765 Phil. 926
LEONEN, J.:
The non-deletion of [Anastacio E. Revilla's] name in the Young Law Firm's name is no more misleading than including the names of dead or retired partners in a law firm's name. It is more for sentimental reasons. It is a fraternal expression to a former brother in the profession that the Private Respondents fully understand, his [referring to Revilla] principled albeit quixotic advocacy.[31]Private respondents point out that the Balgos Law Firm is derailing the liquidation of Ruby Industrial Corporation by filing this Petition for contempt because the Balgos Law Firm resents that its nominee was not elected as liquidator.[32] Private respondents add that petitioners have continuously blocked Ruby Industrial Corporation's unsecured creditors from obtaining relief, as shown by the number of times that Ruby Industrial Corporation's cases have reached this court.[33]
Rule 139-B. Disbarment and Discipline of AttorneysPetitioners argue that liability for contempt is separate from disciplinary action; hence, no forum shopping was committed.[42]
. . . .
Section 18. Confidentiality. — Proceedings against attorneys shall be private and confidential. However, the final order of the Supreme Court shall be published like its decisions in other cases.
SEC. 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing.— After charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within such period as may be fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt:This court has defined contempt of court as:
(a) Misbehavior of an officer of a court in the performance of his official duties or in his official transactions;
(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or judgment of a court, including the act of a person who, after being dispossessed or ejected from any real property by the judgment or process of any court of competent jurisdiction, enters or attempts or induces another to enter into or upon such real property, for the purpose of executing acts of ownership or possession, or in any manner disturbs the possession given to the person adjudged to be entitled thereto;
(c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes or proceedings of a court not constituting direct contempt under section 1 of this Rule;
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice;
(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as such without authority;
(f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly served;
(g) The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or property in the custody of an officer by virtue of an order or process of a court held by him. (Emphasis supplied)
a willful disregard or disobedience of a public authority. In its broad sense, contempt is a disregard of, or disobedience to, the rules or orders of a legislative or judicial body or an interruption of its proceedings by disorderly behavior or insolent language in its presence or so near thereto as to disturb its proceedings or to impair the respect due to such a body. In its restricted and more usual sense, contempt comprehends a despising of the authority, justice, or dignity of a court. The phrase contempt of court is generic, embracing within its legal signification a variety of different acts.[43] (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)In this case, respondents committed acts that are considered indirect contempt under Section 3 of Rule 71. In addition, respondents disregarded the Code of Professional Responsibility when they retained the name of respondent Revilla in their firm name.
Rule 3.02. In the choice of a firm name, no false, misleading or assumed name shall be used. The continued use of the name of a deceased partner is permissible provided that the firm indicates in all its communications that said partner is deceased.Respondents argue that the use of respondent Revilla's name is "no more misleading than including the names of dead or retired partners in a law firm's name."[44]
I am of the opinion that the petition may be granted with the condition that it be indicated in the letterheads of the two firms (as the case may be) that Alexander Sycip, former Justice Ozaeta and Herminio Ozaeta are dead or the period when they served as partners should be stated therein.The use of a deceased partner's name in a law firm's name was allowed upon the effectivity of the Code of Professional Responsibility, with the requirement that "the firm indicates in all its communications that said partner is deceased."[53]
Obviously, the purpose of the two firms in continuing the use of the names of their deceased founders is to retain the clients who had customarily sought the legal services of Attorneys Sycip and Ozaeta and to benefit from the goodwill attached to the names of those respected and esteemed law practitioners. That is a legitimate motivation.
