383 Phil. 671
KAPUNAN, J.:
On 9 September 1992, upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty and the trial on the merits ensued.INFORMATION
The undersigned accuses MARIO BASCO y SALAO of the crime of Qualified Illegal Possession of Firearm, committed as follows:That on or about May 3, 1992, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, not being allowed or authorized by law to keep, possess and carry a firearm, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession, control and custody a firearm, to wit:without first obtaining the necessary license and/or permit to carry and possess the same and in connection and by reason of such possession, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill, fire and shoot one Rolando Buenaventura y Manuel, thus inflicting upon the latter mortal gunshot wounds and injuries which cause the death of the latter as a consequence.
one (1) cal. .38 revolver, Squire Bingham bearing Serial No. 183110 loaded with one (1) live ammunition and five (5) spent shells
Contrary to law.[1]INFORMATION
The undersigned accuses MARIO BASCO y SALAO of violation of Section 261(q), B.P. 881 in relation to Section 31, RA 7166, committed as follows:That on or about May 3, 1992, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession and under his custody and control a cal. 38 revolver "Squire Ringham" bearing Serial Number 183110 by then and there carrying the same along Cabangis Street, Tondo, this City, which is a public place on the aforesaid date which is covered by an Election period, without first securing the written authority from the COMELEC, as provided for by Section 261(q), B.P. 881 in relation to Section 31, RA 7166.Contrary to law.[2]
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:Petitioner received a copy of the trial court’s decision on 22 March 1993. Thereafter, on 6 April 1993, petitioner’s counsel filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the said decision. However, in the notice of hearing, petitioner’s counsel failed to indicate the date and time of the motion’s hearing as explicitly required by Sections 4 and 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court.SO ORDERED.[3]
- In Criminal Case No. 92-109511, finding the accused MARIO BASCO y SALAO guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearm which he used to kill Rolando Buenaventura, Sr. alias Olay and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua. With costs against the accused.
- In Criminal Case No. 92-109512, finding the accused MARIO BASCO Y SALAO guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the violation of Section 261 (q) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, in relation to Section 5 of Republic Act No. 7166 and hereby sentences the accused to suffer an indeterminate sentence ranging from one (1) year as minimum to three (3) years as maximum. Costs against the accused.
NOTIFICATION AND MANIFESTATIONOn 28 April 1993, the trial court issued the following order:
FISCAL ZENAIDA LAGUILLES
Trial Prosecutor
Manila
BRANCH CLERK OF COURT
Branch XLI
Manila
G R E E T I N G S :
Accused intended to submit for this Court’s for consideration and approval on Friday, 23 April 1993 at 8:30 in the morning the Motion for Reconsideration dated 5 April 1993. However, due to inadvertence brought about the need to rush the finalization of this motion, which has been delayed by the spate of prolonged power outages, this setting was omitted.
Accused therefore serves notice that he is submitting the Motion for Reconsideration dated 5 April 1993 for this Court’s consideration and approval on Friday, 23 April 1993 at 8:30 a.m.
Makati, for Manila, 13 April 1993.[4]
In response thereto, petitioner on 4 May 1993 filed a petition for relief from judgment with the Regional Trial Court pursuant to Rule 38 of the Rules of Court. He contended that his inadvertence was due to the perennial brownouts being experienced across the country during that time and should thus be considered as a mistake or excusable negligence. Technical rules of procedure, he further asserted, should not be applied strictly when to do so would result in manifest injustice.[6]O R D E R
The record shows that the judgment in this case was promulgated last March 22, 1993. In other words, accused had up to April 6, 1993 within which to perfect an appeal.
Last April 5, 1993, the accused through a new counsel filed a Motion for Reconsideration without the notice required under Secs. 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court.
Considering that a motion that does not contain a notice of hearing is but a mere scrap of paper, it presents no question which merits the attention and consideration of the Court, it is not even a motion for it does not comply with the rules and hence the Clerk has no right to receive it; the Court did not act on the motion.
Last April 14, 1993, accused through counsel filed with the Court a Notification and Manifestation whereby it prayed that the Motion for Reconsideration be set for hearing today. Considering that the motion above adverted did not suspend the running of the period to appeal; that the judgment in this case has become final and executory, the Motion for Reconsideration and the Notification and Manifestation filed by the accused are hereby denied.
SO ORDERED.[5]
x x xThe failure or defect in the notice of hearing in said motion cannot be cured by subsequent action of the court, for as held in Andrada et al. vs. The Honorable Court of Appeals, et al., 60 SCRA 379, the Supreme Court said:
As can be readily seen, accused had up to April 6, 1993 within which to file his Motion for Reconsideration or Appeal.
