811 Phil. 538
MENDOZA, J.:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff Atty. Edralin S. Mateo as against the defendant Eduardo N. Riguer as follows:Aggrieved, Riguer appealed to the RTC.
1. Ordering the defendant Eduardo Riguer to pay the plaintiff the amount of TWO HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (Php250,000.00) with 6% legal interest commencing from the date of judicial demand or the filing of this case on May 30, 2011, until the finality of this Decision. The total amount due inclusive of interest shall further earn 6% interest until the whole obligation has been paid; and
2. Ordering the defendant Eduardo Riguer to pay the plaintiff the cost of this suit in the amount of FIVE THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED NINETY-FOUR PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS (Php5,494.50).
SO ORDERED.[9]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, let the above-entitled appealed case be DISMISSED with prejudice for lack of merit. The decision in Civil Case No. 19388 dated July 26, 2013 rendered by the MTCC - Branch 1, Cabanatuan City is hereby affirmed in toto.Undeterred, Riguer appealed before the CA.
SO ORDERED.[10]
ACCORDINGLY, this petition is DENIED and the Decision dated June 2, 2014, AFFIRMED.Riguer moved for reconsideration, but his motion was denied by the CA in its September 3, 2015 Resolution for being filed out of time. He filed another motion for reconsideration, but it was again denied by the CA in its January 14, 2016 Resolution as a second motion for reconsideration was prohibited pursuant to Section 2, Rule 52 of the Rules of Court.
SO ORDERED.[11]
Riguer insists that the CA erred in ruling that the first motion for reconsideration was filed out of time. He faults the CA in reckoning the 15-day period to file a motion for reconsideration from May 15, 2015, or the date his former counsel allegedly received the notice of the April 13, 2015 decision. Riguer explained that the notice was received by a certain Marisol Macaldo (Macaldo). He asserts that Macaldo never worked for the law firm which previously represented him because she was a former helper of the father of one of the lawyers in the said law firm. Thus, Riguer concludes that the service of the notice was defective as it was never served at the office of his counsel but at the latter's family home. Likewise, he dismisses the CA's ruling that his motion for reconsideration of the September 3, 2015 resolution was a second motion for reconsideration because it raised a different issue.ISSUES I
WHETHER RIGUER'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION FOR THE APRIL 13, 2015 CA DECISION WAS TIMELY FILED.II
WHETHER ATTY. MATEO IS ENTITLED TO RECOVER P250,000.00 IN ATTORNEY'S FEES PURSUANT TO THE KASUNDUAN.
Time and again, this Court has emphasized that procedural rules should be treated with utmost respect and due regard, since they are designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases to remedy the worsening problem of delay in the resolution of rival claims and in the administration of justice. From time to time, however, we have recognized exceptions to the Rules, but only for the most compelling reasons where stubborn obedience to the Rules would defeat rather than serve the ends of justice.The merits of Riguer's petition for review warrant a relaxation of the rules of procedure if only to attain justice swiftly. As would be further discussed, a denial of his petition would only allow Atty. Mateo to collect unconscionable attorney's fees.
x x x x
Ergo, where strong considerations of substantive justice are manifest in the petition, the strict application of the rules of procedure may be relaxed, in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction. Thus, a rigid application of the rules of procedure will not be entertained if it will obstruct rather than serve the broader interests of justice in the light of the prevailing circumstances in the case under consideration.[16]
Second, the standard of proof required is clear and convincing evidence. This standard of proof is derived from American common law. It is less than proof beyond reasonable doubt (for criminal cases) but greater than preponderance of evidence (for civil cases). The degree of believability is higher than that of an ordinary civil case. Civil cases only require a preponderance of evidence to meet the required burden of proof. However, when fraud is alleged in an ordinary civil case involving contractual relations, an entirely different standard of proof needs to be satisfied. The imputation of fraud in a civil case requires the presentation of clear and convincing evidence. Mere allegations will not suffice to sustain the existence of fraud. The burden of evidence rests on the part of the plaintiff or the party alleging fraud. The quantum of evidence is such that fraud must be clearly and convincingly shown.[19] [Emphases supplied]Other than Riguer's allegation of fraud, no clear and convincing evidence was presented to support a conclusion that Atty. Mateo employed it in preparing, and eventually having Riguer sign, the Kasunduan. Absent sufficient proof of fraud, the contract binds the parties and is the law between them.
