815 Phil. 268
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Michael | Michelle | ||
Grade 6 | P 18,118.10 | Nursery | P 18,280.00 |
1st year high school | 20,366.00 | Grade 1 | |
2nd year high school | 24,241.00 | Grade 2 | 15,050.00 |
3rd year high school | 26,996.00 | Grade 3 | 17,704.00 |
4th year high school | 29,676.00 | | |
Petitioner is endowed with an average intellectual capacity and possesses practical sounding cognitive skills that enables her to confront her challenges in an efficient manner. However, her better judgment and analytical functions are inclined to falter when pressures and stresses overwhelm her.
Personality profile reveals a woman who is overly submissive to the point of being gullible such that she normally gets the raw end of a deal in most social situations. As much as possible, she would want a smooth sailing interaction especially with her loved ones, trying to compensate for lost time when she is not around them.
She is however, the type who knows and honors her commitments and obligations even if the people she trusts, as in the case of her wayward husband – Respondent have already betrayed her.
She is basically goal-focused and independent-minded but these mature and positive traits easily dwindle when her sentimental nature gets the better of her. She welcomes praises and attention accorded to her by her milieu such that she sometimes fail to decipher who among them are merely taking advantage of her generosity/kindness. Consequently, she easily gets fooled, particularly as she could really be too trusting.
Assertiveness and strength of character are the least among her traits but Petitioner always makes it a point to maintain a positive outlook and disposition in life despite her failures. She is very sensitive and considerate of the feelings of other people.
Pyschosexual adjustment is basically adequate even if she has developed a wary attitude towards members of the opposite sex.
Over-all analysis of the test data failed to yield traces of any on-going psychopathological condition nor of any type of personality disorder. Thus, Petitioner is still Psychologically Capacitated to understand, comply and execute her marital obligations.
The same could not be said as true for the Respondent who is undoubtedly suffering from the Narcissistic Type of Personality Disorder, as evidenced by the following symptomatic behavior:
- He is unable to maintain his own direction in life without the financial help and support of other people. He clings to the Petitioner, who is the breadwinner, sacrificing to be away from home to be able to build up a stable future, for his finances. He also maintains an amorous relationship with different women as a source of added emotional support, boost of and satisfaction of his self-directed/immediate needs and desires.
- He is not motivated to work and likewise capitalizes on his physical assets to attain what he wants to achieve.
- He is contented with his present lifestyle without thought of others and has no foresight to prepare for a healthy family, emotionally and socially. He is not bothered by his conscience and even flaunts his indiscretions publicly.
- He has marked adjustment difficulties with his immediate relatives.
- He has a very poor impulse control, easily using invectives/verbal tirades and at times unable to control his aggressions that physical fights with Petitioner arose.
- He took advantage of Petitioner's kindness, resourcefulness and industry, by not fulfilling his part of the marriage covenant. He never cared nor attended to his children but often delegated them to whoever would be willing to assist him.
- He appears not to make use of his judgment and decision making abilities as he is under the mercy of his immature impulses where the important aspect of his life, is himself and immediate gratification of his needs.
Thus, attending to his responsibility, understanding and complying with his obligations in marriage are beyond his capacity. Conclusively, the breakdown of their marriage could be traced to Respondent's aforementioned traits plus his inadequacy and insecurity in dealing with mature roles. Respondent's traits and attitudes have been present even before marriage so that to effect any change or improvement in his dispositions, would be difficult to do. The Psychological Incapacitation is pervasive, permanent and clinically proven to be incurable. Respondent has accepted it as his means of coping with stressing life demands and is not aware that it was the source of their estrangement and final breakdown of their marital relationship.
The root cause of which started in his early days of training where ambivalent/matter-of-fact treatment was received from immediate caregivers. Because of his ordinal position among the children, being the youngest boy, he was always given the choice of what to do, favored or praised. He was not able to overcome such indulgence, carried it to his adolescent/adult years, as he was always given the most attention.
Contrarily, they were also somehow neglected because of financial lack so much so that parents had to work overtime to earn adequately for their living. Respondent together with his younger siblings were left to the care of elder brothers/sisters who just simply/literally followed what their parents would want of them. Guidance and discipline were imposed upon the elder siblings but became oblivious towards the Respondent. It developed in Respondent on how he would go about his life without experiencing the deprivation and hardship that he had undergone. He became self-focused and at the same time hunted for women vulnerable to his superficialities.
