658 Phil. 43
MENDOZA, J.:
8. The promissory note referred to in the complaint expressly state that the loan obligation is payable within the period of ten (10) years. Thus, from the execution date of September 30, 1999, its due date falls on September 30, 2009 (and not 2001 as erroneously stated in the complaint). Thus, prior to September 30, 2009, the loan obligations cannot be deemed due and demandable.
In conditional obligations, the acquisition of rights, as well as the extinguishment or loss of those already acquired, shall depend upon the happening of the event which constitutes the condition. (Article 1181, New Civil Code)
9. Contrary to the plaintiff's proferrence, defendant Jose C. Go had made substantial payments in terms of his monthly payments. There is, therefore, a need to do some accounting works (sic) to reconcile the records of both parties.
10. While demand is a necessary requirement to consider the defendant to be in delay/default, such has not been complied with by the plaintiff since the former is not aware of any demand made to him by the latter for the settlement of the whole obligation.
11. Undeniably, at the time the pledge of the shares of stock were executed, their total value is more than the amount of the loan or at the very least, equal to it. Thus, plaintiff was fully secured insofar as its exposure is concerned.
12. And even assuming without conceding, that the present value of said shares x x x went down, it cannot be considered as something permanent since the prices of stocks in the market either increases (sic) or decreases (sic) depending on the market forces. Thus, it is highly speculative for the plaintiff to consider said shares to have suffered tremendous decrease in its value. More so, it is unfair for the plaintiff to renounce or abandon the pledge agreements.
I. MATERIAL AVERMENTS OF THE COMPLAINT ADMITTED BY DEFENDANT-SPOUSES IN THEIR ANSWER TO OBVIATE THE NECESSITY OF TRIAL
II. NO REAL DEFENSES AND NO GENUINE ISSUES AS TO ANY MATERIAL FACT WERE TENDERED BY THE DEFENDANT-SPOUSES IN THEIR ANSWER
III. PLANTIFF'S CAUSES OF ACTIONS ARE SUPPORTED BY VOLUNTARY ADMISSIONS AND AUTHENTIC DOCUMENTS WHICH MAY NOT BE CONTRADICTED.[10]
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is rendered for the plaintiff and against the defendants ordering them to pay plaintiff jointly and severally the following:SO ORDERED.[14]
- The total amount of P117,567,779.75, plus interests and penalties as stipulated in the two promissory notes;
- A sum equivalent to 10% of the amount involved in this case, by way of attorney's fees; and
- The costs of suit.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 42 of Manila in Civil Case No. 01-101190 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a new one entered denying plaintiff-appellee's motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, the records of the case are hereby remanded to the court of origin for trial on the merits.
SO ORDERED.[16]
I
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED OR ACTED IN GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK, OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN RULING THAT THERE EXISTS A GENUINE ISSUE AS TO MATERIAL FACTS IN THE ACTION IN SPITE OF THE UNEQUIVOCAL ADMISSIONS MADE IN THE PLEADINGS BY RESPONDENTS; ANDII
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED OR ACTED IN GRAVE ABUSE OF JURISDICTION [DISCRETION] IN HOLDING THAT ISSUES WERE RAISED ABOUT THE FACT OF DEFAULT, THE AMOUNT OF THE OBLIGATION, AND THE EXISTENCE OF PRIOR DEMAND, EVEN WHEN THE PLEADING CLEARLY POINTS TO THE CONTRARY.
Under Rule 35 of the 1997 Rules of Procedure, as amended, except as to the amount of damages, when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law, summary judgment may be allowed.[39] Summary or accelerated judgment is a procedural technique aimed at weeding out sham claims or defenses at an early stage of litigation thereby avoiding the expense and loss of time involved in a trial.[40]
Under the Rules, summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of fact which call for the presentation of evidence in a full-blown trial. Even if on their face the pleadings appear to raise issues, when the affidavits, depositions and admissions show that such issues are not genuine, then summary judgment as prescribed by the Rules must ensue as a matter of law. The determinative factor, therefore, in a motion for summary judgment, is the presence or absence of a genuine issue as to any material fact.
