352 Phil. 538
KAPUNAN, J.:
Danilo
Manalastas, Ferdinand Meneses and Ernesto Punzalan were among the four (4)
candidates for mayor of the municipality of Mexico, Pampanga during the May 8,
1995 elections.
On May 24, 1995,
the Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBC) proclaimed Ferdinand Meneses as the
duly elected mayor, having garnered a total of 10,301 votes against Danilo
Manalastas’ 9,317 votes and Ernesto
Punzalan’s 8,612 votes.
On May 30, 1995,
Danilo Manalastas filed an election protest docketed as Election Case No.
E-005-95 before the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, challenging
the results of the elections in the municipality’s forty-seven (47) precincts.[1] In due time, Ferdinand Meneses filed
his answer with counter protest impugning the results in twenty-one (21)
precincts[2] of the 47 protested by Manalastas.
On June 2, 1995,
Ernesto Punzalan filed his own election protest docketed as Election Case No.
E-006-95, also before the RTC in San Fernando, Pampanga, questioning the
results of the elections in one hundred and fifty seven (157) precincts.[3] Meneses, on his part, filed an
answer with counter-protest with respect to ninety-six (96) precincts[4] of the 157 protested by Punzalan.
Since the two
(2) election protests involved the same parties and subject matter, they were
ordered consolidated and were jointly
tried by the RTC of San Fernando, Pampanga, Branch 44.
Succinctly,
the election contests sought the
nullification of the election of Meneses allegedly due to massive fraud, irregularities and other illegal
electoral practices during the registration and the voting as well as during the counting of votes such as:
a. the registration of flying voters;
b. the preparation of ballots by persons other than the registered electors concerned;
c. the use of electoral fraudulent practice such as the ‘lansadera;’
d. false reading of votes for the petitioner/protestant;
e. the counting of illegal and marked ballots and stray votes as votes for the respondent/protestee;
f. switching of ballots in favor of respondent/protestee;
g. tampering with the ballots for the petitioner/protestant after having been cast, so as to annul the same or to substitute therefor illegal votes for respondent/protestee;
h. the adding of more votes to those actually counted for the respondent/protestee and the reducing of the votes actually counted for the petitioner/protestant in the preparation of the corresponding election return;
i. groups of two or more ballots for the respondent/protestee were written each group, by only one (1) person;
j. one (1) ballot for the respondent/protestee written by two or more persons.[5]
By way of
counter-protest to the two (2) election protests, Meneses alleged that he, too, was a victim of massive fraud and
illegal electoral practices such as:
a. The preparation of the ballots by persons other than the registered electors concerned;
b. The use of electoral fraudulent practice known as the ‘lansadera;’
c. False reading of votes for the protestee;
d. The counting of illegal and marked ballots and stray votes for the protestant;
e. Switching of ballots in favor of of protestant;
f. Tampering with the ballots for the Protestee after having been cast, so as to annul the same or to substitute therefor illegal votes for the protestant;
g. The adding of more votes to those actually counted for the protestant and the reducing of the votes actually counted for the protestee in the preparation of the corresponding election returns;
h. Group of two (2) or more ballots for protestant were written, each group, by only one (1) person;
i. One (1) ballot for the protestant written by two (2) or more persons.[6]
Finding the
protests and counter-protests sufficient in form and substance, the trial court
ordered a revision of the ballots. The
result of said physical count coincided with the figures reflected in the
election returns, thus: Meneses -
10,301 votes; Manalastas - 9,317 votes;
and Punzalan - 8,612 votes.
After hearing
the election protests, the trial court rendered judgment on September 23, 1996
with the following findings, viz: that massive fraud, illegal electoral practices and serious
anomalies marred the May 8, 1995 elections; that ballots, election returns and
tally sheets pertaining to Precinct Nos. 8, 20, 41, 53, 68, 68-A and 70
“disappeared under mysterious circumstances;” and that filled-up ballots with undetached lower stubs and groups of
ballots with stubs cut out with scissors were found inside ballot boxes. Because of these irregularities, the trial
court was constrained to examine the contested ballots and the handwritings
appearing thereon and came up with the declaration that Punzalan was the winner
in the elections. The dispositive
portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. In EPC No. E-005-95 – declaring Ferdinand D. Meneses as having garnered
7,719 votes or 33 votes more than the 7,686 votes received by Danilo D.