Thus, they are better off apart for the sake of everyone who are within their bounds of reach" for Respondent does not realize the pain he is causing towards other people, specifically his legal wife – the Petitioner as well as their children.
It is therefore recommended that their marriage covenant be dissolved for everyone's peace of mind, through due process in this Honorable Court.[35]
Based on the evidence submitted, the parties never shared a true married life.
After a careful evaluation of the records, this Court finds the petition to be impressed with merit. The respondent is described as suffering from narcissistic personality disorder found to be permanent, severe, serious, and incurable, rendering him as psychologically incapacitated to perform the marital obligations.
Respondent neglected his obligations as a husband and father to their children. Even prior to the marriage, the respondent manifested his psychological incapacity. He suspected the paternity of his son with the petitioner and even turned his back upon learning it. He has visited only on the day of giving birth by the petitioner of their son. He never cared for his son and would only visit him once in a while. He never worked to support his son. In fact, the respondent was financially dependent on the petitioner even before the marriage. He defrauded the petitioner by registering all the properties bought by the petitioner from the latter's exclusive income under his name declaring themselves as married. Worst, he sold a portion of the property in Morong without the knowledge of the petitioner.
During the marriage, the respondent's laziness became manifest. He focused on his self and does not care who gets hurt for as long as it satisfies him. He gambles and drinks at the expense of the petitioner. He was given the chance to earn for himself and for the family and still, he did not handle it well and instead continued with his vices.
The respondent disregarded his obligations to spend quality time with the petitioner and especially with their children. He even committed infidelities.
All deeds and actions of the respondent are clear demonstrations of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.
By reason of the respondent's immaturity and irresponsibility stemming from his NARCISSISTIC PERSONALITY DISORDER, he was unable to fulfill his duties and responsibilities towards his wife and children, thus constituting psychological incapacity.
The psychological report shows that respondent's psychological incapacity is characterized by juridical antecedence as it was found to have existed even prior to the time he contracted marriage with petitioner. Respondent's personality disorder, the root cause of which can be traced in his childhood years was found to be pervasive and permanent. Being the youngest boy, Respondent was always favored and praised but was not properly guided and disciplined by his parents as the latter were pre-occupied with improving their finances.
It also speaks of gravity because respondent is incapable of rendering marital obligations like commitment, fidelity, trust, support and love toward the petitioner and their children which are very vital in a marital relationship. In fact, Ms. De Guzman stated in her report that attending to his responsibilities, understanding and complying with his obligations in marriage are beyond respondent's capacity.
It is incurable because the psychological incapacity of the respondent is deeply rooted, it is already in his character. No amount of therapy, no matter how intensive, can possibly change the respondent insofar as incapability to perform his essential marital obligations with the petitioner and to his children are concerned. Respondent has already accepted such incapacity as his means of coping with stressing life demands.[39]
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the marriage between YOLANDA EREVE GARLET and VENCIDOR TAEP GARLET held at the Office of the Mayor, Morong, Rizal on March 4, 1994, as NULL AND VOID AB INITIO on [the] ground of psychological incapacity of the respondent to perform the essential marital obligations in accordance with Article 36 of the Family Code, with all the legal effects thereon.
The property relation between the petitioner and respondent under Article 147 of the Family Code is deemed DISSOLVED. The real properties acquired prior to marriage and cohabitation is hereby declared exclusive properties of the petitioner particularly the real property covered by Transfer Certificate [of Title] No. M-38509 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal; and the tricycle and jeepney covered by Certificate of Registration Nos. 13175616 and 27224267, respectively.
The parties are directed to submit list of properties for liquidation, partition and distribution; and the delivery of presumptive legitime of their common children with notice to their creditors upon finality of this decision.
The custody of the children, namely: 1) Michael Vincent E. Garlet; and 2) Michelle Mae E. Garlet is hereby awarded to the petitioner subject to visitorial right of the respondent once a week at the most convenient time of the said children. The respondent is hereby adjudged to give support to the children in the amount of P3,000.00 a month each to be deposited every 5th day of the month in their respective bank accounts under trust of the petitioner; and he is hereby directed to provide at least one-half of the cost of their education.