A "genuine issue" is an issue of fact which requires the presentation of evidence as distinguished from a sham, fictitious, contrived or false claim. When the facts as pleaded appear uncontested or undisputed, then there is no real or genuine issue or question as to the facts, and summary judgment is called for. The party who moves for summary judgment has the burden of demonstrating clearly the absence of any genuine issue of fact, or that the issue posed in the complaint is patently unsubstantial so as not to constitute a genuine issue for trial. Trial courts have limited authority to render summary judgments and may do so only when there is clearly no genuine issue as to any material fact. When the facts as pleaded by the parties are disputed or contested, proceedings for summary judgment cannot take the place of trial.[41] (Underscoring supplied.)
The Court of Appeals held that spouses Gaza, petitioners, failed to deny specifically, in their answer, paragraphs 2, 3 and 5 of the complaint for forcible entry quoted as follows:
xxx xxx xxx.7
2. That defendants specifically deny the allegations in paragraph 2 and 3 of the complaint for want of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof, the truth of the matter being those alleged in the special and affirmative defenses of the defendants;"8
5. That the complaint states no cause of action;
"From the allegations of plaintiffs, it appears that their possession of the subject property was not supported by any concrete title or right, nowhere in the complaint that they alleged either as an owner or lessee, hence, the alleged possession of plaintiffs is questionable from all aspects. Defendants Sps. Napoleon Gaza and Evelyn Gaza being the registered owner of the subject property has all the right to enjoy the same, to use it, as an owner and in support thereof, a copy of the transfer certificate of title No. T-47263 is hereto attached and marked as Annex "A-Gaza" and a copy of the Declaration of Real Property is likewise attached and marked as Annex "B-Gaza" to form an integral part hereof;
6. That considering that the above-entitled case is an ejectment case, and considering further that the complaint did not state or there is no showing that the matter was referred to a Lupon for conciliation under the provisions of P.D. No. 1508, the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure of 1991, particularly Section 18 thereof provides that such a failure is jurisdictional, hence subject to dismissal;
7. That the Honorable Court has no jurisdiction over the subject of the action or suit;
The complaint is for forcible entry and the plaintiffs were praying for indemnification in the sum of P350,000.00 for those copra, lumber, tools, and machinery listed in par. 4 of the complaint and P100,000.00 for unrealized income in the use of the establishment, considering the foregoing amounts not to be rentals, Section 1 A (1) and (2) of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure prohibits recovery of the same, hence, the Honorable Court can not acquire jurisdiction over the same. Besides, the defendants Napoleon Gaza and Evelyn Gaza being the owners of those properties cited in par. 4 of the complaint except for those copra and two (2) live carabaos outside of the subject premises, plaintiffs have no rights whatsoever in claiming damages that it may suffer, as and by way of proof of ownership of said properties cited in paragraph 4 of the complaint attached herewith are bunche[s] of documents to form an integral part hereof;
8. That plaintiffs' allegation that Emilio Herrera was illegally detained together with his daughter was not true and in support thereof, attached herewith is a copy of said Herrera's statement and marked as Annex "C-Gaza."
