508 Phil. 672
Before the Court is the petition for review on
certiorari
filed by the Office of the Ombudsman and Dennis M. Villa-Ignacio, in
his capacity as the Special Prosecutor, Office of the Ombudsman, seeking
the reversal of the Decision
[1]
dated June 25, 2004 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
83091. The assailed decision set aside the Order dated March 17, 2004
issued by petitioner Special Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio in
OMB-C-A-03-0379-J placing respondent Atty. Gil A. Valera, Deputy
Commissioner, Office of the Revenue Collection Monitoring Group, Bureau
of Customs, under preventive suspension for a period of six months
without pay.
Factual and Procedural Antecedents
Respondent
Valera was appointed Deputy Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs by
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on July 13, 2001. He took his oath of
office on August 3, 2001 and assumed his post on August 7, 2001. He is
in charge of the Revenue Collection Monitoring Group.
On August
20, 2003, the Office of the Ombudsman received the Sworn Complaint dated
July 28, 2003 filed by then Director Eduardo S. Matillano of the
Philippine National Police Criminal Investigation and Detection Group
(PNP-CIDG). In the said sworn complaint, Director Matillano charged
respondent Valera with criminal offenses involving violation of various
provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019,
[2] the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines (TCCP), Executive Order No. 38,
[3] Executive Order No. 298
[4] and R.A. No. 6713
[5]
as well as administrative offenses of Grave Misconduct and Serious
Irregularity in the Performance of Duty. Likewise subject of the same
sworn complaint was respondent Valera’s brother-in-law Ariel Manongdo
for violation of Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019.
The sworn complaint alleged that:
On
January 30, 2002, while in the performance of his official functions,
Atty. Gil A. Valera had compromised the case against the Steel Asia
Manufacturing Corporation in Civil Case No. 01-102504 before Branch 39,
RTC, Manila without proper authority from the Commissioner of the Bureau
of Customs in violation of Section 2316 TCCP (Authority of Commission
to make Compromise) and without the approval of the President, in
violation of Executive Order No. 156 and Executive Order No. 38. Such
illegal acts of Atty. Gil A. Valera, indeed, caused undue injury to the
government by having deprived the government of its right to collect the
legal interest, surcharges, litigation expenses and damages and gave the Steel Asia unwarranted benefits in the total uncollected amount of FOURTEEN MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED SIXTY-TWO THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED SIXTY-SEVEN PESOS AND SEVENTY CENTAVOS (P14,762,467.70), which is violative of Sections 3(e) and (g) respectively of RA 3019.
Further
investigation disclosed that Atty. Gil A. Valera while being a Bureau
of Customs official directly and indirectly had financial or pecuniary
interest in the CACTUS CARGOES SYSTEMS a brokerage whose line of
business or transaction, in connection with which, he intervenes or
takes part in his official capacity by way of causing the employment of
his brother-in-law, Ariel Manongdo, thus, violating Section 3(h) of RA
3019 and RA 6713 and Section 4, RA 3019 as against Ariel Manongdo.
Finally,
investigation also disclosed that on April 21, 2002 Atty. Gil A. Valera
traveled to Hongkong with his family without proper authority from the
Office of the President in violation of Executive Order No. 298 (foreign
travel of government personnel) dated May 19, 1995, thus, he committed
an administrative offense of Grave Misconduct.[6]
The sworn complaint prayed that:
1)
Appropriate preliminary investigation be conducted with the end-in-view
of filing the necessary information before the Sandiganbayan;
2)
Pending investigation, Atty. Gil A. Valera be indefinitely suspended
from public office in order to prevent him from further committing acts
of irregularity in public office;
3) This Group be furnished a copy of the Resolution of this (sic) cases.[7]
At
about the same time as the filing of the complaint against respondent
Valera, Director Matillano also filed charges against other officials of
the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) and Bureau of
Customs. The Philippine Daily Inquirer featured a news article on them
with the title “
More gov’t execs flunk lifestyle check.”
[8]Prior
to Director Matillano’s sworn complaint, criminal and administrative
charges were also filed with the Office of the Ombudsman by Atty. Adolfo
Casareño against respondent Valera. The complaint of Atty. Casareño
contained similar allegations as those in the complaint of Director
Matillano in that respondent Valera, without being duly authorized by
the Commissioner of Customs, entered into a compromise agreement with
Steel Asia Manufacturing Corp. in Civil Case No. 01-102504 to the
prejudice of the government.
The cases against respondent Valera before the Ombudsman were docketed as follows:
OMB-C-C-02-0568-I
(For: Violation of Sec. 3(e), R.A. 3019, as amended, and Section 3604
of the Tariff and Customs Code) entitled Alfredo Casareño v. Gil A. Valera and Antonio M. Lorenzana
OMB-C-C-03-0547-J (For: Violation of Sec. 3(e), (g) and (h) of R.A. 3019, as amended) entitled PNP-CIDG v. Gil A. Valera and Ariel N. Manongdo
OMB-C-A-0379-J (For: Grave Misconduct and Serious Irregularity in the Performance of Duty) entitled PNP-CIDG v. Gil A. Valera
On November 12, 2003, Ombudsman Simeon V. Marcelo issued a Memorandum
[9]
inhibiting himself from the foregoing criminal cases as well as the
related administrative case and directing petitioner Special Prosecutor
Villa-Ignacio to act in his (the Ombudsman’s) stead and place. The said
memorandum reads:
MEMORANDUM
TO : HON. DENNIS M. VILLA-IGNACIO
Special Prosecutor
Office of the Special Prosecutor
SUBJECT : OMB-C-C-02-0568-I entitled “Alfredo Casareño
vs. Gil Valera, et al.,” CPL No. C-03-1829 entitled
“PNP-CIDG vs. Atty. Gil Valera and Ariel Manongdo”
and OMB-C-A-0379-J entitled “PNP-CIDG vs.
Atty. Gil Valera”
DATE : November 12, 2003
____________________________________________________________
The undersigned is inhibiting himself in the above-captioned cases. Please act in his stead and place.