Manalastas and dismissing the instant protest.
2. In EPC No. E-006-95 – declaring Ernesto M. Punzalan as the duly elected
Municipal Mayor of Mexico, Pampanga. Protestee Ferdinand D. Meneses is hereby ordered to vacate his position
and to cease and desist from further discharging the duties and functions
officially vested in the Office of the Municipal Mayor of Mexico, Pampanga
which now and henceforth, unless otherwise disqualified by law, are conferred
unto and in favor of Ernesto M. Punzalan, who is hereby ordered to act, perform
and discharge the duties, functions and responsibilities and all incidents
appertaining to and in connection with the Office of the Municipal Mayor of
Mexico, Pampanga, immediately and after
he shall have taken his oath of office as such.
3. The counterclaims interposed by Ferdinand D. Meneses in both cases are
hereby dismissed.
The authorities concerned are
hereby ordered to enforce, implement and assist in the enforcement and
implementation of this Decision immediately after Ernesto M. Punzalan shall
have had taken his oath of office.
As soon as this Decision becomes
final, let notice thereof be sent to the Commission on Elections, Department of
Interior and Local Governments and Commission on Audit.
Without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.[7]
Immediately thereafter,
Meneses filed a notice of appeal from the aforesaid decision declaring Punzalan
as the duly elected mayor of Mexico,
Pampanga. The case was docketed as EAC
No. 48-96 by the COMELEC. Manalastas
did not appeal from the said decision.
On October 1,
1996, Punzalan filed a motion for execution pending appeal with the RTC in San
Fernando, Pampanga. On the same day,
the COMELEC issued an order directing the RTC to elevate the entire records of
the case.
On October 10, 1996, the RTC issued an order which granted Punzalan’s motion for execution pending
appeal. On the same date, Meneses filed before the COMELEC a petition
for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of temporary
restraining order (TRO) and/or preliminary injunction, docketed as SPR No.
47-96, seeking the nullification of the RTC’s order of execution pending
appeal.
On October 11,
1996, the COMELEC issued a TRO enjoining the RTC from enforcing its Order dated
October 10, 1996.
On October 22,
1996, Meneses filed with the COMELEC a motion for contempt against Punzalan, alleging that the latter was
holding the office of mayor of Mexico, Pampanga in violation of the TRO
issued by the COMELEC.
On October 28,
1996, Punzalan filed before this Court
a petition for certiorari, prohibition and declaratory relief with
application for a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining
order, docketed as G.R. No. 126669, to set aside the COMELEC’s TRO issued on
October 11, 1996.
On November 7,
1996, the COMELEC issued two (2) orders, one which submitted for resolution
Meneses’ application for a writ of preliminary injunction and motion for
contempt and another which granted a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining
the enforcement of the RTC’s order of execution dated October 10, 1996.
On November 12,
1996, this Court issued a TRO directing
the COMELEC to cease and desist from enforcing the TRO it issued on October 11,
1996 in SPR No. 47-96.
On November 21,
1996, Punzalan filed before this Court a supplement to the petition seeking to
declare as void the COMELEC’s preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction and to declare Meneses in contempt of court.
On January 9,
1997, the COMELEC issued an order which dispositively read as follows:
Considering that
the 7 November 1996 preliminary injunction of the Commission was pursuant to
its 11 October 1996 temporary restraining order, which was specifically covered
by the Supreme Court’s temporary
restraining order, the Commission will respect and abide by the order of the Supreme Court. Considering, however, that the temporary
restraining order of the Supreme Court relates only to the implementation of
the order of execution of judgment pending appeal of the Regional Trial Court, the Commission finds no legal impediment
to proceed with the resolution of the main action for certiorari pending
before it and shall act accordingly.