xxx xxx xxx.9
Complaint | Answer |
8. The defendant defaulted in the payment of the obligations on the two (2) promissory notes (Annexes "A" and "B" hereof) as he has paid only three (3) installments on interests (sic) payments covering the months of September, November and December, 1999, on both promissory notes, respectively. As a consequence of the default, the entire balance due on the obligations of the defendant to plaintiff on both promissory notes immediately became due and demandable pursuant to the terms and conditions embodied in the two (2) promissory notes;[48] | 6. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraphs 8, 9, 10 and 11 of the Complaint; x x x 8. The promissory notes referred to in the complaint expressly state that the loan obligation is payable within the period of ten (10) years. Thus, from the execution date of September 30, 1999, its due date falls on September 3o, 2009 (and not 2001 as erroneously stated in the complaint). Thus, prior to September 30, 2009, the loan obligations cannot be deemed due and demandable. In conditional obligations, the acquisition of rights, as well as the extinguishment or loss of those already acquired, shall depend upon the happening of the event which constitutes the condition. (Article 1181, New Civil Code) 9. Contrary to the plaintiff's preference, defendant Jose C. Go has made substantial payments in terms of his monthly payments. There is therefore, a need to do some accounting works (sic) just to reconcile the records of both parties. 10. While demand is a necessary requirement to consider the defendant to be in delay/default, such has not been complied with by the plaintiff since the former is not aware of any demand made to him by the latter for the settlement of the whole obligation. 11. Undeniably, at the time the pledge of the shares of stocks were executed, their total value is more than the amount of the loan, or at the very least, equal to it. Thus, plaintiff was fully secured insofar as its exposure is concerned.[49] 12. And even assuming without conceding, that the present value of said shares has went (sic) down, it cannot be considered as something permanent since, the prices of stocks in the market either increases (sic) or (sic) decreases depending on the market forces. Thus, it is highly speculative for the plaintiff to consider said shares to have suffered tremendous decrease in its value. Moreso (sic), it is unfair for the plaintiff to renounce or abandon the pledge agreements. |
Complaint | Answer |
10. Plaintiff made repeated demands from (sic) defendant for the payment of the obligations which the latter acknowledged to have incurred however, defendant imposed conditions such as [that] his [effecting] payments shall depend upon the lifting of garnishment effected by the Bangko Sentral on his accounts. Photocopies of defendant's communication dated March 3, 2000 and April 7, 2000, with plaintiff are hereto attached as Annexes "F" and "G" hereof, as well as its demand to pay dated April 18, 2000. Demand by plaintiff is hereto attached as Annex "H" hereof.[50] [Emphases supplied] | 10. While demand is a necessary requirement to consider the defendant to be in delay/default, such has not been complied with by the plaintiff since the former is not aware of any demand made to him by the latter for the settlement of the whole obligation. |
Complaint | Answer |
9. Defendants' outstanding obligations under the two (2) promissory notes as of May 31, 2001 are: P21,576,668.64 (Annex "A") and P95,991,111.11 (Annex "B"), or a total of P117,567,779.75. Copy of the Statement of Account is hereto attached as Annex "E" hereof.[51] | 9. Contrary to the plaintiff's preference, defendant Jose C. Go has made substantial payments in terms of his monthly payments. There is therefore, a need to do some accounting works just to reconcile the records of both parties.[52] |
The letter dated March 3, 2000 is insufficient to support the material averments in PBCom's complaint for being equivocal and capable of different interpretations. The contents of the letter do not address all the issues material to the bank's claim and thus do not conclusively establish the cause of action of PBCom against the spouses Go. As regards the letter dated April 7, 2000, the trial court itself ruled that such letter addressed to PBCom could not be considered against the defendants-appellants simply because it was not signed by defendant-appellant Jose Go.
Notably, the trial court even agreed with the defendant-appellants on the following points:The alleged default and outstanding obligations are based on the Statement of Account. This Court agrees with the defendants that since the substance of the document was not set forth in the complaint although a copy thereof was attached thereto, or the said document was not set forth verbatim in the pleading, the rule on implied admission does not apply.[53]
x x x The rule authorizing an answer to the effect that the defendant has no knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of an averment and giving such answer the effect of a denial, does not apply where the fact as to which want of knowledge is asserted, is so plainly and necessarily within the defendant's knowledge that his averment of ignorance must be palpably untrue.[58]
Yet, despite the specific allegation as against him, petitioner, in his Answer in Intervention with Counterclaim and Crossclaim, answered the aforesaid paragraph 11, and other paragraphs, merely by saying that "he has no knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to its truth." While it may be true that under the Rules one could avail of this statement as a means of a specific denial, nevertheless, if an allegation directly and specifically charges a party to have done, performed or committed a particular act, but the latter had not in fact done, performed or committed it, a categorical and express denial must be made. In such a case, the occurrence or non-occurrence of the facts alleged may be said to be within the party's knowledge. In short, the petitioner herein could have simply expressly and in no uncertain terms denied the allegation if it were untrue. It has been held that when the matters of which a defendant alleges of having no knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief, are plainly and necessarily within his knowledge, his alleged ignorance or lack of information will not be considered as specific denial. His denial lacks the element of sincerity and good faith, hence, insufficient.[62]