The petitioner shall revert to the use of her maiden name.
The Local Civil Registrars of Morong, Rizal, and Pasig [City] are directed to cause the entry of the foregoing judgment in the Book of Marriages upon issuance thereof.
A decree of declaration of nullity of marriage shall be issued upon compliance with the foregoing judgment.[40]
[W]e scrutinized the totality of evidence adduced by Yolanda and found that the same was not enough to sustain a finding that Vencidor was psychologically incapacitated.
In essence, Yolanda wanted to equate Vencidor's addiction to alcohol, chronic gambling, womanizing, refusal to find a job and his inability to take care of their children as akin to psychological incapacity. At best, Yolanda's allegations showed that Vencidor was irresponsible, insensitive, or emotionally immature. The incidents cited by Yolanda did not show that Vencidor suffered from a psychological malady so grave and permanent as to deprive him of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond.
Yolanda's portrayal of Vencidor as jobless and irresponsible is not enough. It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological illness. Indeed, irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, and the like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36, as the same may only be due to a person's refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage and not due to some psychological illness that is contemplated by this rule. What the law requires to render a marriage void on the ground of psychological incapacity is downright incapacity, not refusal or neglect or difficulty, much less ill will.
In ruling for Yolanda, the trial court gave credence to the psychological report prepared by Ms. De Guzman. x x x
While it is true that courts rely heavily on psychological experts for its understanding of human personality, still the root cause of the psychological incapacity must be identified as a psychological illness, its incapacitating nature fully explained, and said incapacity established by the totality of the evidence presented during trial. Likewise, although there is no requirement that a party to be declared psychologically incapacitated should be personally examined by a physician or a psychologist (as a condition sine qua non), there is nevertheless still a need to prove the psychological incapacity through independent evidence adduced by the person alleging said disorder.
In the instant case, the root cause of the alleged psychological incapacity, its incapacitating nature and the incapacity itself were not sufficiently explained. What can be perused from the psychological report prepared by Ms. De Guzman is that it only offered a general evaluation on the supposed root cause of Vencidor's personality disorder. The report failed to exhaustively explain the relation between being a pampered youngest son and suffering from a psychological malady so grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond.
The psychological report failed to reveal that the personality traits of Vencidor were grave or serious enough to bring about an incapacity to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Ms. De Guzman merely stated in the said report that it is beyond the capacity of Vencidor to attend to his responsibility and understand and comply with his marital obligations. Such statement is a mere general conclusion which, unfortunately, is unsubstantiated. We cannot see how Vencidor's supposed personality disorder would render him unaware of the essential marital obligations or to be incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by him.
Also, we cannot help but note that Ms. De Guzman's conclusions about Vencidor's psychological incapacity were primarily based on the informations fed to her by Yolanda whose bias for her cause cannot be doubted. Moreover, Ms. De Guzman testified that the informations that she obtained from Yolanda were the result of one-hour interview with Yolanda and initial testing given at intervals.
While this circumstance alone does not disqualify the psychologist for reasons of bias, her report, testimony and conclusions deserve the application of a more rigid and stringent set of standards. Ms. De Guzman only examined Vencidor from a third-party account. To make conclusions on x x x Vencidor's psychological condition based on the information fed by Yolanda, during a one-hour interview, is not different from admitting hearsay evidence as proof of the truthfulness of the content of such evidence.
It remains settled that the State has a high stake in the preservation of marriage rooted in its recognition of the sanctity of married life and its mission to protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. Hence, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. Presumption is always in favor of the validity of marriage. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio.[41]
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the instant appeal is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the assailed Decision dated November 27, 2006 and the Order dated February 26, 2007 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage between herein parties is hereby declared as still subsisting and valid.[42]
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT AND DECLARING THAT THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN YOLANDA GARLET AND VENCIDOR GARLET TO BE SUBSISTING. THE COURT OF APPEALS MISINTERPRETED AND MISAPPRECIATED THE APPLICABLE LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE OF THE CASE.II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING THE MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND CONSEQUENTLY DECREEING THAT THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION WAS FILED OUT OF TIME.[46]
1.) Beginning one month after the promulgation of this Resolution, the rule shall be strictly enforced that no motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration may be filed with the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Courts, the Regional Trial Courts, and the [Court of Appeals]. Such a motion may be filed only in cases pending with the Supreme Court as the court of last resort, which may in its sound discretion either grant or deny the extension requested.[49]
As the period to file a motion for reconsideration is non-extendible, petitioner's motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration did not toll the reglementary period to appeal; thus, petitioner had already lost his right to appeal the September 23, 2005 decision. As such, the RTC decision became final as to petitioner when no appeal was perfected after the lapse of the prescribed period.
