484 Phil. 899
This is
a petition for certiorari for the nullification of the February 4, 2002
Resolution of the Sandiganbayan (Division of Five Members)
[1] setting aside the
verbal Order of Justice Narciso S. Nario, the Chairman of its Fourth
Division, ordering the dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. 25911-25915;
25917-25939; 25983-26016; and its December 12, 2003 Resolution denying
the motions for reconsideration of the petitioners and the other
accused in said cases,
[2] as well as their petition for mandamus to
compel the Sandiganbayan to dismiss the said
cases.
The
Antecedents
After the
termination of the requisite preliminary investigation in OMB Cases
Nos. 0-99-2188 to 2205, the Office of the Ombudsman issued a Resolution
on July 27, 2000 finding probable cause against petitioners Antonio H.
Roman, Sr. and Marialen C. Corpuz, the President and Vice-President of
FILSYN Corporation, respectively, and several others. On
April 10, 2000, the petitioners, the Undersecretary of Finance Antonio
P. Belicena, and the officers of the Petron Corporation, were charged
with violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, involving the
so-called “tax credit scam” in an Information docketed as Criminal Case
No. 25922 which reads:
The undersigned
Ombudsman Prosecutors, Office of the Ombudsman, hereby accuse ANTONIO
P. BELICENA, ULDARICO P. ANDUTAN, JR., MONICO V. JACOB, CELSO L.
LEGARDA, ABDULAZIZ F. AL-KHAYYAL, APOLINARIO G. REYES, REYNALDO V.
CAMPOS, RAFAEL S. DIAZ, JR., ANTONIO H. ROMAN, SR., AND MARIALEN C.
CORPUZ, of violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
committed as follows:
That, during the period from
13 May 1994 to 09 June 1997, or for sometime prior or subsequent
thereto, in the City of Manila, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the aforementioned first two
(2) accused Antonio P. Belicena and Uldarico P. Andutan, Jr., both
public officers, being then the Assistant Secretary/Administrator, and
Deputy Executive Director, respectively, of the One Stop Shop
Inter-Agency Tax Credit & Duty Drawback Center, Department of
Finance, Manila, while in the performance of their official functions
and acting with evident bad faith and manifest partiality, conspiring
and confederating with each other, together with accused Monico V.
Jacob, Celso L. Legarda, Abdulaziz F. Al-Khayyal, Apolinario G. Reyes,
Reynaldo V. Campos and Rafael S. Diaz, Jr., all officials of Petron
Corporation, and Antonio H. Roman, Sr. and Marialen C. Corpuz, both
officers of Filsyn Corporation, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and (sic) recommend and criminally
approve the transfer of the following Tax Credit Certificates
purportedly issued to Filsyn Corp., to
wit:
TCC No. | Amount |
0159 | P 713,213.00 |
0164 | 1,399,912.00 |
0205 | 1,313,576.00 |
1106 | 1,128,118.00 |
1010 | 2,268,599.00 |
1029 | 956,662.00 |
1030 | 2,243,517.00 |
1165 | 1,282,215.00 |
1180 | 1,399,950.00 |
1189 | 1,884,327.00 |
1204 | 702,105.00 |
1208 | 563,121.00 |
1245 | 562,551.00 |
1496 | 1,826,342.00 |
1497 | 2,453,521.00 |
1498 | 731,196.00 |
1499 | 418,534.00 |
1564 | 1,431,912.00 |
1592 | 2,006,920.00 |
1633 | 784,148.00 |
1634 | 1,213,080.00 |
1667 | 1,649,799.00 |
1732 | 119,795.00 |
1756 | 2,663,711.00 |
1798 | 2,436,946.00 |
1805 | 602,212.00 |
2160 | 2,375,949.00 |
19762 | 948,215.00 |
19763 | 2,011,753.00 |
2205 | 3,701,703.00 |
2219 | 4,792,190.00 |
2253 | 441,461.00 |
2273 | 1,081,349.00 |
2274 | 1,237,078.00 |
2308 | 1,805,291.00 |
2309 | 1,044,837.00 |
2331 | 1,474,537.00 |
2420 | 1,807,435.00 |
2421 | 1,351,385.00 |
2422 | 687,520.00 |
2423 | 1,508,715.00 |
2424 | 501,893.00 |
2430 | 1,609,726.00 |
2436 | 901,146.00 |
2463 | 1,016,673.00 |
2465 | 337,001.00 |
2482 | 1,960,916.00 |
2583 | 593,876.00 |
2587 | 1,588,883.00 |
2602 | 1,770,638.00 |
2727 | 1,487,893.00 |
2728 | 1,402,612.00 |
2755 | 1,499,909.00 |
2762 | 1,163,789.00 |
2763 | 1,854,245.00 |
3113 | 1,079,770.00 |
3131 | 99,578.00 |
3164 | 459,986.00 |
3202 | 3,699,103.00 |
3204 | 1,225,135.00 |
3288 | 408,000.00 |
3289 | 7,228,572.00 |
3291 | 2,844,774.00 |
3530 | 374,272.00 |
3549 | 1,658,172.00 |
3550 | 613,410.00 |
3416 | 653,750.00 |
3653 | 370,500.00 |
3670 | 805,480.00 |
3708 | 2,899,693.00 |
3909 | 1,867,139.00 |
3910 | 1,509,529.00 |
4009 | 2,308,264.00 |
4035 | 2,790,331.00 |
4042 | 6,326,431.00 |
4147 | 5,317,781.00 |
4299 | 3,336,559.00 |
4557 | 4,987,214.00 |
Total | P131,547,043.00 |
from
Filsyn Corporation, represented by accused Antonio H. Roman, Sr. and
Marialen C. Corpuz, unto and in favor of Petron Corp., represented by
accused Monico V. Jacob, Cesar L. Legarda, Abdulaziz F. Al-Khayyal,
Apolinario G. Reyes, Reynaldo V. Campos or Rafael S. Diaz, Jr., without
legal basis and proper/required documentation, thereby causing undue
injury and damage to the government in the aforestated amount and at
the same time giving unwarranted benefit, preference or advantage to
the said private firms.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
Aside from the
aforestated case, sixty-one (61) similar Informations were filed by the
Office of the Ombudsman against some fifty (50) public officials and
private individuals relating to the issuance of tax credit
certificates.
