537 Phil. 443
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Plaintiff (Victoria M. Rodriguez) is the sole heir and administrator of the estate of Hermogenes Rodriguez by virtue of the Order, dated February, 1994 in Spec. Proc. No. IR-1110, "In the Matter of the Settlement of the Estate of Hermogenes Rodriguez y Reyes, etc.", (sic) of Branch 34 of the Regional Trial Court at Iriga City x x x.Respondent SBMA, in its counter statement of facts,[5] contends that sometime in 1998, Liwanag Santiago, wife of herein petitioner Pedro R. Santiago, by virtue of her employment with respondent SBMA, availed herself of the housing privilege accorded to the latter's employees; that due to said privilege, she was allowed to lease a housing unit[6] inside the Subic Bay Freeport Zone; that the lease agreement, however, "shall be terminated if the lessees are no longer employed with SBMA;"[7] that on 31 January 2002, Liwanag Santiago's employment contract concluded; that since said contract was not renewed, Liwanag Santiago ceased to be an employee of respondent SBMA; and that as a consequence thereof, as mandated by the SBMA Housing Policy, she and her family were asked[8] to vacate and return possession of the subject housing unit.
x x x x
In his lifetime, the late Hermogenes Rodriguez y Reyes was the owner of parcels of land registered in his name under that (sic) certificate of title denominated as a Titulo de Propriedad de Terrenos of 1891 Royal Decree No. 01-4-Protocol x x x.
x x x x
On January 31, 2002, plaintiff Victoria M. Rodriguez, in her capacity as heir and administrator of the estate of Hermogenes Rodriguez, leased to Pedro R. Santiago and Armando G. Mateo, for a period of 50 years, two parcels of land of Hermogenes Rodriguez covered by his aforesaid title, x x x.
x x x x
By virtue of the aforesaid lease contract, plaintiff Pedro R. Santiago is presently occupying the aforesaid parcel of land consisting of 2.5 hectares, more particularly the improvements located at 717 Sta. Rita Road.
Despite the fact that defendant is not the owner of the two aforesaid parcels of land leased to plaintiffs Santiago and Mateo, defendant is claiming possessory, if not proprietary, rights over them. More particularly, defendant is using these two parcels of land for its (sic) own commercial and other purposes.
It is now the desire of plaintiff Victoria Rodriguez to recover possession of the property from the defendant so that she could comply with her contractual commitments to her co-plaintiffs.
x x x x
[D]efendant is claiming possessory, if not proprietary, rights over the parcels of land described in paragraph 7 hereof. Lately, plaintiff Pedro R. Santiago was informed by purported agents or employees of the defendant that he should vacate the premises he and his family are occupying since defendant would be needing the same for its own use. Defendant has no authority to do this since it is not the owner of the premises, and the owner, Victoria Rodriguez (sic) has already leased the premises to plaintiffs Santiago and Mateo.[4]
Plaintiffs' complaint is anchored on a Spanish title which they claim is still a valid, subsisting and enforceable title. Despite the fact that said title was never registered under Act 496, the land Registration Act (later PD 1529), plaintiffs still claim that they have a cause of action.Therein plaintiffs filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied in the second assailed Order dated 7 January 2003.
The court is not convinced.
The action filed by plaintiffs is for recovery of possession based on the ownership by plaintiff Rodriguez of the disputed property evidenced by a Spanish title. Clearly, by the sheer force of law particularly the enabling clauses of PD 892, said type of title can no longer be utilized as evidence of ownership. Verily, Spanish titles can no longer be countenanced as indubitable evidence of land ownership. (Citation omitted.)
As such and on its face, the complaint indeed failed to state a cause of action simply because the court can take judicial notice of the applicability of PD 892 and of the pertinent decisions of the Supreme Court to the case at bench.[14]
In essence, the present petition poses as fundamental issue for resolution by the Court the question of whether or not the RTC committed reversible error in denying the application for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction as well as dismissing the complaint for failure to state a cause of action.I.
