422 Phil. 583
VITUG, J.:
"To summarize, respondent was able to disburse and/or account to complainant the following, to wit:Anent the alleged unauthorized practice of law by respondent during the period of his suspension -
Amount deposited to complainant's TRB and Metrobank account P300,000.00Additional amount received by complainant, as admitted 10,000.00Amount received by complainant from CBC garnished funds 5,000.00Amount received by complainant by way of BPI drafts & plane fare 52,000.00Respondent's expenses in connection with Civil Case No. 17,215 and three CA cases 57,832.67 P424,832.67
"Deducting said amount from the amount received by respondent by way of garnished funds from several banks in Davao City would leave a balance of P845,901.89 (P1,270,734.56 minus P424,832.67).
"Since respondent was allowed to retain for himself the amount of P350,000.00 by way of attorney's fees and respondent voluntarily paid and/or returned to complainant the amount P114,042.28 per BPI Manager's Check 497289 in compliance with the Supreme Court directive, such amounts should be deducted or applied against respondent's accountability of P845,901.89. Therefore, respondent still has in his possession the amount of P381,859.61, after deducting the attorney's fees and the voluntary payment by respondent. Thus,
Amount received by respondent by way of garnished funds P1,270,734.56 Less: Disbursements/Deductions as discussed above 424,832.67 Amount to be accounted for by respondent P845,901.89Less: (1) Respondent's attorney's fees P350,000.00(2) Amount voluntarily returned by respondent 114,042.28 464,042.28Amount still in respondent's possession P381,859.61
"Respondent is obliged to deliver to complainant the amount of P381,859.61 pursuant to Rule 16.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that a lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand."
"There is no doubt that respondent's appearance before the HIGC and his subsequent filing of the Manifestation on Amicable Settlement constitute practice of law in violation of his suspension order. A cursory reading of the transcript of stenographic notes taken during the proceedings before the HIGC on 24 February 2000 (Exhibit 'D' to 'D-14,' Complainant's Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence) reveal that respondent's purpose in appearing before the HIGC is to attend the scheduled preliminary conference. During the preliminary conference, the parties - Atty. De Vera, the Hearing Officer, and the opposing counsel - discussed the facts and circumstances of the case. They also discussed the possibility of an amicable settlement. These are acts which require legal expertise, training and experience.
"Respondent explained in his affidavit that he was at HIGC precisely to inform the hearing officer of his suspension. Considering the delicate nature of his situation, respondent should have, at the start of the preliminary conference, explicitly manifested in open court regarding his suspension. Assuming that respondent did not really intend to appear as counsel in said preliminary conference, his appearance as counsel was clearly evident when he subsequently filed the Manifestation on Offer of Amicable Settlement. Practice of law includes signing and filing of pleadings."
"Respondent's ex-parte direct examination of Mrs. Eva Antipuesto was a flagrant and blatant violation of his suspension order. Having been suspended effective 22 February 2000, respondent should have refrained from performing acts constituting practice of law - which include conducting a direct examination of a witness. Respondent's explanation that he was constrained to conduct a direct examination because of constant pleas by complainant, Ms. Eva Antipuesto, to speed up the case cannot justify respondent's violation of his suspension order. Besides, considering that he was under the control and supervision of the public prosecutor, respondent should have allowed the public prosecutor Danilo Bello, who was present on 29 February 2000 hearing, to conduct the direct examination. No amount of explanation can change the fact [that] respondent conducted the direct examination knowing fully well that he was suspended by Supreme Court from the practice of law. As to the Motion to Reset filed by respondent in the said case, the same constitutes practice of law."
"As regards to the alleged appearance by respondent in the 'Nilda Cuison Go' case, complainant Mercado was not able to show convincing proof that respondent actively practiced law by appearing as private prosecutor in said case. The Certification issued by the Clerk of Court III cannot be considered a proof that respondent actively practiced law. Respondent was able to explain fully that his appearance was only to verify the case status of the case. However, respondent's appearance in the 'Neolito Egot' [case] is considered practice of law because he appeared before the court and represented himself as private prosecutor. Respondent's subsequent desistance is of no moment because there was intent on his part to appear as private prosecutor."