The accused Monico V. Jacob and Celso
Legarda were arraigned and pleaded not guilty.
[4]As narrated by
the petitioners, the following events transpired in the
Sandiganbayan/Office of the
Ombudsman:
4.2 Criminal Case No.
25922, along with other cases involving allegedly anomalous TCC
transfers, namely, Criminal Cases Nos. 25911-25915, 25917-25921,
25923-25939, and 25983-26016 were raffled to the Fourth Division of the
Sandiganbayan.
4.3 On
17 April 2000, petitioners filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a
“Very Urgent Motion for Leave to File Motion for Reconsideration or
Reinvestigation” dated 16 April 2000, with an attached “Motion for
Reconsideration or Reinvestigation (Re: Resolution dated 27 March
2000)” dated 17 April 2000, through which they sought reversal of the
Office of the Ombudsman’s 27 March 2000 “Resolution” which directed the
filing of the “Information” in Criminal Case No. 25922. A
copy of petitioners’ “Very Urgent Motion for Leave to File Motion for
Reconsideration or Reinvestigation” dated 16 April 2000, with their
“Motion for Reconsideration or Reinvestigation (Re: Resolution dated 27
March 2000)” dated 17 April 2000 attached to it as its Annex “1”, is
attached to this “Petition”, and made an integral part of it, as its
Annex “D.”
4.4 On 28 April 2000, the
Fourth Division of the Sandiganbayan issued an
“Order” granting petitioners, among other movants, leave to file their
respective motions for reinvestigation or reconsideration, and gave the
Prosecution sixty (60) days to resolve the said
motions.
4.5 The sixty (60) day deadline
given the Prosecution to complete its reinvestigations and report its
findings in relation to such reinvestigations passed without the
Prosecution resolving petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration or
Reinvestigation (Re: Resolution dated 27 March 2000)” dated 17 April
2000.
4.6 The Prosecution’s failure to
resolve the motions for reconsideration filed by petitioners and the
other accused in Criminal Cases Nos. 25911-25939 and 25983-26016
dragged on into the middle of 2001.
4.7 At
the hearing of Criminal Cases Nos. 25911-25939 and 25983-26016 held on
1 June 2001, the Prosecution was specifically warned by the court that
should it fail to resolve the accused’s pending motions for
reconsideration, it was possible that Criminal Cases Nos. 25911-25939
and 25983-26016 would be dismissed.
4.9
The court’s warning notwithstanding, the Prosecution, in a
“Manifestation” dated 21 June 2001, again sought cancellation of the
arraignment and pre-trial conference in Criminal Cases Nos. 25911-25939
and 25983-26016 set on 2 July 2001, but the court denied that request
in a “Resolution” dated 26 June 2001, in which the court again reminded
the Prosecution that Criminal Cases Nos. 25911-25939 and 25983-26016
had been pending for more than a year and that further delay caused by
it would not be countenanced.
4.10 Despite
the court’s warning, the Prosecution still failed to resolve the
pending motions for reinvestigation by the time of the scheduled
arraignment and pre-trial conference set on 2 July 2001, prompting the
court to issue an order which gave the Prosecution an additional ten
(10) days to resolve the motions, and reset the scheduled arraignment
and pre-trial conference to 17 July
2001.
4.11 Despite the lapse of the ten
(10) day additional period given it, the Prosecution again failed to
complete, and submit the results of, its reinvestigation, and instead
filed a “Manifestation” requesting the cancellation and resetting of
the arraignment and pre-trial conference set on 17 July
2001.
4.12 In an “Order” dated 17 July
2001, the court directed the Prosecution to complete its
reinvestigation, and submit the results of that reinvestigation to the
court, by 16 August 2001, and granted the Prosecution’s request for a
resetting by canceling the scheduled arraignment and pre-trial
conference and setting it on 20 August
2001.
4.13 On 16 August 2001, the
Prosecution again failed to report completion of the reinvestigation
process, but only filed an “Omnibus Motion” in which it informed the
court only that the prosecutor concerned had already made a
recommendation to the Office of the Special Prosecutor. There being no
resolution of the pending motions for reinvestigation yet, the
Prosecution sought yet another cancellation of the scheduled
arraignment and pre-trial conference on 20 August
2001.
4.14 The Prosecution repeated its
request for deferment of the scheduled arraignment and pre-trial
conference at the scheduled hearing on 20 August 2001, but this time,
the request was denied by Justice Nario, who issued an oral order
dismissing the case on account of the long delay associated with the
Prosecution’s resolution of the motions for reinvestigation filed by
accused.
