655 Phil. 93; 107 OG No. 49, 6247 (December 5, 2011)
CARPIO, J.:
Soledad Dalton built a house which she initially used as a dwelling and store space. She vacated the premises when her children got married. She transferred her residence near F. Ramos Public Market, Cebu City.
She constructed the 20 feet by 20 feet floor area house sometime in 1973. The last monthly rental was P69.00. When defendants refused to accept rental and demanded vacation of the premises, she consignated [sic] her monthly rentals in court.
x x x x
It is very clear from the facts that there was no valid consignation made.
The requisites of consignation are as follows:
- The existence of a valid debt.
- Valid prior tender, unless tender is excuse [sic];
- Prior notice of consignation (before deposit)
- Actual consignation (deposit);
- Subsequent notice of consignation;
Requisite Nos. 3 and 5 are absent or were not complied with. It is very clear that there were no prior notices of consignation (before deposit) and subsequent notices of consignation (after deposit)
Besides, the last deposit was made on December 21, 1988. At the time Dalton testified on December 22, 1999, she did not present evidence of payment in 1999. She had not, therefore, religiously paid her monthly obligation.
By clear preponderance of evidence, defendants have established that plaintiff was no longer residing at Eskina Banawa at the time she testified in court. She vacated her house and converted it into a store or business establishment. This is buttressed by the testimony of Rogelio Capacio, the court's appointed commissioner, who submitted a report, the full text of which reads as follows:REPORT AND/OR OBSERVATION "The store and/or dwelling subject to ocular inspection is stuated [sic] on the left portion of the road which is about fifty-five (55) meters from the corner of Banawa-Guadalupe Streets, when turning right heading towards the direction of Guadalupe Church, if travelling from the Capitol Building.
I observed that when we arrived at the ocular inspection site, Mrs. Soledad Dalton with the use of a key opened the lock of a closed door. She claimed that it was a part of the dwelling which she occupies and was utilized as a store. There were few saleable items inside said space."
Soledad Dalton did not take exception to the said report.
Two witnesses who were former sub-lessees testified and clearly established that Mrs. Dalton use the house for business purposes and not for dwelling.[12]
After a careful review of the facts and evidence in this case, we find no basis for overturning the decision of the lower court dismissing plaintiffs-appellants' complaint, as we find that no valid consignation was made by the plaintiff-appellant.
Consignation is the act of depositing the thing due with the court or judicial authorities whenever the creditor cannot accept or refuses to accept payment and generally requires a prior tender of payment. In order that consignation may be effective, the debtor must show that: (1) there was a debt due; (2) the consignation of the obligation had been made because the creditor to whom tender of payment was made refused to accept it, or because he was absent or incapacitated, or because several persons claimed to be entitled to receive the amount due or because the title to the obligation has been lost; (3) previous notice of the consignation had been given to the person interested in the performance of the obligation; (4) the amount due was placed at the disposal of the court; and (5) after the consignation had been made the person interested was notified thereof. Failure in any of these requirements is enough ground to render a consignation ineffective.
Consignation is made by depositing the proper amount to the judicial authority, before whom the tender of payment and the announcement of the consignation shall be proved. All interested parties are to be notified of the consignation. It had been consistently held that compliance with these requisites is mandatory.
No error, therefore, can be attributed to the lower court when it held that the consignation made by the plaintiff-appellant was invalid for failure to meet requisites 3 and 5 of a valid consignation (i.e., previous notice of the consignation given to the person interested in the performance of the obligation and, after the consignation had been made, the person interested was notified thereof).
Plaintiff-appellant failed to notify defendants-appellees of her intention to consign the amount due to them as rentals. She, however, justifies such failure by claiming that there had been substantial compliance with the said requirement of notice upon the service of the complaint on the defendants-appellees together with the summons.
We do not agree with such contention.
The prevailing rule is that substantial compliance with the requisites of a valid consignation is not enough. In Licuanan vs. Diaz, reiterating the ruling in Soco vs. Militante, the Supreme Court had the occasion to rule thus:"In addition, it must be stated that in the case of Soco v. Militante (123 SCRA 160, 166-167 [1983]), this Court ruled that the codal provisions of the Civil Code dealing with consignation (Articles 1252-1261) should be accorded mandatory construction --
We do not agree with the questioned decision. We hold that the essential requisites of a valid consignation must be complied with fully and strictly in accordance with the law. Articles 1256-1261, New Civil Code. That these Articles must be accorded a mandatory construction is clearly evident and plain from the very language of the codal provisions themselves which require absolute compliance with the essential requisites therein provided. Substantial compliance is not enough for that would render only directory construction of the law. The use of the words "shall" and "must [sic] which are imperative, operating to impose a duty which may be enforced, positively indicated that all the essential requisites of a valid consignation must be complied with. The Civil Code Articles expressly and explicitly direct what must be essentially done in order that consignation shall be valid and effectual..."