WHETHER OR NOT SPANISH TITLES ARE STILL ADMISSIBLE AS EVIDENCE OF OWNERSHIP OF LANDS;II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT WAS PROPER IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT PLAINTIFFS COULD STILL PROVE THEIR CLAIMS ON THE BASIS OF EVIDENCE OTHER THAN THE SPANISH TITLE; andIII.
WHETHER OR NOT DEFENDANT, BY FILING A MOTION TO DISMISS INSTEAD OF AN ANSWER, WAS DEEMED TO HAVE ADMITTED HYPOTHETICALLY PLAINTIFFS' ALLEGATIONS OF OWNERSHIP.
As the trial court stated, "(F)undamental is the rule that a defendant moving to dismiss a complaint for lack of cause of action is regarded as having admitted all the allegations thereof, at least hypothetically". (sic) The Complaint specifically alleged that plaintiff Victoria Rodriguez was the great-great-great granddaughter of and the sole heir and administrator of the late spouses Hermogenes Rodriguez and Erlinda Flores and that in his lifetime Hermogenes Rodriguez was the owner of parcels of land registered in his name under that certificate of title denominated as a Titulo de Propriedad de Terrenos of 1891 Royal Decree No. 01-4-Protocol. Defendant was, therefore, deemed to have admitted these allegations. And, with such admissions, then there would be no more need, at least at this stage of the case, for the plaintiffs to present the Spanish title. In other words, the inadmissibility of the title, as argued by the defendant, becomes immaterial since there is no more need to present this title in view of the admissions."Citing the case of Intestate Estate of the Late Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban v. Court of Appeals, et al.,[17]respondent SBMA, however, stresses that "Spanish titles can no longer be countenance as indubitable evidence of land ownership by sheer force of law, particularly, the enabling clause of P.D. 892 in expressly providing that, if not accompanied by actual possession of the land, said type of title x x x can no longer be utilized as proof or evidence of ownership x x x."
P.D. No. 892 became effective on 16 February 1976. The successors of Don Hermogenes Rodriguez had only until 14 August 1976 to apply for a Torrens title in their name covering the Subject Property. In the absence of an allegation in petitioners' Complaint that petitioners' predecessors-in-interest complied with P.D. No. 892, then it could be assumed that they failed to do so. Since they failed to comply with P.D. No. 892, then the successors of Don Hermogenes Rodriguez were already enjoined from presenting the Spanish title as proof of their ownership of the Subject Property in registration proceedings.Prescinding from the foregoing, the instant petition must be denied by virtue of the principle of stare decisis. Not only are the legal rights and relations of herein parties substantially the same as those passed upon in the aforementioned 2005 Evangelista Case, but the facts, the applicable laws, the issues, and the testimonial and documentary evidence are identical such that a ruling in one case, under the principle of stare decisis, is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issue.
Registration proceedings under the Torrens system do not create or vest title, but only confirm and record title already created and vested. (Citation omitted.) By virtue of P.D. No. 892, the courts, in registration proceedings under the Torrens system, are precluded from accepting, confirming and recording a Spanish title. Reason therefore dictates that courts, likewise, are prevented from accepting and indirectly confirming such Spanish title in some other form of action brought before them (i.e., removal of cloud on or quieting of title), only short of ordering its recording or registration. To rule otherwise would open the doors to the circumvention of P.D. No. 892, and give rise to the existence of land titles, recognized and affirmed by the courts, but would never be recorded under the Torrens system of registration. This would definitely undermine the Torrens system and cause confusion and instability in property ownership that P.D. No. 892 intended to eliminate.
Petitioners argued that the Spanish title may still be presented as proof of ownership on the basis of the exception provided in the fourth whereas clause of P.D. No. 892, which reads:
WHEREAS, Spanish titles to lands which have not yet been brought under the operation of the Torrens system, being subject to prescription, are now ineffective to prove ownership unless accompanied by proof of actual possession; . . .