4.15 However, since Justice Nario
and the other (2) regular members of the Fourth Division of the
Sandiganbayan could not reach unanimity on upholding
Justice Nario’s dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. 25911-25939 and
25983-26016, a Special Fourth Division composed of five (5) members of
the Honorable Sandiganbayan was constituted pursuant
to Section 1(b) of Rule XVIII of the 1984 Revised Rules of the
Sandiganbayan.
4.15 On
4 February 2002, a bare majority of respondent court,[5] overruling dissents
by Justice Nario and Justice Raoul Victorino, issued its first
questioned “Resolution” dated 4 February 2002, the dispositive portion
of which set aside the order of dismissal issued by Justice Nario in
open court at the hearing of 20 August 2001 in the following
manner:
“WHEREFORE, the dismissal of these
cases orally ordered in open court by the Chairman of the Fourth
Division during its court session held on August 20, 2001, and
reiterated in his subsequent ponencia, is hereby set
aside. xxx.”
4.16 Petitioners
filed their “Motion for Reconsideration” dated 11 February 2002 from
the questioned “Resolution” dated 4 February 2002 on 18 February
2002. A copy of petitioners’ “Motion for Reconsideration”
dated 11 February 2002 is attached to this “Petition”, and made an
integral part of it, as its Annex “E.”[6]
Several of the
other accused also filed similar motions for reconsideration and/or
motions to quash/dismiss which the prosecution opposed.
[7]On
December 12, 2003, the Sandiganbayan, by unanimous vote, issued a
Resolution denying all the motions respectively filed by the accused,
including the petitioners:
WHEREFORE, for
lack of merit, the court issues an Omnibus Resolution
denying all the above described
motions for reconsideration.
This
disposition renders moot and academic the resolution of the court dated
May 6, 2002 penned by Justice Narciso S. Nario, which deferred action
on the Manifestation of the prosecution considering that there is no
need for the court to act on the same, as the Manifestation was filed
merely for the court’s information on the action taken by the Office of
the Special Prosecutor on the various motions for reconsideration filed
by the accused in these cases.
SO ORDERED.[8]
Only the
petitioners filed their petition for certiorari and mandamus assailing
the February 4, 2002 and the December 12, 2003 Resolutions of the
Sandiganbayan, asserting that the graft court committed a grave abuse
of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in
issuing the same.
[9]In its Comment on the
petition, the Office of the Ombudsman, through the Office of the
Special Prosecutor, avers that the delay in the submission to the
Sandiganbayan of its report on its reinvestigation was caused by the
pendency of the other cases of equal, if not of more importance, not to
mention the filing of twenty-two (22) other motions for reconsideration
and/or reinvestigation by the other accused in the said cases.
[10] It asserts that the
more than one-year delay is not capricious, much less, intolerably
capricious. It also contends that the oral dismissal of the
cases by Justice Narciso S. Nario was too drastic, as it deprived the
respondent of its right to prosecute the cases and prove the guilt of
the petitioners beyond reasonable doubt for the crimes
charged.
The Ruling of the
Court
The petition is
denied due course.
For a petition for certiorari to
be granted, it must set out and demonstrate, plainly and distinctly,
all the facts essential to establish a right to a writ.
[11] The
petitioners must allege in their petition and establish facts to show
that any other existing remedy is not speedy or adequate
[12] and that (a) the
writ is directed against a tribunal, board or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (b) such tribunal, board or
officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction; and,
(c) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.
[13]The public respondent acts
without jurisdiction if it does not have the legal power to determine
the case; there is excess of jurisdiction where the respondent, being
clothed with the power to determine the case, oversteps its authority
as determined by law. There is grave abuse of discretion
where the public respondent acts in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary
or despotic manner in the exercise of its judgment as to be said to be
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
[14] Mere abuse of discretion is not
enough.
In a petition for certiorari, the
jurisdiction of the court is narrow in scope. It is limited
to resolving only errors of jurisdiction. It is not to stray
at will and resolve questions or issues beyond its competence such as
errors of judgment. Errors of judgment of the trial court are
to be resolved by the appellate court in the appeal or
via a petition for review on certiorari in this
Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Certiorari will
issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction. It is not a
remedy to correct errors of judgment.
[15] An error of judgment is one in which the court
may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction, and which error is
reversible only by an appeal. As long as the court acts
within its jurisdiction, any alleged errors committed in the exercise
of its discretion will amount to nothing more than mere errors of
judgment, correctible by an appeal or a petition for review under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court.
[16] An error of jurisdiction is one
where the act complained of was issued by the court without or in
excess of jurisdiction and which error is correctible only by the
extraordinary writ of certiorari.
[17]Generally, the performance
of an official act or duty which necessarily involves the exercise of
discretion or judgment cannot be compelled by mandamus. However, a writ
of mandamus may issue where there is grave abuse of
discretion, manifest injustice, or palpable excess of authority.
[18]In this case, we find and
so rule that the Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed
resolutions. We also held that the petitioners are not entitled to a
writ of mandamus.
