350 Phil. 544
ROMERO, J.:
Like a priceless
treasure coveted by many, but capable of ownership by only one, this 20,592
square-meter parcel of land located at Barrio Titong, Masbate, Masbate is
claimed by two contestants in this petition for review on certiorari.
Unfortunately, legal title over the property can be vested in only one of them.
The case
originated from an action for quieting of title filed by petitioner Mario
Titong. The Regional Trial Court of
Masbate, Masbate, Branch 44[1] ruled in favor of private
respondents, Victorico Laurio and Angeles Laurio, adjudging them as the true
and lawful owners of the disputed land. Affirmed on appeal to the Court of Appeals, petitioner comes to us for a
favorable reversal.
Petitioner
alleges that he is the owner of an unregistered parcel of land with an area of
3.2800 hectares, more or less, surveyed as Lot No. 3918, and declared for
taxation purposes in his name. He
claims that on three separate occasions in September 1983, private respondents,
with their hired laborers, forcibly entered a portion of the land containing an
area of approximately two (2) hectares, and began plowing the same under
pretext of ownership. Private
respondents denied this allegation, and averred that the disputed property formed
part of the 5.5-hectare agricultural land which they had purchased from their
predecessor-in-interest,[2] Pablo Espinosa on August 10, 1981.
In his
testimony, petitioner identified Espinosa as his adjoining owner[3], asserting that no controversy had sprouted between them for twenty years
until the latter sold Lot No. 3479 to private respondent Victorico Laurio.[4] This was corroborated by Ignacio
Villamor, who had worked on the land even before its sale to Espinosa in
1962. The boundary between the land
sold to Espinosa and what remained of petitioner’s property was the old
Bugsayon river. When petitioner
employed Bienvenido Lerit as his tenant in 1962, he instructed Lerit to change
the course of the old river and direct the flow of water to the lowland at the
southern portion of petitioner’s property, thus converting the old river into a
riceland.[5]
For his part,
private respondent anchors his defense on the following facts:
He denied petitioner’s claim of ownership, recounting that the area and boundaries of the disputed land remained unaltered during the series of conveyances prior to its coming into his hands. According to him, petitioner first declared the land for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No. 2916,[6] which showed that the land had an area of 5.5 hectares and was bounded on the North by the Bugsayon River; on the East by property under the ownership of Lucio Lerit; on the South by property owner by Potenciano Zaragoza; and on the West by property owned by Agapito de la Cruz.[7] Private Respondent then alleges that, on December 21, 1960, petitioner sold this property to Concepcion Verano vda. de Cabug, after which Tax Declaration No. 5339[8] was issued in her favor. In compliance with their mutual agreement to repurchase the same, petitioner reacquired the property by way of sale[9] on August 24, 1962 and then declared it for taxation purposes in his name under Tax Declaration No. 5720.[10] However, the property remained in petitioner’s hands for only four (4) days because, on August 28, 1962, he sold it to Espinosa[11] who then declared it in his name under Tax Declaration No. 12311.[12] Consequently, the property became a part of the estate of Pablo Espinosa’s wife, the late Segundina Liao Espinosa. On August 10, 1981, her heirs executed an instrument denominated as “Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Simultaneous Sale” whereby the 5.5-hectare property under Tax Declaration No. 12311 was sold to private respondent[13] in consideration of the amount ofP5,000.00. Thereafter, Tax Declaration No. 12738 was issued in the name of private respondent. In all these conveyances, the area and boundaries of the property remained exactly the same as those appearing in Tax Declaration No. 2916 under petitioner’s name.