The retention of their names is not illegal per se. That practice was followed before the war by the law firm of James Ross. Notwithstanding the death of Judge Ross, the founder of the law firm of Ross, Lawrence, Selph and Carrascoso, his name was retained in the firm name with an indication of the year when he died. No one complained that the retention of the name of Judge Ross in the firm name was illegal or unethical.[52]
1. Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, judgment, or command of a court, or injunction granted by a court or judge;This court found that Atty. Ney was in contempt of court and held that:
2. Misbehavior of an officer of the court in the performance of his official duties or in his official transactions.[59]
Under the second subdivision of [Section 232], Bosque is obviously not answerable, inasmuch as he was not an officer of the court. On the other hand, under this subdivision, the defendant Ney, as an admitted attorney, is liable if his conduct amounted to misbehavior. We are of the opinion that it did. In the offense of Bosque in holding himself out as a general practitioner Ney participated, and for the improper signature of the pleadings he was chiefly and personally responsible.[60]In Cambaliza v. Atty. Cristal-Tenorio,[61] Atty. Ana Luz B. Cristal-Tenorio used a letterhead indicating that Felicisimo Tenorio, Jr. was a senior partner in the Cristal-Tenorio Law Office when, in fact, he was not a lawyer.[62] This court held that:
A lawyer who allows a non-member of the Bar to misrepresent himself as a lawyer and to practice law is guilty of violating Canon 9 and Rule 9.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which read as follows:From the time respondent Revilla was disbarred in 2009, it appears that no efforts were exerted to remove his name from the firm name. Thus, respondents Atty. Young and Atty. Magat are held liable for contempt of court.Canon 9 — A lawyer shall not directly or indirectly assist in the unauthorized practice of law.The term "practice of law" implies customarily or habitually holding oneself out to the public as a lawyer for compensation as a source of livelihood or in consideration of his services. Holding one's self out as a lawyer may be shown by acts indicative of that purpose like identifying oneself as attorney, appearing in court in representation of a client, or associating oneself as a partner of a law office for the general practice of law. Such acts constitute unauthorized practice of law.
Rule 9.01 — A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any task which by law may only be performed by a member of the Bar in good standing.x x x
The lawyer's duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the unauthorized practice of law is founded on public interest and policy. Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly qualified in education and character. The permissive right conferred on the lawyer is an individual and limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards of moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the public, the court, the client, and the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the disciplinary control of the Court. It devolves upon a lawyer to see that this purpose is attained. Thus, the canons and ethics of the profession enjoin him not to permit his professional services or his name to be used in aid of, or to make possible the unauthorized practice of law by, any agency, personal or corporate. And, the law makes it a misbehavior on his part, subject to disciplinary action, to aid a layman in the unauthorized practice of law.[63] (Citations omitted)
SEC. 7. Punishment for indirect contempt.—If the respondent is adjudged guilty of indirect contempt committed against a Regional Trial Court or a court of equivalent or higher rank, he may be punished by a fine not exceeding thirty thousand pesos or imprisonment not exceeding six (6) months, or both. If he is adjudged guilty of contempt committed against a lower court, he may be punished by a fine not exceeding five thousand pesos or imprisonment not exceeding one (1) month, or both. If the contempt consists in the violation of a writ of injunction, temporary restraining order or status quo order, he may also be ordered to make complete restitution to the party injured by such violation of the property involved or such amount as may be alleged and proved.In view of Rule 71, Section 7, a fine of P30,000.00 each is imposed on respondents Atty. Young and Atty. Magat.
The writ of execution, as in ordinary civil actions, shall issue for the enforcement of a judgment imposing a fine unless the court otherwise provides. (Emphasis supplied)
In fact, when co-Private Respondent Gambol, initially cowed perhaps, by the same intimidation worked upon him by the Complainants' counsel in another case, asked permission to delete [Anastacio E. Revilla's] name in the Young Law Firm's name in the pleadings that he (i.e. Private Respondent Gambol) would subsequently file, Respondent Young allowed him to do so.[64]This court recognizes respondent Atty. Gambol's effort to avoid misleading the public by removing respondent Revilla's name in the pleadings he filed. Thus, the Complaint against him is dismissed.