On January 30,
1997, the COMELEC issued an order stating that: 1) it need not act on Meneses’ motion reiterating the prayer to
suspend pendente lite the implementation of the Order dated January 9,
1997, and 2) the Order dated January 9, 1997 shall take effect thirty (30) days
from notice thereof to the parties.
On February 10,
1997, Meneses filed with this Court a petition for certiorari with
prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction, docketed as G.R. No. 127900, which sought to set aside
the COMELEC Orders dated January 9 and 30, 1997.
On April 24,
1997, the COMELEC issued a resolution granting the petition of Meneses to set aside the RTC’s order of
execution pending appeal and allowing Meneses to continue to discharge the duties and functions of municipal
mayor of Mexico, Pampanga, without prejudice to the resolution of his pending
appeal from the RTC’s decision.
On April 28,
1997, Punzalan filed with this Court a petition for certiorari,
docketed as G.R. No. 128000, which sought to nullify the COMELEC’s Resolution
dated April 24, 1997.
On December 8,
1997, the COMELEC promulgated a resolution in EAC No. 48-96 setting aside the
trial court’s decision and affirming the proclamation of Meneses by the MBC as the duly elected mayor
of Mexico, Pampanga, thusly:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision
of the court a quo in Election Protest Case No. E-006-95 declaring protestant-appellee Ernesto M.
Punzalan as the duly elected Mayor of the Municipality of Mexico, Pampanga in
the May 8, 1995 local elections is hereby ANNULLED and SET-ASIDE.
ACCORDINGLY, the
Commission [First Division] hereby AFFIRMS the proclamation of
protestee-appellant Ferdinand D. Meneses by the Municipal Board of Canvassers
as the duly elected Mayor of Mexico, Pampanga but with the modification that
protestee-appellant received only 9,864 votes, or a deduction of 437 votes from
his original 10,301 votes. Further,
this Commission [First Division] hereby COMMANDS protestant-appellee Ernesto M.
Punzalan to RELINQUISH his post in favor of protestee-appellant Ferdinand
Meneses immediately upon finality of this Resolution.[8]
Punzalan filed a motion for reconsideration
of the aforesaid resolution. In its
Resolution dated February 13, 1998, the COMELEC denied said motion for lack of
merit.
Hence, this
petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction and a prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order, filed on February 16, 1998 and
docketed as G.R. No. 132435, to set
aside the COMELEC’s resolutions of December 8, 1997 and February 13, 1998. Thus, petitioner alleges:
1. that the decision (resolution) in question is tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction;
2. that it was rendered in disregard of law and the evidence;
3. that the decision (resolution) in question is a ‘prejudged decision;’ and
4. that the decision (resolution) in question is the culmination of a series of acts of the public respondent favoring the private respondent.[9]
First. Punzalan maintains that the COMELEC acted
with grave abuse of discretion in
declaring as valid the ballots credited to Meneses which did not bear the
signature of the BEI chairman at the back thereof, invoking the ruling of this
Court in Bautista v. Castro[10] wherein it was held that the absence of the signature
of the BEI chairman in the ballot given to a voter as required by law and the
rules as proof of the authenticity of said ballot is fatal.
This contention
is not meritorious.
While Section 24[11] of Republic Act No. 7166, otherwise
known as “An Act Providing For Synchronized National and Local Elections and
For Electoral Reforms,” requires the BEI chairman to affix his signature at the
back of the ballot, the mere failure to do so does not invalidate the same
although it may constitute an election offense imputable to said BEI
chairman. Nowhere in said provision
does it state that the votes contained therein shall be nullified. It is a well-settled rule that the failure
of the BEI chairman or any of the
members of the board to comply with their mandated administrative
responsibility, i.e., signing, authenticating and thumbmarking of ballots,
should not penalize the voter with disenfranchisement, thereby frustrating the
will of the people.[12]
In the recent
case of Marcelino C. Libanan v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
and Jose T. Ramirez,[13] this Court affirmed the ruling of
the Tribunal in Libanan v. Ramirez[14] to the effect that a ballot without BEI chairman’s
signature at the back is valid and not spurious, provided that it bears any one
of these other authenticating marks, to wit: (a) the COMELEC watermark; and (b) in those cases where the COMELEC
watermarks are blurred or not readily apparent, the presence of red and blue
fibers in the ballots. The Court
explained in this wise:
What should, instead, be given weight is the consistent rule laid down by the HRET that a ballot is considered valid and genuine for as long as it bears any one of these authenticating marks, to wit: (a) the COMELEC watermark, or (b) the signature or initials, or thumbprint of the Chairman of the BEI; and (c) in those cases where the COMELEC watermarks are blurred or not readily apparent to the naked eye, the presence of red or blue fibers in the ballots. It is only when none of these marks appears extant that the ballot can be considered spurious and subject to rejection.