Clearly then, no valid consignation was made by the plaintiff-appellant for she did not give notice to the defendants-appellees of her intention to so consign her rental payments. Without any announcement of the intention to resort to consignation first having been made to persons interested in the fulfillment of the obligation, the consignation as a means of payment is void.
As to the other issues raised by the plaintiff-appellant in her second and third assigned errors, we hold that the ruling of the lower court on such issues is supported by the evidence adduced in this case.
That plaintiff-appellant is not residing at the leased premises in Eskina Banawa and that she is using the same for business purposes, not as dwelling place, is amply supported by the testimony of two of plaintiff-appellant's sub-lessees. The Commissioner's Report submitted by Rogelio Capacio, who was commissioned by the lower court to conduct an ocular inspection of the leased premises, further lends support to the lower court's findings. On the other hand, plaintiff-appellant only has her self-serving claims that she is residing at the leased premises in Eskina Banawa to prove her continued use of the leased premises as dwelling place.
There is thus no merit to plaintiff-appellant's fourth assigned error. The lower court acted within its authority in ordering the plaintiff-appellant to vacate the leased premises. The evidence shows that plaintiff-appellant had failed to continuously pay the rentals due to the defendants-appellees. It was therefore within the powers of the lower court to grant such other relief and remedies equitable under the circumstances.
In sum, there having been no valid consignation and with the plaintiff-appellant having failed to pay the rentals due to the defendants-appellees, no error can be attributed to the lower court in rendering its assailed decision.[13]
A sensu contrario, when the creditor's acceptance of the money consigned is conditional and with reservations, he is not deemed to have waived the claims he reserved against his debtor. Thus, when the amount consigned does not cover the entire obligation, the creditor may accept it, reserving his right to the balance (Tolentino, Civil Code of the Phil., Vol. IV, 1973 Ed., p. 317, citing 3 Llerena 263). The same factual milieu obtains here because the respondent creditor accepted with reservation the amount consigned in court by the petitioner-debtor. Therefore, the creditor is not barred from raising his other claims, as he did in his answer with special defenses and counterclaim against petitioner-debtor.
As respondent-creditor's acceptance of the amount consigned was with reservations, it did not completely extinguish the entire indebtedness of the petitioner-debtor. It is apposite to note here that consignation is completed at the time the creditor accepts the same without objections, or, if he objects, at the time the court declares that it has been validly made in accordance with law.[16] (Emphasis supplied)
Art. 1257. In order that the consignation of the thing due may release the obligor, it must first be announced to the persons interested in the fulfillment of the obligation.
Art. 1258. Consignation shall be made by depositing the things due at the disposal of judicial authority, before whom the tender of payment shall be proved, in a proper case, and the announcement of the consignation in other cases.
The consignation having been made, the interested parties shall also be notified thereof. (Emphasis supplied)
Under Art. 1257 of our Civil Code, in order that consignation of the thing due may release the obligor, it must first be announced to the persons interested in the fulfillment of the obligation. The consignation shall be ineffectual if it is not made strictly in consonance with the provisions which regulate payment. In said Article 1258, it is further stated that the consignation having been made, the interested party shall also be notified thereof.[21] (Emphasis supplied)
We hold that the essential requisites of a valid consignation must be complied with fully and strictly in accordance with the law, Articles 1256 to 1261, New Civil Code. That these Articles must be accorded a mandatory construction is clearly evident and plain from the very language of the codal provisions themselves which require absolute compliance with the essential requisites therein provided. Substantial compliance is not enough for that would render only a directory construction to the law. The use of the words "shall" and "must" which are imperative, operating to impose a duty which may be enforced, positively indicate that all the essential requisites of a valid consignation must be complied with. The Civil Code Articles expressly and explicitly direct what must be essentially done in order that consignation shall be valid and effectual.[23] (Emphasis supplied)
A petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court should cover only questions of law. Questions of fact are not reviewable. A question of law exists when the doubt centers on what the law is on a certain set of facts. A question of fact exists when the doubt centers on the truth or falsity of the alleged facts.
There is a question of law if the issue raised is capable of being resolved without need of reviewing the probative value of the evidence. The issue to be resolved must be limited to determining what the law is on a certain set of facts. Once the issue invites a review of the evidence, the question posed is one of fact.[25]