597 Phil. 603
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
. . . Clerk of Court Marlon Roque, MTCC, Branch 3, as former OIC, MTCC; and Clerk of Court Anita G. Nunag, OCC, MTCC, Angeles City to explain in writing, within 10 days from receipt of herein resolution, why they should not be disciplinary dealt with for failure to:and ordered "this administrative matter against Clerks of Court Roque and Nunag be given a separate docket number and re-raffled."[3]
- exercise close supervision over the financial transactions of the court;
- monitor the activities of Cashier I, Aurelia C. Lugue, relative to the proper handling of collections of legal fees; and
- monitor the proper remittance of collections on time which resulted to many instances of delayed remittances[2] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied),
Respondents stand charged for negligence in their duty to monitor and supervise Cashier Aurelia Lugue in the management of court funds. Their failure to monitor the financial transactions of the Court had resulted in the shortage in the Fiduciary Fund (FF) account in the amount of P605,025.00.In recommending the imposition of a fine of P5,000 upon each of the respondents, the OCA explained:
. . . They failed to detect that Cashier Lugue was misappropriating her collections in the FF account through the "lapping technique". They failed to discover the modus operandi of Ms. Lugue because they have very limited knowledge in accounting and have no experience in detailed audit. Further, they both relied on the findings of the COA Auditors that there were no shortages incurred by Ms. Lugue.
In its Audit Report dated 03 February 2006, the OCA Audit Team stated that Cashier Lugue employed the "lapping technique" in delaying the remittance of the Fiduciary Fund. Official Receipts Nos. 15156288 to 15156433 totaling 145 official receipts indicated the total shortage of P605,025.00. The audit team noted that the remittances of almost all the collections in the Fiduciary Fund were delayed.
x x x x
The audit team observed that respondents could have discovered this machinations of Cashier Lugue had they set in place a proper system of internal control like routinely examining the details of collections and comparing the same with validated bank deposits slips; crosschecking the details of official receipts and matching them with the entries in the cash book; and reviewing bank statements for prior months to determine if the deposits tally with the collections. Respondents merely relied on the fact that the amounts deposited were equal to the amounts collected and the entries in the Monthly Reports which could be easily manipulated.
We find the respondents remiss in the performance of their duties. As accountable officers and custodians of the court's funds, respondents were duty-bound to use reasonable skill and diligence in the performance of their duties. It was their responsibility to ensure the correctness and legitimacy of every financial transaction within their responsibility. The trust they reposed ob Cashier Lugue cannot be a valid defense. It was their duty to see to it that their subordinates performed their functions properly.
For failure to exercise diligence in the performance of their duties as officers of the court, this Office finds respondent guilty of simple neglect of duty.
x x x x[7] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Under Section 23, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations, (simple) neglect of duty is punishable by suspension of one month and one day to six months for the first offense. Under Section 19, Rule XIV of the same Rules, the penalty of fine (instead of suspension) may also be imposed in the alternative. Considering th[at] this is respondents' first offense and following the Court's ruling in several cases involving neglect of duty, we find the penalty of fine in the amount of P5,000.00 just and reasonable.[8] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)The evaluation cum recommendation of the OCA is well-taken.
. . . a concealment technique where the subtraction of money from one customer is covered by applying the payment of a different customer. For example, a cashier may steal a payment from customer A and cover it by applying a payment from customer B to customer A's account. Then when customer C pays, that amount is applied to customer B['s account] and so on. Smart crooks would never lap accounts receivable, but amateurs do not realize that the technique requires constant monitoring to avoid detection. Most lapping schemes don't last long because of the continuous manual intervention required.[9]It appears that respondents' supervision as well as monitoring of the financial transactions of the court was merely perfunctory, relying in the main on the Monthly Reports and the fact that the amounts deposited matched the amount of collections.