"After a careful study of the parties' claims and defenses, respondent's appearance on 1 June 2000 for the promulgation of Decision and the filing of the Motion for Reconsideration constitute practice of law in defiance of the Supreme Court Resolution. It appears that respondent did not 'merely attend' the promulgation of the judgment, respondent acted and appeared as counsel for the accused and actively participated in the proceedings. As a matter of fact, after the promulgation of the decision, respondent manifested in open court their intention to appeal and respondent even gave his comments on the Decision of the trial court. These are acts that can be performed only by a lawyer who is authorized to practice law. Needless to say, he was also acting as counsel for the accused when he filed the Motion for Reconsideration."
"Respondent admitted having appeared at the canvassing in question but claims that his participation therein was 'merely like that of a non-lawyer acting as representative of Governor Del Rosario and Representative Floreindo.' When LAKAS-NUCD hired the services of respondent, he was hired not as a mere representative of its candidates. Respondent was hired to protect the interest of its candidates in accordance with the election laws. Reading from the transcript of stenographic notes taken during the canvassing, there was an active and actual exercise of his legal knowledge and expertise. Thus, his appearance constitutes practice of law."
"After a careful study of complainant's allegation, complainant Atty. Cabarroguis failed to provide this Office convincing evidence that respondent actually passed on 'notes' to his son to guide the latter in his direct examination. The act of passing a 'piece of paper' inside the courtroom during the trial does not involve legal expertise or the application of legal knowledge and therefore does not constitute practice of law."
"Exhibit 'EE' is a Manifestation dated 21 May 2001 signed by respondent requesting for a resetting of the case. Exhibit 'FF' is the transcript of stenographic notes taken during the hearing on 10 October 2000 of the case 'People of the Philippines vs. Jailen Paul' before the Regional Trial Court of Davao City. Exhibit 'GG' is an Urgent Motion to Reset dated 3 October 2000 signed by Francis Arnold De Vera (for Eduardo De Vera).
"The pleadings filed clearly show that respondent De Vera practiced law during his suspension. The practice of law includes filing of pleadings before the courts.
"In the following cases, respondent violated his suspension order and practiced law when he signed the following pleadings which were filed before the regular courts.The IBP concluded that, in numerous occasions during the period of his suspension, respondent engaged in the practice of law despite the absence of an order from the Supreme Court lifting his suspension and that, on the basis of the evidence presented by the parties, respondent still had in his possession the excess amount of P381,859.61 due and owing in favor of Rosario Mercado.
"Urgent Manifestation with motion to defer Issuance of Writ of Execution (Exhibit 'T,' Complainant's Formal Offer of Exhibit) dated 07 June 2000 in the case 'Socorro Tiongko et al., vs. Loreto Rosca,' Civil Case No. 3241-B-96;
"Urgent Ex-Parte Request Reiterating Urgent Prayer for 20-Day TRO (Exhibit 'U') dated 7 June 2000 in the case 'Republic of the Philippines vs. Estate of Vicenta Tongko,' Civil Case No. 27-544-99;
"Defendant's Pre-Trial Brief (Exhibit 'V') dated 30 May 2000 in the case 'Alcrej Corporation vs. Raquel Camisura and Cesar Camisura,' Civil Case No. 2815-F-96;
"Defendant's Pre-Trial Brief (Exhibit 'W') dated 30 May 2000 in the case 'Ricardo Gahol et al., versus Eliseo Gatapia' Civil Case No. 2817-F-96;
"Defendant's Pre-Trial Brief (Exhibit 'X') dated 30 May 2000 in the case 'Ricardo Gahol, et al. vs. Eliseo Gatapia' Civil Case No. 2818-F-96; and
"Ex-Parte Urgent Request to Set Continuation of Hearing Contempt Incident (Exhibit 'Z') dated 23 June 2000 in the case 'Panabo Public Market Vendors Estension Association, Inc. vs. Municipality of Panabo,' Civil Case No. 89-23."