426 Phil. 864
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
WHEREFORE, premises considered and by preponderance of evidence, the Court hereby renders decision in favor of herein plaintiffs and intervenors and against defendants Erlinda Reston, Felicisimo Geonzon and Doroteo Salazar, ordering said defendants to reconvey the titles of the property described in the Amended Complaint to herein plaintiffs and intervenors. But as to defendants Abundio Reponte and Januario Reponte, the Court hereby orders the DISMISSAL of the Amended Complaint and Complaint in Intervention against them in view of the absence of any evidence that may implicate them to the case at bar.Petitioner Doroteo Salazar appealed to the Court of Appeals, where the same was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 33875. On October 20, 1995, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
Furthermore, defendants Erlinda Reston, Felicisimo Geonzon and Doroteo Salazar are hereby ordered to pay, jointly and severally, the following sums:
1) P4,000.00 as attorney’s fees to plaintiffs;
2) P5,000.00 as nominal damages to plaintiffs;
3) P4,000.00 as attorney’s fees to intervenors, plus costs.
SO ORDERED.[3]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, for failure of plaintiffs and intervenors to join as defendants Dozen Construction and Development Corporation, an indispensable party, to whom defendant-appellant Doroteo Salazar had sold and conveyed the portions of Lot 6420 sold to him by defendant Erlinda Reston and which corporation holds title to said portions evidenced by TCT No. T-42088 and TCT No. 42083, the decision appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE as against defendant-appellant and the case REMANDED to the court of origin for further proceedings. The decision appealed from is MAINTAINED and declared FINAL and EXECUTORY insofar as it orders the reconveyance of that portion of Lot No. 6420 still owned by and in the name of defendant Erlinda Reston and insofar as it orders defendants Erlinda Reston and Felicisimo Geonzon, jointly and severally, to pay plaintiffs the amount of P4,000.00 as attorney’s fees and P5,000.00 as nominal damages and intervenors the amount of P4,000.00 as attorney’s fees.Accordingly, on July 23, 1996, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint impleading petitioner Dozen Construction and Development Corporation as an additional defendant.[5] This was followed by an amended complaint-in-intervention, filed by intervenors on August 14, 1996, likewise impleading petitioner corporation.[6]
SO ORDERED.[4]
WHEREFORE, premises considered and by preponderance of evidence, the Court hereby renders judgment against defendant Doroteo Salazar and defendant Dozen Construction and Development Corporation, declaring: (a) as null and void ab initio the Sales Certificate Nos. 8495 (in the name of Joaquin Reston, for himself and others) and V-367 (in the name of Olimpio Reston), the Patent or Deed of Conveyance No. V-11571 (in the name of Olimpio Reston), TCT Nos. T-37383 (in the name of Olimpio Reston) and T-38743 (in the names of defendant Erlinda Reston-Geonzon and defendant Doroteo Salazar; (b) as valid and subsisting the Sales Certificate No. 3979 in the name of Silverio Padayao; (c) as null and void the sale of such portions of the land in question by defendant Erlinda Reston-Geonzon to defendant Doroteo Salazar; (d) declaring as null and void the sale of such portions of the land in question by defendant Doroteo Salazar to defendant Dozen Construction and Development Corporation; and ordering said defendants Doroteo Salazar and Dozen Construction and Development Corporation to:While petitioners’ counsel received notice of the above order on December 16, 1998, he failed to inform petitioners thereof. It was only sometime in the first week of April 1999 when petitioners learned of the adverse order against them.In addition, defendant Doroteo Salazar is hereby ordered to pay plaintiffs P30,000.00 as moral damages, P10,000.00 as litigation expenses, and P15,000.00 as attorney’s fees; and to pay as well the intervenors the same amounts for moral damages, litigation expenses and attorney’s fees.
1) Re-convey and to deliver to the plaintiffs and the intervenors the portions of subject land covered by TCT Nos. 42088 and 42083, if same are still owned and in the possession of said defendant corporation. If, however, said realties have already been disposed of to innocent buyers and for value, the said defendant corporation and/or members of its board of directors, jointly and severally, are hereby ordered to pay the value of said land or such portions sold to innocent buyers, which value shall be based on the date that this Decision shall have become final and executory; and2) Pay, jointly and severally, the amount of P50,000.00 to plaintiffs and another sum of P50,000.00 to intervenors as exemplary damages.