While it is true that judgments or orders may be set aside due to fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence (Sec. 2, Rule 38), "a motion which does not meet the requirements of sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Revised Rules of Court is a worthless piece of paper which the clerks has no right to receive and the respondent court a quo no authority to act upon." (Lucila B. Vda. de Azarias, petitioner, vs. The Honorable Manolo L. Madela, et al., 38 SCRA 35.)
"This Court has repeatedly made it clear not only that a notice addressed to the Clerk of Court requesting him to ‘set the foregoing motion for the consideration and approval of this Honorable Court immediately upon receipt hereof’ does not comply with the requirements of Section 5 of Rule 15 but also that subsequent action of the court thereon does not cure the flaw, for a motion with a notice fatally defective is a ‘useless piece of paper.’"The notice of hearing in the motion for reconsideration addressed to the Branch Clerk of Court states: "Please submit the foregoing Motion to the Honorable Court for its consideration and approval immediately upon receipt hereof." The same is patently a defective and fatal notice.
(d) No transfer of appeals erroneously taken – No transfers of appeals taken to the Supreme Court or to the Court of Appeals to whichever of these Tribunals has appropriate appellate jurisdiction will be allowed, continued ignorance of willful disregard of the law on appeals will not be tolerated. (Paragraph [d], Sub-Head 4 of Circular No. 2-90),which circular is based from the High Tribunal’s March 1, 1990 minute resolution in the case of Anacleto Murillo v. Rodolfo Consul, (UDK-9748, 183 SCRA xi, xvii, xviii) where it emphatically declared that:
There is no longer any justification for allowing transfers of erroneous appeals from one court to another, much less for tolerating continued ignorance of the law on appeals. It thus behooves every attorney seeking review and reversal of a judgment or order promulgated against his client, to determine clearly the errors he believes may be ascribed to the judgment or order, whether of fact or of law, then to ascertain which court properly has appellate jurisdiction; and finally, to observe scrupulously the requisites for appeal prescribed by law, with keen awareness that any error or imprecision in compliance therewith may well be fatal to his client’s cause.WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED.
x x xHence, this petition for review on certiorari.
Accused-appellant moors his motion upon the ground that his appeal was not from the judgment of conviction but rather from the court a quo’s order denying his petition for relief from judgment.
We find this argument to be untenable. A Petition for Relief from Judgment is an extraordinary remedy.Relief from judgment or order is premised on equity and it is granted only in exceptional circumstances, as when a judgment or order is entered, or any other proceeding is taken through fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence. (Director of Lands v. Rommaban, 131 SCRA 431, 437 [1984]).Appellant has cited us to no ground to enable him to avail of this remedy. What is evident that accused-appellant resorted to this remedy only to retrieve his lost appeal.
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.[9]
The core issue in this case is whether or not petitioner’s plea for annulment of judgment under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court is meritorious.
- WHETHER OR NOT THE PROSECUTION HAS PROVED THE GUILT OF THE PETITIONER BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
- WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY RULED THAT PETITIONER’S APPEAL FROM THE DENIAL OF HIS PETITION FOR RELIEF SHOULD HAVE BEEN LODGED WITH THIS HONORABLE COURT.
- WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONER HAS SUCCEEDED IN SHOWING HIS ENTITLEMENT TO RELIEF.[10]
Sec. 2. Judgments or orders subject to appeal.—xxxIn Service Specialists, Inc. v. Sheriff of Manila,[12] the Court confirmed that "a judgment or order denying relief under Rule 38 is final and appealable, unlike an order granting such relief which is interlocutory." Hence, jurisdiction then properly belonged to the Court of Appeals.
A judgment denying relief under Rule 38 is subject to appeal, and in the course thereof, a party may also assail the judgment on the merits, upon the ground that it is not supported by the evidence or it is contrary to law.
Relief from judgment under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court is a remedy provided by law to any person against whom a decision or order is entered into through fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence. It is of equitable character, allowed only in exceptional cases as when there is no other available or adequate remedy. When a party has another adequate remedy available to him, which was either a motion for new trial or appeal from adverse decisions of the lower court, and he was not prevented by fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence from filing such motion or taking the appeal he cannot avail himself of the relief provided in Rule 38 (Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation v. Lood, 110 SCRA 205 [1981]; Ibabao v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 150 SCRA 76 [1987]).Petitioner, however, implores the Court to be liberal in the application of technical rules of procedure (which in this instance refer to the requisites of a proper notice of hearing) and cites a plethora of cases[16] in support thereof. He reasons out that the defective notice of hearing in his motion for reconsideration was due to the day-long brown-outs that plagued the metropolis and which caused his counsel to have the above pleading prepared outside the law office. In view of this peculiar circumstance, counsel’s failure to specify the date and time for the hearing of petitioner’s motion for reconsideration should rightly be deemed excusable negligence.
