605 Phil. 194
TINGA, J.:
The Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) charged Romualdez before the Sandiganbayan with violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019 (R.A. 3019), as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The Information reads:Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan in quashing the subject information. Private respondent responded with a Motion to Dismiss with Comment Ad Cautelam, wherein he argued that the proper remedy to an order granting a motion to quash a criminal information is by way of appeal under Rule 45 since such order is a final order and not merely interlocutory. Private respondent likewise raised before this Court his argument that the criminal action or liability had already been extinguished by prescription, which argument was debunked by the Sandiganbayan.That on or about and during the period from 1976 to February 1986 or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the City of Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez, a public officer being then the Provincial Governor of the Province of Leyte, while in the performance of his official function, committing the offense in relation to his Office, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally with evident bad faith, cause undue injury to the Government in the following manner: accused public officer being then the elected Provincial Governor of Leyte and without abandoning said position, and using his influence with his brother-in-law, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, had himself appointed and/or assigned as Ambassador to foreign countries, particularly the People's Republic of China (Peking), Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (Jeddah), and United States of America (Washington D.C.), knowing fully well that such appointment and/or assignment is in violation of the existing laws as the Office of the Ambassador or Chief of Mission is incompatible with his position as Governor of the Province of Leyte, thereby enabling himself to collect dual compensation from both the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Provincial Government of Leyte in the amount of Two Hundred Seventy-six Thousand Nine Hundred Eleven Dollars and 56/100 (US $276,911.56), US Currency or its equivalent amount of Five Million Eight Hundred Six Thousand Seven Hundred Nine Pesos and 50/100 (P5,806,709.50) and Two Hundred Ninety-three Thousand Three Hundred Forty-eight Pesos and 86/100 (P293,348.86) both Philippine Currencies, respectively, to the damage and prejudice of the Government in the aforementioned amount of P5,806,709.50.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Romualdez moved to quash the information on two grounds, namely: (1) that the facts alleged in the information do not constitute the offense with which the accused was charged; and (2) that the criminal action or liability has been extinguished by prescription. He argued that the acts imputed against him do not constitute an offense because: (a) the cited provision of the law applies only to public officers charged with the grant of licenses, permits, or other concessions, and the act charged — receiving dual compensation — is absolutely irrelevant and unrelated to the act of granting licenses, permits, or other concessions; and (b) there can be no damage and prejudice to the Government considering that he actually rendered services for the dual positions of Provincial Governor of Leyte and Ambassador to foreign countries.
To support his prescription argument, Romualdez posited that the 15-year prescription under Section 11 of R.A. 3019 had lapsed since the preliminary investigation of the case for an offense committed on or about and during the period from 1976 to February 1986 commenced only in May 2001 after a Division of the Sandiganbayan referred the matter to the Office of the Ombudsman. He argued that there was no interruption of the prescriptive period for the offense because the proceedings undertaken under the 1987 complaint filed with the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) were null and void pursuant to the Supreme Court's ruling in Cojuangco, Jr. v. PCGG and Cruz, Jr. [sic]. He likewise argued that the Revised Penal Code provision that prescription does not run when the offender is absent from the Philippines should not apply to his case, as he was charged with an offense not covered by the Revised Penal Code; the law on the prescription of offenses punished under special laws (Republic Act No. 3326) does not contain any rule similar to that found in the Revised Penal Code.
The People opposed the motion to quash on the argument that Romualdez is misleading the court in asserting that Section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019 does not apply to him when Section 2 (b) of the law states that corrupt practices may be committed by public officers who include "elective and appointive officials and employees, permanent or temporary, whether in the classified or unclassified or exempt service receiving compensation, even nominal, from the government." On the issue of prescription, the People argued that Section 15, Article XI of the Constitution provides that the right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or employees, from them or from their nominees or transferees, shall not be barred by prescription, laches or estoppel, and that prescription is a matter of technicality to which no one has a vested right. Romualdez filed a Reply to this Opposition.