(Sgd.) SIMEON V. MARCELO
Tanodbayan
(Ombudsman)
On
March 17, 2004, pursuant to the above memorandum, petitioner Special
Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio, in the administrative case OMB-C-A-0379-J,
issued the Order placing respondent Valera under preventive suspension
for six months without pay. In the said order, petitioner Special
Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio found that respondent Valera entered into the
compromise agreement with Steel Asia Manufacturing Corp. in Civil Case
No. 01-102504 without being duly authorized to do so by the Commissioner
of Customs and without the approval of the Secretary of Finance in
violation of Section 2316
[10] of the TCCP.
As
earlier mentioned, Civil Case No. 01-102504 was a collection suit filed
by the Republic of the Philippines represented by the Bureau of Customs
against Steel Asia Manufacturing Corp. for payment of duties and taxes
amounting to P37,195,859.00. The said amount was allegedly paid by Steel
Asia Manufacturing Corp. with spurious tax credit certificates. In
addition to the principal amount, the government likewise demanded
payment of penalty charges (25% thereof), legal interest from date of
demand, litigation expenses and exemplary damages.
Petitioner
Special Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio made the finding that by entering into
the said compromise agreement whereby Steel Asia Manufacturing Corp.
shall pay the overdue taxes and duties in thirty (30) monthly
installments of P1,239,862 from January 2002 to June 2004, respondent
Valera may have made concessions that may be deemed highly prejudicial
to the government,
i.e., waiver of the legal interest from the
amount demanded, penalty charges imposed by law, litigation expenses and
exemplary damages. Further, by the terms of the compromise agreement,
respondent Valera had virtually exonerated Steel Asia Manufacturing
Corp. of its fraudulent acts of using spurious tax credit certificates.
Petitioner
Special Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio concluded the Order dated March 17,
2004 by stating that “[c]onsidering the strong evidence of guilt of
respondent Deputy Commissioner Valera and the fact that the charges
against him consist of Grave Misconduct and/or Dishonesty which may
warrant his removal from the service, it is hereby declared that the
requirements under Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, in relation to Sec. 9,
Rule III of Administrative Order No. 7, on the Rules of Procedure of the
Office of the Ombudsman, as amended, are present, and placing
respondent Deputy Commissioner Valera under preventive suspension
pending administrative investigation on the matter for a period of six
(6) months without pay is clearly justified.”
[11]The decretal portion of the March 17, 2004 Order reads:
WHEREFORE,
pursuant to Sec. 24 of R.A. No. 6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman
Act of 1989, in relation to Sec. 9, Rule III of Administrative Order No.
7, respondent ATTY. GIL A. VALERA, Deputy Commissioner, Office of the
Collection and Monitoring Group, Bureau of Customs, is hereby placed
under preventive suspension for SIX (6) MONTHS WITHOUT PAY.
Pursuant to Sec. 27(1) of R.A. No. 6770, this Order of Preventive Suspension is deemed immediately effective and executory.
The
Honorable Commissioner Antonio M. Bernard, Bureau of Customs, is hereby
directed to implement the Order immediately upon receipt hereof and to
promptly inform this Office of compliance herewith.
Respondent
Atty. Gil A. Valera, Deputy Commissioner, Office of the Collection and
Monitoring Group, Bureau of Customs, is hereby ordered to file his
counter-affidavit and other controverting evidence to the complaint,
copy of which together with the annexes, is hereto attached, within ten
(10) days from receipt hereof in three (3) legible copies addressed to
the Central Records Division, Office of the Ombudsman, Ombudsman
Building, Agham Road, Government Center, North Triangle, Diliman, Quezon
City, furnishing the complainant with a copy of said counter-affidavit.
Further,
respondent is also ordered to submit proof of service of his
counter-affidavit to the complaint, who may file its reply thereto
within a period of ten (10) days from receipt of the same.
Failure
to comply as herein directed within the period prescribed by the rules
shall be deemed as a waiver of the right to submit the party’s
counter-affidavit or reply, nonetheless, despite said non-filing, the
investigation shall proceed pursuant to existing rules.
This Order is being issued by the undersigned in view of the inhibition of the Honorable Tanodbayan Simeon Marcelo from his case as contained in a Memorandum dated 12 November 2003.
SO ORDERED.[12]
Respondent
Valera sought reconsideration of the said Order claiming denial of due
process. He averred that he had already submitted his counter-affidavit
refuting the charges leveled against him by the PNP-CIDG way back on
November 6, 2003. He pointed out that Director Matillano’s sworn
complaint was filed on August 20, 2003 and it was only two months later
or on October 22, 2003 that the Ombudsman found enough basis to proceed
with the administrative investigation of the case by requiring
respondent Valera to file his counter-affidavit. He did so on November
6, 2003. During the said period of two months, the Preliminary
Investigation and Administrative Adjudication Bureau-A (PIAB-A) of the
Office of the Ombudsman did not find enough bases to preventively
suspend him. According to respondent Valera, he was at a loss as to why
it was only then (March 17, 2004) that he was being placed under
preventive suspension.
Acting on respondent Valera’s motion for
reconsideration, petitioner Special Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio issued the
Order dated April 5, 2004 explaining that the delay in the issuance of
the preventive suspension order was due to the inhibition of the
Ombudsman from the case and for which reason, he (petitioner Special
Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio), by virtue of the Memorandum dated November
12, 2003, had to act in his place and stead. Petitioner Special
Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio averred that contrary to respondent Valera’s
assertion, his counter-affidavit would not justify the reversal of the
March 17, 2004 Order since he failed to show that he had the requisite
authority from the Commissioner of Customs to enter into the said
compromise agreement with respect to the Steel Asia Manufacturing Corp.
case. It was not shown under what authority and on what basis respondent
Valera entered into the said compromise agreement.
In light of
the foregoing ratiocination, petitioner Special Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio
denied respondent Valera’s motion for reconsideration. The decretal
portion of his Order dated April 5, 2004 reads:
WHEREFORE,
the undersigned finds no cogent reason to reconsider the suspension
order previously issued dated 17 March 2004 but considers the
Counter-Affidavit received by the Office of the Ombudsman 06 November
2003 as sufficient compliance to the portion of the assailed Order
directing him to file his counter-affidavit. Consequently, the Order
insofar as it requires him to file counter-affidavit contained in the 17
March 200[4] Order is SET ASIDE.[13]
Even
before his motion for reconsideration was acted upon, however,
respondent Valera already filed with the Court of Appeals a special
civil action for certiorari and prohibition as he sought to nullify the
March 17, 2004 Order of preventive suspension issued by petitioner
Special Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio and to enjoin Commissioner of Customs
Antonio M. Bernardo from implementing the said Order.