The Verbal Order of
Dismissal
By Justice Nario Is A
NullityIn the unanimous Resolution of
December 12, 2003, the Sandiganbayan ruled as
follows:
In the cases at bar, the dismissal
made in open court by the Chairman, which was not reduced in writing,
is not a valid dismissal or termination of the cases. This is
because the Chairman cannot unilaterally dismiss the same without the
approval or consent of the other members of the Division. The
Sandiganbayan is a collegiate court and under its
internal rules prevailing at the time (Rule XVIII, Section 1(b) of the
1984 Revised Rules of the Sandiganbayan, which is
now Section 1(b), Rule VIII of the 2002 Revised Internal Rules
of the Sandiganbayan), an order, resolution or judgment, in
order to be valid – that is to say, in order to be considered as an
official action of the Court itself – must bear the unanimous approval
of the members of the division, or in case of lack thereof, by the
majority vote of the members of a special division of five.[19]
We agree with the
foregoing ratiocination. Section 1, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, mandates that a judgment must be written in the
official language, personally and directly prepared by the judge and
signed by him and shall contain clearly and distinctly a statement of
the facts and the law upon which it is based. The rule
applies to a final order dismissing a criminal case grounded on the
violation of the rights of the accused to a speedy trial.
[20] A verbal
judgment or order of dismissal is a violation of the provision; hence,
such order is, in contemplation of law, not in esse, therefore,
ineffective. Justice Nario failed to issue a written
resolution dismissing the criminal cases for failure of the prosecution
to submit its report on the reinvestigation of the cases within the
sixty-day period fixed by the graft court. Moreover, the
verbal order was rejected by majority vote of the members of the
Sandiganbayan Special Division. In fine, there has been no valid and
effective order of dismissal of the cases. The Sandiganbayan cannot
then be faulted for issuing the assailed
resolutions.
Neither are the petitioners entitled to
a writ of mandamus to compel the Sandiganbayan to reinstate the cases,
considering that the verbal order of Justice Nario as aforestated does
not exist at all in contemplation of
law.
In Criminal Cases, the
Accused
Is Entitled To a Speedy
Disposition of the
Cases
against Him
No less than
Section 16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that all
persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases
before all judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative bodies. The
“judicial bodies” envisaged in the said provision include the Office of
the Ombudsman and the Office of the Special
Prosecutor.
Rule 115, Section 1(h) of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure further provides that the accused has the
right to have a speedy, impartial and public trial. The said
rule requires that the arraignment of the accused should be held within
thirty (30) days from the date the court acquired jurisdiction over the
person of the accused, unless a shorter period is provided by special
law or unless excusable delays as provided in Rule 119, Section 10 of
the Rules are attendant.
[21] Such rights to due process, speedy trial and
disposition of the case were first articulated as early as 1297 in
England: “To none will we see, to none will we deny or delay
right or justice.”
[22]It cannot be overstressed
that the accused in all criminal prosecutions are entitled to due
process as much as the prosecution. In
Tatad v.
Sandiganbayan,
[23] we held that substantial adherence to the
requirements of the law governing the conduct of preliminary
investigation, including substantial compliance with the time
limitation prescribed by the law for the resolution of the case by the
prosecutor, is part of the procedural due process constitutionally
guaranteed by the fundamental law. This ruling clearly
applies to reinvestigations authorized by the trial courts, including
the Sandiganbayan.
The right of the accused to a
speedy trial and to a speedy disposition of the case against him was
designed to prevent the oppression of the citizen by holding criminal
prosecution suspended over him for an indefinite time, and to prevent
delays in the administration of justice by mandating the courts to
proceed with reasonable dispatch in the trial of criminal cases.
[24] Such right to a
speedy trial and a speedy disposition of a case is violated only when
the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious and oppressive
delays. The inquiry as to whether or not an accused has been denied
such right is not susceptible by precise qualification. The concept of
a speedy disposition is a relative term and must necessarily be a
flexible concept.
[25]While justice is
administered with dispatch, the essential ingredient is orderly,
expeditious and not mere speed.
[26] It cannot be definitely said how long is too
long in a system where justice is supposed to be swift, but
deliberate. It is consistent with delays and depends upon
circumstances. It secures rights to the accused, but it does
not preclude the rights of public justice.
[27] Also, it must be borne in mind
that the rights given to the accused by the Constitution and the Rules
of Court are shields, not weapons; hence, courts are to give meaning to
that intent.
[28]A balancing test of
applying societal interests and the rights of the accused necessarily
compels the court to approach speedy trial cases on an
ad
hoc basis.
[29]In determining whether the
accused has been deprived of his right to a speedy disposition of the
case and to a speedy trial, four factors must be considered: (a) length
of delay; (b) the reason for the delay; (c) the defendant’s assertion
of his right; and (d) prejudice to the defendant. Prejudice should be
assessed in the light of the interest of the defendant that the speedy
trial was designed to protect, namely: to prevent oppressive pre-trial
incarceration; to minimize anxiety and concerns of the accused to
trial; and to limit the possibility that his defense will be
impaired. Of these, the most serious is the last, because the
inability of a defendant adequately to prepare his case skews the
fairness of the entire system. There is also prejudice if the
defense witnesses are unable to recall accurately the events of the
distant past.
[30] Even if the accused is not
imprisoned prior to trial, he is still disadvantaged by restraints on
his liberty and by living under a cloud of anxiety, suspicion and
often, hostility.
[31] His financial resources may be drained, his
association is curtailed, and he is subjected to public obloquy.
[32]Delay is a two-edge
sword. It is the government that bears the burden of proving
its case beyond reasonable doubt. The passage of time may
make it difficult or impossible for the government to carry its
burden.
[33] The Constitution and the Rules do
not require impossibilities or extraordinary efforts, diligence or
exertion from courts or the prosecutor, nor contemplate that such right
shall deprive the State of a reasonable opportunity of fairly
prosecuting criminals.