Doctrinally-entrenched is that the right to appeal is a statutory right and the one who seeks to avail that right must comply with the statute or rules. The requirements for perfecting an appeal within the reglementary period specified in the law must be strictly followed as they are considered indispensable interdictions against needless delays. Moreover, the perfection of appeal in the manner and within the period set by law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional as well, hence, failure to perfect the same renders the judgment final and executory.
The CA correctly ordered that petitioner's appellant's brief be stricken off the records. As the CA said, the parties who have not appealed in due time cannot legally ask for the modification of the judgment or obtain affirmative relief from the appellate court. A party who fails to question an adverse decision by not filing the proper remedy within the period prescribed by law loses his right to do so. As petitioner failed to perfect his appeal within the period for doing so, the September 23, 2005 decision has become final as against him. The rule is clear that no modification of judgment could be granted to a party who did not appeal. It is enshrined as one of the basic principles in our rules of procedure, specifically to avoid ambiguity in the presentation of issues, facilitate the setting forth of arguments by the parties, and aid the court in making its determinations. It is not installed in the rules merely to make litigations laborious and tedious for the parties. It is there for a reason.
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
Prefatorily, it bears stressing that it is the policy of our Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. Our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a social institution in which the state is vitally interested. The State can find no stronger anchor than on good, solid and happy families. The break up of families weakens our social and moral fabric and, hence, their preservation is not the concern alone of the family members.
Thus, the Court laid down in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals and Molina stringent guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code, to wit:(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation". It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable", thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological – not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis (Salita v. Magtolis, 233 SCRA 100, 108), nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's". The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts x x x.
In Santos v. Court of Appeals, the Court declared that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. It should refer to "no less than a mental, not physical, incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage." The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.
However, in more recent jurisprudence, we have observed that notwithstanding the guidelines laid down in Molina, there is a need to emphasize other perspectives as well which should govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. Each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. In regard to psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court. With the advent of Te v. Te, the Court encourages a reexamination of jurisprudential trends on the interpretation of Article 36 although there has been no major deviation or paradigm shift from the Molina doctrine. (Citations omitted.)
Yoly - Ayoko na nga basta umalis ka sa bahay natin at kung hindi ka aalis kami ng mga anak mo ang aalis. Vencidor
– Paano mga anak natin, sinong mag-aalaga sa kanila. Yoly – Ako na ang bahala sa mga anak ko bubuhayin ko sila. x x x x Yoly – Makikita mo pa naman ang mga anak mo, puwede mo rin naman dalawin kahit dalawang beses sa isang lingo. Vencidor
– Ayoko yata Yoly na magkahiwalay tayo paano na ako, sino ang mag-iintindi sa mga anak ko, halimbawa na umalis ka uli papunta abroad.
Habitual drunkenness, gambling and refusal to find a job, while indicative of psychological incapacity, do not, by themselves, show psychological incapacity. All these simply indicate difficulty, neglect or mere refusal to perform marital obligations that, as the cited jurisprudence holds, cannot be considered to be constitutive of psychological incapacity in the absence of proof that these are manifestations of an incapacity rooted in some debilitating psychological condition or illness.
The Court finds that the psychological report presented in this case is insufficient to establish Nilda's psychological incapacity. In her report, Vatanagul concluded that Nilda is a nymphomaniac, an emotionally immature individual, has a borderline personality, has strong sexual urges which are incurable, has complete denial of her actual role as a wife, has a very weak conscience or superego, emotionally immature, a social deviant, not a good wife as seen in her infidelity on several occasions, an alcoholic, suffers from anti-social personality disorder, fails to conform to social norms, deceitful, impulsive, irritable and aggressive, irresponsible and vain. She further defined "nymphomania" as a psychiatric disorder that involves a disturbance in motor behavior as shown by her sexual relationship with various men other than her husband.