It was proved at
the proceedings in the court a quo that two (2) surveys were made of the
disputed property. The first survey[14] was made for petitioner, while the
second was the relocation survey ordered by the lower court. As
anticipated, certain discrepancies
between the two surveys surfaced. Thus, contrary to petitioner’s allegation in his
complaint that he is the owner of only 3.2800 hectares, he was actually
claiming 5.9789 hectares, the total areas of Lot Nos. 3918, 3918-A and
3606. On the other hand, Lot No. 3479
pertaining to Espinosa, was left with only an area of 4.1841 hectares instead
of the 5.5 hectares sold by petitioner to him. Apprised of the discrepancy,
private respondent filed a protest[15] before the Bureau of Lands against
the first survey, likewise filing a case for alteration of boundaries before
the municipal trial court, the proceedings of which, however, were suspended
because of the instant case.[16]
Private
respondent testified that petitioner is one of the four heirs of his mother,
Leonida Zaragoza. In the Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale of Estate of the deceased Leonida Zaragoza,[17] the heirs adjudicated unto themselves the 3.6-hectare
property of the deceased. The property involved is described in the instrument
as having been declared under Tax Declaration No. 3301[18] and as bounded on the North by
Victor Verano, on the East by Benigno Titong, on the South by the Bugsayon
River and on the West by Benigno Titong. On September 9, 1969, Tax Declaration No. 8723 was issued to petitioner
for his corresponding share in the estate.
However, instead
of reflecting only .9000 hectare as his rightful share in the extrajudicial
settlement[19] petitioner’s share was bloated to
2.4 hectares. It therefore appeared to private respondent that petitioner
encroached upon his (Laurio’s) property and declared it a part of his inheritance.[20] The boundaries were likewise
altered so that it was bounded on the North by Victor Verano, on the East by
Benigno Titong, on the South by property owner Espinosa, and on the West by
property owner Adolfo Titong.[21] Private respondent accordingly denied
that petitioner had diverted the course of the Bugsayon River after he had
repurchased the land from Concepcion Verano vda. de Cabug[22] because the land was immediately
sold to Espinosa shortly thereafter.[23]
The lower court
rendered a decision in favor of private respondents, declaring him as the true
and absolute owner of the litigated property and ordering petitioner to respect
private respondents’ title and ownership over the property and to pay
attorney’s fees, litigation expenses, costs and moral damages.
Petitioner
appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the decision. On motion for
reconsideration, the same was denied for lack of merit. Hence, this petition
for review on certiorari.
At the outset, we
hold that the instant petition must be denied for the reason that the lower
court should have outrightly dismissed the complaint for quieting of title. The
remedy of quieting of title may be availed of under the circumstances
enumerated in the Civil Code:
“ART. 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, by reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or effective but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the title.
An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon title to real property or any interest therein.”
Under this
provision, a claimant must show that there is an instrument, record, claim,
encumbrance or proceeding which constitutes or casts a cloud, doubt, question
or shadow upon the owner’s title to or interest in real property.[24] The ground or reason for filing a
complaint for quieting of title must therefore be “an instrument, record,
claim, encumbrance or proceeding.” Under the maxim expresio unius est
exclusio alterius, these grounds are exclusive so that other reasons
outside of the purview of these reasons may not be considered valid for the
same action.[25]
Had the lower
court thoroughly considered the complaint filed, it would have had no other
course of action under the law but to dismiss it. The complaint failed to allege that an “instrument, record,
claim, encumbrance or proceeding” beclouded the plaintiff’s title over the
property involved. Petitioner merely
alleged that the defendants (respondents herein), together with their hired
laborers and without legal justification, forcibly entered the southern portion
of the land of the plaintiff and plowed the same:
He then
proceeded to claim damages and attorney’s fees. He prayed that, aside from issuing a writ or preliminary
injunction enjoining private respondents and their hired laborers from
intruding into the land, the court should declare him “the true and absolute
owner” thereof. Hence, through his
allegations, what petitioner imagined as clouds cast on his title to the
property were private respondents’ alleged acts of physical intrusion into
his purported property. Clearly, the acts alleged may be considered grounds for
an action for forcible entry but definitely not one for quieting of title.
