516 Phil. 228
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
WHEREFORE, for the foregoing, the Court renders judgment dismissing the plaintiffs' complaint and declaring the defendants the absolute owners and entitled to the possession of the disputed land. The preliminary injunction which was granted by this Court through Judge Lorenzo Carlitos is ordered dissolved, with costs against the plaintiffs.The decision became final and executory. On September 3, 1955, the trial court ordered the sheriff to place Eusebio in possession of the property.[5] The sheriff complied with the order on December 19, 1958.[6]SO ORDERED.[4]
a) Ordering [the] immediate execution of judgment in Civil Case No. 111, against defendants Segundo Gaviola and Alfonso Gaviola;In their answer to the complaint, the defendants averred that the property in which their houses were located is different from that which was adjudicated by the court in Civil Case No. 111 to Eusebio Mejarito.
b) Ordering all defendants evicted from any portion of the land they presently occupy as residential;
c) Ordering all defendants to pay rent in favor of the plaintiff with legal interests imposed reckoned from June 1984 until full payment of what is due and/or until their complete and absolute eviction from their respective residences which rent liabilities when computed annually for each of them is in the sum of PESOS: THREE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED (P3,600.00), Philippine Currency;
d) Ordering defendants to pay plaintiff jointly and severally the sum of PESOS: THIRTY THOUSAND (P30,000.00), Philippine Currency, representing moral damages;
e) Ordering defendants to pay plaintiff jointly and severally the sum of PESOS: TWENTY-FIVE THOUSAND (P25,000.00), Philippine Currency, representing attorney's fee and litigation expenses.
Plaintiff prays for such relief and other remedies as may be just and equitable in the premises.[7]
That on or about the 6th day of September 1997, at around 9 o'clock in the morning at Brgy. Calbani, Municipality of Maripipi, Province of Biliran, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating with one another, and with intent to gain, did then and there unlawfully, feloniously, deliberately took, harvested and gathered one thousand five hundred (1,500) coconut fruits from the plantation of Cleto Mejarito without the consent and authority of the latter, to the damage and prejudice of the owner amounting to P3,000.00.Alfonso admitted that the coconuts were taken upon his instructions, but insisted that the trees from which they were taken were planted on Lot 1311, the property he had inherited from his father, Elias Gaviola; the property of private complainant Cleto Mejarito, Lot 1301, was adjacent to his lot. Alfonso testified that the property was placed in his possession by the sheriff since August 5, 1993, and that since then he had been gathering coconuts every three months without being confronted or prosecuted by anybody.[17] He insisted that his claim was based on the decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. B-0600, which was affirmed by the CA.[18]Contrary to Law.[16]
WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused Alfonso Gaviola y Dimakiling guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified theft; hereby imposing upon him the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from Five (5) Years, Five (5) Months and Ten (10) days of prision correccional, maximum period, as the minimum, to Eight (8) Years and One (1) day of prision mayor, minimum, as the maximum.The trial court ruled that the accused took the coconuts from the coconut trees planted on Cadastral Lot 1301 which was owned by Cleto Mejarito, and not on his own property, Lot 1311, as he claimed.
The accused shall pay the private complainant Cleto Mejarito, through his duly authorized representative, exemplary damages in the amount of P20,000.00 and liquidated damages in the amount of P3,000.00.SO ORDERED.[19]
Art. 308. Who are liable for theft.– Theft is committed by any person who, with intent to gain but without violence, against or intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take personal property of another without the latter's consent.Thus, the elements of theft are: (1) that there be taking of personal property; (2) that said property belongs to another; (3) that the taking be done with intent to gain; (4) that the taking be done without the consent of the owner; and (5) that the taking be accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things.[21]Theft is likewise committed by:
- Any person who, having found lost property, shall fail to deliver the same to the local authorities or to its owner;
- Any person who, after having maliciously damaged the property of another, shall remove or make use of the fruits or objects of the damage caused by him; and
- Any person who shall enter an enclosed estate or a field where trespass is forbidden or which belongs to another and without the consent of its owner, shall hunt or fish upon the same or shall gather fruits, cereals, or other forest or farm products.[20]
According to Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, theft is qualified if coconuts are taken from the premises of a plantation:
- Los que con ánimo de lucrarse, y sin violencia o intimidación en las personas ni fuerza en las cosas, toman las cosas muebles ajenas sin la voluntad, de su dueño.