Similarly,
Section 211 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the “Omnibus
Election Code of the Philippines” provides that in the reading and appreciation
of ballots, every ballot shall be presumed to be valid unless there is a clear
and good reason to justify its rejection. Certainly, the inefficiency of an election
officer in failing to affix his signature at the back of the ballot does not
constitute as a good and clear reason to justify the rejection of a ballot.
Second. Punzalan
contends that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in declaring
valid (a) the ballots wherein the signatures of the BEI chairmen were different
from their respective signatures appearing on several COMELEC documents, (b)
those group of ballots allegedly written by one (1) hand and (c) a number of single ballots written by
two (2) persons. He argues that the
trial court’s findings on the authenticity of said handwritings must prevail
over the findings of the COMELEC because: 1) the finding of the Regional
Trial Court was based first on the findings of the revisors with the assistance
of an expert witness in the person of Atty. Desiderio Pagui; (2) the finding of the Regional Trial Court was arrived at after an
adversarial proceeding where both parties were represented by their lawyers and
the expert witness was cross-examined; and (3) on the other hand, the
findings of the public respondent were
made unilaterally, without any hearing.
and without the presence of the lawyers
of the parties and of the parties themselves.[15]
These arguments
fail to persuade us.
The appreciation
of the contested ballots and election
documents involves a question of fact best left to the determination of the
COMELEC, a specialized agency tasked with the supervision of elections all over
the country. It is the constitutional
commission vested with the exclusive original jurisdiction over election
contests involving regional, provincial and city officials, as well as
appellate jurisdiction over election protests involving elective municipal and
barangay officials. Consequently, in
the absence of grave abuse of discretion or any jurisdictional infirmity or
error of law, the factual findings, conclusions, rulings and decisions rendered
by the said Commission on matters falling within its competence shall not be
interfered with by this Court.[16]
Anent Punzalan’s
assertion that the trial court’s finding which was arrived at after an
adversarial proceeding wherein an expert witness testified and was
cross-examined, should not be interfered with by the COMELEC whose finding was
arrived at without the benefit of a hearing or the aid of an expert, it is axiomatic that the COMELEC need not conduct
an adversarial proceeding or a hearing to determine the authenticity of ballots
or the handwriting found thereon. Neither does it need to solicit the help of handwriting experts in
examining or comparing the handwriting.[17] In fact, even evidence aliunde
is not necessary to enable the Commission to determine the authenticity of the
ballots and the genuineness of the handwriting on the ballots as an examination
of the ballots themselves is already sufficient.[18]
In Erni v. COMELEC,[19] we held that:
x x x. With respect to the contention that a technical examination of the ballots should have been ordered to determine whether they had been written by two or more persons, or in groups written by only one hand, we hold that the Commission en banc did not commit an abuse of its discretion in denying petitioner-protestee’s request. The rule is settled that the Commission itself can make the determination without the need of calling handwriting experts.