Rules of court prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done, or certain proceedings taken, are absolutely indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business. Strict compliance with such rules is mandatory and imperative.[18]With respect to notices of hearing of motions, this has been more often than not the Court’s guiding principle. We have time and again given warning that a notice of hearing which does not comply with the requirements of Secs. 4, 5 and 6, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court,[19] is a worthless piece of paper and would not merit any consideration from the courts. Recently, this rule was reiterated and upheld in People of the Philippines vs. CA, et al.[20] Thus:
Under Section 4 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, the applicable law during the pendency of the case before the trial court, every written motion must be set for hearing by the applicant and served together with the notice of hearing thereof, in such a manner as to ensure receipt by the other party at least three days before the date of hearing, unless the court, for good cause, sets the hearing on shorter notice. Under Sections 5 and 6 thereof, the notice of hearing shall be addressed to the parties concerned and shall specify the time and date of the hearing of the motion; no motion shall be acted upon by the court without proof of service of the notice thereof, except when the court is satisfied that the rights of the adverse party are not affected.A supplemental pleading subsequently filed to remedy the previous absence of notice will not cure the defect nor interrupt the tolling of the prescribed period within which to appeal. In Cledera v. Sarmiento, citing Manila Surety v. Bath, this Court ruled:
A motion without a notice of hearing is pro forma, a mere scrap of paper that does not toll the period to appeal, and upon expiration of the 15-day period, the questioned order or decision becomes final and executory. The rationale behind this rule is plain: unless the movant sets the time and place of hearing, the court will be unable to determine whether the adverse party agrees or objects to the motion, and if he objects, to hear him on his objection, since the rules themselves do not fix any period within which he may file his reply or opposition.
We are not impressed by the argument that the supplement filed by the appellants on May 30 should be deemed retroactive as of the date the motion for reconsideration was filed and, therefore, cured the defect therein. To so consider it would be to put a premium on negligence and subject the finality of judgments to the forgetfulness or whims of parties-litigants and their lawyers. This of course would be intolerable in a well-ordered judicial sytsem.Nonetheless, procedural rules were conceived to aid the attainment of justice. If a stringent application of the rules would hinder rather than serve the demands of substantial justice, the former must yield to the latter. Recognizing this, Sec. 2, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court specifically provide that:
[A]ppellants were or should have been alerted to the fact that their motion for reconsideration of May 12 did not interrupt the period for appeal when they received the court’s order of May 21, 1959, wherein it was stated that what appellants had filed was not even a motion and presented no question which the court could decide.
Sec. 2. Construction.—These rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding. (Italics ours.)The liberal construction of the rules on notice of hearing is exemplified in Goldloop Properties, Inc. v. CA:[21]
Admittedly, the filing of respondent-spouses’ motion for reconsideration did not stop the running of the period of appeal because of the absence of a notice of hearing required in Secs. 3, 4 and 5, Rule 15, of the Rules of Court. As we have repeatedly held, a motion that does not contain a notice of hearing is a mere scrap of paper; it presents no question which merits the attention of the court. Being a mere scrap of paper, the trial court had no alternative but to disregard it. Such being the case, it was as if no motion for reconsideration was filed and, therefore, the reglementary period within which respondent-spouses should have filed an appeal expired on 23 November 1989.Likewise, in Samoso v. CA,[22] the Court ruled:
But, where a rigid application of that rule will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice, then the rule may be relaxed, especially if a party successfully shows that the alleged defect in the questioned final and executory judgment is not apparent on its face or from the recitals contained therein. Technicalities may thus be disregarded in order to resolve the case. After all, no party can even claim a vested right in technicalities. Litigations should, as much as possible, be decided on the merits and not on technicalities.
Hence, this Court should not easily allow a party to lose title and ownership over a party worth P4,000,000.00 for a measly P650,000.00 without affording him ample opportunity to prove his claim that the transaction entered into was not in fact an absolute sale but one of mortgage. Such grave injustice must not be permitted to prevail on the anvil of technicalities.
In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65. (Italics ours.)
(a) An order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration; (b) An order denying a petition for relief or any similar motion seeking relief from judgment; (c) An interlocutory order; (d) An order disallowing or dismissing an appeal; (e) An order denying a motion to set aside a judgment by consent, confession or compromise on the ground of fraud, mistake or duress, or any other ground vitiating consent; (f) An order of execution; (g) A judgment or final order for or against or one or more of several parties or in separate claims, counterclaims, cross-claims and third-party complaints, while the main case is pending, unless the court allows an appeal therefrom; and (h) An order dismissing an action without prejudice.