350 Phil. 510
PUNO, J.:
In this special
civil action for certiorari, petitioner DEL MONTE PHILIPPINES, INC. seeks to set aside the Decision of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), dated May 15, 1996, holding that
it illegally dismissed private respondent PROCESA A. ALSOLA and directing it to pay her backwages and separation
pay.
The facts show
that private respondent PROCESA ALSOLA was a packer paid by the hour in the cannery of petitioner DEL MONTE
PHILIPPINES, INC. in Bugo, Cagayan de Oro City. She has been in petitioner's employ
since December 21, 1972.
The company
rules provide for an Absence Without Permission (AWOP)
policy. They require that if a worker
intends to be absent from work, he should first file an application for leave
and wait for its approval before going on leave. An employee violating the rule shall be declared absent without
permission (AWOP). Moreover, he who
receives a notice to explain his AWOP should justify his absence. The first offense is punishable with oral reprimand; the second offense, a written reprimand; the third offense, 1-7 days suspension; the
fourth offense, 8-15 days suspension; the fifth offense, 16-30 days suspension, and; the sixth offense,
dismissal from service.
Petitioner avers
that private respondent incurred a total of 57 days of absences without
permission from 1993-1994. For 1993, she was AWOP on the following
days: January 2; May 17; June 10-11, 13-19, 22, 24, 28-30; July 1-2, 5; August 23, 25; October 23, 25-28; November 5-20, and; December 27-29. For 1994, she was AWOP
on January 2-10 and February 4.
Petitioner claims that a total of 17 show-cause letters were sent to private respondent
requiring her to explain her absences. Private respondent did not appear before the personnel manager but
merely submitted medical certificates from her doctor attesting that her
absences were compelled by her illness. The last show-cause letter allegedly sent by petitioner to private
respondent was dated January 6, 1994 requiring her to justify in writing
her absence from November 5, 1993 to January 6, 1994. Again, she submitted medical certificates attesting that she was
suffering from worsening arthritis and related illness to justify her absences
for said period. Petitioner claims that
these medical certificates are not sufficient for they were issued by private
doctors not accredited by the
company. Petitioner sent private
respondent a notice of hearing on February 3, 1994, but the latter failed to appear on said date. On March 10, 1994, petitioner
terminated her services for absence without permission.
Private
respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the labor arbiter. The labor arbiter dismissed the complaint[1] holding that petitioner's dismissal
was for a valid cause, i.e., for gross
and habitual neglect of duty due to repeated absences without permission.
On appeal, the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) reversed the decision of the labor arbiter. It held that private respondent was
illegally dismissed as her repeated absences were justified by her worsening arthritis and related illness. However, considering that reinstatement was not feasible due to
her physical condition, it directed petitioner to pay private
respondent six (6) months backwages and separation pay of one (1) month per
year of service.[2] Petitioner moved for
reconsideration but was unsuccessful.
Hence this
petition.
Petitioner
insists that it validly dismissed private respondent for incurring numerous absences without
permission. Allegedly, it sent several show-cause letters to
private respondent each time she incurred an absence without leave, requiring
her to justify the same. However, no
written explanation was made by private
respondent as she merely submitted medical certificates from her doctors, not accredited by the company, stating that her absences were due to illness. Petitioner urges that private
respondent may also be considered to have abandoned her job due to her
intermittent absences.
We reiterate the
rule that findings of quasi-judicial agencies, such as the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC), are
accorded respect and finality if amply supported by substantial evidence.[3] Moreover, in illegal dismissal cases, the onus is on the employer to prove that there was valid
cause for its action.[4] In the case at bar, we find that
the factual finding of the NLRC that
private respondent was illegally dismissed is backed by substantial
evidence.
The NLRC ruling
that private respondent was illegally
dismissed is principally based on petitioner's failure to establish the exact
days she was absent without permission. As found by the NLRC, petitioner
sought to prove private respondent's absences without permission by submitting
17 show-cause letters it allegedly sent to her. However, the NLRC found that only two (2)
show-cause letters were actually sent to and received by respondent: one is dated June 30, 1993,
requiring her to explain her AWOPs from June 10-30, 1993; and the second is dated January 6, 1994
which required her to explain her AWOPs from November 5, 1993 to January 6,
1994. The 15 other show-cause letters
were correctly ignored by the NLRC as self-serving for lack of proof that they
were actually sent to and received by private respondent. Thus, from the evidence, the only absences without permission
proved by petitioner cover only the
period from June 10-30, 1993 and November 5, 1993 to January 6, 1994 (the
period stated in the 2 show-cause letters actually sent to and received by
private respondent) and these absences were supported by medical certificates.