- Los que encontrándose una cosa perdida y sabiendo quién es su dueño se la apropiaren con intencion de lucro.
- Los dañadores que sustrajeren o utilizaren los frutos u objeto del daño causado, salvo los casos previstos en los articulos 606, num. 1., 2. y 3; 608, num. 1; 610, num. 1.; 611;613; segundo párrafo del 617 y 618. (Art. 437 del Cod. Penal de 1850. – Art. 379, Cdo. Franc. – Art. 331, Codigo Brasil. – Art. 151, Cod. Austr. – Arts. 461 y 508, Cod. Belg. – Art. 242, Cod. Alem. – Arts. 422 y 423, Cod. Port. – Art. 402, Cod. Ital.)[22]
Art. 310. Qualified theft. – The crime of theft shall be punished by the penalties next higher by two degrees than those respectively specified in the next preceding article, if committed by a domestic servant, or with grave abuse of confidence, or if the property stolen is motor vehicle, mail matter or large cattle or consists of coconuts taken from the premises of a plantation, fish taken from a fishpond or fishery or if property is taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any other calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance.For one to be guilty of theft, the accused must have an intent to steal (animus furandi) personal property, meaning the intent to deprive another of his ownership/lawful possession of personal property which intent is apart from, but concurrent with the general criminal intent which is an essential element of a felony of dolo (dolos malus). The animo being a state of the mind may be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence, inclusive of the manner and conduct of the accused before, during and after the taking of the personal property. General criminal intent is presumed or inferred from the very fact that the wrongful act is done since one is presumed to have willed the natural consequences of his own acts. Likewise, animus furandi is presumed from the taking of personal property without the consent of the owner or lawful possessor thereof. The same may be rebutted by the accused by evidence that he took the personal property under a bona fide belief that he owns the property.[23]
xxx "In all cases where one in good faith takes another's property under claim of title in himself, he is exempt from the charge of larceny, however puerile or mistaken the claim may in fact be. And the same is true where the taking is on behalf of another, believed to be the true owner. Still, if the claim is dishonest, a mere pretense, it will not protect the taker."In Charles v. State,[26] the State Supreme Court of Florida ruled that the belief of the accused of his ownership over the property must be honest and in good faith and not a mere sham or pretense.
The gist of the offense is the intent to deprive another of his property in a chattel, either for gain or out of wantonness or malice to deprive another of his right in the thing taken. This cannot be where the taker honestly believes the property is his own or that of another, and that he has a right to take possession of it for himself or for another, for the protection of the latter.[25]
The accused have put up a defense of ownership although from the records of Civil Case No. B-0600, Alfonso Gaviola, et al., thru their counsel admitted that from the evidence of Cleto Mejarito especially Exh. "E," Writ of Execution, it appears that the decision was already executed on December 22, 1958.The findings of the RTC were affirmed by the appellate court. The well-entrenched rule is that the findings of facts of the trial court, affirmed by the appellate court, are conclusive on this Court, absent any evidence that the trial court and the appellate court ignored, misconstrued, or misinterpreted cogent facts and circumstances of substance which, if considered, would warrant a modification or reversal of the outcome of the case. We have reviewed the records and find no justification to modify, much less reverse, the findings of the trial and appellate courts.
Further admitted that:
"The southern boundary of the land of Elias Gaviola (Alfonso) is stated as Melecio Gaviola. Actually the land of Melecio Gaviola is now owned by plaintiff (Cleto Mejarito), the land having been adjudicated to his predecessor-in-interest Eusebio Mejarito by virtue of Civil Case No. 111 (Exh. "A") (See also Exh. "6," Tax Declaration No. 3437, reverse side).
