for a period of
two years. In Bautista vs. Barrios,[4] a suspension of two years was imposed on respondent
Barrios, who had drafted a deed of partition for petitioner, but who appeared
for the other party therein, when the same was sought to be enforced by
petitioner. In PNB vs. Cedo,[5] the Court even suspended the respondent therein for
three years, but only because respondent not only represented conflicting
interests, but also deliberately intended to attract clients with interests
adverse to his former employer. Finally, in Natan vs. Capule,[6] respondent was suspended for two
years after he accepted professional employment in the very case in which his
former client was the adverse party.
ACCORDINGLY,
this Court resolves to MODIFY the IBP recommendation to suspend respondent for
one year and modifies it to SUSPENSION from the practice of law for TWO (2)
YEARS, effective immediately.
SO ORDERED.
[1] AGPALO, LEGAL ETHICS (1992), p. 219, citing Rule
15.03, Code of Professional Responsibility.
[2] U.S. vs. Laranja, 21 Phil. 500 (1912).
[3] 199 SCRA 321 (1991).
[4] 9 SCRA 695 (1963).
[5] 243 SCRA 1 (1995).
[6] 91 Phil. 647 (1952).