The rule is that
an employer's power to discipline its workers may not be exercised in an
arbitrary manner as to erode the constitutional guarantee of security of
tenure.[5] In the case at bar, even granting that private respondent
incurred previous AWOPs as far back as 1992, the circumstances under which she was dismissed from service in March
1994, or two years thereafter, are highly suspect. Firstly, private
respondent had no previous disciplinary record in her 22 years of service with
petitioner prior to her dismissal. If
there were really show-cause letters issued to her relative to her previous
absences, nowhere does it appear that petitioner penalized her. The company
rules provide for a graduation of penalties for violation of the AWOP policy, viz:
oral reprimand for the first offense; written reprimand for the second offense; suspension for the third to fifth offense;
and dismissal from service for the sixth offense. Surprisingly, without initially penalizing private respondent
with reprimand or suspension for her previous AWOPs, she was outrightly dismissed by
petitioner from service. Secondly, it appears that petitioner excused private
respondent's alleged past absences as she has been allowed to report back to
work without any sanction from petitioner. Neither did petitioner require that the medical certificates she
submitted be confirmed by its physicians. From the viewpoint of private respondent, everything was in
order. Thus, the show-cause
letter, dated January 6, 1994, requiring her to explain her AWOP from November 5, 1993 to January 6, 1994, led her to believe that she was being charged for her AWOP only
for said period. In compliance, she
submitted the medical certificates issued by her doctor attesting to her
illness, as she has done in the past. However, petitioner now insists that her medical certificates
had to be confirmed by company physicians. This is a complete turn-around for heretofore, private respondent's medical certificates from her personal
physician to justify her AWOP had been accepted by petitioner. Private respondent cannot now be
faulted for submitting this kind of
medical certificates to justify her AWOP in June 1993 and from November 5, 1993 to January 6,
1994.
Finally,
petitioner argues that private respondent may be considered to have abandoned
her job due to her intermittent absences without permission.
We disagree.
Abandonment, as
a just and valid ground for termination, means the deliberate, unjustified
refusal of an employee to resume his employment. The burden of proof is on the employer to show a clear and
deliberate intent on the part of the employee to discontinue employment.[6] The intent cannot be lightly
inferred or legally presumed from certain equivocal acts. For abandonment to be a valid ground for
dismissal, two (2) elements must be proved: the intention of an employee to abandon, coupled with an overt
act from which it may be inferred that the employee has no more intent to
resume his work.[7]
In the case at
bar, these elements were not established. To be sure, there is absolutely nothing in the records proving any
intention on the part of private respondent to abandon her job. Even her actions after her absences
negate an intent to abandon her job. For one, she always reported for
work after her absence. For another, she has been in the employ of petitioner for 22 years and her service
record is unblemished. Prior to her dismissal,
she has no record of infraction of company rules for which she was sanctioned
by either warning, reprimand or suspension. Thus, we cannot conceive how private respondent could abandon her job
and give up the benefits she has earned from years of hard work. Finally, her filing of an illegal dismissal case contradicts petitioner's allegation that she
abandoned her job.[8] In contrast, we note that the
administrative proceedings against private respondent started early in January
1994 and coincided with the
implementation of petitioner's retrenchment program. Thus, there is reason to hold that the dismissal of private
respondent was part of petitioner's scheme to reduce its work force.
We agree with
the ruling of the NLRC that since
reinstatement is not feasible in view of the physical condition of private
respondent brought about by her worsening arthritis, prudence and fair play dictate that private respondent be awarded separation pay with backwages, in
lieu of reinstatement.[9]
IN VIEW OF
THE FOREGOING, the
impugned Decision of public respondent NLRC is AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
[1] See
Decision, dated March 15, 1995; Rollo, pp. 63-68.
[2] NLRC Resolution,
dated May 15, 1996; Rollo, pp.
89-95.
[3] Five J
Taxi v. NLRC, 235 SCRA 556 [1994]; Loadstar Shipping Co., Inc. v. Gallo, 229 SCRA 654 [1994].
[4] Raycor
Aircontrol Systems vs. NLRC, 261 SCRA 589 [1996]; Uy vs. NLRC, 261 SCRA 505 [1996].
[5] Hongkong and
Shanghai Banking Corporation vs. NLRC, 260 SCRA 49 [1996].
[6] Reno
Foods, Inc. vs. NLRC, 249 SCRA 379 [1995].
[7] Jackson
Building Condominium Corporation vs. NLRC, 246 SCRA 329 [1995].
[8] Canete vs.
NLRC, 250 SCRA 259 [1995].
[9] Caliguia vs.
NLRC, 264 SCRA 104 [1996].