On April
16, 2004, the appellate court heard the parties on oral arguments on the
prayer for injunction. On even date, it issued a temporary restraining
order against the implementation of the preventive suspension order.
On
June 25, 2004, the appellate court rendered the assailed Decision
setting aside the March 17, 2004 Order of preventive suspension and
directing petitioner Special Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio to desist from
taking any further action in OMB-C-A-03-0379-J.
In so ruling, the
CA held mainly that petitioner Special Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio is not
authorized by law to sign and issue preventive suspension orders. It
cited Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, otherwise known as “The Ombudsman Act
of 1989,” which vests on the “Ombudsman and his Deputy” the power to
preventively suspend any government officer or employee under the
Ombudsman’s authority pending investigation subject to certain
conditions. In relation thereto, Section 5, Article XI of the
Constitution was also cited as it states that the Office of the
Ombudsman is “composed of the Ombudsman to be known as the Tanodbayan,
one overall Deputy, and at least one Deputy each for Luzon, Visayas and
Mindanao. A separate Deputy for the military establishment may likewise
be appointed.”
Relying on these two provisions of law, the CA
declared that petitioner Special Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio has no
authority to issue a preventive suspension order since he is neither the
Ombudsman nor one of the Deputy Ombudsmen.
The CA was not
persuaded by petitioner Special Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio’s contention
that his authority to issue the March 17, 2004 Order of preventive
suspension could be found in Section 11(4)(c) of R.A. No. 6770 which
provides that the Office of the Special Prosecutor shall, in addition to
those powers expressly enumerated in the said provision, “perform such
other duties assigned to it by the Ombudsman.” The CA held that the
grant of such power to the Office of the Special Prosecutor is subject
to the condition that it shall be “under the supervision and control and
upon the authority of the Ombudsman.”
However, according to the
CA, by virtue of the Memorandum dated November 12, 2003 of Ombudsman
Marcelo where he stated that he was inhibiting himself and directing
petitioner Special Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio to act in his place and
stead, the latter (petitioner Special Prosecutor) officially stepped
into the position of the Ombudsman insofar as the subject case is
concerned. In effect, petitioner Special Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio would
act as the Ombudsman. The CA opined that this is not the kind of duties
contemplated under Section 11(4)(c) of R.A. No. 6770.
Ombudsman
Marcelo’s Memorandum dated November 12, 2003 was declared null and void
by the appellate court for the following reasons:
- The
issuance of that kind of a memorandum effectively stretched (or
over-stretched) the limited powers of the special prosecutor under R.A.
No. 6770 and the Constitution;
- The issuance of that kind
of a memorandum has effectively placed the special prosecutor over and
above all of the five (5) deputies of the Ombudsman in terms of
hierarchy with respect to administrative adjudication;
- To
put it lightly, the Ombudsman, in issuing that kind of a memorandum,
has, wittingly or unwittingly, permitted the Office of the Special
Prosecutor to perform the administrative adjudicative powers of the
Ombudsman not only to issue preventive suspension but to perform,
without qualification, any and all other administrative adjudicative
powers, duties functions and responsibilities pertaining to the former
as provided under R.A. No. 6770 and the Constitution.[14]
In
addition, the CA refuted the finding of petitioner Special Prosecutor
Villa-Ignacio that the evidence of guilt against respondent Valera is
strong to warrant his preventive suspension. The CA proffered the
following circumstances as negating the said finding of petitioner
Special Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio: (1) Unlike the other four government
officials who were simultaneously charged with him, respondent Valera
was not immediately placed under preventive suspension; hence,
indicating that there was no strong evidence against him; (2) Petitioner
Special Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio’s comment filed with the appellate
court did not make any reference to respondent Valera’s supposed foreign
travel violation which was alleged in the sworn complaint of Director
Matillano; and (3) The admission of petitioner Special Prosecutor
Villa-Ignacio’s counsel during the oral arguments on the preliminary
injunction that the PIAB-A recommended against placing respondent Valera
under preventive suspension.
Finally, the CA strongly denounced
petitioner Special Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio for issuing the preventive
suspension order without even considering respondent Valera’s
counter-affidavit and, worse, not knowing that he had already filed it
as early as November 5, 2003. The CA opined that had petitioner Special
Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio duly considered the said counter-affidavit, he
would have reached a different conclusion, i.e., there is no strong
evidence against respondent Valera. Further, that the latter, in
entering into the compromise agreement with Steel Asia Manufacturing
Corp., is authorized to do so under Section 2401
[15]
of the TCCP and Section 2316 thereof, cited by petitioner Special
Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio, is inapplicable. The CA concluded that
petitioner Special Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio acted with grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the March 17, 2004 placing respondent Valera under
preventive suspension for six months without pay in connection with the
administrative case OMB-C-A-03-0379-J.
The decretal portion of the decision of the appellate court reads:
WHEREFORE,
the petition is hereby GRANTED, and the assailed order of March 17,
2004, issued by respondent Dennis Villa-Ignacio in OMB-C-A-03-0379-J is
SET ASIDE.
Respondent Special Prosecutor is DIRECTED to desist from taking any further action in OMB-C-A-03-0379-J.
SO ORDERED.[16]
Hence, the recourse to this Court by petitioners Special Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio and the Office of the Ombudsman.
The Petitioners’ Case
They submit the following as grounds for the allowance of their petition:
IN
ITS DECISION DATED 25 JUNE 2004, THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS
ERROR IN FINDING THAT THE PETITIONER SPECIAL PROSECUTOR COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AND IN SETTING ASIDE THE MARCH 17, 2004 ORDER OF
PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION ISSUED BY THE PETITIONER SPECIAL PROSECUTOR,
CONSIDERING THAT:
I
[PETITIONER]
SPECIAL PROSECUTOR ACTED WITH FULL AUTHORITY CONSIDERING THAT THE
OMBUDSMAN EXPRESSLY ASSIGNED TO [PETITIONER] SPECIAL PROSECUTOR THE
SPECIFIC FUNCTION OF ACTING IN HIS (OMBUDSMAN’S) PLACE AND STEAD IN
OMB-C-A-030379-J, AND THIS DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY SUFFERS FROM NO VICE
OR DEFECT AND, ON THE CONTRARY, HAS THE FULL MANDATE OF THE LAW.
