483 Phil. 56
YNARES-SATIAGO, J.:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds accused JOSEFINA M. DIMALANTA GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of ESTAFA and sentences her to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of 30 years of RECLUSION PERPETUA and to pay the private complainant Elvira D. Abarca the sum of P383,826.00.On November 10, 1999, appellant was charged with Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2 (d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 818, in an Information which reads:
With costs.
SO ORDERED.[1]
That sometime during the month of October, 1998 in Caloocan City, MM. and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, after misrepresentation that she has more than enough fund, defrauded and deceived one, ELVIRA D. ABARCA in the following manner, to wit: said accused purchased and received assorted jewelries from herein complainant in the total amount of P408,826.00 and in payment thereof, accused simultaneously issued the following Panasaid [should read: Panasia] Banking, Inc. checks, to wit:On January 24, 2000, appellant, assisted by counsel de oficio, was arraigned. She entered a plea of “not guilty.”[3] Trial on the merits followed in due course.
Check No. Date Amount 0002598 Nov. 30, 1998 P 37,166.00 0020952 Dec. 15, 1998 37, 166.00 0020953 Dec. 31, 1998 37, 166.00 0020954 Jan. 15, 1999 37, 166.00 0020956 Jan. 31, 1999 37, 166.00 0020957 Feb. 15, 1999 37, 166.00 0020958 Feb. 28, 1999 37, 166.00 0020959 Mar. 15, 1999 37, 166.00 0020960 Mar. 31, 1999 37, 166.00 0020961 Apr. 15, 1999 37, 166.00 0020962 Apr. 30, 1999 37, 166.00 --------------- P408,826.00
when said accused knew fully well that at the time the said checks were not covered with sufficient funds in said bank and would not have such fund even on the date stated on the faces thereof, and when the said checks were presented to the drawee bank for encashment, the same were dishonored for the reason “ACCOUNT CLOSED” and despite due notice as required by Republic Act 4885 and further amended by PD 818 and despite repeated demands, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously refuse and fail to make good her checks and still refused and fails to do so, to the damage and prejudice of herein complainant ELVIRA D. ABARCA in the aforestated amount of P408,826.00.
Contrary to law.[2]
The Office of the Solicitor General thereafter filed a Manifestation and Motion in Lieu of Appellee’s Brief, recommending that a judgment of acquittal be rendered in Criminal Case No. C-58083 (99) without prejudice to appellant’s civil liability as found by the trial court.[13]I
IN FINDING APPELLANT JOSEFINA M. DIMALANTA GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF ESTAFA;
II
IN SENTENCING HER TO SUFFER THE PENALTY OF IMPRISONMENT OF 30 YEARS OF RECLUSION PERPETUA; AND
III
IN ORDERING HER TO PAY COMPLAINANT ABARCA THE SUM OF P383,826.00.[12]
Presidential Decree No. 818 amended Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code insofar as the penalties for felonies under paragraph 2 (d) are concerned, viz:
- By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:
xxx xxx xxx.
(d) By postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an obligation when the offender had no funds in the bank, or his funds deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of the check. The failure of the drawer of the check to deposit the amount necessary to cover his check within three (3) days from receipt of notice from the bank and/or the payee or holder that said check has been dishonored for lack or insufficiency of funds shall be prima facie evidence of deceit constituting false pretense or fraudulent act.xxx xxx xxx.
SECTION 1. Any person who shall defraud another by means of false pretenses or fraudulent acts as defined in paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 4885, shall be punished by:The elements of this form of Estafa are: (1) postdating or issuing a check in payment of an obligation contracted at the time the check was issued; (2) lack of sufficient funds to cover the check; (3) knowledge on the part of the offender of such circumstances; and (4) damage to the complainant.[14]
1st. The penalty of reclusión temporal if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos but the total penalty which may be imposed shall in no case exceed thirty years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed under the Revised Penal Code, the penalty shall be termed reclusión perpetua;
2nd. The penalty of prisión mayor in its maximum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 6,000 pesos but does not exceed 12,000 pesos;
3rd. The penalty of prisión mayor in its medium period, if such amount is over 200 pesos but does not exceed 6,000 pesos; and
4th. By prisión mayor in its minimum period, if such amount does not exceed 200 pesos.
