590 Phil. 711
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
That, for and in consideration of the love and affection of the DONOR [Matilde] for the DONEE [Maria], the latter being adopted and hav[ing] been brought up by the former the DONOR, by these presents, transfer and convey, BY WAY OF DONATION, unto the DONEE the property above-described, to become effective upon the death of the DONOR, but in the event that the DONEE should die before the DONOR, the present donation shall be deemed rescinded and [of] no further force and effect; Provided, however, that anytime during the lifetime of the DONOR or anyone of them who should survive, they could use[,] encumber or even dispose of any or even all of the parcels of land herein donated.[4] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)On September 30, 1986, Original Certificates of Title over Lot Nos. 674 and 676 were issued in Matilde's name.
That in 1978, plaintiff[s] possessed the two (2) parcels of land above-described until January 1991 when defendant entered and possessed the two (2) parcels of land claiming as the adopted son of Crispin Aluad who refused to give back possession until Matilde Aluad died in [1994] and then retained the possession thereof up to and until the present time, thus, depriving the plaintiffs of the enjoyment of said parcels of land x x x;To the complaint respondent alleged in his Answer.[10]
That after the death of Matilde R. Aluad, the plaintiffs succeeded by inheritance by right of representation from their deceased mother, Maria Aluad who is the sole and only daughter of Matilde Aluad[.][9]
That Lot 674 is owned by the defendant as this lot was adjudicated to him in the Last Will and Testament of Matilde Aluad x x x while Lot 676 was purchased by him from Matilde Aluad. These two lots are in his possession as true owners thereof.[11] (Underscoring supplied)Petitioners later filed a Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint Already Filed to Conform to Evidence[12] to which it annexed an Amended Complaint[13] which cited the donation of the six lots via Deed of Donation in favor of their mother Maria. Branch 15 of the RTC granted the motion and admitted the Amended Complaint.[14]
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:On petitioners' motion, the trial court directed the issuance of a writ of execution pending appeal.[20] Possession of the subject lots appears to have in fact been taken by petitioners.Defendant's counterclaim is ordered dismissed for lack of merit.
- Declaring the plaintiffs as the rightful owners of the subject Lots Nos. 674 and 676, Pilar Cadastre;
- Ordering the defendant to deliver the possession of the subject lots to the plaintiffs;
- Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiffs:
- Thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) as attorney's fees;
- Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00), representing the income from subject Lot 676, a year from 1991 up to the time said lot is delivered to the plaintiffs, together with the interest thereof at the legal rate until fully paid;
- Ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00), representing the income from the subject Lot No. 674, a year from 1991 up to the time said lot is delivered to the plaintiffs, plus legal interest thereof at the legal rate until fully paid; and
- The costs of the suit.
SO ORDERED.[19]
Art. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself or by the testator's name written by some other person in his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another.While the appellate court declared respondent as the rightful owner of Lot No. 676, it did not so declare with respect to Lot No. 674, as Matilde's last will and testament had not yet been probated. Thus the Court of Appeals disposed:
The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental witnesses of the will shall, also sign, as aforesaid, each and every page thereof, except the last on the left margin and all the pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each page.
The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which the will is written, and the fact that that testator signed the will and every page thereof, or caused some other person to write his name, under his express direction, in the presence of the instrumental witnesses, and that the latter witnessed and signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator, and of one another.
If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the witnesses, it shall be interpreted to them.
WHEREFORE, finding the instant petition worthy of merit, the same is hereby GRANTED and the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Roxas City, Branch 15, dated 20 September 1996, in Civil Case No. V-6686 for declaration of ownership, recovery of ownership and possession, and damages is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.Their Motion for Reconsideration[23] having been denied,[24] petitioners filed the present Petition for Review,[25] contending that the Court of Appeals erred
A new one is entered in its stead declaring defendant-appellant as the lawful owner of Lot [No.] 676 of the Pilar Cadastre. Accordingly, plaintiffs-appellees are directed to return the possession of the said lot to the defendant-appellant.
Moreover, plaintiffs-appellees are ordered to pay P40,000.00 to defendant-appellant as attorney's fees and litigation expenses.
Costs against plaintiffs-appellees.
SO ORDERED.[22] (Emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied)
As did the appellate court, the Court finds the donation to petitioners' mother one of mortis causa, it having the following characteristics:I
X X X WHEN IT REVERSED THE DECISION OF THE COURT BELOW (RTC, Branch 15, Roxas City) HOLDING THAT THE DEED OF DONATION INTER VIVOS IN FAVOR OF PETITIONERS' MOTHER IS IN FACT A DONATION MORTIS CAUSA.