The report failed to specify, however, the names of the men Nilda had sexual relationship with or the circumstances surrounding the same. As pointed out by Nilda, there is not even a single proof that she was ever involved in an illicit relationship with a man other than her husband. Vatanagul claims, during her testimony, that in coming out with the report, she interviewed not only Reynaldo but also Jojo Caballes, Dorothy and Lesley who were Reynaldo's sister-in-law and sister, respectively, a certain Marvin and a certain Susan. Vatanagul however, did not specify the identities of these persons, which information were supplied by whom, and how they came upon their respective informations. Indeed, the conclusions drawn by the report are vague, sweeping and lack sufficient factual bases. As the report lacked specificity, it failed to show the root cause of Nilda's psychological incapacity; and failed to demonstrate that there was a "natal or supervening disabling factor" or an "adverse integral element" in Nilda's character that effectively incapacitated her from accepting, and thereby complying with, the essential marital obligations, and that her psychological or mental malady existed even before the marriage, x x x. (Citations omitted.)
Vencidor – O sige Yoly ibabalik ko yong alahas mo at pera mo magsimula uli tayo. Yoly – Ayoko na nga makisama sa iyo, basta ibalik mo na lang ang pera ko at mga alahas ko. Vencidor – Paano naman ako dapat tayo ay hati. Yoly – O sige ibalik mo ang P150,000.00, at alahas ko. Vencidor – Gawin mo namang P300,000.00. Yoly – O sige gawin mo ng Tatlong daan, pati bahay sa Pila, Laguna jeep at trysikel sa iyo na umalis ka lang ng bahay. Vencidor – Saan naman ako uuwi, pero pansamantala lang ito di ba? Yoly – Makikita mo pa naman ang mga anak mo, puwede mo rin naman dalawin kahit dalawang beses sa isang lingo. Vencidor – Ayoko yata Yoly na magkahiwalay tayo paano na ako, sino ang mag-iintindi sa mga anak ko, halimbawa na umalis ka uli papunta abroad. Yoly – Ayoko na nga makisama sayo kung [di] ka aalis mapipilitan ako na itataas ko na ito kaso natin. Vencidor – O sige kukunin ko ang pera sa bangko at ibibigay ko sa iyo dadalhin ko sa bahay. Yoly – Ang kikita (sic) ko lagi niyang sinisilip. Vencidor – Dapat naman mag-asawa naman tayo kung ano ang iyo ay akin rin yon di ba. Yoly – Bakit mo kinuha ang pera ko [?] Vencidor – Ginalaw ko iyon kasi inuunahan mo ako. Di mo ako pinalalapit pagtulog ay mag-asawa tayo. At yong Hapon palaging tumatawag, kaya naitago ko ang mga alahas mo. Hinabol pa niyan ng saksak. Yoly – Sinisiraan niya ako sa Hapon ay iyon ay mga kustomer ko. Masasakit ang mga sinasabi niya sa kin. Vencidor – Binabalewala niya ako. Yoly – Basta umalis ka na sa baliay at naibigay ko na sa iyo ang [b]ahay sa [L]aguna, jeep, trysikel at pera ano pa ang gusto mo[?] [S]a amin ng mga anak mo ang bahay sa Natividad St., Ibaba. Wala ka pakialam roon at ako ang nagpundar noon.[70] (Emphases supplied.)
These acts, in our view, do not rise to the level of psychological incapacity that the law requires, and should be distinguished from the "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect," in the performance of some marital obligations that characterize some marriages. The intent of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders – existing at the time of the marriage – clearly demonstrating an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. The psychological illness that must have afflicted a party at the inception of the marriage should be a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she is about to assume. (Emphases supplied, citations omitted.)
We cannot help but note that Dr. Tayag's conclusions about the respondent's psychological incapacity were based on the information fed to her by only one side – the petitioner – whose bias in favor of her cause cannot be doubted. While this circumstance alone does not disqualify the psychologist for reasons of bias, her report, testimony and conclusions deserve the application of a more rigid and stringent set of standards in the manner we discussed above. For, effectively, Dr. Tayag only diagnosed the respondent from the prism of a third party account; she did not actually hear, see and evaluate the respondent and how he would have reacted and responded to the doctor's probes.