Although this court grants the appearance of Atty. Walter Young for the Liquidator, his appearance however shall be allowed only if in the name of the Young Law Firm, managed by the said counsel, and not under the name of the Law Firm of Young Revilla Gambol and Magat. This is to avoid any misconception that a disbarred lawyer, Revilla, continues to practice law.[66]Petitioners argue that respondent Judge Calo's Order is an indirect violation of "the proscription against the participation of ... disbarred lawyer[s]"[67] in court. Further, the Young Law Firm does not exist.[68]
[T]he law provides ample judicial remedies against errors or irregularities being committed by a Trial Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction. The ordinary remedies against errors or irregularities which may be regarded as normal in nature (i.e., error in appreciation or admission of evidence, or in construction or application of procedural or substantive law or legal principle) include a motion for reconsideration (or after rendition of a judgment or final order, a motion for new trial), and appeal. The extraordinary remedies against error or irregularities which may be deemed extraordinary in character (i.e., whimsical, capricious, despotic exercise of power or neglect of duty, etc.) are inter alia the special civil actions of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, or a motion for inhibition, a petition for change of venue, as the case may be.Whether petitioners availed themselves of judicial remedies was not stated in their Petition. Nevertheless, this court cannot ignore the possible effect of respondent Judge Calo's Order. Thus, the Complaint against respondent Judge Calo shall be re-docketed as an administrative matter. Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Now, the established doctrine and policy is that disciplinary proceedings and criminal actions against Judges are not complementary or suppletory of, nor a substitute for, these judicial remedies, whether ordinary or extraordinary. Resort to and exhaustion of these judicial remedies, as well as the entry of judgment in the corresponding action or proceeding, are prerequisites for the taking of other measures against the persons of the judges concerned, whether of civil, administrative, or criminal nature. It is only after the available judicial remedies have been exhausted and the appellate tribunals have spoken with finality, that the door to an inquiry into his criminal, civil or administrative liability may be said to have opened, or closed.[71] (Citation omitted)
SECTION 11. . . . The Supreme Court en bane shall have the power to discipline judges of lower courts, or order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon.Also, Rule 4, Section 3(a) of the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court[72] provides that the administrative functions of this court include "disciplinary and administrative matters involving justices, judges, and court personnel[.]"
when a party repetitively avails of several judicial remedies in different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues either pending in or already resolved adversely by some other court.[74]The elements of forum shopping are:
(a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both actions;This court has explained that disbarment proceedings are sui generis, and are not akin to civil or criminal cases.[76] A disbarment proceeding "is intended to cleanse the ranks of the legal profession of its undesirable members in order to protect the public and the courts."[77]
(b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and
(c) the identity of the two preceding particulars, such that any judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration.[75]
The disciplinary authority of the Court over members of the Bar is broader [than] the power to punish for contempt. Contempt of court may be committed both by lawyers and non-lawyers, both in and out of court. Frequently, where the contemnor is a lawyer, the contumacious conduct also constitutes professional misconduct which calls into play the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court. Where the respondent is a lawyer, however, the Supreme Court's disciplinary authority over lawyers may come into play whether or not the misconduct with which the respondent is charged also constitutes contempt of court. The power to punish for contempt of court does not exhaust the scope of disciplinary authority of the Court over lawyers. The disciplinary authority of the Court over members of the Bar is but corollary to the Court's exclusive power of admission to the Bar. A lawyers [sic] is not merely a professional but also an officer of the court and as such, he is called upon to share in the task and responsibility of dispensing justice and resolving disputes in society. Any act on his part which visibly tends to obstruct, pervert, or impede and degrade the administration of justice constitutes both professional misconduct calling for the exercise of disciplinary action against him and contumacious conduct warranting application of the contempt power.[80] (Citations omitted)WHEREFORE, respondents Atty. Walter T. Young and Atty. Dan Reynald R. Magat are found in contempt of court for using a disbarred lawyer's name in their firm name and are meted a fine of P30,000.00 each.