II
NO
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION HAS BEEN COMMITTED BY THE PETITIONERS IN
FINDING, AT THAT STAGE, THE EVIDENCE OF GUILT TO BE STRONG ON THE PART
OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT, FOR GRAVE MISCONDUCT AND/OR DISHONESTY.
III
PRIVATE RESPONDENT’S PETITION FILED BEFORE THE COURT A QUO SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED FOR VIOLATION OF THE RULE ON FORUM SHOPPING.[17]
The
petitioners vigorously maintain that no grave abuse of discretion
attended the issuance by petitioner Special Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio of
the March 17, 2004 Order placing respondent Valera under preventive
suspension because the Ombudsman, in directing petitioner Special
Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio to act in his place and stead insofar as
OMB-C-A-03-0379-J was concerned, fully clothed the latter with delegated
authority to act thereon. Since under Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, the
Ombudsman may preventively suspend respondent Valera in the subject
administrative case, it follows that with the delegation of his
authority to petitioner Special Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio, he had full
authority to preventively suspend respondent Valera. Petitioner Special
Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio, upon finding that all the elements for
preventive suspension in Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770 are present,
accordingly placed respondent Valera under preventive suspension for six
months without pay in connection with the subject administrative case.
The
petitioners defend the validity of the Ombudsman’s delegation of his
authority to petitioner Special Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio with respect to
the administrative case OMB-C-A-03-0379-J contending that: “a) the
authority to preventively suspend is not insusceptible to delegation to
an alter ego of the Ombudsman; b) the petitioner Special Prosecutor
possessed the necessary qualifications and competence to exercise the
delegated functions; c) no law or rule was violated with the said
delegation.”
[18]Nothing
in Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770 allegedly prohibits the delegation by
the Ombudsman of his authority to preventively suspend to his alter ego.
The petitioners point out that under R.A. No. 6770, the Special
Prosecutor, like the Deputy Ombudsmen, heads a major office in the
Office of the Ombudsman;
[19] he is appointed in the same manner as the Deputy Ombudsmen;
[20] he shares the same qualifications
[21] and enjoys the same rank and privilege as the latter.
[22]
As such, the Special Prosecutor, like any of the other Deputy
Ombudsmen, has the competence and capability to preventively suspend any
officer or employee under the authority of the Ombudsman.
The petitioners invoke, in particular, Section 11(4)(c) of R.A. No. 6770:
Sec. 11. Structural Organization. –
…
(4)
The Office of the Special Prosecutor shall, under the supervision and
control and upon the authority of the Ombudsman, have the following
powers:
…
(c) To perform such other duties assigned to it by the Ombudsman.
By
this provision, the Ombudsman may allegedly validly delegate to the
Special Prosecutor such other functions that he cannot, otherwise,
perform by himself and that he (the Ombudsman) is not obliged to always
make such delegation to the Overall Deputy Ombudsman. In the exercise of
quasi-judicial functions, there is no law which mandates that the
Ombudsman can only inhibit himself in favor of the Deputy Ombudsmen.
The
petitioners assert that the evidence of respondent Valera’s guilt for
serious administrative infractions is strong. According to them, the
facts that have so far been established show that respondent Valera
entered into the compromise agreement with Steel Manufacturing Asia
Corp. to unduly shield and promote its interests and to the prejudice of
the government. It is allegedly suspicious that he (respondent Valera)
simply allowed the said company to redeem the spurious tax credit
certificates with a 30-month staggered payment when sufficient
properties of the said company had already been attached to satisfy not
only the P37 million principal amount of taxes owed by the said company
but the penalty charges and damages as well. He further unjustifiably
exonerated the said company’s officers of any criminal wrongdoing when
they are conclusively liable for the procurement of these spurious tax
credit certificates. Further, respondent Valera was never authorized by
the Customs Commissioner to enter into such compromise agreement nor was
it approved by the Secretary of Finance as required by Section 2316 of
the TCCP. Neither was it approved by the President of the Philippines as
further required by E.O. No. 38. Respondent Valera thus committed an
act of misrepresentation when he signed the compromise agreement under
the clause “
By authority of the Commissioner.”
The
petitioners posit that conclusively at the given stage respondent Valera
appeared to have committed Grave Misconduct and Dishonesty to warrant
his preventive suspension. They also aver that the evidence strongly
show that respondent Valera obtained employment for his brother-in-law,
Ariel Manongdo, with Cactus Cargo Systems, Inc., a customs brokerage
firm whose business principally involves dealing on a regular basis with
the Bureau of Customs, in contravention of R.A. No. 6713 and R.A. No.
3019.
To refute the appellate court’s statement that there was
inordinate delay in the issuance of the March 17, 2004 Order of
preventive suspension, the petitioners explain that the same was due to,
among others, the inhibition of the Ombudsman from the case, the delay
in the transmittal of the case records and the amount of time that it
took petitioner Special Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio to study the
recommendation of the PIAB-A and the divergent recommendation of the
Assistant Ombudsman for Preliminary Investigation, Adjudication and
Monitoring Office (PAMO).
Moreover, even if the PIAB-A
recommended against placing respondent Valera under preventive
suspension, petitioner Special Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio was not bound to
adopt the same. With respect to respondent Valera’s counter-affidavit,
the petitioners insist that the same failed to rebut the strong evidence
against him; hence, justifying his preventive suspension.
Finally,
the petitioners fault the appellate court for not dismissing outright
respondent Valera’s petition for certiorari. They charge him with
violation of the rule on non-forum shopping as he filed his petition for
certiorari with the CA even when his motion for reconsideration had yet
to be acted upon by petitioner Special Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio.