Alfonso Gaviola could not have made a mistake to extricate themselves from the ejectment, Cleto Mejarito wanted to pursue in Civil Case No. B-0600.
They submitted a well entrenched analyses as they concluded further; to quote:
"Finally, that these three parcels of lands are separate and distinct from each other is confirmed by the cadastral survey were the lands of plaintiff (Cleto Mejarito), of Elias Gaviola (Alfonso) and of Segunda Gaviola, are denominated as Cadastral Lot Nos. 1301, 1311 and 1303, respectively. Not only that, their definite locations and boundaries are even delineated in the sketch prepared by the court-appointed commissioner, which sketch is now marked as Exhibits "H" and series' (Memorandum of defendants Gaviolas dated April 13, 1989, in Civil Case No. B-0600).
The general rule is that a judicial admission is conclusive upon the party making it and does not require proof; except when it is shown that the admission was made through palpable mistake and (2) when shown that no such admission was in fact made. (Atillo III vs. C.A. 266 SCRA 596).[27]
From the above enumeration or statement of boundaries, it is clear that these three parcels of land are distinct and separate from each other, as the following observations can be made:We further note that petitioner failed to adduce evidence to corroborate his claim that, prior to September 6, 1997, he had gathered coconuts from the coconut trees on the private complainant's property three times a year, and that the latter or his caretaker was aware thereof but failed to remonstrate.So it is now clear that the land of plaintiff is west of the land of Hermenegildo Gaviola (now Segundo Gaviola), and that they are two distinct and separate lands.
- land of plaintiff and Elias (Alfonso) Gaviola:
- Both have the same northern boundary: Isabela Mejarito. But the same can be explained by the fact that sometime in 1934 Isabela Mejarito, through Pastor Armoela, sold the land now owned by Elias (Alfonso) Gaviola to him. See Ex. "15." In fact, the first time that the land bought by Elias Gaviola was declared in his name was in 1935 in Tax Dec. No. 2839 (Exh. "14") which cancelled in part Tax Dec. No. 1942 (Exh. "16") in the name of Isabela Mejarito.
What caused the confusion (identical northern boundary of the lands of plaintiff and Elias Gaviola) was that the northern boundary (Isabela Mejarito) of the land of plaintiff was not adjusted accordingly despite the sale. It should have been changed to Elias Gaviola to reflect the sale.- The southern boundary of the land of Elias Gaviola (Alfonso) is stated as Melecio Gaviola. Actually the land of Melecio Gaviola is now owned by plaintiff the land having been adjudicated to his predecessor-in-interest Eusebio Mejarito by virtue of Civil Case No. 111 (Exhibit "A") (See also Exh. "6," Tax Dec. No. 3437, reverse side)
- land of plaintiff and Hermenegildo (Segundo) Gaviola:
- The eastern boundary of the land of plaintiff is stated as "Hermenegildo Gaviola," father and predecessor-in-interest of defendant Segundo Gaviola;
- The western boundary of the land of Hermenegildo Gaviola (Exh. "31-A") was previously declared as Melecio Gaviola. But after the case (Civil Case No. 111, Exh. "A"), it was changed to "Eusebio Mejarito," predecessor-in-interest of plaintiff by virtue of said case. (Exh. "31-A" and "30-A."
Indeed, that the lands of plaintiff, of Elias Gaviola (father of defendant Alfonso), and of defendant Segundo Gaviola (now, but Hermenegildo Gaviola before) are separate and distinct from each other is shown by the fact that they have been covered by different sets of tax declarations since as early as 1906. It should be noted that the tax declarations that cover each land do not merge with, overlap, or cancel, each other. There appear apparent minor discrepancies but they can easily be explained by two events: the sale of a portion of the land of Isabela Mejarito to Elias Gaviola and the decision in Civil Case No. 111. If these two events are considered, these apparent discrepancies vanish into thin air.