When the issues
were joined by the filing of the answer to the complaint, it would have become
apparent to the court that the case was a boundary dispute. The answer alleged,
among other matters, that petitioner, “in bad faith, surreptitiously,
maliciously and fraudulently had the land in question included in the survey of
his land which extends to the south only as far as the Bugsayon River which is
the visible and natural and common boundary between the properties.”[26] Moreover, during the hearing of the
case, petitioner proved that it was actually a boundary dispute by evidence
showing what he considered as the boundary of his property which private
respondents perceived as actually encroaching on their property. In this regard, the following pronouncements
of the Court are apropos:
“x x x (T)he trial court (and likewise the respondent Court) cannot, in an action for quieting of title, order the determination of the boundaries of the claimed property, as that would be tantamount to awarding to one or some of the parties the disputed property in an action where the sole issue is limited to whether the instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding involved constitutes a cloud upon the petitioners’ interest or title in and to said property. Such determination of boundaries is appropriate in adversarial proceedings where possession or ownership may properly be considered and where evidence aliunde, other than the `instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding’ itself, may be introduced. An action for forcible entry, whenever warranted by the period prescribed in Rule 70, or for recovery of possession de facto, also within the prescribed period, may be availed of by the petitioners, in which proceeding the boundary dispute may be fully threshed out.”[27]
Nonetheless,
even if the complaint below were to be considered as a valid one for quieting
of title, still, the instant petition for review on certiorari must
fail.
As a general
rule, findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are binding and conclusive upon
this Court. Such factual findings shall
not be disturbed normally unless the same are palpably unsupported by the
evidence on record or the judgment itself is based on a misapprehension of
facts.[28] Upon an examination of the records,
the Court finds no evident reason to depart from the general rule.
The courts below
correctly held that when petitioner “sold, ceded, transferred and conveyed” the
5.5-hectare land in favor of Pablo Espinosa, his rights of ownership and
possession pertaining thereto ceased and these were transferred to the
latter. In the same manner, Espinosa’s
rights of ownership over the land ceased and were transferred to private
respondent upon its sale to the latter. This finds justification in the Civil
Code, as follows:
“ART. 1458. By the contract of sale one of the contracting parties obligates himself to transfer the ownership of and to deliver a determinate thing, and the other to pay therefor a price certain in money or its equivalent.
A contract of sale may be absolute or conditional.”
In other words,
a sale is a contract transferring dominion and other real rights in the thing
sold.[29] In the case at bar, petitioner’s
claim of ownership must of necessity fail because he has long abdicated his
rights over the land when he sold it to private respondent’s
predecessor-in-interest.
Petitioner’s
claim that he acquired ownership over the disputed land through possession for
more than twenty (20) years is likewise unmeritorious. While Art. 1134 of the
Civil Code provides that “(o)wnership and other real rights over immovable
property are acquired by ordinary prescription through possession of ten
years,” this provision of law must be read in conjunction with Art. 1117 of the
same Code. This article states that “x
x x (o)rdinary acquisitive prescription of things requires possession in good
faith and with just title for the time fixed by law.” Hence, a prescriptive
title to real estate is not acquired by mere possession thereof under claim of
ownership for a period of ten years unless such possession was acquired con
justo titulo y buena fe (with color of title and good faith).[30] The good faith of the possessor
consists in the reasonable belief that the person from whom he received the
thing was the owner thereof, and could transmit his ownership.[31] For purposes of prescription, there
is just title when the adverse claimant came into possession of the property
through one of the modes recognized by law for the acquisition of ownership or
other real rights but the grantor was not the owner or could not transmit any
right.[32]
Petitioners have
not satisfactorily met the requirements of good faith and just title. As aptly
observed by the trial court, the plaintiff’s admitted acts of converting the boundary line (Bugsayon River) into a
ricefield and thereafter claiming ownership thereof were acts constituting
deprivation of the rights of others and therefore “tantamount to bad faith.”[33] To allow petitioner to benefit from
his own wrong would run counter to the maxim ex dolo malo non oritur actio
(no man can be allowed to found a claim upon his own wrongdoing). Extraordinary acquisitive prescription
cannot similarly vest ownership over the property upon petitioner. Art. 1137 of the Civil Code states that
“(o)wnership and other real rights over immovables prescribe through
uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty years, without need of
title or of good faith.” Petitioner’s
alleged possession in 1962 up to September 1983 when private respondents
entered the property in question spanned twenty-one (21) years. This period of
time is short of the thirty-year requirement mandated by Art. 1137.