The Respondent’s Counter-Arguments
Respondent
Valera mainly argues that petitioner Special Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio
has no authority to issue the March 17, 2004 Order placing him under
preventive suspension. While Section 11(4)(c) of R.A. No. 6770 grants
the Office of the Special Prosecutor the power to “perform such other
duties assigned to it by the Ombudsman,” the performance of such other
duties should still be “under the supervision and control and upon the
authority of the Ombudsman.” Respondent Valera echoes the ratiocination
of the CA that the Memorandum dated November 12, 2003 issued by
Ombudsman Marcelo directing petitioner Special Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio
to act in his place and stead in OMB-C-A-03-0379-J produced the effect
of making him (petitioner Special Prosecutor) step into the position of
the Ombudsman. This is not the kind of assignment of duties contemplated
by Section 11(4)(c) of R.A. No. 6770 because, in such a case, the
Ombudsman’s power of supervision and control over the Special Prosecutor
is undermined.
Respondent Valera submits that the Ombudsman’s
memorandum designating petitioner Special Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio to
act in his place and stead has destroyed the hierarchy of command within
the Office of the Ombudsman because it put the Special Prosecutor over
and above the Office of the Overall Deputy Ombudsman. Such designation
infringes on Section 11(2) of R.A. No. 6770 which provides that the
Overall Deputy Ombudsman “shall oversee and administer the operations of
the different offices under the Office of the Ombudsman.” The Overall
Deputy Ombudsman is next in line to the Ombudsman as shown by the fact
that he assumes as Acting Ombudsman in case of vacancy in the Office of
the Ombudsman due to death, resignation, removal or permanent disability
of the incumbent Ombudsman.
Respondent Valera stresses that the
power to preventively suspend any officer or employee under the
authority of the Ombudsman pending investigation is exclusively vested
on the Ombudsman or his Deputy pursuant to Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770.
Since the Special Prosecutor is not named therein as vested with the
said power, then petitioner Special Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio has no
authority to issue a preventive suspension.
In relation thereto,
the Special Prosecutor’s powers is allegedly limited to the conduct of
preliminary investigation and prosecution of criminal cases within the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Respondent Valera cites the
enumeration of the Special Prosecutor’s powers in Section 11(4) of R.A.
No. 6770:
Sec. 11. Structural Organization. –
…
(4)
The Office of the Special Prosecutor shall, under the supervision and
control and upon the authority of the Ombudsman, have the following
powers:
(a) To conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan;
(b) To enter into plea bargaining agreement; and
(c) To perform such other duties assigned to it by the Ombudsman.
Applying the rule of
ejusdem generis,
respondent Valera theorizes that since the first two powers relate to
criminal complaints and criminal cases, then the last power – “to
perform such other duties assigned to it by the Ombudsman” – can only
refer to other duties related to criminal complaints and criminal cases
and not to administrative complaints, investigation, adjudication and
administrative preventive suspension. While he concedes that the
Ombudsman may inhibit himself in certain cases, respondent Valera is of
the view that when the Ombudsman does inhibit himself in an
administrative investigation pending before the Office of the Ombudsman,
he may not designate the Special Prosecutor to act in his place and
stead.
Respondent Valera also harps on petitioner Special
Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio’s alleged failure to consider his (respondent
Valera’s) counter-affidavit before issuing the preventive suspension
order. This omission coupled with the delay in issuing the same
allegedly renders the March 17, 2004 Order null and void.
On the
evidence against him, respondent Valera claims that the same is not
strong. He cites the delay in placing him under preventive suspension as
he alleges that the first complaint involving the Steel Manufacturing
Asia Corp. case was filed against him by Atty. Casareño as early as
August 26, 2002. However, it was only on March 17, 2004 that he was
placed under preventive suspension by petitioner Special Prosecutor
Villa-Ignacio. The strength of the evidence against him is also belied
by the fact that the PIAB-A recommended against placing him under
preventive suspension.
On the procedural point, respondent Valera
states that he filed the petition for certiorari with the CA without
awaiting the resolution of his motion for reconsideration because, at
the time, petitioner Special Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio still had not
resolved the same despite the lapse of the period provided by the
Ombudsman’s rules of procedure.
Issue
The
basic issue for the Court’s resolution is whether petitioner Special
Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio has the authority to place respondent Valera
under preventive suspension in connection with the administrative case
OMB-C-A-03-0379-J pending before the Office of the Ombudsman.
The Court’s Ruling
The Court holds that the Special Prosecutor has no such authority.
Preliminarily,
it is noted that petitioner Special Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio anchors
his authority to conduct the administrative investigation in
OMB-C-A-03-0379-J on the Memorandum dated November 12, 2003 issued by
Ombudsman Marcelo inhibiting himself therefrom and directing petitioner
Special Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio to act in his place and stead.
Significantly,
Ombudsman Marcelo did not state in the said memorandum the reason for
his inhibition. On this point, the rule on voluntary inhibition of
judges finds application to the Ombudsman in the performance of his
functions particularly in administrative proceedings like
OMB-C-A-03-0379-J. Like judges, the decision on whether or not to
inhibit is admittedly left to the Ombudsman’s sound discretion and
conscience.
[23] However, again
similar to judges, Ombudsman Marcelo has no unfettered discretion to
inhibit himself. The inhibition must be for just and valid causes.
[24] No such cause was proffered by Ombudsman Marcelo for his inhibition in OMB-C-A-03-0379-J.
The Court shall now proceed to resolve the basic issue of the case.
The Ombudsman, pursuant to his power of
supervision and control over the Special
Prosecutor, may authorize the latter to
conduct administrative investigationThe Office of the Ombudsman is vested by the Constitution with the following powers, functions and duties:
(1)
Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or
omission of any public official, employee, office or agency, when such
act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient;
(2)
Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any public official or
employee of the Government, or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, as well as of any government-owned and
controlled corporation with original charter, to perform and expedite
any act or duty required by law, or to stop, prevent and correct any
abuse or impropriety in the performance of duties;
(3) Direct the
officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public official
or employee at fault, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion,
fine, censure, or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith;
(4)
Direct the officer concerned, in any appropriate case, and subject to
such limitations as may be provided by law to furnish it with copies of
documents relating to contracts or transactions entered into by his
office involving the disbursement or use of public funds or properties,
and report any irregularity to the Commission on Audit for appropriate
action;
(5) Request any government agency for assistance an
information necessary in the discharge of its responsibilities, and to
examine, if necessary, pertinent and records and documents;
(6) Publicize matters covered by its investigation when circumstances so warrant and with due prudence;
(7)
Determine the causes of inefficiency, red tape, mismanagement, fraud
and corruption in the Government and make recommendations for their
elimination and the observance of high standards of ethics and
efficiency; and
(8) Promulgate its rules of procedure and
exercise such other powers or perform such functions or duties as may be
provided by law.[25]
R.A.