The Sandiganbayan granted Romualdez' motion to quash in the first Resolution assailed in this petition. The Sandiganbayan stated:We find that the allegation of damage and prejudice to the Government in the amount of P5,806,709.50 representing the accused's compensation is without basis, absent a showing that the accused did not actually render services for his two concurrent positions as Provincial Governor of the Province of Leyte and as Ambassador to the People's Republic of China, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and United States of America. The accused alleges in the subject Motion that he actually rendered services to the government. To receive compensation for actual services rendered would not come within the ambit of improper or illegal use of funds or properties of the government; nor would it constitute unjust enrichment tantamount to the damage and prejudice of the government.
Jurisprudence has established what "evident bad faith" and "gross negligence" entail, thus:In order to be held guilty of violating Section 3 (e), R.A. No. 3019, the act of the accused that caused undue injury must have been done with evident bad faith or with gross inexcusable negligence. But bad faith per se is not enough for one to be held liable under the law, the "bad faith" must be "evident".xxx xxx xxx
. . . . "Gross negligence" is characterized by the want of even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a willful or omitting to act in a willful or intentional manner displaying a conscious indifference to consequences as far as other persons may be affected. (Emphasis supplied)
The accused may have been inefficient as a public officer by virtue of his holding of two concurrent positions, but such inefficiency is not enough to hold him criminally liable under the Information charged against him, given the elements of the crime and the standards set by the Supreme Court quoted above. At most, any liability arising from the holding of both positions by the accused may be administrative in nature.xxx xxx xxxHowever, as discussed above, the Information does not sufficiently aver how the act of receiving dual compensation resulted to undue injury to the government so as to make the accused liable for violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019.
The Sandiganbayan found no merit in Romualdez' prescription argument.
The People moved to reconsider this Resolution, citing "reversible errors" that the Sandiganbayan committed in its ruling. Romualdez opposed the People's motion, but also moved for a partial reconsideration of the Resolution's ruling on prescription. The People opposed Romualdez' motion for partial reconsideration.
Thereafter, the Sandiganbayan denied via the second assailed Resolution the People's motion for reconsideration under the following terms —The Court held in its Resolution of June 22, 2004, and so maintains and sustains, that assuming the averments of the foregoing information are hypothetically admitted by the accused, it would not constitute the offense of violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019 as the elements of (a) causing undue injury to any party, including the government, by giving unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to such parties, and (b) that the public officer acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence, are wanting.It likewise found no merit in Romualdez' motion for partial reconsideration.[2]
As it is, a perusal of the information shows that pertinently, accused is being charged for: (a) having himself appointed as ambassador to various posts while serving as governor of the Province of Leyte and (b) for collecting dual compensation for said positions. As to the first, the Court finds that accused cannot be held criminally liable, whether or not he had himself appointed to the position of the ambassador while concurrently holding the position of provincial governor, because the act of appointment is something that can only be imputed to the appointing authority.
Even assuming that the appointee influenced the appointing authority, the appointee only makes a passive participation by entering into the appointment, unless it is alleged that he acted in conspiracy with his appointing authority, which, however, is not so claimed by the prosecution in the instant case. Thus, even if the accused's appointment was contrary to law or the constitution, it is the appointing authority that should be responsible therefor because it is the latter who is the doer of the alleged wrongful act. In fact, under the rules on payment of compensation, the appointing authority responsible for such unlawful employment shall be personally liable for the pay that would have accrued had the appointment been lawful. As it is, the appointing authority herein, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos has been laid to rest, so it would be incongruous and illogical to hold his appointee, herein accused, liable for the appointment.
Further, the allegation in the information that the accused collected compensation in the amounts of Five Million Eight Hundred Six Thousand Seven Hundred Nine Pesos and 50/100 (P5,806,709.50) and Two Hundred Ninety-three Thousand Three Hundred Forty Eight Pesos and 86/100 (P293,348.86) cannot sustain the theory of the prosecution that the accused caused damage and prejudice to the government, in the absence of any contention that receipt of such was tantamount to giving unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to any party and to acting with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. Besides receiving compensation is an incident of actual services rendered, hence it cannot be construed as injury or damage to the government.