Nor was evidence aliunde necessary to enable the Commission to determine the genuineness of the handwriting on the ballots, an examination of the ballots themselves being sufficient. x x. x..[20]
In Bocobo v. COMELEC,[21] we likewise ruled that:
x x x. Handwriting experts, while probably useful, are not indispensable in examining or comparing handwriting; this can be done by the COMELEC itself. We have ruled that evidence aliunde is not allowed to prove that a ballot is marked, an inspection of the ballot itself being sufficient (Penson v. Parungao, 52 Phil. 718). x x x.[22]
In the case at
bar, the opinion of Atty. Pagui, who was claimed to be a handwriting expert,
was not binding upon the COMELEC especially so where the question involved the mere similarity or dissimilarity of
handwritings which could be determined by a comparison of existing signatures
or handwriting.[23] Section 22 of Rule 132 of the
Revised Rules on Evidence explicitly authorizes the court, by itself, to make a comparison of the
disputed handwriting “with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party
against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction
of the judge.”
In Lorenzo v.
Diaz,[24] this Court enumerated the tools to
aid one in the examination of handwriting, thus:
The authenticity of a questioned signature cannot be
determined solely upon its general characteristics, similarities or dissimilarities
with the genuine signature. Dissimilarities as regards spontaneity, rhythm , presence of the pen,
loops in the strokes, signs of stops, shades, etc., that may be found between
the questioned signature and the genuine one are not decisive on the question
of the former’s authenticity. The
result of examination of questioned handwriting, even with the benefit of aid
of experts and scientific instruments, is, at best, inconclusive. There are other factors that must be taken
into consideration. The position of
the writer, the condition of the surface on which the paper where the
questioned signature is written is placed, his state of mind, feelings and
nerves, and the kind of pen and/or paper used, played an important role on the
general appearance of the signature. Unless, therefore, there is, in a given case, absolute absence, or
manifest dearth, or direct or circumstantial competent evidence of the character of a questioned handwriting, much
weight should not be given to characteristic similarities, or dissimilarities,
between the questioned handwriting and an authentic one.[25]
Indeed, the
haste and pressure, the rush and excitement permeating the surroundings of polling places could certainly affect the
handwriting of both the voters and the election officers manning the said
precincts. The volume of work to be
done and the numerous documents to be filled up and signed must likewise be
considered. Verily, minor and
insignificant variations in handwriting must be perceived as indicia of
genuineness rather than of falsity.
In Go Fay v.
Bank of the Philippine Islands,[26] this Court held that carelessness,
spontaneity, unpremeditation, and speed in signing are evidence of
genuineness. In U.S. v. Kosel,[27] it was ruled that dissimilarity in certain letters in
a handwriting may be attributed to the mental and physical condition of the
signer and his position when he signed. Grief, anger, vexation, stimulant, pressure and weather have some
influence in one’s writing. Because of
these, it is an accepted fact that it is very rare that two (2) specimens of a person’s signature are exactly
alike.
On the issue of
the genuineness of the handwriting on the ballots, it is observed that the
specimens examined by Atty. Desiderio A. Pagui, presented by Punzalan as an
expert witness, were mere certified true copies of the ballots and documents
concerned.[28] This fact raised a cloud of doubt
and made the findings suspect. Consequently, the examination of the ballots themselves by the COMELEC
should not be brushed aside. Section
23, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court explicitly authorizes the court (the COMELEC
in this case) to make itself the comparison of the disputed handwriting “with
writings admitted as genuine by the party whom the evidence is offered.”
Expert opinions
are not ordinarily conclusive in the sense that they must be accepted as true
on the subject of their testimony, but are generally regarded as purely
advisory in character; the courts may place whatever weight they choose upon
such testimony and may reject it, if they find that it is consistent with the
facts in the case or otherwise unreasonable.[29]
In the same
manner, whether or not certain ballots were marked had been addressed by the
COMELEC by personally and actually examining the ballots themselves. We find no compelling reasons to disturb its
findings.
In closing, we
would like to stress a well-founded rule ensconced in our jurisprudence that laws and statutes
governing election contests especially appreciation of ballots must be liberally
construed to the end that the will of the electorate in the choice of public
officials may not be defeated by technical infirmities.[30] An election protest is imbued with
public interest so much so that the need to dispel uncertainties which becloud
the real choice of the people is imperative.