No. 6770 was enacted to provide for the functional and structural
organization of the Office of the Ombudsman. It substantially reiterates
the constitutional provisions relating to the Office of the Ombudsman.
In addition, R.A. No. 6770 granted to the Office of the Ombudsman
prosecutorial functions
[26] and made the Office of the Special Prosecutor an organic component of the Office of the Ombudsman.
[27]
As such, R.A. No. 6770 vests on the Office of the Special Prosecutor,
under the supervision and control and upon the authority of the
Ombudsman, the following powers:
(a) To conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan;
(b) To enter into plea bargaining agreement; and
(c) To perform such other duties assigned to it by the Ombudsman.[28]
Based
on the pertinent provisions of the Constitution and R.A. No. 6770, the
powers of the Ombudsman have generally been categorized into the
following: investigatory power; prosecutory power; public assistance
functions; authority to inquire and obtain information; and function to
adopt, institute and implement preventive measures.
[29] The Ombudsman’s investigatory and prosecutory power has been characterized as plenary and unqualified:
The
power to investigate and to prosecute granted by law to the Ombudsman
is plenary and unqualified. It pertains to any act or omission of any public officer or employee when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient…[30]
On the other hand, the authority of the Office of the Special Prosecutor has been characterized as limited:
Moreover,
the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman should not be equated
with the limited authority of the Special Prosecutor under Section 11 of
R.A. 6770. The Office of the Special Prosecutor is merely a component
of the Office of the Ombudsman and may act only under the supervision
and control and upon the authority of the Ombudsman. Its power to
conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute is limited to criminal
cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Certainly, the
lawmakers did not intend to confine the investigatory and prosecutory
power of the Ombudsman to these types of cases. The Ombudsman is
mandated by law to act on all complaints against officers and employees
of the government and to enforce their administrative, civil and
criminal liability in every case where the evidence warrants. To carry
out this duty, the law allows him to utilize the personnel in his office
and/or designate any fiscal, state prosecutor or lawyer in the
government service to act as special investigator or prosecutor to
assist in the investigation and prosecution of certain cases. Those
designated or deputized to assist him work under his supervision and
control. The law likewise allows him to direct the Special Prosecutor to
prosecute cases outside the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction in accordance
with Section 11(4c) of R.A. 6770.[31]
The
Court has consistently held that the Office of the Special Prosecutor
is merely a component of the Office of the Ombudsman and may only act
under the supervision and control and upon authority of the Ombudsman.
[32]Section 38(1), Chapter 7, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987 defines “supervision and control” thus:
(1) Supervision and Control.
– Supervision and control shall include authority to act directly
whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to a
subordinate; direct the performance of duty; restrain the commission of
acts; review, approve, reverse or modify acts and decisions of
subordinate officials or units; determine priorities in the execution of
plans and programs; and prescribe standards, guidelines, plans and
programs. Unless a different meaning is explicitly provided in the
specific law governing the relationship of particular agencies, the word
“control” shall encompass supervision and control as defined in this
paragraph.
The power of supervision and control has been likewise explained as follows:
In
administrative law, supervision means overseeing or the power or
authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their
duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them, the former may
take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform such
duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to
alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had
done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of
the former for that of the latter.[33]
Pursuant
to its power of supervision and control, the Office of the Ombudsman is
empowered under Section 15(10) of R.A. No. 6770 to:
(10)
Delegate to the Deputies, or its investigators or representatives such
authority or duty as shall ensure the effective exercise or performance
of the powers, functions, and duties herein or hereinafter provided;
…
Complementary thereto, Section 11(4)(c) thereof requires the latter to:
(c) [p]erform such other duties assigned to it by the Ombudsman.
Hence,
under the foregoing provisions, the Ombudsman may delegate his
investigatory function, including the power to conduct administrative
investigation, to the Special Prosecutor.
Section 24 of R.A. No 6770, however, grants
the power to preventively suspend only to the
Ombudsman and the Deputy OmbudsmenSection 24 of R.A. No. 6770 reads:
Sec. 24. Preventive Suspension.
– The Ombudsman and his Deputy may preventively suspend any officer or
employee under his authority pending an investigation, if in his
judgment the evidence of guilt is strong, and (a) the charge against
such officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave
misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (b) the charges would
warrant removal from the service; or (c) the respondent’s continued
stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him.
The
preventive suspension shall continue until the case is terminated by the
Office of the Ombudsman but not more than six months, without pay,
except when the delay in the disposition of the case by the Office of
the Ombudsman is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the
respondent, in which case the period of such delay shall not be counted
in computing the period of suspension herein provided.
It
is observed that R.A. No. 6770 has invariably mentioned the Special
Prosecutor alongside the Ombudsman and/or the Deputy Ombudsmen with
respect to the manner of appointment,
[34] qualifications,
[35] term of office,
[36] grounds for removal from office,
[37] prohibitions and disqualifications
[38] and disclosure of relationship requirement.
[39]
However, with respect to the grant of the power to preventively
suspend, Section 24 of R.A. No 6770 makes no mention of the Special
Prosecutor. The obvious import of this exclusion is to withhold from the
Special Prosecutor the power to preventively suspend. It is a basic
precept of statutory construction that the express mention of one
person, thing, act or consequence excludes all others as expressed in
the familiar maxim
expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
[40]The
petitioners’ contention that since the Special Prosecutor is of the
same rank as that of a Deputy Ombudsman, then the former can rightfully
perform all the functions of the latter, including the power to
preventively suspend, is not persuasive. Under civil service laws, rank
classification determines the salary and status of government officials
and employees.