We did not rule on the issue of prescription because the Sandiganbayan's ruling on this point was not the subject of the People's petition for certiorari. While the private respondent asserted in his Motion to Dismiss Ad Cautelam filed with us that prescription had set in, he did not file his own petition to assail this aspect of the Sandiganbayan ruling, he is deemed to have accepted it; he cannot now assert that in the People's petitionthat sought the nullification of the Sandiganbayan ruling on some other ground, we should pass upon the issue of prescription he raised in his motion.Hence this second motion for reconsideration, which reiterates the argument that the charges against private respondent have already prescribed. The Court required the parties to submit their respective memoranda on whether or not prescription lies in favor of respondent.
Besides, the only proceeding that could interrupt the running of prescription is that which is filed or initiated by the offended party before the appropriate body or office. Thus, in the case ofPeople v. Maravilla, this Court ruled that the filing of the complaint with the municipal mayor for purposes of preliminary investigation had the effect of suspending the period of prescription. Similarly, in the case of Llenes v. Dicdican, this Court held that the filing of a complaint against a public officer with the Ombudsman tolled the running of the period of prescription.Clearly, following stare decisis, private respondent's claim of prescription has merit, similar in premises as it is to the situation in Marcelo. Unfortunately, such argument had not received serious consideration from this Court. The Sandiganbayan had apparently rejected the claim of prescription, but instead quashed the information on a different ground relating to the elements of the offense. It was on that point which the Court, in its 23 July 2008 Decision, understandably focused. However, given the reality that the arguments raised after the promulgation of the Decision have highlighted the matter of prescription as well as the precedent set in Marcelo, the earlier quashal of the information is, ultimately, the correct result still.
In the case at bar, however, the complaint was filed with the wrong body, the PCGG. Thus, the same could not have interrupted the running of the prescriptive periods.[9]
Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.In this connection, although the Revised Penal Code (RPC) expressly states in Article 10 thereof that "[o]ffenses which are or in the future may be punishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions of [the RPC]," it likewise provides that the RPC "shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should specially provide the contrary." Verily, in a long line of court decisions,[5] provisions of the RPC have been applied suppletorily to resolve cases where special laws are silent on the matters in issue. The law on the applicability of Article 10 of the RPC is thus well-settled.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.
ART. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. - The period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall be interrupted by filing of the complaint or information, and shall commence to run again when such proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to him.Applying Article 10 of the RPC, the provisions of Article 91 may be applied suppletorily to cases involving violations of special laws where the latter are silent on the matters in issue. The only exception supplied by Article 10 is "unless the [special laws] should specially provide the contrary."
The term of prescription shall not run when the offender is absent from the Philippine Archipelago. (Emphasis supplied)
x x x The statute is not a statute of process, to be scantily and grudgingly applied, but an amnesty, declaring that after a certain time oblivion shall be cast over the offence; that the offender shall be at liberty to return to his country, and resume his immunities as a citizen and that from henceforth he may cease to preserve the proofs of his innocence, for the proofs of his guilt are blotted out.[12]This Court's position was soundly rejected by the legislature when it enacted the Revised Penal Code in 1930. A more exacting rule on prescription was embodied in the Code, Article 91 of which was plain and categorical: "The term of prescription shall not run when the offender is absent from the Philippine Archipelago." Besides, it must be noted that even the cases involving liberal interpretation of the statute of limitations in favor of the accused relate only to the following issues: (1) retroactive[13] or prospective[14] application of laws providing or extending the prescriptive period; (2) the determination of the nature of the felony committed vis a vis the applicable prescriptive period;[15] and (3) the reckoning of when the prescriptive period runs.[16] Thus, contrary to the opinion of the majority in Romualdez, these cases are no authority to support the conclusion that the prescriptive period in a special law runs while the accused is abroad.
There is good reason for the rule freezing the prescriptive period while the accused is abroad. The accused should not have the sole discretion of preventing his own prosecution by the simple expedient of escaping from the State's jurisdiction. This should be the rule even in the absence of a law tolling the running of the prescriptive period while the accused is abroad and beyond the State's jurisdiction. An accused cannot acquire legal immunity by being a fugitive from the State's jurisdiction. In this case, there is even a law - Article 91 of the RPC, which Article 10 of the RPC expressly makes applicable to special laws like RA 3019 - tolling the running of the prescriptive period while the accused is abroad.I maintain that an accused cannot acquire legal immunity by fleeing from the State's jurisdiction. To allow such a loophole will make a mockery of our criminal laws. Contrary to private respondent's claim, prescription has not set in.