Prescinding from
the foregoing, we find that respondent COMELEC did not act with grave abuse of
discretion in G.R. No. 132435. The
petitions in G.R. Nos. 126669, 127900 and 128800 are rendered moot by the preceding
disquisition.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition
in G.R. No. 132435 is hereby DISMISSED. The status quo order issued by this Court on February 24, 1998 is LIFTED. The petitions in G.R. Nos. 126669, 127900
and 128800 are rendered moot and academic by the foregoing disquisition.
Further, this
decision is immediately executory in view of the shortness of time between now
and the next elections and to prevent the case from becoming moot and academic.
SO ORDERED.
[1] Precinct Nos. 8; 8-A; 9; 9-A; 10; 14; 14-A; 15; 15-A;
15-A-1; 15-B; 16; 16-A; 17; 17-A; 19; 27; 27-A; 27-A-1; 27-B; 28; 28-A; 29; 29-A;
30; 30-A; 30-A-1; 30-B; 33; 33-A; 40; 41; 41-A; 50; 50-A; 51; 51-A; 52; 52-A;
53; 53-A; 53-A-1; 53-B; 67; 67-A; 80 and 81.
[2] Precincts Nos. 21-A; 20; 6-A; 21-A-1; 28-A; 20-A,
45-B, 77-A-1; 75; 75-A;32; 69; 68; 68-A; 79-B; 76-A; 13; 78-A-1; 77; 77-A and
47-A.
[3] Precinct Nos. 1; 1-A; 2; 2-A; 3; 3-A; 4; 4-A; 5; 5-A;
8; 8-A; 9; 9-A; 10; 12; 12-A; 13-A; 14:
14-A; 15: 15-A; 15-A-1; 15-B; 16; 16-A; 17; 17-A; 19; 20; 20-A; 20-B; 21-A;
21-A-1; 22-A; 23; 23-A; 24: 24-A; 25; 25-A; 26; 27; 27-A; 27-A-1; 27-B; 28;
28-A; 29; 29-A; 30; 30-A; 30-A-1; 30-B; 31; 31-A; 32; 32-A; 33; 33-A; 34; 34-A;
34-A-1; 34-B; 38; 39; 39-A; 40; 41; 41-A; 42; 42-A; 44; 44-A; 44-A-1; 45-A;
45-A-1; 45-B; 46; 47; 47-A; 47-A-1; 48; 48-A; 48-A-1; 48-B; 49; 49-A; 50; 50-A;
51; 51-A; 52; 52-A; 53; 53-A; 53-A-1; 53-B; 54;54-A; 54-A-1; 55; 55-A; 55-A-1;
55-B; 56; 56-A; 57; 58; 58-A; 58-A-1; 58-B; 59; 59-A; 60; 60-A; 61; 61-A; 62;
62-A; 65; 65-A; 65-A-1; 65-B; 67; 67-A; 68; 68-A; 68-B; 69; 69-A; 70; 70-A; 71;
71-A; 72; 72-A; 73; 73-A; 74; 74-A;75; 75-A; 76; 76-A; 77; 77-A; 77-A-1; 77-B;
78; 78-A-1; 79-A; 79-A-1; 80; 81 and 81-A.
[4] Precinct Nos. 25; 24-A; 60-A; 1; 55-B; 48-A-1; 55-A-1; 55-A; 46; 79; 78-A; 41; 44-B;
59-A; 55-A; 39; 58-B; 21; 26; 68; 48-B; 45; 58-A; 72; 73-A; 79-A; 77; 47; 77-A;
47-A; 47-A-1; 77-A-1; 28; 45-B; 20-A; 21-A; 20; 43-A; 44-A-1; 43; 45-A; 20-A-1; 77-B; 36-A; 37; 49-A; 36; 37-A;
26; 38-A; 23; 65-A; 27-A-1; 64-A; 34-A-1; 65; 64; 23; 18; 74; 22-A; 4; 23-A;
63; 27; 48-A; 27-A; 48; 49; 58; 58-A; 20-B; 35-A; 35; 11; 26-A-1; 28-A; 6-A;
79-B; 2-A; 5; 3; 68; 72-A; 74-A; 41-A; 78; 3-A; 79-A-1; 78-B; 67-A; 76; 4-A;
13; 78-A-1; and 11-A.