[34] As held in
Williams v. United
States,
[35] for the government to sustain its right to try
the accused despite a delay, it must show two things: (a) that the
accused suffered no serious prejudice beyond that which ensued from the
ordinary and inevitable delay; and (b) that there was no more delay
than is reasonably attributable to the ordinary processes of
justice.
Closely related to the length of delay is
the reason or justification of the State for such delay.
Different weights should be assigned to different reasons or
justifications invoked by the State. For instance, a
deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper or prejudice
the defense should be weighted heavily against the State. Also, it is
improper for the prosecutor to intentionally delay to gain some
tactical advantage over the defendant or to harass or prejudice
him.
[36] On the
other hand, the heavy case load of the prosecution or a missing witness
should be weighted less heavily against the State. Corollarily, Section
4, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure enumerates the
factors for granting a continuance.
[37]The Delay in the
Arraignment And
The Trial of the Petitioners
was
Caused By Them, the Other
Accused and the
Ombudsman/
Special ProsecutorIn
its February 4, 2002 Resolution, the Sandiganbayan overruled the verbal
Order of Justice Nario for the following
reasons:
In the present case, (1) there is
already a delay of the trial for more than one year now; (2) but it is
not shown that the delay is vexatious, capricious and oppressive; (3)
it may be that, as stated in the herein dissented Resolution, “at the
hearings conducted in these cases, the defense orally, openly and
consistently asked for the dismissal of these cases;” however, these
oral manifestations were more of “knee-jerk reactions” of the defense
counsel in those hearings everytime the prosecution requested for
postponement than anything else as said defense counsel did not
seriously pursue the dismissal of these cases, such as by reducing
their “request” in a formal written motion to dismiss and/or insisting
that the court formally rule on their request for dismissal and go on
certiorari if denied; and (4) considering the nature and importance of
the cases, if there is any prejudice that may have resulted as a
consequence of the series of postponements, it would be more against
the government than against any of the accused; however, be that as it
may, none of the herein accused has come out to claim having been thus
prejudiced.[38]
The records show
that the failure of the petitioners and the other accused to be
arraigned and the case against them tried was caused by (1) the filing
of their motion for reconsideration and/or reinvestigation which was
granted by the Sandiganbayan; and (2) the failure of the
Ombudsman/Special Prosecutor to terminate his reinvestigation and
submit his report thereon within the sixty-day period fixed by the
graft court.
The Ombudsman/Special Prosecutor filed
the Informations on April 10, 2000 even before the lapse of the
five-day period within which to file a motion for reconsideration or
the reinvestigation thereof as provided in Administrative Order No. 15
of the Ombudsman.
[39] This impelled the petitioners to file on April
17, 2000 a very urgent motion for leave to file a motion for
reconsideration of the said resolution finding probable cause against
them or the reinvestigation thereof, on the ground that there was no
factual and legal basis for their indictment for violation of Section
3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019.
On April 28, 2000, the
Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution granting the motion of the
petitioners and gave the prosecutor a period of sixty (60) days from
notice within which to conduct a reinvestigation of the case. However,
aside from the petitioners, the other accused filed 23 separate motions
for reconsideration/reinvestigation in Criminal Cases Nos. 25911-25939
and 25983-26016.
The arraignment of the accused
including the petitioners and the pre-trial of the cases had to be
suspended by the Sandiganbayan until after the Ombudsman/Special
Prosecutor had completed the consolidated reinvestigation of the cases
and submitted his consolidated report to the graft court. However, the
Prosecutor failed to terminate his reinvestigation of the cases within
the period given him, which impelled the Sandiganbayan, over the verbal
objections of the petitioners, to repeatedly reset the arraignment of
the petitioners and that of the other accused. Thereafter, Justice
Nario verbally dismissed the cases on August 20, 2001, despite the
“Omnibus Motion” of the Prosecution on August 16, 2001 informing the
Sandiganbayan that he had already submitted his recommendation on his
reinvestigation to the Office of the Special Prosecutor for the
latter’s consideration and approval.
The
Petitioners were Burdened to
Prove the Factual and Legal
Basis
For Motion Nolle Prosequi;
The Prosecutor was
Burdened
To Prove a Valid Justification
For
Non-Compliance with
The Order of the
Sandiganbayan
And the Motion for
ContinuancePrefatorily, we find it unfair
for the majority members of the Sandiganbayan to brand the verbal
motions
nolle prosequi of the petitioners as a mere
“knee-jerk reaction/action” to the Prosecutor’s repeated motions for
continuance. Although the petitioners failed to file written motions
for the dismissal of the cases, their verbal motions should not be
brushed aside as trivial. Ideally, the petitioners should
file formal motions for the dismissal of the cases. However, they are
not precluded from orally moving for the dismissal of the said
cases. In
McCandles v. District
Court,
[40] the appellate court held that the proper
method of making demands for speedy trial is by motions filed in the
case or made in open court. A demand therefor must be made in
court. The Sandiganbayan would have acted beyond its
authority if it had dismissed the case against the accused simply
because the prosecutor had gone to sleep at the switch while the
defendant and his counsel rested in silence.
[41] The accused must not be
rewarded by the dismissal of the case and the State and society
punished by the neglect of the prosecutor unless the accused himself
calls the attention of the court to the matter.
[42]Under Section
9, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the petitioners
had the burden of proving the factual basis for their motions for the
dismissal of the Informations on the ground of a denial of their right
to a speedy trial and to a speedy disposition of the cases against
them. They were burdened to prove that such delay caused by the
Prosecutor was vexatious, capricious or whimsical. On the
other hand, the Prosecutor was burdened to present evidence to
establish that the delay in the submission of his report on the
reinvestigation of the cases was reasonably attributed to the ordinary
process of justice, and that the accused suffered no serious prejudice
beyond that which ensued after an inevitable and ordinary
delay.