To allow an accused to prevent his prosecution by simply leaving this jurisdiction unjustifiably tilts the balance of criminal justice in favor of the accused to the detriment of the State's ability to investigate and prosecute crimes. In this age of cheap and accessible global travel, this Court should not encourage individuals facing investigation or prosecution for violation of special laws to leave Philippine jurisdiction to sit-out abroad the prescriptive period. The majority opinion unfortunately chooses to lay the basis for such anomalous practice. (Emphasis supplied)
[I]f the Sandiganbayan merely legally erred while acting within the confines of its jurisdiction, then its ruling, even if erroneous, is properly the subject of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, and any Rule 65 petition subsequently filed will be for naught. The Rule 65 petition brought under these circumstances is then being used as a substitute for lost appeal. If on the other hand, the Sandiganbayan ruling is attended by grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, then this ruling is fatally defective on jurisdictional ground and we should allow it to be questioned within the period for filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, notwithstanding the lapse of the period of appeal under Rule 45. To reiterate, the ruling's jurisdictional defect and the demands of substantial justice that we believe should receive primacy over the strict application of rules of procedure, require that we so act.To reiterate, grave abuse of discretion is a fatal defect that renders a ruling void. No Sandiganbayan ruling on the quashal of the Information, therefore, lapsed to finality.
It would be specious to fault private respondent for failing to challenge the Sandiganbayan's pronouncement that prescription had not arisen in his favour. The Sandiganbayan quashed the Information against respondent, the very same relief he had sought as he invoked the prescription argument. Why would the private respondent challenge such ruling favourable to him on motion for reconsideration or in a separate petition before a higher court? Imagine, for example, that the People did not anymore challenge the Sandiganbayan rulings anymore. The dissent implies that respondent in that instance should nonetheless appeal the Sandiganbayan's rulings because it ruled differently on the issue of prescription. No lawyer would conceivably give such advice to his client. Had respondent indeed challenged the Sandiganbayan's ruling on that point, what enforceable relief could he have obtained other than that already granted by the Anti-Graft Court?To be sure, what the majority says is not untrue as a practical matter. But we are here concerned with actual legal reality, not with any practical what could have been, nor with the advice that the respondent's counsel could have given. The legal reality we have to live with, for jurisdictional purposes, is that the respondent did not question the Sandiganbayan ruling before us; thus, the prescription issue is beyond our jurisdiction to rule upon in the present petition for certiorari.
Sec. 2. Second Motion for Reconsideration. No second motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final resolution by the same party shall be entertained.The majority ruling disregarded this rule and chose to rule on the respondent's Second Motion for Reconsideration without even rendering a separate specific ruling on the respondent's prior Motion for Leave to Admit Second Motion for Reconsideration. In its present ruling, the majority after reciting how the case came to the Second Motion for Reconsideration stage, merely stated:
Hence, this second motion for reconsideration which reiterates the argument that the charges against private respondent have already prescribed. The Court required the parties to submit their respective memoranda on whether or not prescription lies in favor of respondent.At page 10 of its Resolution, the majority added that:[16]
The matter of prescription is front and foremost before us. It has been raised that following our ruling in Romualdez v. Marcelo, the criminal charges against private respondent have been extinguished by prescription. The Court agrees and accordingly grants the instant motion.[15]
Clearly, following stare decisis, private respondent's claim of prescription has merit, similar in premises as it is to the situation of Marcelo. Unfortunately, such argument had not received serious consideration from this Court. The Sandiganbayan had apparently rejected the claim of prescription, but instead quashed the information on a different ground relating to the elements of the offense. It was on that point which the Court in its 23 July 2008 Decision, understandably focused. However, given the reality that the arguments raised after the promulgation of the Decision have highlighted the matter of prescription as well as the other precedents set in Marcelo, the earlier quashal of the information is, ultimately, the correct result still. [Italics supplied].Based on these justifications, the majority then proceeded to grant the motion to admit the second motion for reconsideration and to dismiss the petition. In this manner, the majority - after twice considering the petition and the issue of prescription, and deciding that this is a matter for the Sandiganbayan to rule upon - saw it fit to reverse itself and recognize that "the criminal charges against private respondent have been extinguished by prescription."