[5] Rollo of
G.R. No. 132435, pp. 27-28.
[6] Id., at
29.
[7] Id. at 67-68. The table of votes for each candidate therefore translates into:
RTC’s Ground for invalidation PUNZALAN MENESES MANALASTAS
1.) Lacks signature of BEI Chairman 9 173 113
2.) Signature of BEI Chairman appearing
at the
back of the ballot in different
from
those appearing on COMELEC
Forms
Nos. 13 and 14. 515 1,361 764
3.) Group of ballots written by one hand;
one
ballot written by two persons 7 934 640
4.) Marked ballots
68 135 121
599 2,603 1,639
Votes on
proclamation 8,612 10,301 9,317
- 599
- 2,603 -1,638
RTC
validated votes 8,013 7,698 7,679
+ 9 + 21 + 7
TOTAL 8,022 7,719 7,886
[8] Id., at 181-182. The summary of votes from COMELEC show:
COMELEC VALIDATED VOTES
RTC’s Grounds for invalidation
MENESES PUNZALAN
________________________________________________________________________
1. Lacks signature of BEI Chairman 173 9
2. Signature of BEI Chairman appearing
at the back of the ballot is different
from those appearing on COMELEC
Form Nos. 13 and 14. 1,361 515
3. Group of ballots written by one
hand; one ballot written by two persons 546 0
4. Marked ballots 69 51
2,149 575
Marked ballots found by COMELEC - 4 - 10
2,145 565
RTC results 7,719 8,022
TOTAL 9,864 8,587
[9] Id., at 11.
[10] 206 SCRA 305 [1992].
[11] Sec. 24. Signature
at the Back of Every Ballot. – In every case before delivering an official ballot
to the voter, the chairman of the board of election inspectors shall, in the
presence of the voter, affix his signature at the back thereof. Failure to authenticate shall be noted in
the minutes of the board of election inspectors and shall constitute an
election offense punishable under Sections 263 and 264 of the Omnibus Election
Code.
[12] Fernandez v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 91351, April 3,
1990.
[13] G.R. No. 129783, December 22, 1997.
[14] HRET Case No. 95-020.
[15] Rollo
of G.R. No. 132435, p. 14.
[16] Mastura v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 124521, January
16, 1998; Bulaong v. COMELEC, 241 SCRA 180 [1995]; Navarro v.
COMELEC, 228 SCRA 596 [1993]; Lozano v. Yorac, 203 SCRA 256 [1991];
Pimping v. COMELEC, 140 SCRA 192 [1985].
[17] Erni v. COMELEC, 243 SCRA 706 [1995]; Bulaong v.
COMELEC, supra; Bocobo v.
COMELEC, 191 SCRA 576 [1990].
[18] Erni v. COMELEC, supra.
[19] Ibid.
[20] Id., at
712.
[21] Supra.
[22] Id., at
580.
[23] People v. Agamata, [CA], 64 O.G. 2735,
cited in II Regalado, Remedial Law, 1989, p. 506.
[24] 53 O.G. 4110-4111, cited in Francisco on Evidence,
Vol. VII, Part 1, 1997 Edition, p. 674.
[25] Ibid.
[26] 46 Phil. 968 (1924).
[27] 24 Phil. 594 (1913).
[28] Exhibit “D,” p. 1, Folder of Exhibits of Punzalan, p. 183.
[29] Francisco on Evidence, Vol. VII, Part 1, p. 662.
[30] Bince, Jr. v. COMELEC, 242 SCRA 273 (1995)
; Benito v. COMELEC, 235 SCRA
436 (1994); Pahilan vs. Tabalba,
230 SCRA 205 (1994); Aruelo, Jr. v.
Court of Appeals, 227 SCRA 311 (1993); Tatlonghari v. COMELEC, 199 SCRA 849 (1991) ; Unda v. COMELEC, 190 SCRA 827
(1990); De Leon v. Guadiz, Jr.,
104 SCRA 591 (1981).