Costs against defendant Salazar and defendant corporation.[7]
The petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED in view of the following infirmities:Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration[13] which was denied by the Court of Appeals on February 4, 2000.[14]
1) There are no specific material dates showing that the petition was filed within the required period (Sec. 3, Rule 46, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended by the Resolution of the Supreme Court En Banc dated July 21, 1998 in Bar Matter No. 803 which took effect on September 1, 1993);2) No authorized representative of petitioner Dozen Construction and Development Corporation has signed the verification/certification on non-forum shopping (Id.);3) The assailed RTC Order of November 27, 1998 (Annex D as marked and not Annex C as alleged in the petition) was not a certified true copy (Id.);4) The petition was not accompanied by such material portions of the record as referred to therein; and other documents relevant or pertinent thereto (Id.);5) The copy of the Petition for Relief from the orders dated November 27, 1998 and May 6, 1999, more particularly pages 4, 5, 6, 7 and 9, is not readable.SO ORDERED.[12]
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, FORMER SEVENTEENTH DIVISION, COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT DENIED, IN THE RESOLUTIONS DATED 24 AUGUST 1999 AND 4 FEBRUARY 2000, THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND PROHIBITION FILED BY HEREIN PETITIONERS ON MERE TECHNICALITIES, SINCE THE DENIAL OF SAID GROUND WOULD NOT SERVE THE DEMANDS OF SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE.On June 14, 2000, the petition for certiorari was dismissed on the ground that the correct remedy is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.[16] Petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration was denied with finality on August 28, 2000.[17]
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT JUDGE BENIGNO G. GAVIOLA COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN HE, IN AN ORDER DATED 31 MAY 1999, DENIED PETITIONERS’ PETITION FOR RELIEF, WHEN IN FACT, THE SAME WAS FILED IN TIME AND WITHIN THE SIX (6) MONTH PERIOD UNDER THE RULES OF COURT.
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT JUDGE BENIGNO G. GAVIOLA COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN HE, IN AN ORDER DATED 27 NOVEMBER 1998, DIRECTED THE RECONVEYANCE OF TCT NOS. 42088 AND 42083.
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT JUDGE BENIGNO G. GAVIOLA COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN HE HELD PETITIONERS LIABLE TO PRIVATE RESPONDENTS FOR MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AS WELL AS ATTORNEY’S FEES AND LITIGATION EXPENSES.[15]
If the incompetence, ignorance or inexperience of counsel is so great and the error committed as a result thereof is so serious that the client, who otherwise has a good cause, is prejudiced and denied his day in court, the litigation may be reopened to give the client another chance to present his case. Similarly, when an unsuccessful party has been prevented from fully and fairly presenting his case as a result of his lawyer’s professional delinquency or infidelity the litigation may be reopened to allow the party to present his side. Where counsel is guilty of gross ignorance, negligence and dereliction of duty, which resulted in the client’s being held liable for damages in a damage suit, the client is deprived of his day in court and the judgment may be set aside on such ground.It cannot even be said that petitioners were remiss in not apprising themselves of the status of their case. Having engaged the services of counsel, they had justifiable reason to expect that their interests in the case will be amply protected.
In view of the foregoing circumstances, higher interests of justice and equity demand that petitioners be allowed to present evidence on their defense. Petitioners may not be made suffer for the lawyer’s mistakes and should be afforded another opportunity, at least, to introduce evidence on their behalf. To cling to the general rule in this case is only to condone rather than rectify a serious injustice to a party whose only fault was to repose his faith and entrust his innocence to his previous lawyers.[25]
A client may reasonably expect that his counsel will make good his representations and has the right to expect that his lawyer will protect his interests during the trial of his case. For the general employment of an attorney to prosecute or defend a case or proceeding ordinarily vests in a plaintiff’s attorney the implied authority to take all steps or do all acts necessary or incidental to the regular and orderly prosecution and management of the suit, and in a defendant’s attorney, the power to take such steps as he deems necessary to defend the suit and protect the interests of the defendant.[26]Indeed, the fundamental purpose of procedural rules is to afford each litigant every opportunity to present evidence in their behalf in order that substantial justice is achieved. Court litigations are primarily for the search of truth, and a liberal interpretation of the rules by which both parties are given the fullest opportunity to adduce proofs is the best way to ferret out such truth. The dispensation of justice and vindication of legitimate grievances should not be barred by technicalities.[27]
xxx xxx xxx, “[d]ismissal of appeals purely on technical grounds is frowned upon and the rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense, for they are adopted to help secure, not override, substantial justice, and thereby defeat their very aims.” Verily, this Court, in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, may even stay the dismissal of appeals grounded merely on technicalities, especially in this case where petitioners’ appeal appears prima facie worthy of the CA’s full consideration on the merits.[28]In the case at bar, there exist cogent reasons to apply the foregoing principles. Petitioners were deprived of their right to present evidence at the trial proper through the gross and palpable mistake of their lawyer, who agreed to a submission of the case for decision without fully substantiating their defense. In addition, petitioners were deprived of their right to appeal the adverse order of the trial court when their lawyer failed to promptly notify them of the same, to enable them to move for reconsideration or appeal in due course. Thus, the relaxation of the strict application of technical rules is warranted.