[41] Although
there is substantial equality in the level of their respective
functions, those occupying the same rank do not necessarily have the
same powers nor perform the same functions.
The Ombudsman and the
Deputy Ombudsmen, as they are expressly named in Section 24 of R.A. No.
6770, have been granted the power to preventively suspend as the same
inheres in their mandate under the Constitution:
Sec. 12.
The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act
promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public
officials or employees of the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations, and shall, in appropriate cases, notify the complainants
of the action taken and the result thereof.[42]
While
R.A. No. 6770 accords the Special Prosecutor the same rank as that of
the Deputy Ombudsmen, Section 24 thereof expressly grants only to the
Ombudsman and the Deputy Ombudsmen the power to place under preventive
suspension government officials and employees under their authority
pending an administrative investigation.
[43]However,
if the Ombudsman delegates his authority to conduct administrative
investigation to the Special Prosecutor and the latter finds that the
preventive suspension of the public official or employee subject thereof
is warranted, the Special Prosecutor may recommend to the Ombudsman to
place the said public officer or employee under preventive suspension.
Pertinently,
the investigation of OMB-C-A-03-0379-J was initially conducted by the
PIAB-A, a panel composed of two Special Prosecution Officers III
[44] and Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officers II.
[45]
The said investigating panel submitted to the Ombudsman the Memorandum
dated November 5, 2003 which contained its initial findings stating in
part thus:
After a careful evaluation of the complaint,
it appears that the evidence of guilt in the case under review, in the
context of Sec. 24, R.A. 6770, are not strong enough to warrant the
imposition of preventive suspension of respondent Atty. Gil A. Valera.
The evidence on record fall short of the quantum of evidence necessary
to establish the necessary weight to preventively suspend him. However,
the Investigating Panel finds enough basis to proceed with the
administrative investigation of this case.[46]
It
appears in the signatory page of the said memorandum that the findings
and recommendation therein were reviewed by the Director
[47] of the PIAB-A. Further, the memorandum was, likewise, reviewed by the Assistant Ombudsman,
[48]
Preliminary Investigation, Adjudication and Monitoring Office (PAMO)
with the notation “recommending disapproval.” This demonstrates that in
the conduct of administrative investigation, the PIAB-A exercises merely
recommendatory powers particularly with respect to whether to place the
public official or employee subject thereof under preventive
suspension.
Ombudsman Marcelo designated the Special Prosecutor
to conduct the administrative investigation. In the course thereof,
petitioner Special Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio found that the preventive
suspension of respondent Valera was warranted under Section 24 of R.A.
No. 6770. However, since under the said provision only the Ombudsman or
his Deputy may exercise the power of preventive suspension, petitioner
Special Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio could only recommend to the Ombudsman
or, in this case because of the latter’s inhibition, to the designated
Deputy Ombudsman to place respondent Valera under preventive suspension.
Stated
differently, with respect to the conduct of administrative
investigation, the Special Prosecutor’s authority, insofar as preventive
suspension is concerned, is akin to that of the PIAB-A,
i.e.,
recommendatory in nature. It bears stressing that the power to place a
public officer or employee under preventive suspension pending an
investigation is lodged only with the Ombudsman or the Deputy Ombudsmen.
Consequently,
petitioner Special Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio had no authority to issue
the March 17, 2004 Order placing respondent Valera under preventive
suspension for six months without pay in connection with the
administrative case OMB-C-A-03-0379-J. The appellate court thus
correctly nullified and set aside the said assailed order.
Considering
the finding that petitioner Special Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio had no
authority to issue the March 17, 2004 preventive suspension order, the
resolution of the issue of whether or not the evidence of respondent
Valera’s guilt is strong to warrant his preventive suspension need not
be passed upon at this point. Anent respondent Valera’s alleged
non-compliance with the rule on non-forum shopping when he filed the
petition for certiorari with the appellate court, suffice it to state
that the appellate court correctly overlooked this procedural lapse. The
merits of respondent Valera’s case are special circumstances or
compelling reasons which justified the appellate court’s relaxing the
rule requiring certification on non-forum shopping.
[49]It
is well to mention, at this point, that after the appellate court
rendered its decision nullifying the March 17, 2004 Order of petitioner
Special Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio and directing him to desist from taking
any further action in OMB-C-A-03-0379-J, the said case was next
assigned to the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military and
Other Law Enforcement Offices (MOLEO), headed by Mr. Orlando C.
Casimiro.
[50] The hearings in
OMB-C-A-03-0379-J were, thus, continued by the Deputy Ombudsman for
MOLEO. On August 30, 2004, a Decision was rendered in the said
administrative case finding petitioner Valera guilty of grave misconduct
and decreeing his dismissal from the service. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision of the Deputy Ombudsman for MOLEO.
Petitioner Valera subsequently filed a petition for review with this
Court assailing the said decision of the appellate court. The said
petition, docketed as G.R. No. 167278, is now pending with the Court.
WHEREFORE, the petition is
DENIED.
The Decision dated June 25, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 83091, insofar as it set aside the March 17, 2004 Order issued by
petitioner Special Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio in OMB-C-A-03-0379-J, is
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.Davide,
Jr., C.J., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago,
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio Morales,
Azcuna, Tinga, and
Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur,
Garcia, J., no part.
[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr., with Presiding
Justice Cancio C. Garcia (now an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court)
and Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion, concurring.
[2] The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
[3]
Reorganizing and Extending the Life of the Special Task Force Created
under Executive Order No. 156 dated October 7, 1999, entitled “Creating a
Special Task Force to Review, Investigate and Gather Evidence Necessary
to Successfully Prosecute Irregularities Committed at the Bureau of
Internal Revenue, Bureau of Customs and Other Government Offices or
Agencies Under or Attached to the Department of Finance.”
[4]
Amending further Executive Order (E.O.) No. 298, series of 1995 as
amended by E.O. No. 298-A, Series of 1995, which prescribes rules and
regulations and new rates of allowances for official, local and foreign
travels of government personnel.
[5]
An Act Establishing a Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees, to Uphold the Time-Honored Principle of Public
Office Being a Public Trust, Granting Incentives and Rewards for
Exemplary Service, Enumerating Prohibited Acts and Transactions and
Providing Penalties for Violations thereof and For Other Purposes,
otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards For Public
Officials and Employees.