Petitioner basically
anchors his claim over the property on the survey plan prepared upon his
request,[34] the tax declaration in his name,[35] the commissioner’s report on the
relocation survey,[36] and the survey plan.[37] Respondent court correctly held
that these documents do not conclusively demonstrate petitioner's title over
Lot Nos. 3918-A and 3606.
A survey
is the act by which the quantity of a parcel of land is ascertained and also a
paper containing a statement of courses, distances, and quantity of land.[38] A survey under a proprietary title
is not a conveyance. It is an
instrument sui generis in the nature of a partition; a customary mode in
which a proprietor has set off to himself in severalty a part of the common
estate.[39] Therefore, a survey, not being a
conveyance, is not a mode of acquiring ownership. A fortiori, petitioner cannot found his claim on the
survey plan reflecting a subdivision of land because it is not conclusive as to
ownership as it may refer only to a delineation of possession.[40]
Furthermore, the
plan was not verified and approved by the Bureau of Lands in accordance with
Sec. 28, paragraph 5 of Act No. 2259, the Cadastral Act, as amended by Sec.
1862 of Act No. 2711. Said law ordains
that private surveyors send their original field notes, computations, reports,
surveys, maps and plots regarding a piece of property to the Bureau of Lands
for verification and approval.[41] A survey plan not verified and
approved by said Bureau is nothing more than a private writing, the due
execution and authenticity of which must be proven in accordance with Sec. 20
of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. The
circumstance that the plan was admitted in evidence without any objection as to
its due execution and authenticity does not signify that the courts shall give
probative value therefor. To admit
evidence and not to believe it subsequently are not contradictory to each
other. This Court cannot alter the
conclusions of the Court of Appeals on the credibility accorded to evidence
presented by the parties.[42]
Similarly,
petitioner’s tax declaration issued under his name is not even persuasive
evidence of his claimed ownership over the land in dispute. A tax declaration, by itself, is not
considered conclusive evidence of ownership.[43] It is merely an indicium of a claim
of ownership.[44] Because it does not by itself give
title, it is of little value in proving one’s ownership.[45] Moreover, the incompatibility in
petitioner’s tax declaration and the commissioner’s report as regards the area
of his claimed property is much too glaring to be ignored. Tax Declaration No. 8717 states that
petitioner’s property has an area of 3.2800 hectares while the totality of his
claim according to the commissioned geodetic engineer’s survey amounts to
4.1385 hectares. There is therefore a
notable discrepancy of 8,585 square meters. On the other hand, private respondent’s claimed property, as borne out by Tax Declaration
No. 12738, totals 5.5 hectares, a more proximate equivalent of the
5.2433-hectare property as shown by the commissioner’s report.
There is also
nothing in the commissioner’s report that substantiates petitioner’s claim that
the disputed land was inside his property. Petitioner capitalizes on the lower
court’s statement in its decision[46] that “as reflected in the commissioner’s
report dated May 23, 1984 (Exhibit 3-3-A), the area claimed is inside lot 3918
of the defendants (Exhibit 2)”[47] or the private respondents.
A careful reading of the decision would show that this statement is found in
the summary of defendants’ (herein private respondents) evidence. Reference to Lot No. 3918 may, therefore, be
attributed to mere oversight as the lower court even continues to state the
defendants’ assertion that the 2-hectare land is part of their 5.5-hectare
property. Hence, it is not amiss to conclude that either petitioner
misapprehended the lower court’s decision or he is trying to contumaciously
mislead or worse, deceive this Court.