Indubitably, there was an undue and
inordinate delay in the reinvestigation of the cases by the
Ombudsman/Special Prosecutor, and, consequently, the submission of his
report thereon. Despite the lapse of more than one year, he failed to
comply with the Orders of the Sandiganbayan. It bears stressing that a
reinvestigation is summary in nature, and merely involves a
reexamination and re-evaluation of the evidence already submitted by
the complainant and the accused, as well as the initial finding of
probable cause which led to the filing of the Informations after the
requisite preliminary investigation. Undeniably, the
Ombudsman/Special Prosecutor is saddled with “cases of equal, if not of
more importance” than the cases against the petitioners. However, this
is not a valid justification for an inordinate delay of one (1) year in
the termination of the reinvestigation of the cases. The Prosecutor
should have expedited the reinvestigation not only because he was
ordered by the Sandiganbayan to submit a report within sixty (60) days,
but also because he is bound to do so under the Constitution, and under
Section 13 of Rep. Act No. 6770:
The
Ombudsman and his deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act
promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public
officials or employees of the Government, or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations, and shall, in appropriate cases, notify the complainants
of the action taken and the results thereof. (Section 12, Article XI of
the 1987 Constitution)
The Ombudsman and his
deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act promptly on complaints
filed in any form or manner against public officials or employees of
the Government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled corporations, and enforce
their administrative, civil and criminal liability in every case where
the evidence warrants in order to promote efficient service by the
government to the people. (Section 13, Republic Act No.
6770)
In
Hodges v. United
States,
[43] it was emphasized that the government, and for
that matter, the trial court, is not without responsibility for the
expeditious trial for criminal cases. The burden for trial promptness
does not solely rest upon the defense. The right to a speedy
trial is not to be honored only for the vigilant and the
knowledgeable.
[44] In
De Vera v.
Layague,
[45] we also held
that:
The constitutional mandate to promptly
dispose of cases does not only refer to the decision of cases on their
merits, but also to the resolution of motions and other interlocutory
matters, as the constitutional provisions explicitly mention “cases”
and “matters.” Therefore, respondent judge must not be
excused for his delay in resolving the incident in Civil Case No.
17,215.
The Dismissal of
the
Information Was Too
DrasticWe note that the Prosecutor
informed the Sandiganbayan on August 16, 2001 that he had already
submitted his recommendation on the reinvestigation of the cases to the
Special Prosecutor, and requested for continuance anew. The
graft court again obliged, and reset the arraignment of the accused to
August 20, 2001, only to be informed by the Prosecutor that his
recommendation had not yet been acted upon by the Special
Prosecutor/Ombudsman. The unexplained delay by the Ombudsman/Special
Prosecutor of his compliance with the Sandiganbayan’s directive brings
to mind the trite and distressing observation of this Court in
Abardo v. Sandiganbayan:
[46]Clearly, the delay
in this case disregarded the Ombudsman’s duty, as mandated by the
Constitution and Republic Act No. 6770, to enforce the criminal
liability of government officers or employees in every case where the
evidence warrants in order to promote efficient service to the people.
The fact that up to this time no trial has been set, apparently due to
the inability of the Ombudsman to complete the reinvestigation is a
distressing indictment of the criminal justice system, particularly its
investigative and prosecutory pillars.
The
Sandiganbayan, for its part, is not free of blame. In
resolving the motions for reconsideration of the petitioners and the
other accused, it should have required the Ombudsman/Special
Prosecutor, under pain of contempt, to explain and justify the
inordinate delay in the submission of the report on the
reinvestigation. The Sandiganbayan failed to do so. The graft court was
content to issue mere orders denying the motions for reconsideration of
the petitioners and the other accused.
The Court is
wont to stress that the State, through the Sandiganbayan and the
Ombudsman/Special Prosecutor, has the duty of insuring that the
criminal justice system is consistent with due process and the
constitutional rights of the accused. Society has a
particular interest in bringing swift prosecutions and society’s
representatives are the ones who should protect that interest.
[47] It has been held
that the right to a prompt inquiry into criminal charges is fundamental
and the duty of the charging authority is to provide a prompt
disposition of the case.
[48]Prescinding from the
foregoing, we agree with the Sandiganbayan that the dismissal of the
cases was precipitate and unwarranted. The State should not
be prejudiced and deprived of its right to prosecute the cases simply
because of the ineptitude or nonchalance of the Ombudsman/Special
Prosecutor.
Under Section 9, Rule 119 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, the trial court may dismiss a criminal
case on a motion
nolle prosequi if the accused is
not brought to trial within the prescribed time and is deprived of his
right to a speedy trial or disposition of the case on account of
unreasonable or capricious delay caused by the prosecution.
[49] En
contrario, the accused is not entitled to a dismissal where
such delay was caused by proceedings or motions instituted by
him.
[50] But it
must be understood that an overzealous or precipitate dismissal of a
case may enable the defendant, who may be guilty, to go free without
having been tried, thereby infringing the societal interest in trying
people accused of crimes rather than granting them immunization because
of legal error.