II
X X X WHEN IT RULED THAT RESPONDENT IS THE RIGHTFUL OWNER OF LOT NO. 676 AS LOT BUYER ON THE BASIS OF A DEED OF SALE EXECUTED BY THE DONOR WHO HAD NO MORE RIGHT TO SELL THE SAME.III
X X X WHEN IT FAILED TO DECLARE PETITIONERS THE RIGHTFUL OWNER OF LOT NO. 674 AFTER HAVING RULED WHEN IT HELD THAT RESPONDENT CANNOT BE DECLARED OWNER THEREOF.IV
X X X WHEN IT HELD THAT THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL IS IN VIOLATION OF PARAGRAPH (a) SECTION 2, RULE 39, OF THE RULES OF COURT (AND ORDERING PETITIONERS TO RETURN POSSESSION OF LOT 676 TO RESPONDENT) AND ORDERING PETITIONERS TO PAY ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COST[S] OF SUIT.[26]
The phrase in the earlier-quoted Deed of Donation "to become effective upon the death of the DONOR" admits of no other interpretation than to mean that Matilde did not intend to transfer the ownership of the six lots to petitioners' mother during her (Matilde's) lifetime.[28]
(1) It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of the property while alive; (2) That before the death of the transferor, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed; and (3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.[27] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
x x x [I]t is well to point out that the last provision (sentence) in the disputed paragraph should only refer to Matilde Aluad, the donor, because she was the only surviving spouse at the time the donation was executed on 14 November 1981, as her husband - Crispin Aluad [-] had long been dead as early as 1975.[31]The trial court, in holding that the donation was inter vivos, reasoned:
x x x The donation in question is subject to a resolutory term or period when the donor provides in the aforequoted provisions, "but in the event that the DONEE should die before the DONOR, the present donation shall be deemed rescinded and [of] no further force and effect". When the donor provides that should the "DONEE" xxx die before the DONOR, the present donation shall be deemed rescinded and [of] no further force and effect" the logical construction thereof is that after the execution of the subject donation, the same became effective immediately and shall be "deemed rescinded and [of] no further force and effect" upon the arrival of a resolutory term or period, i.e., the death of the donee which shall occur before that of the donor. Understandably, the arrival of this resolutory term or period cannot rescind and render of no further force and effect a donation which has never become effective, because, certainly what donation is there to be rescinded and rendered of no further force and effect upon the arrival of said resolutory term or period if there was no donation which was already effective at the time when the donee died?[32] (Underscoring supplied)A similar ratio in a case had been brushed aside by this Court, however, thus:
x x x [P]etitioners contend that the stipulation on rescission in case petitioners [donee] die ahead of [donor] Cabatingan is a resolutory condition that confirms the nature of the donation as inter vivos.As the Court of Appeals observed, "x x x [t]hat the donation is mortis causa is fortified by Matilde's acts of possession as she continued to pay the taxes for the said properties which remained under her name; appropriated the produce; and applied for free patents for which OCTs were issued under her name."[35]
Petitioners' arguments are bereft of merit.[33]
x x x x
x x x The herein subject deeds expressly provide that the donation shall be rescinded in case [donees] the petitioners predecease [the donor] Conchita Cabatingan. As stated in Reyes v. Mosqueda, one of the decisive characteristics of a donation mortis causa is that the transfer should be considered void if the donor should survive the donee. This is exactly what Cabatingan provided for in her donations. If she really intended that the donation should take effect during her lifetime and that the ownership of the properties donated to the donee or independently of, and not by reason of her death, she would not have expressed such proviso in the subject deeds.[34] (Underscoring supplied)
x x x Article 805 particularly segregates the requirement that the instrumental witnesses sign each page of the will from the requisite that the will be "attested and subscribed by [the instrumental witnesses]. The respective intents behind these two classes of signature[s] are distinct from each other. The signatures on the left-hand corner of every page signify, among others, that the witnesses are aware that the page they are signing forms part of the will. On the other hand, the signatures to the attestation clause establish that the witnesses are referring to the statements contained in the attestation clause itself. Indeed, the attestation clause is separate and apart from the disposition of the will. An unsigned attestation clause results in an unattested will. Even if the instrumental witnesses signed the left-hand margin of the page containing the unsigned attestation clause, such signatures cannot demonstrate these witnesses' undertakings in the clause, since the signatures that do appear on the page were directed towards a wholly different avowal.Furthermore, the witnesses did not acknowledge the will before the notary public,[40] which is not in accordance with the requirement of Article 806 of the Civil Code that every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses.
x x x It is the witnesses, and not the testator, who are required under Article 805 to state the number of pages used upon which the will is written; the fact that the testator had signed the will and every page thereof; and that they witnessed and signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another. The only proof in the will that the witnesses have stated these elemental facts would be their signatures on the attestation clause.[39] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)