[6] Rollo, pp. 109-110.
[7] Rollo, p. 110.
[8] Id. at 255.
[9] Rollo, p. 126.
[10] The said provision reads:
Sec. 2316.
Authority of Commissioner to make Compromise.
– Subject to the approval of the Secretary of Finance, the Commissioner
of Customs may compromise any case under this code or other laws as
part of laws enforced by the Bureau of Customs, involving the imposition
of fines, surcharges, and forfeitures, unless, otherwise, specified by
law.
[11] Rollo, p. 131.
[12] Rollo, pp. 131-132.
[13] Rollo, pp. 144-145.
[14] Rollo, p. 91.
[15] The provision reads:
Sec. 2401.
Supervision and Control Over Criminal and Civil Proceedings.
– Civil and criminal actions and proceedings instituted in behalf of
the government under the authority of this Code or other law enforced by
the Bureau shall be brought in the name of the government of the
Philippines and shall be conducted by customs officers but no civil or
criminal action for the recovery of duties or the enforcement of any
fine, penalty or forfeiture under this Code shall be filed in court
without the approval of the Commissioner. (As amended by RA 9135)
[16] Rollo, pp. 28-29.
[17] Id. at 21-22.
[18] Petitioners’ Memorandum, p. 21;
Rollo, p. 444.
[19] Section 3 reads in part:
Sec. 3.
Office of the Ombudsman.
– The Office of the Ombudsman shall include the Office of the Overall
Deputy, the Office of the Deputy for Luzon, the Office of the Deputy for
the Visayas, the Office of the Deputy for Mindanao, the Office of the
Deputy for the Armed Forces, and the Office of the Special Prosecutor …
While Section 11 reads in part:
Sec. 11.
Structural Organization. –
(3)
… The Office of the Special Prosecutor shall be an organic component of
the Ombudsman and shall be under the supervision and control of the
Ombudsman.
[20] Section 4 reads in part:
Sec.
4. Appointment. – The Ombudsman and his Deputies, including the Special
Prosecutor, shall be appointed by the President from a list of at least
twenty-one (21) nominees …
[21] Section 5 reads in part:
Sec. 5.
Qualifications. – The Ombudsman and his Deputies, including the Special Prosecutor, shall be natural born citizens of the Philippines, …
[22] Section 11 reads in part:
Sec. 11.
Structural Organization. –
(4) …
The Special Prosecutor shall have the rank and salary of a Deputy Ombudsman.
[23] Argana v. Republic, G.R. No. 147227, 19 November 2004, 443 SCRA 184.
[24] Chin v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 144618, 15 August 2003, 409 SCRA 206.
[25] Section 13, Article XI.
[26] Section 15(1), R.A. No. 6770 reads:
Sec. 15.
Powers, Functions and Duties. – The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions and duties:
(1)
Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any
act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency,
when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or
inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may
take over, at any stage, from investigatory agency of Government, the
investigation of such cases.
[27] Acop v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 120422, 27 September 1995, 248 SCRA 566.
[28] Section 11(4), R.A. No. 6770.
[29] Concerned Officials of the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System v. Vasquez, G.R. 109113, 25 January 1995, 240 SCRA 502.
[30] Uy v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 105965-70, 20 March 2001, 354 SCRA 651.
[31] Id. at 659-660.
[32] Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan, L-79690-707, 27 April 1988, 160 SCRA 843;
Acop v. Office of the Ombudsman, supra; and
Uy v. Sandiganbayan, supra.
[33] Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 113216, 5 September 1997, 278 SCRA 656.
[34] Supra, at note 20.
[35] Supra, at note 21.
[36] Section 7 reads:
Sec. 7.
Term of Office.
– The Ombudsman and his Deputies, including the Special Prosecutor,
shall serve for a term of seven years without reappointment.
[37] Section 8 reads in part:
Sec. 8.
Removal; Filling of Vacancy. –
…
(2) A Deputy, or the Special Prosecutor, may be removed from office by the President, …
[38] Section 9 reads in part:
Sec. 9.
Prohibitions and Disqualifications. – The Ombudsman, his Deputies and the Special Prosecutor shall not, during their tenure, hold any other office or employment …
[39] Section 10 reads in part:
Sec. 10.
Disclosure of Relationship.
– It shall be the duty of the Ombudsman, his Deputies, including the
Special Prosecutor, to make under oath, to the best of their knowledge
and/or information, a public disclosure of the identities of, and their
relationship with the person referred to in the preceding section.
[40] City Government of San Pablo, Laguna v. Reyes, G.R. No. 127708, 25 March 1999, 305 SCRA 353.
[41] See
Cuevas v. Bacal,
G.R. No. 139382, 6 December 2000, 347 SCRA 338 citing the explanation
proffered by the Commission on Reorganization which drafted the
Integrated Reorganization Plan, adopted and declared part of the law by
Presidential Decree No. 1 on September 24, 1972.
[42] Article XI, Section 12 of the Constitution.
[43] Garcia v. Mojica, G.R. No. 139043, 10 September 1999, 314 SCRA 207.
[44] Special Prosecution Officers III Orlando I. Ines (Chairman) and Roberto T. Aganon (member).
[45] Graft Investigation & Prosecution Officers II Ma. Isabel A. Alcantara and Evangeline Y. Grafil (members).
[46] Rollo, p. 167.
[47] Director Jose T. De Jesus, Jr.
[48] Assistant Ombudsman Pelagio S. Apostol.
[49] Twin Towers Condominium Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123552, 27 February 2003, 398 SCRA203.
[50] As stated in the Court’s (Third Division) Resolution dated March 9, 2005 in G.R. Nos. 165007-09, entitled
Valera v. Office of the Ombudsman.
The petition in the said case was filed by Valera assailing the Joint
Resolution dated August 23, 2004 of the Ombudsman, through the Deputy
Ombudsman (MOLEO), finding the existence of probable cause that he
(Valera) committed violations of penal law in connection with the
criminal cases OMB-C-C-03-0547-J and OMB-C-C-02-0568-I. In the said
Resolution, the Court dismissed Valera’s petition.