[51] Not too long ago, we emphasized
that:
…[T]he State, like any other litigant,
is entitled to its day in court, and to a reasonable opportunity to
present its case. A hasty dismissal such as the one in
question, instead of unclogging dockets, has actually increased the
workload of the justice system as a whole and caused uncalled-for
delays in the final resolution of this and other cases. Unwittingly,
the precipitate action of the respondent court, instead of easing the
burden of the accused, merely prolonged the litigation and ironically
enough, unnecessarily delayed the case – in the process, causing the
very evil it apparently sought to avoid. Such action does not
inspire public confidence in the administration of justice.[52]
There can be no
denying the fact that the petitioners, as well as the other accused,
were prejudiced by the delay in the reinvestigation of the cases and
the submission by the Ombudsman/Special Prosecutor of his report
thereon. So was the State. We have balanced the
societal interest involved in the cases and the need to give substance
to the petitioners’ constitutional rights and their quest for justice,
and we are convinced that the dismissal of the cases is too drastic a
remedy to be accorded to the petitioners. The cloud of suspicion may
still linger over the heads of the petitioners by the precipitate
dismissal of the cases. We repeat -- the cases involve the
so-called tax credit certificates scam and hundreds of millions of
pesos allegedly perpetrated by government officials in connivance with
private individuals. The People has yet to prove the guilt of the
petitioners of the crimes charged beyond reasonable doubt. We
agree with the ruling of the Sandiganbayan that before resorting to the
extreme sanction of depriving the petitioner a chance to prove its case
by dismissing the cases, the Ombudsman/Special Prosecutor should be
ordered by the Sandiganbayan under pain of contempt, to explain the
delay in the submission of his report on his
reinvestigation.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE
FOREGOING, the petition is
DENIED DUE
COURSE.
SO
ORDERED.Austria-Martinez,
and
Chico-Nazario, JJ.,
concur.
Puno, (Chairman), J., on official
leave.
Tinga, J., on
leave.
[1] Penned by Associate Justice
Nicodemo T. Ferrer, with Associate Justices Rodolfo G. Palattao and
Catalino R. Castañeda, Jr., concurring, and with Associate Justices
Narciso S. Nario and Raoul V. Victorino,
dissenting.
[2] Penned by Associate Justice Rodolfo G.
Palattao, with Associate Justices Gregory S. Ong, Norberto Y. Geraldez,
Raoul U. Victorino and Diosdado M. Peralta,
concurring.
[3] Rollo, pp.
72-74.
[4] Id. at
64.
[5]
SEC. 2.
Resolution on Interlocutory or Incidental
Motions. – Rulings on all written motions on interlocutory or
incidental matters submitted to any regular Division for resolution
shall be reached in consultation among and by the unanimous vote of the
three (3) Justices participating in the consideration thereof:
Provided, however, that rulings on oral motions or objections made in
the course of the trial or hearing shall be made by the Chairman of the
Division: Provided, further, that oral motions or objections on
substantial but interlocutory or incidental matters maybe ordered
reduced into writing and shall likewise be resolved by the unanimous
vote of the three (3) Justices of the Division.
In
case a unanimous vote cannot be obtained, a Special Division of five
(5) Justices shall be constituted pursuant to Section 1 (b), Rule VIII.
A majority vote of such Special Division shall suffice to decide
interlocutory or incidental
motions.
...
(b)
In Division – The unanimous vote of three (3) Justices in a Division
shall be necessary for the rendition of a judgment or final
order. In the event a unanimous vote is not obtained, the
Presiding Justice shall designate by raffle and on rotation basis two
(2) Justices from all the other members of the
Sandiganbayan to sit temporarily with them, forming
a Special Division of five (5) Justices, and the vote of a majority of
such Special Division shall be necessary for the rendition of a
judgment or final order.
[6]
Rollo, pp.
9-14.
[7] Id. at
62-64.
[8]
Id. at 69-70.
[9] Penned by Associate
Justice Rodolfo G. Palattao (retired), with Associate Justices Gregory
S. Ong, Norberto Y. Geraldez, Raoul V. Victorino and Diosdado M.
Peralta, concurring.
[10] Rollo, pp.
140-143.
[11] Henry v. Finta, 559 So.2d
434 (1990).
[12] Alabama Power Co. v. City of Fort
Payne, 187 So. 632 (1939).
[13] Sanchez v.
Court of Appeals, 279 SCRA 647
(1997).
[14] Condo Suite Club Travel, Inc. v.
NLRC, 323 SCRA 679 (2000).
[15] People v.
Court of Appeals, 308 SCRA 687
(1999).
[16]
Ibid.
[17] Toh v. Court of Appeals,
344 SCRA 831 (2000).
[18] Licaros, Jr. v.
Sandiganbayan, 370 SCRA 394 (2001);
Angchangco, Jr.
v. Ombudsman, 268 SCRA 301 (1997).
[19]
Id. at 68.
[20] Rivera, Jr. v. People,
189 SCRA 831 (1990).
[21] SEC. 10.
Exclusions.-The following periods of delay shall be
excluded in computing the time within which trial must
commence:
(a) Any period of delay resulting from
other proceedings concerning the accused, including but not limited to
the following:
(1) delay resulting from an
examination of the accused, and hearing on his/her mental competency,
or physical incapacity;
(2) delay resulting from
trials with respect to charges against the
accused;
(3) delay resulting from interlocutory
appeals;
(4) delay resulting from hearings on
pre-trial motions; Provided, That the delay does not
exceed thirty (30) days;
(5) delay resulting from
orders of inhibition, or proceedings relating to change of venue of
cases or transfer from other courts;
(6) delay
resulting from a finding of the existence of a valid prejudicial
question; and
(7) delay reasonably attributable to
any period, not to exceed thirty (30) days, during which any proceeding
concerning the accused is actually under
advisement.