With respect to
the awards of moral damages of P10,000.00 and attorney’s fees of P2,000.00,
the Court finds no cogent reason to delete the same. Jurisprudence is replete with rulings to the effect that where
fraud and bad faith have been established, the award of moral damages is in
order.[48] This pronouncement finds support in
Art. 2219 (10) of the Civil Code allowing the recovery of moral damages for
acts enumerated in Art. 21 of the same Code. This article states that “(a)ny
person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter
for the damage.” The moral damages are
hereby increased to P30,000.00. We agree with the respondent court in holding that the award of
attorney’s fees is justified because petitioner filed a clearly unfounded civil
action.[49]
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on
certiorari is hereby DENIED and the questioned Decision of the Court of Appeals
AFFIRMED. This Decision is immediately executory. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
[1] Penned by
Judge Manuel C. Genova.
[2] Rollo,
p. 17.
[3] TSN, May
8, 1995, p. 4.
[4] TSN, May
8, 1985, p. 6.
[5] TSN,
February 11, 1986, pp. 4-6.
[6] Exh. 11.
[7] Exhs.
11-A & 11-B.
[8] Exh. 10.
[9] Exhs. 8
& 8-A.
[10] Exh. 7.
[11] Exhs. 6
& 6-B.
[12] Exh. 5.
[13] He is
described in the instrument as “married to Nelia Averilla.”
[14] Exh. B.
[15] Exh. 15.
[16] TSN,
October 26, 1989, pp. 7-11, 45-49.
[17] Exhs. 12
& 12-B.
[18] Exh. 13.
[19] Exh.
12-A.
[20] TSN,
October 26, 1989, p. 35.
[21] Exh.
14-A.
[22] Exh. 8-B.
[23] Exhs. 6
& 6-B.
[24] Vda. de
Aviles v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 95748, November 21, 1996, 264 SCRA
473, 479.
[25] Ibid.,
citing Lerum v. Cruz, 87 Phil. 652 (1950).
[26] Ibid.,
p. 11.
[27] Vda. de
Aviles v. Court of Appeals, supra at p. 482.
[28] Inland Trailways, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,
325 Phil. 457, 462 (1996); Valenzuela v. Court of Appeals, 323 Phil.
374, 383 (1996); Acebedo Optical Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
118833, November 29, 1995, 250 SCRA 409, 414.
[29] AQUINO,
CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Vol. 3, 1990 ed., p. 1 citing Denoga v.
Insular Government, 19 Phil. 261 (1911).
[30] Santiago v.
Cruz, 19 Phil. 145 (1911).
[31] Art.
1127, Civil Code.
[32] Art.
1129, ibid.
[33] Decision,
p. 10.
[34] Exh. B.
[35] Exh. A.
[36] Record,
pp. 39-40.
[37] Exh. C.
[38] 40A WORDS
AND PHRASES 531citing Miller v. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp., D.C.Va., 112
F.Supp. 221, 224.
[39] Ibid.,
citing Jennings v. Burnham, 28 A. 1048, 56 N.J.L. 289, 291.
[40] Heirs of
George Bofill v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107930, October 7, 1994, 237
SCRA 451, 458.
[41] Fige v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107951, June 30, 1994, 233 SCRA 586, 590.
[42] Ledesma v.
Realubin and Court of Appeals, 118 Phil. 625, 629 (1963).
[43] Rivera v.
Court of Appeals, 314 Phil. 57 (1995); Republic v. IAC, G.R. No. 74380,
July 5, 1993, 224 SCRA 285, 296; De Jesus v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
57092, January 21, 1993, 217 SCRA 307, 317.
[44] Director
of Lands v. IAC, G.R. No. 73246, March 2, 1993, 219 SCRA 339, 348.
[45] Sapu-an v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 91869, October 19, 1992, 214 SCRA 701.
[46] Decision,
p. 6.
[47] Petition,
p. 9.
[48]
Development Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
109937, March 21, 1994, 231 SCRA 370, 377; Pasibigan v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 90169, April 7, 1993, 221 SCRA 202, 208; De Guzman v.
NLRC, G.R. No. 90856, July 23, 1992, 211 SCRA 723, 731.
[49] Art. 2208 (4), Civil Code.