In point of fact, appellant was able to show that she was merely requested by complainant to assist in the sale of the jewelry. In her desire to help, she was able to convince Levinia Maranan to dispose of the items. Appellant further testified that the checks she issued to complainant were to be funded by Maranan everytime she was able to sell pieces of jewelry.
ATTY. QUIROZ: Q. Is it not a fact, Madam Witness, that it was your agreement with Mrs. Dimalanta that these jewelries were subject of a reselling, that she will sell them? A. Yes, sir. Q. You were very aware of that? A. Yes, sir. [17]
This admission lends credence to the claim of appellant that she subsequently delivered the jewelry to Maranan. It was only after notice from Maranan that the jewelry had been sold on installment that appellant issued the postdated checks. The issuance of the checks was merely to facilitate collection by Abarca of payments due. Thus, the checks were not the efficient cause of the defraudation. The bad checks were not issued prior to or simultaneous with the act of fraud, but rather, for a pre-existing obligation. This fact is evidenced by Abarca’s own testimony that appellant signed a piece of paper acknowledging receipt of the jewelry, the individual items of which were listed therein. Abarca went on to say that she no longer had the receipt signed by appellant, which was why she had to rely on another list on a pink slip of paper during her testimony in court (TSN, April 23, 2001, p. 4). If indeed appellant issued the postdated checks as payment for the jewelry on the same occasion that the said jewelry were delivered, why then would she need to sign a receipt for the same? Moreover, why was the said receipt no longer in the possession of Abarca? It is entirely possible that Abarca surrendered the receipt upon the subsequent delivery of the checks to her by appellant.In effect, therefore, appellant issued the checks as evidence of indebtedness to cover the value of the jewelry. It has been ruled in this connection that a drawer who issues a check as security or evidence of investment is not liable for Estafa.[19]
xxx xxx xxx.
Thus, even assuming that the checks were indeed issued simultaneously with the delivery of the jewelry as Abarca claims, she was not induced to part with the jewelry because of the checks. Abarca admitted that she knew that appellant was just a secretary at the Caloocan City Hall and that the latter was merely renting the place where she was residing. These facts tend to show that Abarca was aware of the financial status of appellant, that is, that the latter could not afford the P408,826.00-price of the jewelry. Consequently, Abarca must have likewise known at the time the checks were issued that appellant had no money of her own to fund the checks on their maturity. She was well aware that the jewelry were to be sold by appellant and that the proceeds of the sale would be deposited by the latter in her current account to fund the checks. It was a business arrangement she entered into with appellant whereby the latter would assist her in selling the jewelry. Abarca had been in the business of buying and selling jewelry for around ten years already. Abarca was thus fully aware of the conditions, advantages and disadvantages of the arrangement and cannot now allege to be the victim of deceit.[18]
The prosecution failed to prove deceit in this case. The prima facie presumption of deceit was successfully rebutted by appellant’s evidence of good faith, a defense in estafa by postdating a check. Good faith may be demonstrated, for instance, by a debtor’s offer to arrange a payment scheme with his creditor. In this case, the debtor not only made arrangements for payment; as complainant herself categorically stated, the debtor-appellant fully paid the entire amount of the dishonored checks.Indeed, any allegation of intent of malice or deceit on appellant’s part was rebutted by her extraordinary effort to pay complainant notwithstanding her own financial situation.[22]
It must be noted that our Revised Penal Code was enacted to penalize unlawful acts accompanied by evil intent denominated as crimes mala in se. The principal consideration is the existence of malicious intent. There is a concurrence of freedom, intelligence and intent which together make up the “criminal mind” behind the “criminal act.” Thus, to constitute a crime, the act must, generally and in most cases, be accompanied by a criminal intent. Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea. No crime is committed if the mind of the person performing the act complained of is innocent.