Since Petitioners alleged that they were in actual possession of the Subject Property, then they could still present the Spanish title as evidence of their ownership of the Subject Property. (Citation omitted.)
This Court cannot sustain petitioners' argument. Actual proof of possession only becomes necessary because, as the same whereas clause points out, Spanish titles are subject to prescription. A holder of a Spanish title may still lose his ownership of the real property to the occupant who actually possesses the same for the required prescriptive period. (Citation omitted.) Because of this inherent weakness of a Spanish title, the applicant for registration of his Spanish title under the Torrens system must also submit proof that he is in actual possession of the real property, so as to discount the possibility that someone else has acquired a better title to the same property by virtue of prescription.
Moreover, legislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole, and not just a particular provision alone. A word or phrase taken in the abstract may easily convey a meaning quite different from the one actually intended and evident when the word or phrase is considered with those with which it is associated. An apparently general provision may have a limited application if read together with other provisions of the statute. (Citation omitted.)
The fourth whereas clause of P.D. No. 892 should be interpreted and harmonized with the other provisions of the whole statute. (Citation omitted.) Note that the tenor of the whole presidential decree is to discontinue the use of Spanish titles and to strip them of any probative value as evidence of ownership. It had clearly set a deadline for the filing of applications for registration of all Spanish titles under the Torrens system (i.e., six months from its effectivity or on 14 August 1976), after which, the Spanish titles may no longer be presented to prove ownership.
All holders of Spanish titles should have filed applications for registration of their title on or before 14 August 1976. In a land registration proceeding, the applicant should present to the court his Spanish title plus proof of actual possession of the real property. However, if such land registration proceeding was filed and initiated after 14 August 1976, the applicant could no longer present his Spanish title to the court to evidence his ownership of the real property, regardless of whether the real property was in his actual possession.
Therefore, the fact that petitioners were in actual possession of the Subject Property when they filed the Complaint with the trial court on 29 April 1996 does not exclude them from the application of P.D. No. 892, and their Spanish title remain inadmissible as evidence of their ownership of the Subject Property, whether in a land registration proceeding or in an action to remove a cloud on or to quiet title.
The preceding discussion does not bar holders of Spanish titles from claiming ownership of the real property on some other basis, such as those provided in either the Land Registration Decree (Citation omitted.) or the Public Land Act.[42] Petitioners though failed to allege any other basis for their titles in their Complaint aside from possession of the Subject Property from time immemorial, which this Court has already controverted; and the Spanish title, which is already ineffective to prove ownership over the Subject Property.
Therefore, without legal or equitable title to the Subject Property, the petitioners lacked the personality to file an action for removal of a cloud on, or quieting of, title and their Complaint was properly dismissed for failing to state a cause of action. In view of the dismissal of the case on this ground, it is already unnecessary for this Court to address the issue of prescription of the action.[19]
ART. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines.With the above provision of law and preceding discussions, in tandem with the Court's pronouncements in numerous cases, i.e., Director of Forestry v. Muñoz;[20] Antonio v. Barroga;[21] Republic v. Court of Appeals.;[22] National Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals;[23] Carabot v. Court of Appeals;[24] Republic v. Intermediate Appellate Court;[25] Widows and Orphans Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals;[26] Director of Lands v. Heirs of Isabel Tesalona;[27] and Intestate Estate of Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban v. Court of Appeals,[28] it is quite evident that the RTC committed no reversible error in taking heed of our final, and executory, decisions – those decisions considered to have attained the status of judicial precedents in so far as the use of Spanish titles to evidence ownership are concerned. For it is the better practice that when a court has laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases where the facts are substantially the same.[29]
SEC. 2. Modes of appeal. –[17] 333 Phil. 597 (1996).x x x x
(c) Appeal by certiorari. – In all cases where only questions of law are raised or involved, the appeal shall be to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45.