(b) Any period of delay
resulting from the absence or unavailability of the accused or an
essential witness.
For purposes of this
subparagraph, an accused or an essential witness shall be considered
absent when his/her whereabouts are unknown and, in addition, he/she is
attempting to avoid apprehension or prosecution or his/her whereabouts
cannot be determined by due diligence. An accused or an essential
witness shall be considered unavailable whenever his/her whereabouts
are known but his/her presence for trial cannot be obtained by due
diligence or he/she resists appearing at or being returned for
trial.
(c) Any period of delay resulting from the
fact that the accused is mentally incompetent or physically unable to
stand trial.
(d) If the information is dismissed
upon motion of the prosecution and thereafter a charge is filed against
the accused for the same offense, or any offense required to be joined
with that offense, any period of delay from the date the charge was
dismissed to the date the time limitation would commence to run as to
the subsequent charge had there been no previous
charge.
(e) A reasonable period of delay when the
accused is joined for trial with a co-accused over whom the court has
not acquired jurisdiction, or as to whom the time for trial has not run
and no motion for severance has been granted.
(f)
Any period of delay resulting from a continuance granted by any justice
or judge
motu proprio or on motion of the accused or
his/her counsel or at the request of the public prosecutor, if the
justice or judge granted such continuance on the basis of his/her
findings that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh
the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy
trial. No such period of delay resulting from a continuance
granted by the court in accordance with this subparagraph shall be
excludable under this section unless the court sets forth, in the
record of the case, either orally or in writing, its reasons for
finding that the ends of justice served by the granting of such
continuance outweigh the best interest of the public and the accused in
a speedy trial.
[22] C. 29 of King Edward’s Charter of 1297
(1225).
[23] 159 SCRA 70 (1988).
[24] State v.
Frith, 194 So. 1 (1940).
[25]
Ibid.
[26] Smith v. United States, 3
L.Ed.2d 1041 (1959).
[27] Barker v. Wingo, 33
L.Ed.2d 101 (1972).
[28] McCandles v. District
Court, 61 N.W.2d. 674 (1954).
[29] Barker v.
Wingo, supra.
[30]
Ibid.
[31]
Id.
[32] United
States v. Marion, 30 L.Ed.2d 468
(1971).
[33] United States v. Hawk, 88
L.Ed.2d 640 (1986).
[34] State v. Frith,
supra.
[35] 250 F.2d. 19
(1957).
[36] Barker v. Wingo,
supra.
[37] Under Rule 119, Section 4 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure, the following factors shall be considered by the
trial court:
SEC. 4.
Factors for granting
continuance. – The following factors, among others, shall be
considered by a court in determining whether to grant a continuance
under Section 3(f) of this Rule.
a) | Whether or not the failure to grant a continuance in the proceeding would likely make a continuation of such proceeding impossible or result in a miscarriage of justice; and |
|
|
b) | Whether or not the case taken as a whole is so novel, unusual and complex, due to the number of accused or the nature of the prosecution, or that it is unreasonable to expect adequate preparation within the periods of time established therein. |
In addition, no
continuance under Section 3(f) of this Rule shall be granted because of
congestion of the court’s calendar or lack of diligent preparation or
failure to obtain available witnesses on the part of the prosecutor
(Sec. 10, Cir. 38-98).
[38] Rollo, pp.
46-47.
[39] WHEREFORE, pursuant to the above-quoted
Section 27, R.A. No. 6770, in the interest of justice, Section 7, Rule
II, Administrative Order No. 07 is hereby amended as
follows:
Section 7, Motion for
Reconsideration –
a) | Only one motion for reconsideration or reinvestigation of an approved order or resolution shall be allowed, the same to be filed within five (5) days from notice thereof with the Office of the Ombudsman, or the proper Deputy Ombudsman as the case may be, with corresponding leave of court in cases where the information has already been filed in court; |
|
|
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b) | The filing of a motion for reconsideration/reinvestigation shall not bar the filing of the corresponding information in Court on the basis of the finding of probable cause in the resolution subject of the motion. |
|
[40] 61 N.W.2d.674
(1954).
[41] State v. McTague, 216
N.W.787 (1927).
[42] McCandles v. District Court,
supra.
[43] 408 F.2d. 543
(1969).
[44] Barker v. Wingo,
supra.
[45] 341 SCRA 67 (2000).
[46] 355 SCRA 641
(2001).
[47] Barker v. Wingo,
supra.
[48] Dickey v. State of Florida,
398 U.S. 30 (1970).
[49] Rule 119, Section 9 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure provides that:
SEC. 9.
Remedy
where accused is not brought to trial within the time limit.
– If the accused is not brought to trial within the time limit required
by Section 1(g), Rule 116 and Section 1, as extended by Section 6 of
this rule, the information may be dismissed on motion of the accused on
the ground of denial of his right to speedy trial. The
accused shall have the burden of proving the motion but the prosecution
shall have the burden of going forward with the evidence to establish
the exclusion of time under Section 3 of this Rule. The
dismissal shall be subject to the rules on double
jeopardy.
Failure of the accused to move for
dismissal prior to trial shall constitute a waiver of the right to
dismiss under this section. (sec. 14, cir.
38-98)
[50] United State v. Lustman,
258 F.2d 475 (1958).
[51] Barker v. Wingo,
supra.
[52] People v. Leviste, 255 SCRA
238 (1996).