Sec. 24. Compensation of attorneys; agreement as to fees. - An attorney shall be entitled to have and recover from his client no more than a reasonable compensation for his services, with a view to the importance of the subject-matter of the controversy, the extent of the services rendered, and professional standing of the attorney. No court shall be bound by the opinion of attorneys as expert witnesses as to the proper compensation but may disregard such testimony and base its conclusion on its professional knowledge. A written contract for services shall control the amount to be paid therefor unless found by the court to be unconscionable or unreasonable. [Emphases supplied]Accordingly, whether there is an agreement or not, the courts can fix a reasonable compensation which lawyers may receive for their professional services.[20] As an officer of the court, the lawyer submits himself to the authority of the court and, as such, the power to determine the reasonableness or unconscionable character of attorney's fees stipulated by the parties is a matter falling within the regulatory prerogative of the courts.[21]
Stipulated attorney's fees are unconscionable whenever the amount is by far so disproportionate compared to the value of the services rendered as to amount to fraud perpetrated upon the client. This means to say that the amount of the fee contracted for, standing alone and unexplained would be sufficient to show that an unfair advantage had been taken of the client, or that a legal fraud had been perpetrated on him.Applying the aforementioned standards, no other conclusion can be reached other than that the P250,000.00 attorney's fees was unconscionable. First, the attorney's fees amounted to almost 50% of the value of the property litigated as it was only sold for P600,000.00. Second, Riguer was a farmer of advanced age with limited educational attainment. Third, the stipulated attorney's fees in the Kasunduan referred to Atty. Mateo's services for the appeal because the legal fees during the proceedings in the trial court had already been paid. Lastly, Atty. Mateo judicially admitted that he believed he was entitled to 10% attorney's fees. It was stated in the Kasunduan that Atty. Mateo was to be paid P250,000.00 because he claimed that the litigated property had a fair market value of around P3 million. The same, however, was sold for only P600,000.00.
The decree of unconscionability or unreasonableness of a stipulated amount in a contingent fee contract, will not, however, preclude recovery. It merely justifies the fixing by the court of a reasonable compensation for the lawyer's services.
Generally, the amount of attorney's fees due is that stipulated in the retainer agreement which is conclusive as to the amount of the lawyer's compensation. A stipulation on a lawyer's compensation in a written contract for professional services ordinarily controls the amount of fees that the contracting lawyer may be allowed, unless the court finds such stipulated amount unreasonable or unconscionable. x x x x
We have identified the circumstances to be considered in determining the reasonableness of a claim for attorney's fees as follows: (1) the amount and character of the service rendered; (2) labor, time, and trouble involved; (3) the nature and importance of the litigation or business in which the services were rendered; (4) the responsibility imposed; (5) the amount of money or the value of the property affected by the controversy or involved in the employment; (6) the skill and experience called for in the performance of the services; (7) the professional character and social standing of the attorney; (8) the results secured; (9) whether the fee is absolute or contingent, it being recognized that an attorney may properly charge a much larger fee when it is contingent than when it is not; and (10) the financial capacity and economic status of the client have to be taken into account in fixing the reasonableness of the fee.[23] [Emphases supplied]
With the material contradictions in the Dela Peria's evidence, the CA cannot be faulted for upholding the validity of the impugned 4 November 1997 Deed of Absolute Sale. Having been duly notarized, said deed is a public document which carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon it with respect to its due execution. Regarded as evidence of the facts therein expressed in a clear, unequivocal manner, public documents enjoy a presumption of regularity which may only be rebutted by evidence so clear, strong and convincing as to exclude all controversy as to falsity. The burden of proof to overcome said presumptions lies with the party contesting the notarial document like the Dela Peñas who, unfortunately, failed to discharge said onus. Absent clear and convincing evidence to contradict the same, we find that the CA correctly pronounced the Deed of Absolute Sale was valid and binding between Antonia and Gemma.[25] [Emphasis and underscoring supplied]In the case at bench, other than his bare assertions, Atty. Mateo never presented proof to support his claim that the consideration indicated in the deed of sale was spurious. Absent any proof to the contrary, the contents of the notarized deed of sale should be held valid and true. Further, Riguer pointed out that the property was located in a remote location, which made it less valuable compared to properties located in the center of the city.