Finally, that these three parcels of lands are separate and distinct from each other is confirmed by the cadastral survey where the lands of plaintiff, of Elias Gaviola and of Segundo Gaviola, are denominated as Cadastral Lot Nos. 1301, 1311 and 1303, respectively. Not only that, their definite locations and boundaries are even delineated in the sketch prepared by the court-appointed commissioner, which sketch is now marked as Exhs. "H" and series, of plaintiff. Also, the report to which the sketch is attached even states that the house of defendant Alfonso Gaviola is located on the land of Elias Gaviola; and while said report enumerates the houses located on the land of plaintiff, neither the house of defendant Alfonso Gaviola nor of defendant Segundo Gaviola nor of the other defendants are among those mentioned therein.[28]
Moreover, petitioner's land is residential, while that of the private complainant is coconut land. There are no coconut trees in the lot owned by petitioner, nor is there evidence that he planted coconut trees on private complainant's property at any time, believing that it was his own land. Petitioner could thus not have mistaken the property of the private complainant for that of his own.
The attorney for the appellant in this court attempts to show that the defendant could not be guilty of larceny, even though it be admitted that he took and carried away the paddy in question, for the reason that he claimed to be the owner of the land. That question had been decided against him by a court of competent jurisdiction and he made no objection to said decision. After that decision he could no longer claim that he was the owner of the land from which he took and carried away the paddy, and moreover, it was shown during the trial of the cause that Domingo Corpus, by his laborers, had actually planted the paddy upon the land in question. It is difficult to understand upon what theory the defendant could justify his claim that he was the owner of the paddy, after a final decision had been rendered against him to the contrary, and when it was clearly proven that he had not even planted it. The paddy had been planted by Domingo Corpus upon land which a court of competent jurisdiction decided belonged to him and had been harvested by him and piled upon the land at the time the defendant entered the land and took and carried it away. The defendant neither planted the paddy nor reaped it. The court decided, before he took and carried away the paddy, that the land belonged to Domingo Corpus. The defendant must have known that the paddy did not belong to him. In view of the litigation, he must have known to whom it did belong.[30]In fine, we find and so hold that the petitioner's claim of good faith in taking the coconuts from the private complainant's land is a mere pretense to escape criminal liability.
"Eusebio Mejarito," predecessor-in-interest of plaintiff by virtue of said case. ( Exh. "31- A" and "30-A.")
So it is now clear that the land of plaintiff is west of the land of Hermenegildo Gaviola (now Segundo Gaviola), and that they are two distinct and separate lands.
Indeed, that the lands of plaintiff, of Elias Gaviola (father of defendant Alfonso), and of defendant Segundo Gaviola (now, but Hermenegildo Gaviola before) are separate and distinct from each other is shown by the fact that they have been covered by different sets of tax declarations since as early as 1906. It should be noted that the tax declarations that cover each landdo not merge with, overlap, or cancel, each other. There appear apparent minor discrepancies but they can easily be explained by two events: the sale of a portion of the land of Isabela Mejarito Elias Gaviola and the decision in Civil Case No. 111. If these two events are considered, these apparent discrepancies vanish into thin air.Moreover, petitioner's land is residential, while that of the private complaint is coconut land. There are no coconut trees in the lot owned by petitioner, nor is there evidence that he planted coconut trees on private complaint's property at any time, believing that it was his own land. Petitioner could thus not have mistaken the property of the private complainant for that of his own.
Finally, that these three parcels of lands are separate and distinct from each other is confirmed by the cadastral survey where the lands of plaintiff, of Elias Gaviola and of Segundo Gaviola, are denominated as Cadasral Lot Nos. 1301, 1311 and 1303, respectively. Not only that, their definite locations and boundaries are even delineated in the sketch prepared by the court-appointed commissioner, which sketch is now marked as Exhs. "H" and series, of plaintiff. Also, the report to which the sketch is attached even states that the house of defendant Alfonso Gaviola is located on the land of Elias Gaviola; and while said report enumerates the houses located on the land of plaintiff, neither the house of defendant Alfonso Gaviola nor of defendant Segundo Gaviola nor of the defendants are among those mentioned therein.[28]