Dr. Tayag, in her report, merely summarized the petitioner's narrations, and on this basis characterized the respondent to be a self-centered, egocentric, and unremorseful person who "believes that the world revolves around him"; and who "used love as a . . . deceptive tactic for exploiting the confidence [petitioner] extended towards him." Dr. Tayag then incorporated her own idea of "love"; made a generalization that respondent was a person who "lacked commitment, faithfulness, and remorse," and who engaged "in promiscuous acts that made the petitioner look like a fool"; and finally concluded that the respondent's character traits reveal "him to suffer Narcissistic Personality Disorder with traces of Antisocial Personality Disorder declared to be grave and incurable."
We find these observations and conclusions insufficiently in-depth and comprehensive to warrant the conclusion that a psychological incapacity existed that prevented the respondent from complying with the essential obligations of marriage. It failed to identify the root cause of the respondent's narcissistic personality disorder and to prove that it existed at the inception of the marriage. Neither did it explain the incapacitating nature of the alleged disorder, nor show that the respondent was really incapable of fulfilling his duties due to some incapacity of a psychological, not physical, nature. Thus, we cannot avoid but conclude that Dr. Tayag's conclusion in her Report – i.e., that the respondent suffered "Narcissistic Personality Disorder with traces of Antisocial Personality Disorder declared to be grave and incurable – is an unfounded statement, not a necessary inference from her previous characterization and portrayal of the respondent. While the various tests administered on the petitioner could have been used as a fair gauge to assess her own psychological condition, this same statement cannot be made with respect to the respondent's condition. To make conclusions and generalizations on the respondent's psychological condition based on the information fed by only one side is. to our mind, not different from admitting hearsay evidence as proof of the truthfulness of the content of such evidence.
The Court finds that Dr. Patac's Psychiatric Evaluation Report fell short in proving that the respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital duties. We emphasize that Dr. Patac did not personally evaluate and examine the respondent; he, in fact, recommended at the end of his Report for the respondent to "undergo the same examination [that the petitioner] underwent." Dr. Patac relied only on the information fed by the petitioner, the parties' second child, Emmanuel, and household helper, Sarah. Largely, the doctor relied on the information provided by the petitioner. Thus, while his Report can be used as a fair gauge to assess the petitioner's own psychological condition (as he was, in fact, declared by Dr. Patac to be psychologically capable to fulfill the essential obligations of marriage), the same statement cannot be made with respect to the respondent's condition. The methodology employed simply cannot satisfy the required depth and comprehensiveness of the examination required to evaluate a party alleged to be suffering from a psychological disorder.
We do not suggest that a personal examination of the party alleged to be psychologically incapacitated is mandatory. We have confirmed in Marcos v. Marcos that the person sought to be declared psychologically incapacitated must be personally examined by a psychologist as a condition sine qua non to arrive at such declaration. If a psychological disorder can be proven by independent means, no reason exists why such independent proof cannot be admitted and given credit. No such independent evidence appears on record, however, to have been gathered in this case.[74]
The Constitution sets out a policy of protecting and strengthening the family as the basic social institution, and marriage is the foundation of the family. Marriage, as an inviolable institution protected by the State, cannot be dissolved at the whim of the parties. In petitions for the declaration of nullity of marriage, the burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage lies with the plaintiff. Unless the evidence presented clearly reveals a situation where the parties, or one of them, could not have validly entered into a marriage by reason of a grave and serious psychological illness existing at the time it was celebrated, we are compelled to uphold the indissolubility of the marital tie.
[63] | Q - | Now Madam Witness, how did you know that your husband was not trying to look for a job while you were in Japan? |
| A - | Yes, ma'am. The truth of the matter, my sister told me that he is always out of the house and frequently drinking and gambling, ma'am. |
| Q - | How did you know that your husband was out all the time and drinking and gambling while you were in Japan? |
| A - | I was being told by my relatives and also his relatives of his activities, ma'am. (TSN, March 10, 2006, pp. 40-41.) |